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BY  THE 
EDITOR. 
THE  person  chiefly  concerned  in  improving this 
edition of Mr. Loclte's  Works,  having  long  enter- 
tained  a  high  esteem  for  that  author's  writings, 
and  being  informed  that a  new  edition  was  pre- 
paring, became naturally desirous of seeing one more 
complete than any of the foregoing;  and of contri- 
buting his assistance towards it (so  far as the short 
time allowed for that purpose would  give leave) by 
not only  collating  former editions,  and correctil~g 
those numerous errors which had crept into most of 
them;  but  also  by  inserting,  or  giving  some  de- 
scription of such other pieces as are known to have 
come from the same hand, though  not appearing in 
any catalogue or collection of his works. 
The farther liberty has  been  taken  to subjoin  a 
few things by other hands, which seemed  necessary 
to a right use of Mr. Locke's discoveries, and a more 
ready application of the principles whereon they are 
founded, a. g. 
1. To  the Essay on Human Understanding is pre- 
fixed a correct analysis, which has been of consider- 
able service by reducing that Essay into some better 
nlethod, which the author himself' shows us, (preface 
and elsewhere) that he was very sensible it wanted, 
though  he contented himself with leaving it in its 
original fortn, fosreasons grounded on the prejudices 
a2 iv  Prejace Ey the E'dilor.  Preface by  the Editor.  v 
then prevailing against so novel a system ;  but which 
hardly now subsist. 
This map of the intellectual world, which exhibits 
the whole doctrine of ideas in one view, must to an 
attentive reader appear more  commodious than any 
of  those  dry compends  generally made  use  of by 
young students,  were they more perfect than even 
the best of them are found to be. 
2.  There is also annexed to the salile Essay a small 
tract in defence of Mr. Locke's  opinion concerning 
personal identity; a point of some consequence, but 
which  many ingenious persons,  probably  from  not 
observing what passed  between him  and  Molyneux 
on the subject, [letters in September and December, 
1693,  and  January,  February,  May,  1694,]  have 
greatly misunderstood. 
It  may perhaps  be  expected that we  should  in- 
troduce this  edition  of Mr. Locke's  Works  with  a 
particular history of the author's circumstances and 
connexions;  but as several  narratives  of this  kind 
have been already publishsd by different writers, viz. 
A. Wood,  [Ath. Ox. Vol.  21 ;  P. Coste,  [character 
of Mr. Locke here annexed];  Le  Clerc, [first printed 
in English  before  the Letters on  Toleration,  1689, 
but  more  complete  in  the edition  of  1713,  from 
whence  the chief part  of  the  subsequent  lives  is 
extracted];  Locke's  Article  in the Su  plement  to 
Collier Addend. ;  and by the compilers o  if'  the General 
Dictionary,  Biographia Britannica,  Memoirs  of his 
Life and Character, 1749, kc. &c. and since most of 
that same account which  has been prefixed to some 
late editions, by way of Life, is likewise here annexed ; 
there seems to be little occasion for transcribing any 
more of such common occurrences, as are neither in- 
teresting enough in themselves, nor sufficiently cha- 
racteristic of the autho-r.  We have therefore chosen 
to confine the following  observations  to a  critical 
survey of Mr. Locke's  writings,  after giving some 
accoilnt of  bis literary correspondence, and of such 
nnonymous tracts as are not commorlly known to bc 
his,  but yet distinguishable  from  others  that have 
been  imputed to him.  Besides  those  posthumous 
pieces  which  have  been  already  collected  by  Des 
Maizeaux, and joined with some  others  in the late 
editions, there is extant, 
1. His Introductor  Discourse to Churchill's  Col- 
lection of Voyages, ?  in 4 vols.  fol.]  containing the 
whole History of Navigation from its Original to that 
Time, (A. D. 1704) with a Catalogue and Character 
of most Books of Travels*. 
These voyages  are commonly said to have been 
published under his direction.  They were presented 
by him to the university of Oxford [v. Collier's Dict.3 
That  he was well versed in such authors is pretty plain, 
from the good use he has made of them in his essays ; 
and the introductory discourse is by no means un- 
worthy of him, though  deemed too large to be ad- 
mitted  into  this  publication:  whether  it may  be 
added, some time hence, in a supplemental volume, 
along with  some of his  other tracts hereafter  men- 
tioned, must be submitted to the public,  and those 
who are styled proprietors. 
2. For the same reason we are obliged to suppress 
another piece usually ascribed to him,  and entitled, 
The History of our Saviour Jesus Christ, related in 
the  Words of Scripture, containing, in Order of Time, 
all the Events and Discourses recorded in the Four 
Evangelists, &c. 8vo. printed for A. and J. Churchill, 
1'705,  concerning which  a  learned  friend, who  has 
carefully examined it, gives the following account : 
"  I am inclined to  think that this work is the genuine 
production of Mr. Locke.  It is compiled with ac- 
curacy and judgment, and is in every respect worthy 
of  that masterly writer.  I have  compared  it with 
Mr.  Locke's  Treatise  on  the  Reasonableness  of 
Christianity,  and find  a  striking  resemblance  be- 
.* To the present edition this ~rork  is dded. Prefuce  by  the Editor.  vii 
tween  them in  some of their expressions,  in their 
quotations from  scripture, and in the arrangement 
of our Saviour's  discourses."  Under each of these 
heads this ingenious writer has produced remarkable 
instances of such resemblance, but too particular and 
minute to be here recited:  on the last he adds, that 
whoever reads the Treatise on the Reasonableness of 
Christianity with  the least attention, will  perceive 
that Mr. Locke has every where observed  an exact 
chronological order in the arrangement of his texts, 
which  arrangement perfectly corresponds with that 
of the History.  It  would have been very difficult to 
throw a multitude of citations from the four Evan- 
gelists into such a chronological series without the 
assistance of some Harmony, but Mr. Locke was too 
cautious a  reasoner to depend upon  another man's 
hypothesis ;  I am therefore persuaded that he com- 
piled  this Harmony,  the History of Christ, for his 
own  immediate  use,  as  the  basis  of  his  Reason- 
ableness of  Christianity.  Ant1 though the original 
plan  of  this  history  may  have  been  taken  from 
Garthwaite's  Evangelical  Harmony,  4to.  1633,  as 
Dr.  Doddridge supposes,  pet  the whole  narrative 
and particular arrangement  of facts is so very dif- 
ferent, that Mr. Locke's  History in  1705 may pro- 
perly be termed a new work. 
3. Select Moral Books of the Old Testament and 
Apocrypha, paraphrased, viz. Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, 
Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, in one vol.  12mo. 1706. 
This useful work is given by tradition to Mr. Locke, 
and his name often written before it accordingly.  It 
was printed for his old booksellers A.  and J. Churchill, 
a,nd is thought by some good judges to bear evident 
marks of authenticity: of which I shall only observe 
farther,  that  by  the method  there  taken  of  para- 
phrasing these writers in  one close,  continued dis- 
course, where the substance is laid together and pro- 
perly digested, a much better connexion appears to 
be preserved,  and the author's  sense  more clearly 
expressed, than it can be in any separate exposition 
of each verse with all the repetitions usual in eastern 
writings,  and all the disadvantages arising fiom the 
very inaccurate division of their periods, as is hinted 
in the judicious preface to that work. 
4. A letter to Mrs. Cockburn, not inserted before 
in any collection of Mr. Lockc's pieces.  It was sent 
with  a present of books to that lady, on her beins 
discovered  to have written a Defence of his Essay 
against some Remarks made upon it by Dr. T. Burnet, 
author of the Theory of the Earth, &c.  Dr. Burnet's 
Remarks appeared without his name in three parts, 
the first ofwhich was animadverted on by Mr. Locke 
at  the end of his Reply to Bishop Stillingfleet in 1697; 
the two others were left to the animadversion of his 
friends.  Mrs. Cockburn, to whom the letter under 
consideration  is addressed, finished her Defence of 
the Essay in  December,  1701,  when  she was  but 
twenty-two years old, and published it in May, 1702, 
the author being industriously concealed: which oc- 
casioned Mr. Locke's elegant compliment ofits being 
"  a generosity above the strain of that groveling age, 
and like that of' superior spirits, who assist without 
showing themselves."  In 1724 the same lady wrote a 
letter to  Dr. Holdsworth on his injurious imputations 
cast upon Mr. Locke concerning the Resurrection of 
the same Body, printed in 1786; ;  and afterwards an 
elaborate Vindication of Mr. Locke's Christian Prin- 
ciples, and his controversy on that subject, fisst pub- 
lished,  together  with  an account of  her works,  by 
Dr. Birch, 1751, and the fore-mentioned letter added 
here below, Vol. x. p. 314. 
5.  Of the  same kind  of  correspondence  is  the 
curious letter to Mr. Bold,  in 1699, (which  is also 
inserted in the tent11 vol. p. 315), as corrected from 
the original.  Mr.  Bold,  in 1699, set forth a piece, 
entitled, Some Considerations on the principal  Ob- 
jections and Arguments which have been published 
against Mr. Locke's Essay; and added in a collection viii  Preface by  the Editor.  Prqfice 2iy the Editor.  ix 
of tracts, published 1706, three defences of his Rea- 
sonableness of Christianity;  with a large discourse 
concerning the Resurrection of the same Body, and 
two letters on the Necessary Immateriality of created 
thinking Substance. 
Our author's  sentiments of Mr. Bold may be seen 
at lar  e in the letter itself, Vol. x.  p.  315. 
6.  %r.  Locke's  fine account of Dr.  Pococke was 
first published in a collection of his letters, by Curl, 
1714, (which  cdledion is not now to be met with) 
and some extracts made from it by Dr. Twells, in his 
Life of that learned  author, [Theol. Works, Vol. I. 
p.  83.j  The same is given  at full length  by Des 
Maizeaux, as a letter to * * * *,  (intending Mr. Smith 
of Dartmouth, who had prepared  materials for that 
life)  but without  specifying  either  the  subject  or 
occasion. 
7. ThelargeLatin  tract ofLockeYs,  De  Toleratione, 
was first introduced  in the late 4to. edition of his 
works; but as we have it translated by Mr. Popple to 
the author's  entire satisfaction,  and as there is no- 
thing extraordinary in  the language of the original, 
it was judged unnecessary to repeat so many things 
over again by inserting it.  Perhaps it might aford 
matter of more curiosity to compare some parts of his 
Essay with Mr. Burridge's Version, said to be printed 
in 1701, about which he and his friend Molyneux ap- 
peared so extremely anxious, but which he tells Lim. 
borch (Aug.  1701) he bad  not then seen ;  nor have 
we  learnt the fate of this Latin version,  any more 
than what became of a French one, (probably that 
of P.  Coste, mentioned under Locke's  article in the 
General Dictionary)  in  correcting which  he (Mr. 
Locke)  had  taken  very  great pains,  and likewise 
altered  many passages  of the original,  in order to 
make them more clear  and easy to be translted*. 
Many of these alterations I haveformerly seen under 
* Biogr. Britan. p. 2999. 
his hand in the library at Oates, where he spent the 
last and  most  agreeable part of his life in the com- 
p. any of lady Masham, and where his own conversa- 
tlon must have proved no less agreeable and instruct- 
ing to that lady, since by means of it, as well as from 
an educatioi~  under the eye of her father, Cudworth, 
she appears to have  profited  so  much  as  to com- 
pose  a very rational discourse,  entitled,  Occasional 
Thoughts in Reference to a virtuous and Christian 
Life, published 1705, and frequently ascribed to Mr. 
Locke.  [See  particularly Boyer's  Annals of Queen 
Anne, Vol. 111.  p. 262.1  She was generally believed 
(as Le Clerc tells us) to be the author of another dis- 
course on the Love of God, in answer to Mr. Norris ; 
which  has likewise been  attributed to Mr. Locke, 
and has his name written before it in a copy now in 
the library of Sion College, but others give it to Dr. 
Whitby.  Of  the same excellent lady Mr. Locke gives 
the following character to Limborch : "  Ejus [i. e. 
Historiae Ii~quisi~ionis]  lectionem sibi et utilissimarn 
et jucundissimam  fore spondet domina Cudwortha, 
que paternae  benignitatis  haeres  omnem  de rebus 
religionis persecutionem maxime aversatur."  Lett. 
June,  1691.  "  I-Iospes  mea tyrannidi  ecclesiasticae 
inimicissima, saepe mihi laudat ingenium et consilium 
tuum, laboremque huic operi tam opportune impen- 
sum, creditaue fiustra de religionis reformatione et 
~vangelii  p;opagatione  tant&  undique  strepiturn 
moveri,  dum tyrannis  in  ecclesih  vis in rebus re- 
ligionis (uti pasvim mos est) aliis sub nominibus utcun- 
clue speciosis obtinet et laudatur."  Id. Nov. 1691. 
8.  We cannot in this place forbear lamenting the 
suppression of some of Mr. Locke's  treatises, which 
are in all probability not to be retrieved.  His Right 
Method  of  searching after Truth, which  Le Clerc 
mentions, is hardly to be met with ;  nor can a tract 
which we have good ground to  believe that he wrote, 
in the Unitarian Controversy, be well  distinguished 
at this distance of  time;  unless it prove to be the x  Prefoce  by  the Edito?..  Preface  by  the  Editor.  xi 
following piece, which some ingenious persons have 
judged to be his ;  and if they are right in their con- 
jecture, as I have no doubt but they are, the address 
to himself that is prefixed to it must have been made 
on purpose to conceal the true author, as a more at- 
tentive perusal of  the whole tract will convince any 
one,  and at the same time show what reason there 
was for so extremely cautious a proceeding.  Part of 
the long title runs thus: "  The Exceptions of  Mr. 
Edwards  in  his  Causes  of  Atheism,  against  The 
Reasonableness  of  Christianity as  delivered in the 
Scriptures, examined  and  found unreasonable,  un- 
scriptural, and injurioue, &c.  London, printed in the 
year 1695,"  47 pages, 4to. 
It  is  uncertain  whether  he  lived  to finish  that 
System of Ethics which his friend iVIolyneux so fre- 
quently recommended to him :  but from a letter to 
the same person, dated April, 1698, it appears, that 
he had several plans by him, which either were never 
executed, or never saw the light. 
Among the late Mr. Yorke's  papers,  burnt in his 
chambers in Lincoln's-Inn, were many of Mr. Locke's 
letters to lord  Sommers,  but probably no copies of 
these remain ;  which must prove an irreparable loss 
to the public,  many of them being in all likelihood 
written on subjects of a political nature, as that emi- 
nent patriot was well acquainted with, and seems to 
have availed himself considerably of', Mr.Locke'sprin- 
ciples throughout his excellent treatise, entitled, The 
Judgment of whole Kingdoms and Nations concern- 
ing the Rights and Prerogatives of  Kings,  and the 
Rights, Privileges,  and Properties of the People.  A 
work which seems to be but little known at present, 
though there was a tenth edition of it in 1771.  The 
conclusion is taken almost verbatim from Mr. Locke. 
9. Thirteen letters to Dr. Mapletoft, giving some 
account of his friends, with a large description of a 
severe nervous disorder, and his method of treating it, 
and fiequent intimations of his desire to succeed the 
doctor in his professorship at Gresham College, &c. 
were very obligingly communicated by a grandson of 
the doctor's ;  but we have not room to insert them,as 
they contain very few matters of literature, to which 
our inquiries are chiefly confined at  present; nor shall 
we be excused perhaps for taking notice of his letter 
to the earl of **, dated May 6, 1676, with a curious 
old MS.  on the subject of Free-masonry, published 
in the Gentleman's  Magazine for September, 1758. 
We are informed,  that there is a great number of 
original letters of  Mr. Locke, now in the hands of 
- 
the Rev. Mr. Tooke, chaplain to the British factory 
at Petersburgh ;  but have no proper means of apply- 
ing for them*. 
10. Forty letters to Edward Clarke, Esq. M. P. are 
among Dr. Birch's papers in the Museum, but of like 
unimportance.  Perhaps some readers think that the 
late editions of Mr. Locke's works are already clogged 
with too many of that kind; however I shall give one 
of these for a specimen, on raising the value of coin, 
as the same method which he there recon~mends,  viz. 
of weighing it, has of  late been  practised.  See the 
letter in Vol. x.  of this  edition, p. 320.  The two 
letters  from  lord  Shqftesbury and sir  Peter King 
will speak for themselves. 
11. It may likewise be observed,  that our author 
has met with the fate of most eminent writers, whose 
names give a currency to  whatever passes under them, 
viz. to have many spurious productions fathered on 
him.  Beside those above-mentioned, there is a Com- 
mon-Place-Book to the Bible, first published in 1693, 
and afterwards swelled out with a great deal ofmatter, 
ill digested, and all declared to  be Mr. Locke's ;  but 
* We have  been  indulged  by  Mr. Tooke  with  a  sight of  some 
papers, which came  into his hands, reputed to be the productions of 
Mr.  Locke.  Son~e  of them are evidently not his: and of those which 
have any importsnce we  are not able just now to ascertain the au- 
thenticity.  Amongst the latter is a tragedy entitled Tamerlane the 
beneficent .-Ed.  of the preyent edition. xii  Preface  @ the Editor. 
whatever hand he might be supposed to have in the 
original book itself',  it is plain he had none in that 
preface, which is neither sense nor English.  A puerile 
edition of Bsop's  Fables has likewise his name pre- 
fixed to it, and was in all probability ascribed to him 
for no better reason than the frequent mention made 
of that book in his  Thoughts on Education.  The 
title runs thus : "  Bsop's Fables in English and Latin, 
interlineary, for the Benefit of those who, not having 
a Master, would learn either of those Tongues.  The 
Second Edition, with Sculptures.  By John Locke, 
gent.  Printed for A. Bettesworth, 1723." 
12. But it is high  time to conduct the reader to 
Mr. Locke's more authentic and capital productions, 
the constant demand for which shows that they have 
stood the test of time ;  and their peculiar tendency 
to enlarge and improve the mind must continue that 
demand while a regard to virtue or religion,  science 
or common sense, remains amongst us.  I wish it were 
in my power to give so clear and just a view of these 
as might serve to point  out their proper uses,  and 
thereby direct young unprejudiced readers to  a more 
beneficial study of them. 
The Essay 011 Humar~  Understanding, that most 
distinguished of all his works, is to be considered as 
a system, at its first appearance, absolutely new, and 
directly opposite to the notions and persuasions then 
established in the world.  Now as it seldom happens 
that the person who first suggests a discovery in any 
science is  at the same time solicitous,  or perhaps 
qualified, to lay open all the consequences that follow 
fkom it; in such a work much of course is left to the 
reader,  who must carefully apply the leading prin- 
ciples  to  many  cases  and  conclusions  not  there 
specified.  To what else but a  neglect  of this ap- 
plication shall we impute it that there are still num- 
bers amongst us who profess to pay the greatest de- 
ference to Mr. Locke, and to  be well acquainted with 
his writings,  and would perhaps take it ill to have 
Preface  Zy the Editor.  xiii 
this pretension questioned ;  yet appear either wholly 
unable,  or unaccustomed, to draw the natural con- 
sequence from any one of his  principal positions? 
Why, for instance, do we still continue so unsettled 
in  the first  principles  and  foundation  of  morals? 
How  came  we  not  to perceive  that  by  the  very 
same arguments which that great author used with 
so lnucli success in extirpating innate ideas, he most 
effectually  eradicated  all  innate  or connate senses, 
instincts, 8rc. by not or~ly  leading us to conclude that 
every such sense must, in the very nature of it, imply 
an object correspondent to and of the same standing 
with itself, to which it  refers [as each relative implies 
its correlate], the real existence of  which object he 
has  confuted in every shape; but also by showing 
that for each moral proposition  men  actually want 
and may demand a  reason  or  proof deduced from 
another  science,  and  founded  on  natural  good 
and evil:  and consequently where no such reason 
can be assigned, these same senses, or instincts, with 
whatever titles  decorated*,  whether  styled sympa- 
thetic or sentimental, common or intuitive,-ought 
to be looked upon as  no more than  mere  habits; 
under which  fiamiliar name their authority is soon 
discovered, and their effects accounted for. 
From the same principles it may be collected that 
all such pompous theories of morals, however seem- 
ingly diversified, yet amount ultimately to the same 
thing, being all built upon the same false bottom of' 
innate notions ;  and from the history of this science 
we may see that they have received no manner of im- 
provement (as indeed by the supposition of their in- 
nateness they become incapable of any) from the days 
I  of Plato to our own; but must always take the main 
point, the ground of obligation, for granted :  which 
* See a very accurate explanation of Mr. Locke's doctrine on this 
head and some others, in a Philosophical Discourse on the Nature pf 
Human  Being,  prefixed  to  some  Remarks  upoh  bishop  Berkley's 
Treatise on the same subject.  Printed for Dodsley,  1776. xiv  l'reface  by the  Editor.  PrcJCi~lce  hu the Editor.  sv 
is in truth the shortest and safest way of' proceeding 
for such self-taught philosophers, and saves a deal of' 
trouble in seeking reasons  for what  they advance, 
where none are to be found.  Mr. Locke went a far 
different way  to work,  at the very  entrance on his 
Essay, pointing out the true origin of all our passions 
and affections, i. e.  sensitive pleasure and pain ;  and 
accordicgly directing us to the proper principle and 
end of virtue,. private happiness, in each individual ; 
as well as laying clown tlie adecluate  rule  and only 
solid  ground of  inoral  obligation,  the divine  will. 
From  whence  also it may well  be  concluded  that 
moral propositions are equally capable of  certainty, 
and tliat such certainty is equally reducible to strict 
deinonstration here as in other sciences, since they 
consist of the very same kid  of ideas, [viz.  general 
abstract ones, tlie true and only ground of all general 
knowledge] ;  provided always that the term  be once 
clearly settled, in wliich lies the chief difficuIty, and 
are  constantly  applied  (as  surely  they  may  be) 
wit11 equal steadiness and precision :  wliich was un- 
doubtedly Mr. Locke's  meaning in that assertion of 
his wliich drew upon him so Inany solicitations to set 
about such a systematic demonstration of' morals. 
In  the same plain and popular introduction, when 
he has been proving that inen think not always, [a 
position which, as he obsmves,  letter to Molyneux, 
August 4,  1696, was then admitted in s commence- 
ment act at Cambridge for probable, and which few 
there now-a-days are found weak enough to question] 
how come we not to attend him through the genuine 
consequences of that proof? This would soon let us 
into the true nature of the human constitution, and 
enable us to determine whether thought, when every 
mode of it is suspended, though but for an hour, can 
be deemed an essential property of our immaterial 
principle, or mind, and as such inseparable froin some 
imaginary substance, or substratum,  [words,  by the 
by,  so far as they have  a  meaning,  taken entirely 
i;.oln  matter, atid tcr~niriating~  in  it]  any more than 
lllotion, uncler its various moclihcations, can be judged 
essential to the body, or to n purcly material systeni *. 
of  that same substai~ce  or substratrlm, whether ma- 
terial or immaterial,  MI.. Lvcke has firther  shown us 
that we can form but :L  very ilnpert'ect, arid confused 
idea, if in truth wc have any idea at  all of it, thougll 
c~lsto~il  and an attachment to the established mode 
of  philosopi~ising  still prevails to s~lch  a degree that 
we scarcely know how to j)roceed without it, and are 
apt to make as  nii~ch  noise with such logical terms 
aticl distinctions,  cs the sclioolrncn  used  to do with 
their principle of inclividuation, substantial forms, kc. 
Whereas, it' we could be persuaded to quit every a].- 
bitrary hypotliesis,  ancl  trust to fact and experience, 
a sollart  sleep my  night would yield sufficient satis- 
fhction in the present  case, which  th~rs  may derive 
light  even  fsom  the  darkest parts of  nature.;  and 
which will the rnore merit our regard, since the same 
point has been  in soale measure confirnied  to us by 
 evela la ti on,  as our author lias likewise  shown in  his 
introduction to the Reasonableness of Christianity. 
The above-mentioned  Essay contains  some more 
refined specr~lations  which are daily gaining ground 
among thouglitfirl and intelligent persons,  notwith- 
stand~ng  tlie  neglect  and the  contempt  to which 
studies of this kincl  are frequently exposed.  And 
wlien we consider the force of  bigotry and the pre- 
judice in fhvour of antiquity whicil adheres to  narrow 
minds, it must bc matter of' surprise to find so small 
a  number  of  exceptions made  to some  of  his  dis- 
quisitions which lie out ofthe common road. 
* Vide Defeilce of Locke's Opinion coilcerning Personal Identity, 
Appendix  to the  Theory  of  Religion,  p.  431,  kc. and note  1. to 
Archbishop King's Or. of E.  Sir Isaac  Newton had the very same 
sentinients with tllose of our author on the present subject, and more 
particularly 011  that state to which he was approaching ;  as appears 
from  a conversatio~~  Iield with him a little before his death, of which 
I 11arc  bcen infor~ncd  by one who took do\i,n sir Isaac's words at the 
time,  ar~d  silirc rcad them to me. xvi  Pmface by  the Editor. 
That well-known chapter of Power has been ternled 
the worst part of his whole Essay*, and seems indeed 
the least defensible, and what gave himself the least 
satisfaction, after all the pains he and others took to 
reform it; [v. letters between him and Molyneux and 
Limborch.  To  which may be added note 45 to King's 
Or. of E. p.  290, 4th edit.]  which might induce one 
to believe that this most  intricate subject is placed 
beyond human reach ;  since so penetrating a genius 
confesses his inability to see through it.  And happy 
are those inquirers who can discern the extent of their 
faculties ! who have learnt in time where to stop and 
suspend a positive determination! "  If  you will argue:' 
says he, for or against liberty from consequences, "  I 
will not undertake to answer you ;  for I own freely to 
you the weakness of my understanding, that though 
it be unquestionable that there is  omnipotence and 
omniscience in God our Maker,  yet I cannot make 
freedom in  man  consistent  with  omnipotence  and 
omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded 
of both as of any truths I most firmly assent to ;  and 
therefore I have  long left  off  the consideration  of 
that question, resolving all into this short conclusion: 
that, if it be possible for God to make a free agent, 
then man  is free ;  though I see 11ot the way of it." 
Letter to M. Jan. 20, 1694. 
13. Connected in some sort with the fore-mentioned 
Essay, and in their way equally valuable, are his tracts 
on Education and the early Conduct of the Under- 
standing, both worthy,  as we apprehend, of a more 
careful  perusal  than  is  commonly  bestowed  upon 
them, the latter more especially, which  seems to  be 
little known,  and less attended to.  It contains an 
easy popular illustration of  some  discoveries in the 
foregoing Essay, particularly that great and universal 
law of nature, the support of so many mental powers, 
(v. g. that of memory under all its modifications) and 
* Biogr. Brit. though others are pleased to style it the finest. 
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produces equally remarkable effects in the in- 
tellectual,  as that of gravitation does in the material 
world ;-I  mean  the association  of ideas :  the first 
hint whereof did not appear till the fourth edition 
of his Essay, and then came in as it were by the by, 
under some very peculiar circumstances, and in com- 
pratively trivial instances ;  the author himself seem- 
ing not to be sufficiently aware of its extensiveness, 
and the many uses to whicli it is applicable, and has 
been  applied  of late by several of our own writers. 
The former tract abounds with no less curiolls and 
entertaining than useful  observations on the various 
tempers and dispositions of youth :  with  proper di- 
rections for the due regulation and improvement of 
them, and just remarks on the too visible defects in 
that point ;  nor should it be looked upon  as merely 
fitted for the instruction of schoolmasters or nurses, 
but as affording matter of reflection to men of busi- 
ness, science, and philosophy.  The several editions 
of this  treatise, which  has been  much esteemed by 
foreigners, with the additions made to it abroad, may 
be seen in Gen. Dict. Vol. VII. y. 145, 
14. Thus much may serve to point out the import- 
ance of some of our autho~'s  more private  and re- 
cluse studies ;  but it was not  in such only that this 
excellent person exercised his learning and abilities. 
The public  rights  of mankind,  the great object of 
political  union ;  the authority, extent, and bounds 
of civil government in  consequence of such union; 
these were subjects which engaged, as they deserved, 
his  most  serious attention.  Nor  was  he more in- 
dustrious here in establishing sound principles and 
pursuing them consistently, than firm and zealous in 
support of them, in the worst of times, to the injury 
of his fortune,  and at the peril  of his life (as  ma 
be seen more  fully in the life annexed);  to whic  K 
may be added, that such zeal and firmness must ap- 
pear in him the more meritorious, if joined with that 
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timorousness  and irresolution  which  is  there ob- 
served  to have  been  part  of  his  natural  temper, 
p. xxviii.  Witness his farnotis Letter from a Person 
of Quality,  giving an  account of the debates and 
resolutions  in  the house of  lords concerning a bill 
for  establishing  passive  obedience,  and  enacting 
new oaths to enforce it:  [V.  Biogr. Brit.  p.  2996, 
N.  I.]  which  letter,  together  with  some  supposed 
cotnmunications  to  his  patron.  lord  Shaftesbury, 
raised such a storm against him as drove him out of 
his own country, and long pursued himi at a distance 
from it.  [Ib.  p.  2997,  &c. from A. Wood.]  This 
letter was  at length treated in  the same way that 
othzrs of like tendency have been  since, by men of 
the sarne spirit, who are ready to bestow a like treat- 
ment on the authors themselves, whenevei they can 
get them into their power.  Nor will it be improper 
to remark  how  seasonable  a  recollection  of  Mr. 
Locke's political principles is now become, when se- 
veral writers have attempted, from particular emer- 
gencies, to  shake those universal and invariable truths 
whereon all just government is ultimately founded ; 
when they betray so gross an ignorance or contempt 
of them, as even to avow the directly opposite doc- 
trines, viz.  that government was  instituted for the 
sake of governors?  not of the governed ; and conse- 
quently that the ~nterests  of the former are of su- 
perior considel-ation to any of the latter ;-that  there 
is  an absolute indefeasible right  of exercising de- 
spotism on one side,  and as unlimited  an obligation 
of  submitting to it on  the other;-doctrines  that 
have been  confuted  over and over,  and  exploded 
long ago,  and which  one might well  suppose  Mr. 
Locke must have for ever silenced by his incompara- 
ble treatises upon that subject*, which have indeed 
* First published  in  1698,  the several  additions to which (all  I 
believe,  inserted  in the subsequent  editions) remain under his own 
hand in the library of Christ's College! Cambridge. 
exhausted  it ;  and notwithstanding any objections 
that have yet been, or are likely to be brought against 
them, may, I apprehend, be fairly justified, and how- 
ever unfashionable  they grow, continue fit to be in- 
culated;  as will  perhaps  be  fi~lly  made  appear  on 
any farther provocation. 
15. Nor was the religious liberty of  inankind less 
dear to our author than their civil rights, or less ably 
asserted by him.  With what clearness and precision 
has  he stated  the terms of it,  and vindicated  the 
subject's just title to it, in his admirable letters con- 
cerning Toleration!  How  closely  does  he  pursue 
the adversary through all his subterfuges, and strip 
intolerance of' all her pleas ! 
The  first Lord Shaftesbury has written a most ex- 
cellent  treatise  on  the same  subject,  entitled,  An 
Essay concerning Toleration,  1667, which,  though 
left unfinished, well  deserves to see the light;  and, 
as I am assured, in due time will be published at  the 
end of his lordship's life, now preparing. 
16. From one who knew so well how to direct the 
researches of  the human mind, it was natural to ex- 
pect that christianity and the scriptures would not 
be neglected,  but rather hold  the chief place in his 
inquiries.  These were accordingly the object of his 
more mature meditations;  which were no less suc- 
cessfully employed upon  thein,  as  may be seen  in 
part above.  His Reasonableness of Christianity, as 
delivered in the Scriptures, is a work that will richly 
repay the labour  of  being  thoroughly studied, to- 
gether with both  its Vindications, by all those who 
desire  to entertain proper  notions  concerning  the 
pure, primitive plan of Christ's religion, as laid down 
by himself;  where  they will  also  meet with  many 
just observations on our Saviour's admirable method 
of conducting it.  Of this book,  among other com- 
mendations, Limborch says, "  Plus rerae Theologiae 
ex ill0  quam  ex  operosis  multorum  Systematibus 
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hausisse  me  ingenue  fateor."  Lett.  March  23, 
1697. 
In his Paraphrase and Notes upon the Epistles of 
St.  Paul,  how  fully  does  our  author  obviate  the 
erroneous doctrines (that of absolute reprobation in 
particular),  which  had  been  falsely  charg:d  upon 
the apostle ! And to Mr. Locke's  honour ~t should 
be  remembered,  that  he was  the first  of our com- 
mentators  who  showed  what  it was  to comment 
upon  the apostolic writings:  by  taking the whole 
of  an epistle together,  and striking  off  every  sig- 
nification of every term foreign to the main  scope 
of it; by keeping this point constantly in view, and 
carefully observing each  return to it after any di- 
gression ;  by tracing out a strict, though sometinles 
less visible,  connexion in that very consistent writer, 
St. Paul ;  touching the propriety and pertinence of 
whose writings  to their several  subjects and occa- 
sions, he appears to have formed the most just con- 
ception, and thereby confessedly led the way to  some 
of our best modern interpreters.  Vide Pierce, pref: 
to Coloss. and Taylor on Ram. No. 60. 
I cannot dismiss  this imperfect  account of  Mr. 
Locke and his works, without giving way to a pain- 
ful  reflection,  which  the  consideration  of  them 
naturally  excites.  When  we  view  the variety  of 
those very useful and important subjects which have 
been treated in so able a manner by our author, and 
become sensible of the numerous national obligations 
due to his memory  on that account, with what in- 
dignation must we behold the remains of that great 
and good man, lying under a mean mouldering tomb- 
stone, [which  but too strictly verifies the prediction 
he had given of it, and its little tablet, as ipsa brevi 
peritura] in an obscure country churchyard-by  the 
side of a forlorn wood-while  so many superb monu- 
ments  are daily  erected  to perpetuate  names  and 
characters hardly worth preserving ! 
Books  and Treatises  written,  or supposed  to be 
written, by Mr. Locke. 
Epistola de Tolerantia. 
The History of our Saviour Jesus Christ. 
Select Books of'the Old Testament and Apocrypha 
paraphrased. 
Introductory Discourse to Churchill's  Collection 
of Voyages. 
Exceptions of Mr. Edwards to the Reasonableness 
of Christianity, kc. examined. 
Pieces groundlessly ascribed, or of doubtful authority. 
Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Virtuous 
and Christian Life. 
Discourse on the Love of God. 
Right Method of searching after Truth. 
Spurious ones : 
Common-Place-Book to the Bible. 
Interlineary Version of Esop's Fables. 
P. S. Having heard that some of Mr. Locke's  MSS. 
were  in the possession of those gentlemen to whom 
the library at Oates belonged,  on  application made 
to Mr. Palmer, he was so obliging as to offer that a 
search should be made after them, and orders given 
for  communicating  all that could be  fbund there; 
but as this notice  comes unhappily  too late  to be 
I  made  use  of  on  the  present  occasion,  I can  only 
take  the liberty of  intimating it along with  some 
other sources  of  intelligence,  which  I  have  en- 
deavoured  to lay  open,  and which  may  probably 
afford matter for a supplemental volume, as above- 
mentioned. LIFE OF  THE AUTHOR. 
JOHN  LOCKE,  one of the  eatest philosophers and most ya-  'F  luable writers  who  have a  orned  this  country,  was  born  ht 
Wrington in Somersetshire,  on  the twenty-ninth  of August, 
1638.  His father, who had been bred  to the law, acted in the 
capacity  of  steward,  or  court-keeper,  to  colonel Alexander 
Popham ;  and, upon the breaking out of  the civil war, became 
a captain in the service of the parliament.  He was  a gentle- 
man of strict probity and economy,  and possessed  of a hand- 
some fortune ;  but, as it came much  impaired into  the hands 
of his son, it was probably injured through the misfortunes of 
the times.  However, he  took great pains  in  his son's  educa- 
tion ;  and though  while  he was  a  child, he  behaved  towards 
him with great distance and severity, yet as he  grew up,  he 
treated him with more  familiarity, till at length they lived to- 
gether  rather  as friends,  than  as two  persons,  one of  whom 
might justly  claim respect  from  the other.  When he was of 
a proper  age, young  Locke was  sent to Westminster  school, 
where he continued till the  ear 1651 ;  when he was entered a 
student of Christcchurch-co  f  lege, in  the  university of Oxford. 
Here he so greatly distinguished himself by his application and 
proficiency,  that he was  considered to be  the most  ingenious 
young man in  the  college.  But, though  he gained  such re- 
putation  in  the  university, he was  afterwards often  heard to 
complain of the  little  ~atisfaction  which  he had  found in  the 
method of study which had been prescribed to him, and of the 
Httle service which it  had agorded him, in enlightening and en- 
larging his mind, or in making  him more exact  in his reason- 
ings.  For the only philosophy then taught at Oxford was the 
Peripatetic,  perplexed  with  obscure  terms,  and  encumbered 
with  useless  questions.  The first books  which  gave  him  a 
relish  for  the  study of  hiiosophy, were  the  writings  of Des 
Cartes; for though he cf  id not  approve of all his  notions, yet 
he found that he wrote with great ~erspicuity. Having taken xxiv  The Lfe of  the Author.  The Life  of the  Author.  x  xv 
his  degree of B. A.  in 1655, and that of M. A. in 1658, Mr. 
Locke for  some  time  closely ap lied himself to the study of 
physic,  goin  through the  usui  courses  preparatory  to  the 
practice ;  an  fi it is said that he got  some business in that pro- 
fession at Oxford.  So great was  the  delicacy of his constitu- 
tion, however, that he was not  capable of a laborious applica- 
tion to the medical art ;  and it is not im  robable that his  rin- 
ci  a1  motive in  studyin  it was,  that  e might  be  qu  lfied  E  B  R  J 
w en necessar  to act as  is own physician.  In the year 1664, 
he accepted o  P  an offer  to go abroad, in the capacity of  secre- 
tary  to sir  William  Swan,  who  was  ap ointed envoy  from 
king  Charles 11. to the elector  of  Brari 1  enburgh,  and some 
other German princes ;  but returning to England again within 
less  than  a year,  he  resumed  his  studies at Oxford with  re- 
newed vigour, and applied himself  particularly to natural phi- 
losophy.  While he was at Oxford m 1666, an accident intro- 
duced  him  to the  acquaintance of  lord Ashley,  afterwards 
earl of Shaftesbury.  That nobleman,  having been advised to 
drink the mineral waters at Aetrop, for an abscess in his breast, 
wrote  to Dr.  Thomas,  a physician  in  Oxford, to  procure a 
quantity of them to be  in  readiness against  his arrival.  Dr. 
Thomae, being obliged to be  absent from home  at that time, 
prevailed with  his friend Mr. Locke  to execute  this commis- 
sion.  But it happening that the waters were not ready on the 
day after  lord Ashley's  arrival, through  the fault of the per- 
son who  had  been  sent  for  them,  Mr. Locke  found himself 
obliged to wait on his lordship, to make excuses for the disap- 
pointment.  Lord Ashley received  him with  his usual polite- 
ness, and was  satisfied with  his  apology.  Upon his  rislng to 
go away, his  lordship, who  had  received great pleasure froi;~ 
his conversatiot~,  detained him to  supper, and engaged him to 
dinner on the following day, and even to drink the waters, that 
he might have the more of his  company.  When his lordship 
left Oxford to go to Sunnin  -hill, he made Mr. Locke promise  f  to visit him there ;  as he di  in the summer of the  ear 1667. 
Afterwards lord Ashley invited Mr. Locke to  his 4  ouse, and 
prevaijed on him to take up his residence with him.  Having 
now  secured him as an inmate,  lord Ashley was governed en- 
tirely by his  advice, in submitting to have  the abscess  in his 
breast opened ; by which o  eration his  life was saved, thou& 
the wound was never elosex  The success which attended this 
operation gave his lordship a high opinian of  Mr. Locke's  me- 
dl-1  skill, and contributed  to  increase  his attachment to him, 
notwithstanding that he regarded this as the least of his 
fications.  Sensible  that  hls great abilities were  calculated to 
render him eminently serviceable to the world in other depart- 
ments of knowledge, he would  not  suffer him  to  practise me- 
dicine out of his house, excepting among some of his   articular 
friends ;  and he urged him to apply his studies to state affairs, 
and political subjects, both ecclesiastical and civil.  Mr. Locke's 
inclination was not backward in prompting him to comply with 
his lordship's wishes ;  and he succeeded so well in these studies, 
that lord Ashley began to consult him upon  all occasions. 
By his acquamtance with this nobleman, Mr. Locke was in- 
troduced to the  conversation of the duke of Buckingham, the 
earl of  Halifax, and other of the most eminent persons of that 
age, who were all charmed with  his conversation.  The free- 
dom which  he would  take with  men  of  that  rank, had some- 
thing in  it very suitable to  his character.  One day, three or 
four of  these lords  having  met  at lord Ashley's,  when  Mr. 
Locke was present, after some compliments, cards were brought 
in, before  scarcely any conversation had  assed between them. 
Mr. Locke looked on  for  some  time whi e they were at play,  T 
and then, taking his pocket-book, began to write with great at- 
tention.  At length, one of them had the curiosity to ask him 
what he was writing  c6 My lord,"  said he, "  I am endeavour- 
ing to profit, as far as I am able, in your company; for having 
waited with impatience for the honour of being in an assembly 
of the greatest  eniuses of  the age,  and having at length ob- 
tained this goo  fortune, I thought that I could  not do better  d 
than write  down your  conversation;  and,  indeed,  I have  set 
down  the  substance  of what  has been  said for  this hour  or 
two."  Mr. Locke had no  occasion to read  much of what  he 
had written ;  those noble persons saw the ridicule, and diverted 
themselves with improving the jest.  For, immediately quitting 
their  play, they entered  into rational  conversation, and s ent 
the rema~nder  of  the day in  a  manner more  suitable to t  eir  K 
character.  In the  year 1668, at the request  of the earl  and 
countess of  Northumberland,  Mr. Locke  accompanied  them 
in a tour to France, and  staid  in that country with  the coun- 
tess, while the earl went towards Italy, with an intention of vi- 
siting  Rome.  But  this  nobleman  dying on  his  journey  at 
Tunn, the countcss came back  to England sooner than was at 
first designed, and Mr. Locke with  her, who  continued to re- 
side,  as before,  at lord Ashley's.  'That nobleman, who  was 
then chancellor  of  the exchequer, having, in  conjunction with 
other lords, obtained a grant of  Carolina, employed Mr. Locke 
to draw up the fundamental constitutions of that province.  In 
executing this task, our author had formed articles relative to 
religion,  and  public  worship,  on  those  liberal  and  enlarged xxvi  The Lge  of the Author.  The Life  ofthe Author.  xxvii 
principles of  toleration, which were agreeable to the sentiments 
of his enlightened  mind;  but  some  of  the  clergy, jealous  of 
such provisions as might prove an obstacle to their ascendanc , 
expressed their disapprobation of them, and procured an ad  8l  i- 
tional article to be inserted, securing the countenance and sup- 
port of the state only to the exercise of religion  accordin 
the discipline of the established church.  Mr.  Locke stil  f re-  to 
tained h~s  student's  place at Christ-church, and made frequent, 
visits to Oxford, for the sake of consulting books in the prose- 
cution of his studies, and for the benefit of chan  e of  air.  At 
lord Ashley's  he inspected the  education of  his ?  ordship's only 
son, who was  then  about sixteen years  of  age ;  and  executed 
that province with the greatest care, and to  the entire satisfac- 
tion  of his  noble patron.  As the  young  lord was  but  of  a 
weakly constitution, his father  thought  proper  to marry hi 
early, lest the family should become extinct by his death.  And, 
since he was too young, and had too little experience to choose 
a wife for himself, and lord Ashley had the highest opinion of 
Mr. Locke's  'udgment, as well  as the greatest  confidence  in  /  his integrity,  le desired him  to make a  suitable choice for his 
son.  This was  a difficult and delicate task : for though  lord 
Ashley did not  insist  on  a  great  fortune for his  son, yet  he 
would have him marry a lady of a  ood  family, an  agreeable 
tem  er, a  fine person, and, above  a  7  1,  of  good  education  and 
understanding, whose  conduct  would  be  very  different 
R?rn  that of  the generality of court ladies.  Notwithstanding 
the difficulties attending such a commission, Mr. Locke under- 
took it, and executed  it very happily.  The eldest son by this 
marriage, afterwards  the noble  author of  the Characteristics, 
was committed to the care  of Mr. Loclte in his education, and 
gave evidence to the world  of  the master-hand which  had di- 
rected and guided his genius. 
In 1670, and in the following  year,  Mr. Locke began  to 
form  the plan  of  his  Essay  on  Human Understanding,  at 
the earnest request of some of his friends, who were accustomed 
to meet in his chamber, for the  urpose of conversing on phi- 
losophical subjects ;  but the emp ?  oyments and avocations which 
were found for him by  his patron,  would  not  then suffer him 
to make any great progress in that work.  About this time, it 
sed,  he was  made fellow of  the  Royal  Society.  In 
1672,  ord Ashley,  having been  created earl of  Shaftesbury,  is supY' 
and raised to the dignity of  lord high  chancellor of England, 
inted Mr. Locke  secretary of  the  presentations ; but  he 
he  apP"  d that place  only till  the end of the following year, when 
the earl was  obliged  to  resign  the  great seal.  Hu  dismissal 
was followed by that of  Mr. Locke, to whom the earl had com- 
rnunicated his most secret affairs, and who contributed towards 
the publication of  some treatises, which were intended to excite 
the nation to watch  the conduct of the Roman Catholics, and 
to oppose the arbitrary designs of  the court.  After  this  his 
lordship, who was  still president  of  the Board  of  Trade,  ap 
poi~lted  Mr  Locke secretary to the  same ; which  office he  re- 
tained not  long, the  commission being  dissolved  in  the year 
1674.  In the following  ear, he was  admitted  to  the degree 
of bachelor of  hysjc ;  anndit appears that he continued to prG 
secute this stu g  y, and to keep up his acquaintance with several 
of  the faculty.  In what  reputation  he was  held  by some  of 
the most eminent of them, we  may judge from the testimonial 
that was given of him by the celebrated Dr. Sydenham, in his 
book,  entitled,  Observationes Medicae  circa  Morborum Acu- 
torum Historiam  et  Curationem,  &c. "  YOU  know  likewise," 
says he, "  how much  m  method  has been  a  proved  of by a  B  R  person who has examine  it to the bottom, an  who is our com- 
mon  friend: I mean  Mr. John  Locke,  who,  if we  consider 
his genius, and  enetrating and exact judgment, or the strict-  T  ness of his  mora s,  has  scarcely any superlor, and  few equals 
now  living."  In the summer of  1675,  Mr. Locke, being ap- 
prehensive of a consumption, travelled into France, and resided 
for some time at Montpelier, where he became ac  uainted with  1  Mr. Thomas Herbert, afterwards earl of  Pembro  e,  to whom 
he communicated his  design of  writing his  Essay  on Human 
Understanding.  From Montpelier he went  to Paris,  where 
he contracted a  friendship with M. Justel,  the celebrated ci- 
vilian, whose house was at that time the place of resort for men 
of  letters;  and where  a  familiarity commenced  between him 
and several other persons of  eminent learning.  In 1679, the 
earl of  Shaftesbury  being again  restored  to favour  at  court, 
and made  resident of  the council,  sent  to request  that Mr. 
Locke wou  P  d  return  to England, which  he  accordingly did. 
Within  six months, however,  that  nobleman was  again  dis- 
placed,  for refusin  his  concurrence with  the designs of  the  'f  court, which  aime  at the establishment  of  popery and  arbi, 
trary powcr ;  and, in 1682, he was obliged to retire to Holland, 
to avoid  a  prosecution  for high  treason, on  account of  pre- 
tended crimes of  which he was accused.  Mr. Locke remained 
steadily attached  to his  patron,  following him  into Holland ; 
and u  on his lordship's death, which happened soon afterwards, 
he di8  not think it  safe to return  to England, where  his inti- 
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powerful and  malignant enemies.  Before he had been a year 
m Holland, he was  accused at the English court of being  the 
author of certain tracts which  had been published  against the 
government ; and,  notwithstanding  that  another  person  was 
soon afterwards discovered to be  the writer  of them, yet as he 
was  observed to join  in company at the  Hague with  several 
Englishmen who were the avowed enemies of  the system  of 
@tics  on which the English court now acted, information of 
this  circumstance  was  conveyed  to  the  earl  of  Sunderland, 
then secretary of  state.  This  intelligence lord  Sunderla~ld 
communicated to the king, who  immediately ordered  that bi: 
shop Fell,  then  dean of Christ-church, should receive his ex- 
press  command to  eject Mr. Locke  from his  student's place, 
which  the  bishop  executed accordingly.  After this violent 
procedure of  the court a  ainst him  in England, he thought it 
rudent to remain in Ho  land, where he was at the accession of 
King  James II  f 
.  Soon after  that  event, William  Penn,  the 
famous quaker, who  had known Mr. Locke at the university, 
used his  interest with  the king  to  procure  a  ardon for him ;  Y  and would  have obtained it had  not Mr. Loc  e  declined  the 
acceptance of such an offer, nobl  observing, that he had no oc-  d'  casion for a pardon, since he ha  not been guilty of any crime. 
In the  year  1685,  when  the duke of Monmouth  and his 
party were  making preparations in Holland for  his  rash and 
unfortunate  enterprise, the English  envoy at  the Hague de- 
manded that Mr.  Locke,  with  several others, should  be  de- 
livered up to him,  on suspicion of  his  being engaged in  that 
undertaking.  And though this sus  icion was not only ground-  P  less, but without even a  shadow o  probability, it obliged him 
to  lie  concealed  nearly twelve  months, till it was  sufficiently 
known that he had no concern whatever in that business.  To- 
wards  the latter end of  the year 1686, he a  peared  again in 
public ;  and in the following year formed a yiterar i  at  Amsterdam,  of which Lhborch, Le Clerc,  and ot  er learned 
men, were members, who met together weekly for conversation 
upon  subjects  of  universal  learning.  About  the end of the 
year 1687, our author finished  the  composition of  his  great 
work,  the  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  which 
had been the principal object of his  attention for some years; 
and that the public  mi  ht be  apprised of  the outlines of  his 
plan, he  made an  abri  fi  gment of  it himself, which  his friend 
Le  Clerc  translated  into  French,  and inserted  in  one of his 
''  Bibliotheques."  This abridgment was  so  highly a  proved 
of  by ad thinking persons, and sincere lovers of  truth, t g  at they 
expressed the strongest desire to see the whole work.  During 
the  time  of  his  concealment,  he  wrote his  first Letter  con- 
cerning Toleration, in Latin, which was first printed at Gouda, 
in 1689, under the title of  E istola de Tolerantia, &c. 12mo.  K  This excellent performance, w ich has ever since been held in 
the highest esteem by the best judges, was translated into Dutch 
and French, in the same year, and was also printed. in English 
in 4to.  Before this work made its appearance, the hap  y Re-  i'  volution in 1688, effected by  the courage and good con  uct of 
the prince of  Orange, opened the way for Mr. Locke's  return 
to his native country ;  whither he came  in the  fleet which con- 
veyed the princess  of  Orange.  After  public liberty had been 
restored, our author thought it proper to assert his own T!e  ri  hts;  and therefore put in his claim to the student's p ace in 
Arist-church. of which be had been uniustlv deorived.  Find-  - 
J  l 
ing, however, that  the  society resisted his pretensions,  on the 
plea that their  proceedin  s had  been conformable to their sta- 
tutes, and that they coul  fi not  be prevailed u on to dispossess 
the person who had been elected in his room, \  e desisted from 
his claim.  It  is true, that they made him an offer of being ad- 
mitted a supernumerar  student; but, as his sole motive in en 
deavouring to procure i;  is restoration was,  that such a measure 
mi  ht proclaim the injustice of  the mandate for his ejection, he 
dif not  think proper  to accept it.  As Mr. Locke was justly 
considered to be a sufferer for the principles of the Revolution, 
he might without much difficulty have obtained some very con 
siderable post;  but he  contented  himself with  that  of  com- 
missioner of appeals, worth about  200Z.  per annum.  Tn  July, 
1689, he wrote a letter to his  friend Limborch, with whom he 
frequently corresponded, in which  he  took  occasion  to  speak 
of the  act  of toleration, which  had  then  just  passed, and  at 
which he ex  ressed his satisfdtion ;  thou  h he at the same time  K  intimated, t  at he considered  it to  be f  efective, and not suf- 
ficiently  comprehensive.  "  I doubt not,"  says he, 
. t 
"but  gou  have  already  heard,  that  toleration  is  at len  th  establis ed 
among us by law;  not,  however,  perhaps,  wi  that  latitude 
which you,  and such as you,  true  Christians,  devoid of envy 
and ambition, would have wished.  But it is somewhat to have 
roceeded  thus far.  And  I hope  these be  innings are the 
blished in the church of Christ."  %  foundations of liberty and peace, which shall  ereafter be esta- 
About this time Mr. Locke had an  offer to go abroad in a 
ublic character ;  and it was left to hi choice whether he would  k  envoy at the court of  the emperor, the elector of Branden- 
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agree with  him ;  but he declined  it on account of the infirm 
state of his  health.  In the  year 1690, he published  his  cele- 
brated  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding,  in  folio; 
a work which has made the  author's name immortal, and does 
honour to our country; which  an  eminent and learned writer 
has styled,  one  of the noblest, the usefullest,  the most  ori- 
ginal books the world ever saw."  But, notwithstanding its ex- 
traordinary merit, it gave great offence to many people at the 
first publication, and was  attacked by  various writers, most of 
whose names are now forgotten.  It was  even  proposed,  at a 
meeting of the heads of  houses of the university of  Oxford, to 
censure and discourage the reading of it; and, after various de- 
bates among themselves, it was concluded, that each head of  a 
house should endeavour to  revent  it from  being  read in his  P  college.  They were afraid o  the light which it poured in upon 
the minds of men.  But all their  efforts were in vain ;  as were 
also the attacks of  its various opponents on the reputationeither 
of the work or its author, which  continued daily to increase in 
every part  of  Europe.  It was  translated  into  French  and 
Latin, and  the  fourth in English, with  alterations and  addi- 
tions, was printed  in the year 1700: since which  time it has 
assed through  a vast number of editions.  In  the year 1690, 
Ekewise, Mr. Locke  published his  Second Letter  concerning 
Toleration,  in dto.,  written  in answer to Jonas Proast, a cler- 
gyman  of Queen's-college,  Oxford,  who  published  an  attack 
upon  the  First  Letter;  and  in the same  year  hc  sent  into 
the world  his  Two  Treatises  on  Government,  8vo.  Those 
valuable treatises, which  are some of  the best  extant on  the 
subject in  any langua  e, are employed in refuting  and  over- 
turning  sir Robert Fi  f  mer's  false  princi  es,  and  in pointing  .p'  out the true origin, extent, and end of civl  government.  About 
this time  the coin  of  the kingdom was  in a very bad  state, 
owing to its having been so much clipped, that it wanted above 
a third of  the standard weight.  The magnitude of this  evil, 
and the mischiefs which it threatened, havlng engaged the se- 
rious  consideration of  Mr. Locke, with  the view 
of assisting those who were at the head of affairs to form a ri8ht 
understanding  of  this matter,  and  to excite them  to  rectlfy 
such  shameful abuse,  printed  Some  Considerations  of  the 
Consequences of lowering the Interest,  and raising the Value 
of  Money, 1691,  8vo.  Afterwards he  ublished  some  other 
small pieces on the same  subject ;  by wKich  he  convinced the 
world, that he was as able to  reason  on  trade and business, as 
on the most  abstract  parts  of  science.  These writings occa- 
sioned his being  frequently consulted by the ministry, relative 
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to the new coinage of silver,  and other topics.  With the earl 
of Pembroke, then  lord  kee  privy seal, he was  for 
some time accustomed 
the air of London began 
to the earl of Peterborough's  seat,  near Fulham, where he al- 
ways  met  with  the most  friendly  reception.  He was  aftel,- 
wards,  however,  obliged  to  quit  London  entirely,  at  least 
during the winter  season, and to remove  to some  place  at  a 
greater distance.  He had  frequently paid visits to sir Francis 
Masham, at Oates in Essex, about twenty miles from London, 
where  he  found that  the  air agreed  admirably well with  his 
constitution, and where  he  also  enjoyed  the  most  delightful 
society.  We ma  imagine, therefore, that he was ~ersuaded, 
without much dl  .d  culty,  to accept of an offer which slr Francis 
made  to give him  apartments in  his  house, where  he might 
settle during the remainder  of his life.  Here he was received 
upon his own terms, that he might have his entire liberty, and 
look upon himself as at his own house ;  and here he chiefly pur- 
sued his future studies, being seldom absent, because the alr of 
London grew more and more troublesome to him. 
In 1693, Mr.  Locke  published A third Letter for  Tolera- 
tion, to the Author of  the third Letter concerning Toleration, 
8vo. ;  which  being  replied  to  about  twelve years afterwards, 
by his old  ants onist, Jonas Proast, he began  A fourth Let- 
ter, which  was  f  eft  at his  death  in an unfinished  state,  and 
ublished among  his posthumous  pieces.  In 1693, he  ub- 
[shed  his  Thouehts  concerning  Education,  8vo.  whic l  he 
reatly im  roved In subsequent editions.  In 1695, king Wit 
fam, who P  new how to  appreciate his abilities for serving the 
public, appointed  him one of  the commissioners of  trade  and 
I? 
antations ;  which obliged him to reside more in London than. 
e had done for some time  ast.  In the same year he published 
his  excellent treatise,  entit  I'  ed,  The Reasonableness  of  Chri- 
stianity, as delivered in the Scri tures, avo., which was written, 
it is said, in order to promote  t  R e scheme which king William 
had so much at heart, of a  comprehension with the dissenters. 
This book ha\ing been attacked, in the following year, by Dr. 
Edwards,  in  his  Socinianism unmasked,  and  in a  manner 
that was  rude and scurrilous;  Mr. Locke published,  in  the 
same  year, a  first,  and  a  second Vindication  of  the Reason- 
ableness of  Christianity,  &c. 8v0. ;  in which  he defended  his 
work with  such  strength  of ar  ument,  that, if  his  adversary 
had  been  an ingenuous  one,  l!e  might  have just1  expected 
from him a public  acknowledgment of his error.  d  r.  Locke's 
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worthy and pious clergyman of  the name  of Bolde, who was 
the  author  of  A Collection of  Tracts,  ublished in Vindica- 
tion of  Mr.  Iacke's  Reasonableness  of  ~hristianit~,  as de- 
livered in the Scriptures, and of  his Essay concerning Human 
Understanding,  in 8vo.  Scarcely was he disengaged from this 
controversy, before he was  drawn into another, on the follow- 
in  occasion.  Some time before  this, Mr. Toland  published 
a fook, entitled  Christianity not mysterious, in which be  en- 
deavoured to prove,  "  that there  is nothing in the Christian 
religion, not only contrary to reason,  but even nothing above 
it;"  and in explaining some of his notions, he made use of  se- 
veral arguments from Mr. Locke's Essay  concerning Human 
Understanding.  About the same time  several treatises were 
published by some Unitarians, maintaining, that there was no- 
thing in the Christian reli  ion  but what was  rational  and in- 
telligible, which sentiment  %ad been  advanced by Mr. Locke. 
The use which was made of  his writings in these instances, de- 
termined Dr. Stillingfleet,  bishop  of  Worcester,  to make  an 
attack upon  our  author.  Accordingly,  in his Defence of  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Trinit , published  in  1697,  he  censured 
some passages  in  the JssaY  concerning Human Understand- 
-trines of  Chri-  ing, as tendlng to  subvert the fundamental doud 
stianity.  Mr. Locke immediately published an answer to this 
charge,  in A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bi- 
shop of  Worcester,  &c.  to which  the bishop replied in  the 
same  year.  This was  confuted  in  a  second letter  of  Mr. 
Locke s, which drew a second answer from the bishop, in 1698. 
A third letter  of Mr. Locke's was  the last which ap eared in  K  this controversy, the  death  of the bishop  having  ta en place 
not long after ~ts  publication.  It  was generally admitted, that 
Mr. Locke had greatly the advantage of  the bisl~op  in  this 
controversy.  When speaking of  it, M. Le Clerc says, ''  Every 
body admlred the strength of  Mr. Locke's  reasonings, and h~s 
great clearness and  exactness,  not only in explaining his  own 
notions,  but in  confuting  those  of  his adversary.  Nor were 
men of understanding less surprised, that so learned  a man as 
the bisho  should engage in a controversy, in which he had all  'f  the disa  vantages possible:  for he was by no  means  able to 
maintain his opinions against  Mr. Locke, whose reasoning hc 
neither understood,nor the subject itselfaboutwhich he disputed. 
had  spent  the greatest part of his time 
antiquities,  and reading a prodi- 
books;  but was  no yt  philoso her;  nor 
himself  to that c ose  mode OF  thinking 
and reasoning, in which Mr. Locke did so highly excel.  How- 
ever,  though  our  excellent  philosopher obtained so  great  a 
victory over  the bishop,  and  had  reason  to complain  of  his 
unjust charges against  him, and  of  his writing on subjects of 
which  he  had  not  a  sufficient  knowledge,  yet  he  did  not 
triumph  over  his  ignorance,  but  detected  and  confuted his 
errors with civility and respect."  And an Irish prelate,  in a 
letter to Mr. Molyneux, an intimate friend of  Mr. Locke, thus 
expresses himself upon the subject :  I have read Mr. Jocke's 
letter  to  the  bishop  of  Worcester  with  great  satisfaction, 
and am wholly of  your  opinion,  that  he  has  fairly laid  the 
great bishop on his back ;  but it is with  so  much gentleness, 
as if  he were afraid  not on1  of  hurtin  him,  but  even  of 
spoiling or tumbling  his clot  K  es.  Indeef  I cannot tell which 
I most admire, thegreat civility and good manners in his book, 
or the forcibleness and clearness of his reasonings." 
Mr. Locke's publications in the controversy above-mentioned 
were  the last which were committed by himself  to the press. 
The asthmatic complaint,  to which  he had been  long subject, 
increasing with his years, began now to subdue his constitution, 
and rendered  him very infirm.  He,  therefore,  determined to 
resign his post of commissioner of trade and plantations;  but 
he acquainted none of  his  friends with  his design,  till he had 
given up his commission  into the king's  own hand.  IIis ma- 
'esty was very unwilling to receive it, and told our author, that 
ie  would  be well  pleased with his  continuance in  that office, 
thou  h he should give little or no attendance ;  for that he did  f  not  esire him  to stay in town  one day to the injury of  his 
health.  But Mr. Locke told  the  kin^.  that he could not in 
conscience hold a place, to which a conzderable salary was an- 
nexed, without dischargng the duties of it; upon which the king 
reluctantly accepted his resignation.  Mr. Locke's  behaviour in 
this instance discovered such a de  ee  of integrity and virtue, 
as reflects  more honour  on his  c  f?  aracter  than his extraordi- 
nary intellectual endowments.  His majesty entertained a great 
esteem for him,  and would sometimes desire his attendance, in 
order to consult with  him  on public affairs,  and  to know his 
sentiments of  things.  From this time  Mr. Locke continued 
altogether at Oates, in which  agreeable  retirement he applied 
himselfwholl  to the study of  the sacred Scri tures.  In this 
employment ie  found so much pleasure, that fe  regretted his 
not having devoted more of  his time to it in  the former part 
of his life.  And his  great regard  for the sacred writi~~gs  ap- 
pears from his  answer to a relation who had inquired  of him, 
what was the shortest and surest way for a young gentleman to 
attain a true knowledge  of  the Christian religion?  "  Let him 
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study,"  said  Mr. I,ocke,  "  the holy Scripture,  especially in 
tlle  New  Testament.  Therein  are  contamed  the  words  of 
eternal life.  It  has God for its author ;  salvation for its end ; 
and truth, without any mixture of error, for its matter."  Mr. 
Locke now  found  his  asthmatic disorder  rowing  extremely  P  troublesome, though it did not prevent him  rom enjoying great 
cheerfulness of  mind.  In this  situation  his  sufferings were 
greatly alleviated by the  kind  attention  and  agreeable con- 
versation  of  the  accomplished  lady  Masham,  who  was  the 
daucrhter of  the  learned Dr. Cudworth ; as this lady and Mr. 
~ocie  had a great esteem and friendship for each other.  At 
the commencement of  the summer of  the year 1703, a season, 
which, in former years, had always restored him some degrees 
of strength,  he perceived that it  had began  to  fail him rnore 
remarkably than ever.  This convinced him that his dissolution 
was at no great distance, and he often spoke of it himself, but al- 
ways with great composure ;  while he omitted none of the precau- 
tions which, from his skill in physic, he knew had a tendency to 
prolong his life.  At length  his legs began to swell;  and that 
swelling increasing every da  his  strength visibly diminished.  f  He therefore prepared to ta  e leave  of  the world, deeply im- 
ressed with a sense of  God's manifold blessin  s to him, which 
7  f  ge took delight in recountin  to his friends, an  full of a sincere 
resignation to the divine wil ,  and of firm hopes in the promises 
of future life.  As he had been incapable for a considerable time 
of going to church, he thought proper to receive the sacrament 
at home ;  and two of his friends communicating with  him,  as 
soon as the ceremony was finished he told the minister, "  that 
he was in perfect charity with  all men, and in a sincere com- 
munion  with  the  church of  Christ,  by  what  name soever  it 
might be distinguished."  He lived  some  months after  this; 
which time he spent in acts of piety and devotion.  On the day 
before  his  death,  lady  Masham  being  alone with  him,  and 
sitting by his bed-side, he exhorted her to regard this world only 
as a state of  preparation  for a better;  adding,  "  that he had 
lived long enough, and that he thanked God he had enjoyed a 
happy life ;  but that, after all,  he looked upon  this  life to be 
nothing but vanity."  He had no rest that night,  and resolved 
to try to rise on the following morning; which he did, and was 
carried into his stud ,  where he was  placed in an eas 
Y 
- B  f  and sle  t for a cons1  erable time.  Seeming a little re reshed, 
he wou d  be  dressed as  he used  to be;  and observing lady 
Masham  reading  to  herself  in  the  Psalms  while  he  was 
dressing,  he  requested her  to read  aloud.  She did so; ant1 
he appeared very attentive, till, feeling the approach of death, 
he desired her to break off,  and in a few minutes ex  ired, on  S  the twenty-eighth of October, 1704, in the seventy-thir  year of 
his a  e.  He  was interred in the church of  Oates, where there 
is a Lent  monument erected to hismemory, with a modest in- 
scription in Latin, written b  himself. 
Thus died that great andl most excellent philosopher John 
Locke,  who was  rendered  illustrious not only by his wisdom, 
but by his piety and virtue, by his love of  truth, and diligence 
in the pursuit  of  it, and  b  his  generous  ardour in  defence  i;  of the civil and religious rig  ts of  mankind.  His writings have 
immortalized his name ;  and, particularly, his Essay concerning 
the Human Understanding.  In  this work, "  discarding all sy- 
stematic  theories, he has,from actual experience and observation, 
&&neated  the features, and described the operations of the hu- 
man mind,  with a degree of precision and minuteness not to be 
found  in  Plato, Aristotle,  or Des Cartes.  After clearing the 
way, by  setting aside the whole  doctrine of  innate notions and 
princip es,  bot  speculative and practical, the author traces all 
Ideas to two  sources,  sensation and reflection ;  treats at large 
on the nature of ideas,  simple and complex ;  of the operations 
of  the human  understanding  in forming, distinguishing, com- 
pounding, and associating them ;  of  the manner in which words 
are applied as representations of  ideas ;  of  the difficulties and 
obstructions in the search after truth, which arise from the im- 
erfections of  these signs;  and of  the nature,  reality, kinds, 
zegrees, casual hinderances,  and  necessary  limits,  of  human 
knowledge.  Thou h several topics are treated of in this work, 
which ma  be consi  ered as episodical with respect to the main  K  8 
design ;  t  ough many opinions which the author advances may 
admit of controversy;  and though  on some topics he may not 
hare expressed himself with his usual perspicuity, and on others 
may be thought too verbose ;  the work is of inestimable,  value, 
as a history of  the human  understanding,  not  compiled from 
former books,  but written from  materials collected  by a  long 
and attentive observation of what  passes in the human mind." 
the Two Treatises of Government, is also 
which  will  render  his  memory  dear  to  the 
of  civil and religious freedom.  But even 
constitution of which is defensible only on 
laid down, it has been violently opposed 
those  slavish doctrines which  were  dis- 
carded  at the Revolution in 1688 ;  and by that  class of p'  I- 
ticians who would submit to the abuses and corruptions to w ~ch 
the best systems of government are liable, rather than encoura  e 
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extension of  knowledge,  and  of  science, might give men just 
reason to ho ,e  for, and to expect.  And in our time, we  have  1  seen a forma  attempt made  to overturn the princi  les in Mr.  E  Loclte'swork by Dr. Tucker, dean of Gloucester, in  is Treatise 
on  Civil  Government, published  in  the  year  1781.  That 
gentleman was  pleased  to  assert,  that  the princi  les  of  Mr. 
Locke "  are extremely dangerous to the peace and fa  piness of  F  all society ;" that  his writings, and  those of  some  o  the most 
eminent  of  his disciples,  a  have  laid  a  foundation for  such 
disturbances and dissensions,  such mutual jealousies and ani- 
mosities,  as ages to come will not  be able to settle and com- 
pose;"  and,  speakin  of  the paradoxes which  he supposes to 
attend the system of %  r. Locke and his followers, he asserted, 
that "  they rendered it one of the most mischievous, as well as 
ridiculous schemes, that ever disgraced the reasoning faculties 
of human nature."  To  the dis  ace of the age, it was for a time 
fashionable to applaud his libe  r;  on the doctrines of our author. 
But his gross m~srepresentations  of the principles of Mr. Locke, 
his laborlous attempts to involve him in darkness and obscurity, 
and to draw  imagmary  consequences  from  his propositions, 
which cannot by any just  reasonin  be deducible from  them,  7.  were ably exposed in  different pub ications ;  and by no writer 
with greater force and spirit, than by Dr. Towers,  in his Vin- 
dication of  the political Principles of Mr. Locke,  in Answer to 
the Objections of  the Rev. Dr. Tucker,  Dean  of  Gloucester, 
published in 1782, in octavo. 
Of Mr. Locke's  private character an  account was first pub- 
lished by Mr. Peter Coste, who hadlived with him as an ama- 
nuensis, which was afterwards h refixed by M. des Maizeaux to 
A  Collection  of  several  Pieces  of  Mr.  Locke  never  before 
printed, &c.,  pyblished in 1'720 ;  from which, together with M. 
le Clerc's  Bibliotheque Choisie,  we  shall present  our readers 
with  some interesting  particulars  relating  to this great man. 
Mr. Locke possessed a great knowledge of  the world, and was 
intimately conversant in the business of it.  He was prudent, 
without cunning ;  he enga  ed men's  esteem by his probity; and  P  took care to secure himsel  from the attacks of false %ends  and 
sordid flatterers.  Averse to all mean compliance, his wisdom, 
his experience, and his gentle manner,  ained him the respect 
of  his inferiors,  the esteem  of  his  equ 3  s,  the friendship and 
confidence of  those of  the highest  quality.  He was  remark- 
able for the ease and politeness of his behaviour ;  and those who 
knew him only b  his writings, or b  the reputation which he 
had acquired, anJ  who had supposeJhim a reserved or austere 
man, were surprised, if they happened to be introduced to him, 
to find him all affability, good-humour, and complaisance.  If 
there was any thing wl~ch  he could not bear, it was ill-mannel~, 
with which he was always disgusted, unless when it proccedcd 
from ignorance; but when it was the effect of  ride, ill-nature, 
or brutality,  he detested it.  Civility he  considered to be not 
only a duty of humanit ,  but of  the Christian profession,  and 
what ought to be more f  requently pressed and urged upon men 
than it commonly is.  With a view to  promote it,  hc recom- 
mended a treatise in the moral essays written by the gentlemen 
of  Port Royal, 
"  concerninB 
the means  of  preserving peace 
among men ;"  and also the  ermons of  Dr. Wichcote on this 
and other moral subjects.  He  was exact to his word, and reli- 
iously performed whatever he promised.  Though he chicfly 
kved  truths  which  were  useful,  and  with  such  stored  his 
mind, and was best pleased to make them the subjects of  con- 
versation ;.  yet he used to say, that, in order to employ one part 
of this life m serious and important occupations, it was necessary 
to spend another in mere  amusements ; and, when an occasion 
naturally offered,  he  gave  himself  up with  pleasure  to  the 
charms of a free and facetious conversation.  He remembered 
many agreeable stories, which he always introduced with great 
propriety; and generally made them yet more delightful, by his 
natural and pleasant manner of tellin  them.  He  had a peculiar  F  art, in conversation, of  leading persp e to talk concerning what 
they best understood. With a gardener, he conversed of garden- 
in  with a jeweller of jewels ;  with a chemist of chemistry, &c. 
"  gy  this,"  said he,  "  I please those men,  who  commonly can 
speak pertinently upon nothing else.  As they believe I have an 
esteem for their profession, they are charmed with showing their 
abilities before me ;  and I, in the meanwhile, improve myself 
by  their  discourse."  And,  indeed,  he  had  by  this method 
acquired a very good insight into all thc arts.  He used to say 
too, that the knowledge of the arts contained more  true phi- 
losophy, than all those fine learned hypotheses, which,  having 
no relation to the nature of  things,  are fit only to make men 
lose their  time in  inventing or comprehending them.  By the 
several questions which  he would  put to artificers,  he would 
find out the secret of their art, which  they did not understand 
themselves;  and often give  them  views  entirely  new,  which 
sometimes they put in practice to their profit.  He  was so far 
from assumin  those affected airs of  gravity, by which some  t  persons, as we 1 learned as unlearned, love to distinguish them- 
selves from  the rest  of  the world,  that,  on  the contrary,  he 
looked upon them as infallible marks  of  impertinence.  Nay, 
sometimes he would divert  himself with imitating that stuhed xxxviii  The Lfe of the  Author.  The L$e  of  the Author.  xxxix 
gravity, in order to  turn it the better into ridicule;  and upon 
such occasions he always recollected this maxim of  the duke de 
la Rochefoucault, which he particularlyadmired, "  that gravity 
is a mystery of the body, invented to conceal the defects of the 
mind."  One thing, which those who  lived any time with Mr. 
Locke could not help observing  in him was, that he used his 
reason in every thing he did ;  and that nothing that was useful 
seemed unworthy of his attention and care.  He  often used to 
say, that "  there was an art in every thing ;" and it was easy 
for any one to see it, from the manner in which he went about 
the most triflin  things. 
As Mr. Loc  f  e kept  utility in view in all his  disquisitions, 
he esteemed the employments of men only in proportion to the 
good which they were capable of  producing.  On this account 
he had no great value for those critics, or mere grammarians, 
who waste their lives in comparing words  and phrases, and in 
coming to a determination in  the choice of a various reading, 
m a passage of  no  importance.  He  valued yet less those pro- 
fessed disputants, who, being wholly  ssessed with a desire of  P"  coming off with victory, fortify themse ves behind the ambiguity 
of a word, to give their adversaries the more trouble; and when- 
ever he had to  argue with  such  persons, if  he did not before- 
hand strongly resolve to  keep his temper, he was apt to grow 
somewhat warm.  For his natural disposition was irritable ;  but 
his anger never lasted long.  If he retained any resentment, it 
was against himself,  for having given way to such a ridiculous 
assion, which, as he used to say, may do a great el  of harm, 
gut never yet did the least good.  He  was charitable to the 
poor,  excepting such as were idle or profane,  and spent their 
Sundays  in ale-houses,  instead  of  attending at church.  And 
he  particularly  com  assionated  those,  who,  after  they  had 
laboured as long as t  E eir strength would permit, were reduced 
to poverty.  He  said, that it was not enough to keep them from 
starving, but that a provision ought to be made for them, suf- 
ficient to render them comfortable.  In his  friendships he was 
warin  and steady;  and,  therefore,  felt  a  strong indignation 
against  any discovery  of  treachery or  insincerity in those  in 
whom  he confided.  It is said,  that a  particular  person, with 
whom he had contracted an intimate friendship in the earlier 
part of  his  life,  was  discovered  by him  to  have acted  with 
great baseness  and  perfidy.  He had not only taken  every 
method  private1  of  doing  Mr. Locke  what  injury he could  r  in the opinion o  those with whom  he was  connected, but had 
also gone off with a large sum of money which was his property, 
and at a time too when he knew that such  a step must involve 
him in considerable difficulties.  Many years after all  inter- 
course had, by such treachery, been  broken off between them, 
and when Mr. Locke was one of the lords of  trade and  lanta- 
tions, information was  brought  to  him one morning, w  \  ile he 
was at breakfast, that a  erson  shabbily dressed requested the 
honour  of  speakin  to Em.  Mr. Locke, with  the politenes~ 
and humanity whic  8, were natural to him, immediately ordered 
him  to be  admitted;  and beheld, to his great astonishment, 
hi false friend, reduced by a life of cunning and extravagance 
to poverty and distress, and come to solicit his for  iveness, and  I  to implore his assistance.  Mr. Locke looked  at  im for some 
time  very  steadfastly,  without  speaking  one  word.  At 
len  th,  taking out a fifty-pound note,  he presented it to him 
wit f the following remarkable  declaration : a Though I sin- 
cerely forgive your behaviour to me,  yet I must  never put it 
in your power to injure me a  second  time.  Take this  trifle, 
which I give, not as a mark of  my former friendship, but as a 
relief to your present wants,  and  consign to the service of your 
necessities, without recollecting how little  ou deserve it.  No 
reply!  It  is impossible to regain my goodYopinion ;  for know, 
friendship once Injured is for ever lost." 
Mr. Locke was naturally very active, and emplo  ed himself 
as much as his health would  permit.  Sometimes K e diverted 
himself  by workin  in the garden, at which  he was  very  ex- 
pert.  He loved w f  king ;  but being prevented by his asthmatic 
complaint from takin  much of  that exercise, he  used to ride 
out  after  dinner,  eit  f  er on  horseback  or in an open  chaise, 
as he was able to bear it.  His bad health occasioned  disturb- 
ance to no person but himself;  and persons might be with him 
without  any  other concern  than  that  created  by seeing him 
suffer.  He did  not  differ  from  others  in  the  article  of 
diet; but  his  ordinary  drink  was  only  water;  and  this  he 
thought was the cause of his having his life prolonged to such 
an age,  notwithstanding the weakness  of his constitution.  To 
the same cause,  also,  he  thought that the preservation of his 
eye-sight was in a great measure to be attributed ;  for be could 
read by candle-light all sorts of  books to the last, if they were 
not of a very small print, and he had never made use of spec- 
tacles.  He had no other disorder but his  asthma,  excepting 
a deafness of six months' continuance about four years before his 
death.  Writin  to a friend, whiie labouring under this afflic- 
tion, he observe%, that since it had entirely deprived him of the 
pleasures of conversation,  he  did not know but it was better 
to be blind than deaf."  Among  the honours  paid to the me- 
mory of this great man,  that of queen Caroline, consort of king xi  The Lfe of  the Author. 
George IL, ought  not  to  be  overlooked;  for that princess, 
having erected a pavilion  in  Richmond park in honour of phi- 
losophy,  placed in  it our author's  bust, with  those of Bacon, 
Newton,  and Clarke,  as  the four prime English  hilosophers. 
Mr. Locke left several MSS. behind him, from w 1  ich his exe- 
cutors,  sir Peter King, and Anthony Collins, Es  published, 
in 1105, his Paraphrase  and Notes upon St. ~auy's  Epistle to 
the Galatians, in quarto, which were soon followed by those upon 
the Corinthians, Romans,  and  Ephesians,  with  an essay pre- 
fixed,  for  the  understanding  of  St. Paul's  Epistles, by con- 
sdlting St. Paul himself.  In 17'06, Posthumous Works of  Mr. 
Locke were  ublished  in octavo,  comprizing a treatise On the 
Conduct of t \  e Understanding,  supplementary to the author's 
essay; An Examination of Malebranche7s  Opinion of seeing all 
Things in God,  &c.  In 1708, Some Familiar Letters between 
Mr. Locke  and several of  his Friends were  also published in 
octavo;  and in 1720, M. des Maizeaux7s Collection,  already 
noticed by us.  But all our author's works have been collected 
to ether, and frequently reprinted, in three vols.  folio,  in four 
vo  7  s.  quarto, and In ten vols. octavo. 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  THOMAS, 
EARL OF PEMBROKE AND  MONTGOMERY. 
BARON  HERBERT  OF CARDIFF,  LORD  ROSS  OF KENDAL,  PAR, 
FITZHUGH,  MARMION,  ST.  QUINTIN,  AND  SHURLAND j 
LORD  PRESIDENT  OF  HIS  MAJESTY'S  MOST 
HONOURAI3LE  PRIVY  COUNCIL, AND LORD 
LIEUTENANT  OF THE  COUNTY  OF 
WILTS,  AND OF SOUTH WALES. 
MY  LORD, 
THIS  Treatise, which is  grown up under your  lord- 
ship's  eye,  and  has ventured  into the world by your 
order, does now,  by  a natural kind of  right, come to 
your  lordship  for that protection,  which you several 
years since promised  it.  It is not that I think  any 
name, how great soever, set at  the beginning of a book, 
will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in 
it.  Things in print must stand and fall by their own 
worth,  or the reader's  fancy.  But there being  no- 
thing more to be desired for truth than a fair,  unpre- 
judiced hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me 
that  than  your  lordship,  who  are allowed  to have 
got so  intimate  an  acquaintance  with  her,  in  her 
more  retired  recesses.  Your  lordship  is  known to 
have so far advanced your  speculations in the most 
abstract  and  general  knowledge  of  things,  beyond xlii  The Epistle Dedicatory. 
the ordinary reach,  or  common  methods,  that your 
allowance  and  approbation  of  the  design  of  this 
treatise  will  at least  preserve  it from  being  con- 
demned  without  reading;  and will  prevail  to have 
those parts a little weighed,  which might otherwise, 
perhaps, be thought to deserve no consideration,  for 
being  somewhat out of the common  road.  The im- 
putation of novelty is a terrible charge amongst those 
who judge of men's heads, as they do of their perukes, 
by the fashion;  and can allow none to be right, but 
the received doctrines.  Truth scarce ever yet carried 
it by  vote  any where  at its first  appearance:  new 
opinions are always suspected,  and usually opposed, 
without any other reason,  but because  they are not 
already common.  But truth,  like  gold,  is  not  the 
less so for being newly brought out of  the mine.  It 
is trial and examination must give it price,  and not 
any antique fashion : and though it be not  yet cur- 
rent by the public  stamp;  yet it may,  for all that, 
be  as  old  as  nature,  and  is certainly  not the less 
genuine.  Your  lordship  can  give  great  and  con- 
vincing instances of  this,  whenever  you please to ob- 
lige the public with some of  those large and compre- 
hensive discoveries you have made of  truths hitherto 
unknown, unless to some few, from whom  your lord- 
ship has been  pleased  not  wholly  to conceal  them. 
This alone  were  a  sufficient reason,  were.there  no 
other, why I should dedicate this Essay to your lord- 
ship ;  and its having some little correspondence with 
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some  parts  of  that  nobler  and vast  system  of  the 
sciences  your lordship has made so new,  exact,  and 
instructive  a  draught of,  I think it glory enough, if 
your lordship permit me to boast, that here and there 
I have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different 
from yours.  If your lordship think fit, that, by your 
encouragement,  this  should  appear in  the world,  I 
hope it may be a reason,  some time or other, to lead 
your lordship farther ;  and you will allow me to say, 
that you here give the world an earnest of something, 
that, if they can bear with this,  will be  truly worth 
their expectation.  This, my lord, shows what a pre- 
sent I here make to your lordship; just  such as the 
poor  man does  to his rich  and great neighbour,  by 
whom the basket  of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, 
though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in 
much greater perfection.  Worthless things receive a 
value, when they are made the offerings  of  respect, 
esteem,  and gratitude:  these you have given  me so 
mighty and peculiar reasons to have,  in the highest 
degree, for your lordship, that if they can add a price 
to what  they go along with,  proportionable  to their 
own  greatness,  I  can with confidence  brag,  I here 
make your lordship the richest present you ever re- 
ceived.  This I  am  sure,  I  am  under  the greatest 
obligations  to seek  all occasions  to acknowledge a 
long train of  favours I have received  from your lord- 
ship ;  favours,  though great and important in them- 
selves,  yet made much more so by the forwardness, xliv  The Epistle Dedicatory. 
concern,  and kindness,  and  other  obliging  circum- 
stances, that never failed to accompany them.  To all 
this, you are pleased to add that which gives yet more 
weight  and relish  to all the rest:  you  vouchsafe  to 
continue me  in  some  degrees  of  your  esteem,  and 
allow  me  a  place  in your  good  thoughts ; I  had 
almost said  friendship.  This,  my  lord,  your  words 
and actions so constantly show on all occasions, even 
to others when I am absent,  that it is not vanity in 
me to mention what every body knows: but it would 
be want of  good manners,  not to acknowledge what 
so many are witnesses of,  and every day tell me, I am 
indebted to your lordship for.  I wish  they could  as 
easily assist my gratitude, as they convince me of the 
great and growing engagements it has to your lord- 
ship.  This I am sure, I should write of  the under- 
standing without having any, if I were not extremely 
sensible of  them, and did  not lay hold on this oppor- 
tunity to testify to the world, how much I am obliged 
to be,  and how much I am, 
My lord, 
Your lordship's 
Most humble, and 
Most obedient servant, 
JOHN  LOCKE. 
DoraeCCourt, 24th 
of  May,  1680. 
THE 
EPISTLE TO THE READER. 
READER, 
J  HERE  put into thy hands,  what  has been the di- 
version of some of my idle and heavy hours :  if it has 
the good luck  to prove so  of any of thine, and thou 
hast but half so much pleasure in reading, as I had in 
writing  it,  thou wilt  as little  think  thy money,  as I 
do  my pains,  ill bestowed.  Mistake not  this  for  a 
commendation  of my work ;  nor  conclude, because I 
was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am 
fondly taken with it now it is done.  He that hawks 
at larks  and sparrows, has  no  less  sport,  though a 
much less  considerable  quarry, than he that flies  at 
nobler  game:  and  he  is little acquainted  with  the 
subject of this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING,  who does 
not know, that as it is the most  elevated  faculty of 
the soul, so  it is  employed with  a greater  and more 
constant delight than any of the other.  Its searches 
after  truth  are  a  sort  of  hawking  and  hunting, 
wherein the very pursuit  makes  a great part of  the 
pleasure.  Every step the mind takes in its progress 
towards knowledge makes  some discovery,  which  is 
not only new, but the best too, for the time at least. 
For the understanding, like the eye, judging of ob- 
jects  only by its own  sight, cannot but be pleased 
with what it discovers, having less regret for what has 
escaped it, because it is unknown.  Thus he who has 
raised himself above the alms-basket, and, not content 
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thoughts on work, to find and follow truth, will (what- 
ever he lights on) not miss  the hunter's  satisfaction ; 
every moment of his pursuit will reward his pains with 
some delight,  and he will have  reason  to think  his 
time not ill spent, even when  he cannot much boast 
of any great acquisition. 
This, reader, is the entertainment of those who let 
loose  their  own  thoughts, and follow  them in writ- 
ing; which  thou  oughtest not  to envy them,  since 
they afford thee an opportunity of the like diversion, 
if thou wilt make use of thy own thoughts in reading. 
It  is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself: 
but if they are taken upon trust from others, it is no 
great matter what they are, they not following truth, 
but some meaner consideration : and it is not worth 
while to be  concerned, what  he says or  thinks, who 
says or thinks only as  he  is directed by another.  If 
thou judgest for thyself, I know thou wilt judge  can- 
didly; and  then I shall not be harmed  or  offended, 
whatever be thy censure.  For though it be certain, 
that there is  nothing in this  treatise,  of  the truth 
whereof  I  am  not  fully persuaded;  yet I  consider 
myself as liable to mistakes,  as I can think thee,  and 
know that this book  must stand or fall with thee,  not 
by any opinion I have  of  it,  but  thy own.  If  thou 
findest little in it new or instructive to thee, thou art 
not to blame me for it.  It was  not meant  for those 
that had already mastered  this  subject, and made  a 
thorough  acquaintance with  their  own  understand- 
ings ;  but for my own information, and the satisfaction 
of  a  few  friends, who  acknowledged  themselves not 
to have  sufficiently considered it.  Were  it fit  to 
trouble thee with the history  of this Essay, I should 
tell the,  that five or six friends meeting at my cham- 
ber,  and discoursing on  a  subject very remote from 
this, found themselves  quickly at a stand, by the dif- 
ficulties  that  rose  on  every  side.  After  we  had  a 
while  puzzled  ourselves, without  coming any nearer 
a  resolution  of  those  doubts which  perplexed us,  it- 
came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course ; 
and that  before we  set  ourselves  upon  inquiries  of 
that  nature,  it  was  necessary  to examine our  own 
abilities,  and  see what  objects  our  understandings 
were, or were  not,  fitted  to deal with.  This I pro- 
posed to the company, who  all readily assented; and 
thereupon it was agreed, that this should be our first 
inquiry.  Some hasty and undigested  thoughts on a 
subject I had  never  before  considered, which  I set 
down  against our next  meeting,  gave  :he  first  en- 
trance into  this  discourse; which having  been  thus 
begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written 
by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neg- 
lect,  resumed again,  as my humour or occasions per- 
mitted ;  and at last, in a retirement, where an attend- 
ance  on my health gave  me  leisure,  it was brought 
into that order thou now  seest it. 
This discontinued way of  writing may  have  occa- 
sioned, besides others, two contrary faults,viz. that too 
little and too much may be said in it.  If thou findest 
any thing wanting, I shall be glad, that what I have 
writ gives  thee  any desire,  that I should  have gone 
farther :  if it seems too much to thee, thou must blame 
the subject ;  for when I put pen to paper, I thought 
all I  shoul(1 have  to say on  this matter would have 
been contained in one sheet of paper ;  but the farther 
I went,  the larger prospect I  had ;  new  discoveries 
led me still on, and so  it grew insensibly to the bulk 
it now appears in.  I will  not  deny,  but possibly  it 
might he reduced to a  narrower compass than it is ; 
and that some parts of  it might be  contracted; the 
way it has been writ in,  by catches, and many long 
intervals of interruption, being apt to cause  some re- 
petitions.  But to confess  the truth, I  am  now too 
lazy, or too busy, to make it shorter. 
I am not  ignorant how  little I  herein consult my 
own  reputation, when I knowingly let it go with  a 
fault, so apt to disgust the most judicious, who  are 
always the nicest readers.  But they who know sloth xlviii  The Epistk to the Reader. 
is  apt to content  itself with any excuse, will  pardon 
me, if mine has prevailed on me, where, I think, I hare 
a very good  one.  I will  not therefore allege  in  my 
defence,  that  the same  notion,  having  different  re- 
spects, may be  convenient  or necessary to prove  or 
illustrate several parts of the same discourse ;  and that 
so it has happened in many parts of this :  but waving 
that,  I  shall frankly  avow,  that I  have  sometimes 
dwelt long upon  the same  argument, and expressed 
it different ways, with a quite different design.  I pre- 
tend not to publish  this Essay for the information of 
men of large thoughts, and quick apprehensions ;  to 
such masters of knowledge I profess myself a scholar, 
and therefore warn  them beforehand  not to expect 
any thing here, but what, being  spun out of my own 
coarse thoughts, is fitted to men  of my own size ;  to 
whom,  perhaps,  it will  not be unacceptable,  that I 
have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to 
their  thoughts  some  truths,  which  established  pre- 
judice,  or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves, 
might render  difficult.  Some objects  had  need  be 
turned on every side :  and when the notion is new, as 
I confess some of  these are to me, or out of the ordi- 
nary road,  as I suspect they will appear to others ;  it 
is not one  simple view  of it,  that will gain it admit- 
tance into every understanding, or fix it there with a 
clear and lasting impression.  There are few, I be- 
lieve, who have not observed in themselves or others, 
that what in one way  of proposing was very obscure, 
another way of expressing it has made very clear and 
intelligible :  though afterward the mind  found little 
difference in the phrases, and wondered why one failed 
to be  understood more  than the other.  But every 
thing does not hit alike upon  every man's  imagina- 
tion.  We have our understandings no less different 
than our palates;  and he that thinks the same truth 
shall  be  equally  relished  by every one  in the  same 
dress, may as well  hope  to feast every one with  the 
same sort of cookery: the meat may be the same, and 
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the nourishment good,  yet  every one not  he able  to 
receive it with that seasoning ;  and it must be dressed 
another way,  if  you will have it go down with some, 
even of strong constitutions.  The truth is, those who 
advised me to publish it,  advised me,  for this reason, 
to publish it as it is : and since I have been brought 
to let it go abroad,  I desire it should be understood 
by whoever gives himself  the pains to read it ;  I have 
so little affection  to be  in print,  that if  I were  not 
flattered this Essay might  be  of  soine use  to others, 
as I think it has been  to me,  I should have confined 
it to the view of some friends, who gave the first occa- 
sion to it.  My appearing therefore in print, being on 
purpose to be as useful as I may, I think it necessary 
to make what I have  to say as easy and  intelligible 
to all sorts of  readers  as I can.  And  I had  much 
rather the speculative and quick-sighted  should  com- 
plain of  my being  in  some  parts tedious,  than that 
any one,  not accustomed to abstract speculations,  or 
prepossessed  with  different  notions,  should  mistake, 
or not comprel~end  my meaning. 
It will possibly be censured as a great piece of  va- 
nity or insolence in me, to pretend to instruct this our 
knowing age ;  it amounting to little less, when I own, 
that I publ~sh  this Essay with hopes it may be useful 
to others.  But if it may be permitted to speak freely 
of those, who with a feigned modesty condemn as use- 
less what they themselves write,  methinks it savours 
much more of  vanity or insolence,  to publish a book 
for any other end ;  and he fails very much of that re- 
spect he owes the public,  who prints, and consequently 
expects  men  should  read  that,  wherein  he intends 
not they should meet with any thing of use to them- 
selves  or others:  and should  nothing  else  be found 
allowable in this treatise, yet my design will not cease 
to ,be so; and the goodness  of  my intention ought 
to be some excuse for the worthlessness of  my present, 
It is  that chiefly which  secures me from the fear of 
censure, which I expect not to escape more than better 
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writers.  Men's principles, notions,  and relishes are so 
different, that it is hard to find a book which pleases 
or disp!eases  all men.  I acknowledge the age we live 
in is not the least knowing, and therefore not the most 
easy to be satisfied.  If I have not the good  luck to 
please,  yet nobody ought to be offended with me.  I 
plainly tell all my readers,  except half  a dozen,  this 
treatise was not at first intended for them ;  and there- 
fore they need  not  be  at the trouble to be  of  that 
number.  But yet if  any one thinks fit to be angry, 
and rail at it, he may do it securely : for I shall find 
some better  way  of  spending my time  than  in such 
kind of conversation.  I shall always  have  the satis- 
faction to have  aimed  sincerely at truth and useful- 
ness, though in one of  the meanest ways.  The com- 
monwealth  of  learning  is  not  at this  time  without 
master-builders,  whose mighty  designs  in  advancing 
the sciences will  leave lasting monuments to the ad- 
miration of  posterity:  but every one  must  not  hope 
to be a Boyle,  or  a  Sydenham : and in  an  age that 
produces such masters,  as the great Huygenius,  and 
the incomparable  Mr. Newton,  with  some  others  of 
that strain ; ibt  is ambition enough to be employed as 
an under-labourer  in clearing the ground a little, and 
removing some of  the rubbish that lies in the way to 
1~no;vledge  ;  which certainly had been very much more 
advanced in the world, if the endeavours of ingenious 
and industrious  men had  not  been much cumbered 
with the learned but frivolous use of uncouth, affected, 
or unintelligible terms,  introduced into the sciences, 
and there made an art of,  to that degree,  that philo- 
sophy,  which  is  nothing  but  the true knowledge of 
things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to be brought 
into  well-bred  company,  and  polite  conversation. 
Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of 
language, have so long passed for mysteries of science; 
and  hard  and  misapplied  words,  with  little  or  no 
meaning,  have,  by  prescription,  such  a  right  tc be 
mistaken for deep learning, and height of speculation, 
that it will not be easy t6 persuade either those who 
speak, or those who hear them,  that they are but the 
covers of ignorance, and hinderance of true knowledge. 
To break  in upon the sanctuary of  vanity and igno- 
rance, will be,  I suppose,  some service to human un- 
derstanding;  though  so  few  are apt to think they 
deceive or are deceived in the use  of  words,  or that 
the language of the sect they are of has any faults in 
it, which ought to be examined or corrected;  that I 
hope I shall be pardoned,  if I have in the third book 
dwelt long on this subject,  and endeavoured to make 
it so plain, that neither the inveterateness of the mis- 
chief,  nor  the prevalence of  the fashion, shall be any 
excuse  for  those  who will  not  take  care about the 
meaning of  their  own words,  and will not suffer the 
significancy of their expressions to be inquired into. 
I have been told,  that: a short epitome of  this trea- 
tise, which was printed 1688, was by some condemned 
without reading, because innate ideas were denied in 
it; they too  hastily  concluding,  that if  innate ideas 
were not supposed, there would be little left either of 
the notion or proof of spirits.  If any one take the like 
offence at the entrance of  this treatise,  I shalldesire 
him to read it through; and then I hope he will be 
convinced,  that the taking away false  foundations  is 
not to the prejudice,  but advantage of  truth ;  which 
is never injured or endangered so much, as when mixed 
with, or built on, falsehood.  In the second edition, f 
added as followeth : 
The bookseller will not forgive me, if I say nothing 
of  this second edition, which he has promised, by the 
correctness  of  it,  shall make  amends  for  the many 
faults committed in the former.  He desires too, that 
it should be known, that it has one whole new chapter 
concerning identity,  and many additions and amend- 
ments in other places.  These I must inform my reader 
are not all new matter, but most of  them  either far- 
ther  confirmations  of  what I had  said,  or  explica- 
tions, to prevent others being mistaken in the sense of 
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what was formerly printed,  and not any variation in 
me from it ; I must only except the alterations I have 
made in Book 11. Chap. 21. 
What I had there writ concerning liberty and the 
will,  I thought deserved as accurate a view as I was 
capable of: those subjects having in all ages exercised 
the learned part of  the world with questions and dif- 
ficulties that have not a little perplexed morality and 
divinity, those parts of knowledge that men are most 
concerned to be clear in.  Upon  a closer  inspection 
into the working of  men's  minds,  and a stricter exa- 
mination of  those motives  and views  they are turned 
by, I have found reason somewhat to alter the thoughts 
I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last 
determination  to the will  in  all  voluntary  actions. 
This I cannot forbear  to acknowledge  to the world 
with as much freedoriz and readiness,  as I at  first pub- 
lished what then seemed to me to be right; thinking 
myself  more  concerned  to  quit  and  renounce  any 
opinion of my own, than oppose that of another, when 
truth appears against it.  For it is truth alone I seek, 
and that will always be welcome to me, when or from 
whence soever it comes. 
But what forwardness soever I have to resign any 
opinion  I have,  or  to recede from any thing I have 
writ upon  the first evidence  of  any error in it; yet 
this I must own, that I have not had the good luck to 
receive any light from  those  exceptions I have  met 
with in print against any part of my book ; nor have, 
from any thing that has been urged against it, found 
reason to  alter my sense in any of the  points that have 
been questioned.  Whether the subject I have in hand 
requires oftenmore thought and attention than cursory 
readers, at  least such as are prepossessed,  are willing 
to allow;  or,  whether  any obscurity  in  my  expres- 
sions casts a cloud over it, and these notions are made 
difficult to others' apprehensions in my way of treat- 
ing them : so it is,  that my meaning,  I find,  is often 
mistaken, and I have not the good luck  to be every 
where rightly  understood.  There are so many in- 
stances of this, that I think it  justice to my reader and 
myself  to conclude,  that either  my  book  is  plainly 
ellough written to be rightly understood by those who 
peruse it with that attention and indiffcrency, which 
every  one  who will  give himself  the pains  to read 
ought to employ in reading-; or else, that I have writ 
mine so obscurely,  that it is  in  vain  to go about to 
mend it.  Whichever of  these be the truth, it is my- 
self only am affected thereby, and therefore I shall be 
far from troubling my reader with what I think might 
be said,  in answer to those several objections I have 
met with  to passages here  and there  of  my book: 
since I persuade myself,  that he who thinks them of 
moment enough to be concerned whether they are true 
or false, will be able to see, that what is said is either 
not well founded, or else not contrary to  my doctrine, 
when T  and my opposer come both to be well under- 
stood. 
If any,  careful  that none of  their  good  thoughts 
should be lost,  have  published  their  censures of  my 
Essay, with this honour done to it,  that they will not 
suffer it to be an Essay; I leave it  to the public to 
value the obligation they have to their  critical pens, 
and shall not waste my reader's  time in so idle or ill- 
natured an employment of  mine,  as to lessen the sa- 
tisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to  others, in 
so hasty a confutation of what I have written. 
The booksellers preparine for the fourth edition of 
my  Essay, gave me notice of  it, that J might, if I had 
leisure,  make  any  additions or alterations I  should 
think fit.  Whereupon I thought it convenient to ad- 
vertise the reader,  that besides  several corrections I 
had  made here  and  there,  there was  one  alteration 
which  it was  necessary  to mention,  because it ran 
through the whole book,  and is of  consequence to be 
rightly understoocl.  What I thereupon said was this : 
Clear and distinct  ideas are terms, which,  though 
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to  think every one, who uses, does not perfectly under- 
stand.  And possibly it is but here and there one, who 
gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to 
know what  he  himself  or  others precisely mean  by 
them: I have therefore in  most  places  chose  to put 
determinate or  determined,  instead  of  clear  and  di- 
stinct,  as more likely to direct men's  thoughts to my 
meaning in this matter.  By those  denominations, I 
mean some object in the mind,  and consequently de- 
termined,  i. e.  such as it is  there seen and perceived 
to be.  TJiis, I think, may fitly be called a determinate 
or determined idea, when such as it is at any time ob- 
jectively  in the mind,  and so  determined there, it is 
annexed, and without variation determined to a name 
or articulate sound, which is to be steadily the sign of 
that very same object of the mind or determinate idea. 
To  explain this  a little more particularly.  By de- 
terminate, when applied to a simple idea, I mean that 
simple appearance which the mind has in its view,  or 
perceives in itself,  when that idea is  said to be in it : 
by determinate,  when  applied to a  complex  idea,  I 
mean such an one RS consists of a determinate number 
of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such 
a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its 
view,  and sees in itself,  when  that idea is present in 
it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name 
to it : I say should be; because  it is  not  every one, 
not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, 
as to use 110  word, till he views in his mind the precise 
determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign 
of.  The want  of  this is  the cause  of  no  small ob- 
scurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses. 
I know there are not words enough in any language 
to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's 
discourses and reasonings.  But this hinders not,  but 
that when any one uses any term, he may have in his 
mind a determined idea, which  he  makes it the sign 
of, and to which he should  keep it steadily annexed, 
during that present discourse.  Where he does not, or 
do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct 
ideas:  it is plain his  are not so; and therefore there 
can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, 
where such terms are made use of, which have not such 
a precise determination. 
Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas 
a way  of speaking less liable  to mistakes,  than clear 
and distinct: and where men have got such determined 
ideas of  all that they reason, inquire,  or argue about, 
they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes 
at an end.  The greatest  part  of  the  questions and 
controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the 
doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the 
same) indetermined ideas, which they are niade to stand 
for; I  have  made  choice  of  these  terms  to  signify, 
1. Some immediate  object of  the mind, which it per- 
ceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses 
as a sign of it. 8. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. 
which the mind has in itself, and knows and sees there, 
be determined without any change to that name,  and 
that name determined to that precise idea.  If men had 
such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, 
they would both  discern how far their own inquiries 
and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the 
disputes and wranglings they have with others. 
Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I 
should advertise the reader, that there is an addition 
of two chapters wholly new ;  the one of  the association 
of ideas,  the other of  enthusiasm.  These,  with some 
other larger additions never before printed, he has en- 
gaged to print by themselves  after the same manner, 
and for the same purpose, as was done when this Essay 
had the second impression. 
In the sixth edition, there is very little added or al- 
tered ; the greatest part  of  what is new  is contained 
in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, 
if  he thinks  it worth while,  may,  with  a very little 
labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition. CONTENTS 
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5.  Modes of  tastes and smells. 
6.  Some simple modes have no names. 
7.  Why some modes have,  an6 others have not names. 
CHAPTER XIX. 
OF THE MODES OF THINKING. 
SECT. 
I, 2.  Sensation, remembrance, contemplation, kc. 
3. The various attention of  the mind in thinking. 
4.  Hence  it is probable  that thinking  is  the  action,  not 
essence of the soul. 
CHAPTER XX. 
OF MODES  OF PLEASURE  AND PAIN. 
SECT. 
1.  Pleasure and pain simple ideas. 
2.  Good and evil, what. 
3.  Our passions moved by good and evil. 
4.  Love. 
5.  Hatred. 
6.  Desire. 




1  I.  Despair. 
12.  Anger. 
13.  Envy. 
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14.  What passions all men have. 
15. 16.  Pleasure and pain, what. 
17.  Shame. 
IS. These instances do show how our ideas of the passions :we 




1. This idea how got. 
2.  Power active and ~assive. 
3. Power includes relation. 
4.  The clearest idea of active power had from spirit. 
5.  Will and understanding,  two powers. 
6. Faculties. 
7. Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity. 
8. Liberty, what. 
9. Supposes understanding and will. 
10. Belongs not to volition. 
11. Voluntary opposed  to involuntary, not to necessary. 
12. Liberty, what. 
13. Necessity,  what. 
11-20.  Liberty belongs not to the will. 
21. But to the agent or man. 
22-24.  In respect of  willing,  a man is not free. 
25-27.  The will determined by something urithout it. 
28. Volition, what. 
29. What determines the will. 
30.  Will and desire must not be confounded. 
3 1. Uneasiness determines the will. 
32. Desire is uneasiness. 
33.  The uneasiness of desire determines the will. 
34.  This the spring of  action. 
35.  The greatest positive  good  determines  not the will, but 
uneasiness. 
36.  Because  the  removal  of  uneasiness  is  the  first  step to 
happiness. 
37.  Because uneasiness alone is present. 
38.  Because all, who  allow the joys of  heaven  possible, pursue 
them not.  But a great uneasiness is never neglected. 
39. Desire accompanies all uneasiness. 
40. The  most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will. 
41. All desire happiness. 
42.  Happiness, what. 
43.  What good is desired, what not. 
44.  Why the greatest good is not always desired. 
45. Why, not being desired, it moves not the will. 
46. Due consideration raises desire. 
47.  The power to suspend the prosecution of  any desire, makes 
may for consideration. 
48. To be determined  by our own judgment is no restraint to 
liberty. 
49.  The freest agents are so determined. 
50. A  constant  determination  to  a  pursuit  of  happiness  no 
abridgment of  liberty. 
5  1.  The necessity of  pursuing  true happiness  the foundation 
of all liberty. 
52. The  reason of it. 
53.  Government  of  our  passions  the  right  improvement  of 
liberty. 
54,  55:  How men come to pursue different courses. 
56. How men come to choose ill. 
57. First,  from  bodily  pains.  Secondly,  from  wrong  desires 
arising from wrong judgment. 
59, 59. Our  judgment of present good or evil always right. 
60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of 
their happiness. 
61,  62.  A more particular account of wrong judgments. 
63.  In comparing present and future. 
64, 65.  Causes of  this. 
66.  In considering consequences of actions. 
67.  Causes of this. 
68.  Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our happiness. 
69.  We can  change the agreeableness  or disagreeableness  in 
things. 
70. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment. 
7 1-73.  Recapitulation. 
CHAPTER XXII. 
OF MIXED MODES. 
SECT. 
I. Mixed modes,  what. 
2.  Made by the mind. 
3. Sometimes got by the explication of  their names, 
4.  The name ties the parts of the mixed.modes into one idea. 
5.  The cause of  making mixed modes. 
6. Why  words in one language have none answering in another. 
7.  And languages change. 
8.  Mixed modes,  where they exist. 
9.  How we get the ideas of mixed modes. 
10. Motion, thinking,  and power have been most modified. 
11. Several words  seeming  to signify  action,  signify but the 
effect. 
12. Mixed modes made also of other ideas. HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. 
CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION. 
5 1.  SINCE  it is the understanding, that  An 
sets man above the rest of sensible beings,  intb the  un. 
and gives him all the advantage and do-  derstanding 
minion  which  he has  over  them ;  it is  pleasant and 
certainlv a  subject,  even  for  its noble- 
useful. 
U  - 
ness, w&th  our labour to inquire into.  The under- 
standing,  like  the  eye,  whilst  it makes us  see and 
perceive  all other things,  takes no notice  of itself; 
and it requires  art and pains to set it at a distance, 
and make  it its own  object.  But, whatever  be the 
difficulties that lie in the way of this inquir i;  what-  ever it be,  that keeps us so much in the dar  to our- 
selves;  sure I  am,  that  all the light we can let in 
upon  our own  minds,  all the acquaiatance  we  can 
make with our own understandings, will not only be 
very pleasant, but bring us great advantage in direct- 
ing our thoughts in the search of other things. 
5 2.  This, therefore, being my purpose ;  Design. 
to inquire into the original, certainty, and 
extent  of  human  knowledge,  together  with  the 
"rounds  and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent- 
f  shall not at present meddle with the physical con- 
sideration of  the mind, or trouble myself to examine, 
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wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our 
spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have 
any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our un- 
derstandings;  and whether  those ideas  do,  in their 
formation,  any,  or  all of  them, depend on matter or 
no.  These are speculations, which,  however  curious 
and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of  my 
way in  the design I am now  upon.  It shall suffice 
to my  present  purpose,  to  consider  the  discerning 
faculties of  a man, as  they  are employed  about the 
objects  which  they  have  to do  with:  and I  shall 
imagine  I  have  not  wholly  misemployed  myself  in 
the thoughts I shall have  on this occasion, if, in this 
historical,  plain  method,  I  can  give  any account of 
the ways whereby our understandings come to attain 
those notions  of  things we  have, and  can  set down 
any measures  of  the certainty of  our knowledge,  or 
the grounds  of  those  persuasions,  which  are to be 
found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly 
contradictory ;  and yet asserted, somewhere or other, 
with  such  assurance  and  confidence,  that he that 
shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe 
their  opposition, and at the same time consider the 
fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, 
the  resolution  and  eagerness  wherewith  they  are 
maintained-may  perhaps have reason to suspect, that 
either there is no such thing as truth at all,  or  that 
mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain 
knowledge of  it. 
Method.  §  3.  It is,  therefore,  worth  while  to 
search  out the bounds  between  opinion 
and knowledge ; and examine by what measures, in 
things  whereof  we  have  no  certain  knowledge,  we 
ought to regulate our assent, and moderate  our per- 
suasions.  In order  whereunto,  I  shall pursue  this 
following method. 
First,  I  shall inquire  into  the  original  of  those 
ideas,  notions,  or  whatever  else  you  please  to call 
them, which a man observes, and is conscious to him- 
self he has in his  mind,  and the ways whereby the 
understanding comes to he furnished with them. 
Secondly, I shall endeavour  to show what  know- 
ledge the understanding  hath by  those  ideas;  and 
the certainty, evidence, and extent of it. 
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature 
and grounds of  faith,  or  opinion;  whereby I mean 
that assent which we give to any proposition as true, 
of whose  truth yet we  have no  certain knowlectge: 
and  here  we  shall  have  occasion  to  examine  the 
reasons and degrees of assent. 
S 4.  If, by this inquiry into the nature  Useful to 
of  the understanding, I can discover  the  ~~~~$!~~; 
powers  thereof,  how  far they reach,  to  comprehen- 
what  things they are in any degree pro-  sion. 
portionate, and where they fail us ;  I suppose it may 
be  of use  to prevail with the busy mind  of man, to 
be more cautious in meddling with. things exceeding 
its comprehension ;  to stop when it is at the utmost 
extent of its tether ; and to sit down in a quiet igno- 
rance of  those things  which, upon examination,  are 
found  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  our  capacities. 
We should not then perhaps be so forward,  out of 
an  affectation  of  an  universal  knowledge,  to raise 
questions, and perplex ourselves and others with dis- 
putes  about things to which our understandings  are 
not  suited,  and  of  which  we  cannot  frame in our 
minds  any clear  or distinct perceptions,  or whereof 
(as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not 
any notions  at all.  If we can find  out how  far the 
understanding  can  extend its view,  how far it has 
faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can 
only judge  and guess, we may learn to content our- 
selves with what is attainable by us in this state. 
$j 5.  For, though the comprehension of  our  capaci- 
our understandings comes exceeding short  ty suited  to 
of the vast extent of things ;  yet we shall  our state and 
have cause enough to magnify the bounti-  concerns* 
ful Author of  our being, for that proportion and de- 
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gree of  knowledge  he has  bestowed  on  us,  so  far 
above all the rest of  the inhabitants of this our man- 
sion.  Men have reason to be well satisfied with what 
God hat11 thought fit for  them,  since he hat11 given 
them  (as  St. Peter  says)  mav'ia  mpos  cwqv  xar  ~uo~Glav, 
whatsoever  is  necessary for  the conveniences  of  life 
and information  of  virtue;  and har  put within the 
reach of their discovery the comfortable provision  for 
this life, and the way that leads to  a better.  How short 
soever their knowledge may come  of  an universal or 
perfect comprehension of whatsoever is, it yet secures 
their great concernments, that they have light enough 
to lead them to the knowledge  of their Maker, and 
the sight of their own duties.  Men may find matter 
sufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands 
with  variety,  delight,  and satisfaction,  if  they  will 
not boldly  quarrel with  their  own  constitution, and 
throw away the blessings their hands are filled with, 
because  they  are not  big  enough  to  grasp  every 
thing.  We shall not have much reason  to complain 
of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ 
them about what may be of  use  to us; for  of  that 
they are very capable :  and it will be an unpardonable, 
as well  as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the 
advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve 
it to the  ends for  which  it was  given  us,  because 
there are some things that are set out of  the reach 
of it.  It will be no excuse  to an idle and untoward 
servant, who would not attend his business by candle- 
light, to plead that he had not broad sun-shine.  The 
candle  that  is  set  up  in  US,  shines bright enough 
for  all our purposes.  The discoveries we can make 
with this, ought to satisfy us : and we shall then use 
our understandings  right, when we entertain all ob- 
jects in that way  and proportion that they are suited 
to  our  faculties,  and  upon  those  grounds they  are 
capable of being proposed to us; and not peremptorily 
or intemperately require demonstration, and demand 
certainty, where probability  only is to be had, and  which 
is  sufficient to govern all our concernments.  If we 
will disbelieve  every thing,  because  we  cannot  cer- 
tainly know  all  things,  we  shall do  muchwhat  as 
wisely as he, who would not use his legs, but sit still 
and  perish, because he had no wings to fly. 
§ 6.  When we know our own strength, 
we shall the better know what to under-  ,,four  caps- 
take with hopes of success ;  and when we  city, a  cure 
have well surveyed the powers of our own  ofscepticis" 
minds, and made some  estimate what we 
andidleness. 
may expect from them, we  shall not be inclined either 
to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in 
despair of knowing any thing ; or, on the other side, 
question  every  thing,  and  disclaim  all  knowledge, 
because some things are not to be understood.  It is 
of  great use  to the sailor, to know the length of his 
line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths 
of  the ocean.  It is well  he knows, that it is long 
enough  to reach  the  bottom,  at such  places as are 
necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against 
running upon shoals that may ruin him.  Our busi- 
ness here is not to know all things, but those which 
concern our conduct.  If we can find out those mea- 
sures, whereby a rational creature, put in that state 
in which  man is  in  this world,  may,  and  ought to 
govern his  opinions,  and  actions  depending  thereon, 
we  need  not to be troubled that some other things 
escape our knowledge. 
$ 7.  This was that which gave the first  Occasion of'  rise  to this  essay concerning  the under-  t,lis essay. 
standing.  For  I  thought that the  first 
step towards satisfying  several inquiries the mind of 
man was very apt to run into, was  to take a survey 
of  our own understandings, examine our own powers, 
and see to what things they were adapted.  Till that 
was  done, I suspected we  began  at the wrong  end, 
and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure 
possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we 
let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being ;  as 
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doubted  possession  of  our  understandings, wherein 
there was  nothing  exempt from its decisions, or that 
escaped its comprehension.  Thus men extending their 
inquiries  beyond  their  capacities,  and  letting  their 
thoughts wander  into those depths, where they can 
find no sure footing ;  it is no wonder, that they raise 
questions, and multiply disputes, which, never coming 
to  any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and 
increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in 
perfect scepticism.  Whereas, were the capacities of 
our understandings well considered, the extent of our 
knowledge  once  discovered,  and the horizon  found, 
which  sets the bounds between the enlightened and 
dark parts of  things,  between what  is  and what is 
not comprehensible  by us-men  would perhaps with 
less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the 
one,  and employ their  thoughts  and discourse with 
more advantage and satisfaction in the other.  " 
8.  Thus much I thought necessary to 
What  jdea  say  concerning  the occasion  of  this  in-  stands for. 
quiry into human  understanding.  But, 
before I proceed  on to what I have thought on this 
subject, I must here in  the entrance beg pardon  of 
my reader for the frequent use  of  the word "  idea:' 
which he will find in the following treatise,  It being 
that term,  which,  I think,  serves  best  to stand for 
whatsoever  is  the object of  the understanding when 
a man thinks ; I have used it to express whatever  is 
meant by phantasm, notioil,  species, or whatever it is 
which the mind can be employed  about in thinking ; 
and I could not avoid frequently using it (1). 
I presume it will be  easily granted me, that there 
are such  ideas  in  men's  minds:  every  one  is  con- 
scious  of them in himself,  and men's  words  and ac- 
tions will satisfy him that they are in others. 
Our first inquiry  then  shall be,  how  they come 
into the mind. 
This modest  apology of  our author could not  procure him the free 
use  of  the word  idea:  but great offence has been taken at it, and it has 
been  censured as of  dangerous consequence: to which you  may here see 
what he answers.  '  The world,'  saith  the* bishop of  Worcester,  hath 
6 been  strangely amused with  ideas of  late, and we  have been told, that 
6 strange things might be done by the help of ideas;  and yet these ideas, 
cat last,  come  to  be  only common notions of  things,  which  we  must 
r make use of in our reasoning.  You (i. e.  the author of  the Essay con- 
6 cerning Human Understanding) say in that chapter about the existence 
6 of  God,  you  thought it most  proper  to  express yourself in  the most 
r usual and familiar way,  by  common words  and expressions.  I would 
r you  had done so  quite  through  your  book;  for then  you  had  never 
6 given that occasion to  the enemies of  our faith,  to take up your new 
6 way of  ideas,  as an effectual battery  (as  they  imagined)  against  the 
(mysteries of  the  Christian  faith.  But  you  mi  ht have enjoyed  the 
satisfaction of your ideas long enough before I haf taken notice of them, 
6 unless I had found them employed about doing mischief.' 
To which our author+ replies, It is plain, that that which your lord- 
ship apprehends, in my book, may be of  dangerous consequence  to  the 
article which your lordship has endeavoured to defend, is my introducing 
new  terms;  and that which  your  lordship instances in, is that of  ideas. 
And  the reason  your  lordship gives in every of  these places, why your 
lordship has  such an a  prehension  of  ideas,  that  they may be  of  dan- 
erous consequence to tiat article of  faith which  our lordship has en- 
ieavoured to defend, is because they have been applied to  snch purposes. 
And I might  (your  lordship says) have enjoyed the satisfaction of m 
ideas long enough before you had taken notice of them, unless your lord: 
ship had found them employed in doin  mischief.  Which, at Ittst, as I 
humbly conceive, amounts  to &us  mucf,  and no more;  ub. That your 
lordship fears idem, i. e.  the term ideas, may,  some time or other, prove 
of  very dangerous consequence to what your lordship has endeavoured to 
defend, because they have been  made use of  in arguing against it.  For 
I am sure your lordship does not mean,  that  you  apprehend the things, 
signified b  ideas, may be of dangerous consequence to the article of faith 
your lordsiiP endeavours to defend, because they have been made use of 
against it: for (besides that your  lordship mentions  terms)  that would 
be to expect that those who oppose that article, should oppose it without 
any thoughts;  for the things signified by  ideas, are nothing but the im- 
mediate  objects of  our minds  in thinking:  so that unless any one can 
oppose the article your lordship defends, without thinking on something, 
he must use the things signified b  zdeas;  for he that thinks, must have 
some immediate object of his mindiin thinking, i. c.  must have ideas. 
But whether it be the name, or the thing;  ideas in sound, or ideas in 
signification, that your lordship apprehends may be  of  dangerous conse- 
qaence to  that article of  faith  which ymr  lo~.dsh+  endeavmrs to dgend-it 
seems to me,  I will  not  say a new  way of  reasoning (for that belongs to 
me) ;  but were it not your lordship's, I should think it  a very extraordinary 
way of  reasoning, to write against a book, wherein your lordship acknow- 
ledges they are not used  to bad purposes, nor employed to do mischief, 
only because you find that ideas are,  by those who oppose your lordship, 
emHoyed to do mischief;  and so apprehend, they may be  q  rdaqerow con- 
?  d  ae  wenre to the article your lordship has engaged in the  efence of.  For 
W  lether ideas as terms, or idem as the imlnediate objects of  the mind sig- 
nlfied by those terms, may be, in your lordship's apprehension, ofdangerow 
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consequence to that article-I  do not see how  our lordship's writing against 
the notion ofidem,  as staM  in my book,  wirl at all hinder your  opposers 
from  employiw them in doing mischieS, as before. 
However, be that as it  will, so it is, that your lordship apprehends these 
new  terms, these ideas, with which the world hath, of  late, been so strangely 
amwed, (though at last they come  to be  only common notions of  things,  as 
your lordship owns) may be  of  dangerous consequence to that article. 
My lord,  if  any,  in answer to  your  lordship's  sermons,  and in other 
pamphlets, wherein your lordship complains they have talked so much of 
idea, have been  troublesome to your  lordship with  that trrm, it is not 
strange  that  your  lordship  should be  tired with  that  sound:  but  how 
natural soever it be  to our weak  constitutions to be  offended with  any 
sound wherewith an importunate  din hath  been made about our  ears; 
yet, my lord, I know your  lordship has a better opinion of  the articles of 
our faith, than to  think  any of  them  can be  overturned, or so much as 
shaken, with a breath, formed into any sound or term whatsoever. 
Names  are but the  arbitrary marks  of  conceptions; and  so  they be 
sufficiently appropriated to them in their use, I know no other difference 
any of  them have in particular, but as they are of  easy or  difficult pro- 
nunciation, and of  a more or  less pleasant  sound;  and what  particular 
antipathies  there may be in men to some of them, upon that account, is 
not  easy to be  foreseen.  This I am  sure,  no term whatsoever in itself 
bears, one more than another, any opposition to truth of  any kind;  they 
are only propositions that do or can oppose the truth of  any article or doc- 
trine ;  and thus no term is privileged for being set in opposition to  truth. 
There is no word to be found, which may not be brought  into a pro- 
position, wherein the most sacred and most evident truths may be opposed ; 
but that is not a fault in the term, but him that uses it.  And therefore I 
cannot easily persuade myself  (whatever your lordship hath said in the 
heat  of  your  concern)  that you  have bestowed so much pains upon my 
book,  because the word  idea is so much used  there.  Por  though upoq 
my saying, in my chapter about the existence of God, 'That I scarceused 
the word idea in that whole chapter, your lordship wishes, that I  had done 
so quite through my book;  yet I must rather look upon that as a compli- 
ment  to  me, wherein your lordship wished  that my book  had been  all 
through suited to vulgar readers, not used to that and the like terms, than 
that your  lordship  has such  an apprehension of the word idea;  or that 
there is any such harm in the use of  it, instead of  the word notion (with 
which  your lordship seems to take it to agree in signification ,  that your 
lordship would think it worth your while to spend any part o  i  your valu- 
able time and thoughts about my book,  for having the word idea so often 
in it; for this would be  to make your  lordship to write only against an 
impropriety of speech.  I own to your lordship, it is a great condescension 
in your lordship to have done it, if that word have such a share in what 
your lordship has writ against my book,  as some expressions would per- 
suade one ;  and I would,  for the satisfaction of  your lordship, change the 
term  of  idea for a better, if your  lordship, or any one,  could help me to 
it; for, that notion will not so well stand for  every immediate object of 
the mind in thinking, as idea does,  I have (as I guess) somewhere given a 
reason in my book, by showing that the term notion is more peculiarly ap- 
propriated  to a certain sort of  those objects,  which I call mixed modes : 
and, I think, it would not sound altogether so well, to say, the notion of 
red, and the notion o  a horse;  as the idea of  red,  and the idea qf  a horse. 
But if  any one thin  I! s it will, I contend not ;  for I have no fondness for, 
nor an antipathy to, any particular articulate sounds ;  nor do I think there 
is any spell or fascination in any of  them. 
13ut  be  thc word  idea  proper  or  improper, I do  not  see how  it is thc 
better or the worse, because ill men  have ~rladc  use of  it, or because it has 
been made use of  to And  p~lrj~oser  ;  for if that be a reason to condemn, or 
lay it by,  we  must lay by  the terms, .coipfnre, reu.\or~,percej~/ron,  di.ctinct, 
c/ear, &c.  Nay, the name of  God  himself will not c:~cape; for I do not 
think any one of  these, or  any other term, can  be producccl, which hath 
not been made use of  by such men, and to such purposes.  Ancl therefore, 
if  the  unitarians,  in Iheil. l~tf~  ~~t~ntph/efs,  haoe  i?~IX.ed oery much  of;  nnrl 
&tranqeIy amuscd  the  u~orld  w~fh  itlras, I cannot believe  your  ldrilship 
will think  that word  one jot  the worse, or  the more dangerous, because 
they use it; any more than, for their use  of  them, you will think  reason 
or  scri ture terms ill or  dangerous.  And  therefore what  your  lordship 
says, tKat I  might haue  enjoyed the satisf~ction  of  tny  ideas bng enough 
before your lord~hip  had  taken  notice  qf  them, unless you  had fbzmd them 
em  oyed in doing mischi?,';  will,  I presume, when your lordship has con- 
si s"  ered  again of  this matter, prevail with  your  lordship, to let me enjoy 
still  the satisjflction I  take in  m?j ideas, i. e. as much satisfaction as I can 
take in so small a matter, as is the using of  a proper  tcrm, notwithstand- 
ing it shoz~ld  be  enzplo?/ed hy otliers in doing n~icclizqf~ 
For, my lord, if I should leave it  wholly out of my book, and substitute 
the word notion every where in the room of  it, and every body else do so 
too,  (though your  lordship does not,  I suppose, suspect that I have the 
vanity to think they would follow my example) my book  would, it seems, 
be  the more to  your  lordship's liking; but I do not see how this would 
one jot abate the mischif  your lordship complains of.  For the unitarians 
might as much employ notions, as they do now ideas, to do mischief;  un- 
less they are such fools to think  they can conjure with  this notable word 
idea, and that the force of  what they say, lies in  the sound, and not in 
the signification of  their terms. 
This I am  sure of,  that the truths of the Christian religion can be no 
more  battered by one word  than  another;  nor  can they be beaten down 
or endangered b  any sound whatsoever.  And I am apt to flatter myself, 
that your  lor(lsKip is satisfied that there is no  harm in the word ideal, 
because you say, you should not have taken any notice of my ideas, if the 
enemies of  our faith  had not taken up my  new  way qf  ideas, as an efictuat 
battery against the  nzysteries  of  the Christian faith.  In which place,  69 
new  way of  idea.?, nothing,  I think, can be construed to be meant,  but my 
expressing myself by that of ideas;  and not by other more common words, 
and of ancienter standing in the English language. 
As  to  the objection, of  the author's way by ideas being a new  way,  he 
thus answers:  my  new  way  by  ideas,  or  may way  1?1/ ideas,  which  often 
occurs  in  your  lordship's  letter, is,  I co~fess,  a very large and doubtful 
expression, and may, in the full latitude,  oomprehend my whole ess0.y ; 
because  treating  in  it of  the understanding, which  is nothing  but the 
faculty of  thinking, I could not well  treat of  that  faculty of  the mind, 
which  consists in thinking, without considering the immediate objects of 
the mind in thinking, which I call idea.? :  and therefore in treating of the 
understanding, I guess it will not  be  thought  strange, that the  greatest 
part  of  my book  has been taken up, in considering what these objects of 
the mind, in thinking, are ;  whence they come ;  what use the mind makes 
of them, in its several ways of  thinking;  and what are the outward marks 
whereby it signifies them to others, or records them for its own use.  And 
this, in short, is my  wa?j by  ideas, that which your lordship calls nzy  new 
way by  ideas;  which, my lord, if it be new,  it is but a new  history of  an 
old thing.  For I think it  will not be doubted, that men always performed 
the actions of  thinking, reasonb~g,  b~lieuin~,  and knowing, just after the 
same manner they do now;  though whetlicr the same account has herc- 10  INTRODUCTION.  INTRODUCTION.  11 
tofore been given of  the way how they performed these actions, or wherein 
they consisted, 1 do not know.  Were  I  as well read as your  lordship, I 
should have been safe from that gentle  reprimand of  your  lordship's,  for 
thinking  my way  of  ideas  NEW,  for  want  of looking  into  other men's 
thoughts, which appear in  their bo6ks. 
Your  lordship's words,.  as an acknowledgment  of your instructions in 
the case, and as a warning to others,  who will  be so bol4adventurers as 
to spin  any thing bare1  out  of  their own thoughts,  I  shall  set down at 
large.  And they run ttus : Whether you took this way of  ideas  from  the 
modem philosopher  mentioned  by  ou,  is not  at all  material;  but I in- 
tended no rrflction upow you in it rfbr that you mean, by my commending 
you as a scholar  of  so great a  mas2er) ;  I never  meant to  take ,from you 
the honour of  your own inventions :  and Ido believe you zohen you say,  That 
you  wrote from  your  own  thoughts,  and  the  ideas you  had  there.  But 
many  things may seem  new  20  one,  who  converses  only  with his  own 
thoughts,  which  really  are  not  so;  as  he  may $nd,  when he looks into 
the thoughts of  other  men,  which appear in their  books.  And  therefore, 
although I  have a just  esteem for  the  invention  qf  such  who  can spin 
volumes  barely out  of  their  own  thoughts;  yet  I  am apt  to think,  they 
would  oblige the world more,  if, after  they have  thought  so  much  them- 
selves,  they  would  examine  what  thoughts  others  have  had  bcfore  them 
clmcerning  the  same  things;  that  so  those  may  not  be  thought  their 
own inventions which are common  to  themselves  and  others.  If a  man 
should try all the mqnetical experiments himsejfi  and publish  them as his 
own thoughts,  he might take himself  to be  the  inventor  of them;  but  he 
that examines and compares  with them what Gilbert and others have done 
before him,  will not  diminish  the praise  of  his diligence,  but may wish he 
had  compared  his thoughts  with other  men's;  by which  the  world would 
receiue greater advantage,  although he  had  lost  the  honour  of  being  an 
originat: 
To  alleviate my  fault herein, I  agree with your  lordship,  that many 
things may seem  NEW to one  that converses  only with his own thoughts, 
which really are not so :  but I must crave leave to  suggest to your lordship, 
that if in  the spinning  them out of his own thoughts, they seem new to 
him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and  they may as justly be 
thought his  own  invention, as any one's ;  and he is as certainly the  inventor 
of  them, as any one who thought on them before  him :  the distinction of 
invention, or not invention, lyingnot in  thinking first, or not first, but in 
borrowing,  or  not  borrowing,  our  thoughts  from  another: and  he to 
whom, spinning them out of his own thoughts, they seem new,  could not 
certainly borrow them from another.  So he truly invented printing in 
Europe, who, without an  communication with the Chinese, spun it out of  K  his own thoughts; thoug  it were ever so true,  that the Chznese had the 
use of pinting,  nay,  of  inting  in the very same  way,  among them, 
many ages  before him.  &  that he that spins an  thing out of  his own 
thoughts, that sermn new to him,,  cannot  cease to tiink it his own inven- 
tion, should he  examine ever so far,  what thoughts others haue had before 
him rrmccrning thc arLrnc. thing, and whquld  find,  by  examining,  that thev 
hail the same thoughts too. 
Hut what great  r,blig{~fion  thin  u~ould  be  to the  world, or weighty  cause 
of  turning  over  and  looking  into books,  I  confess  I  do not  see.  The 
great end to me, in conversing with m  own or other men's  thoughts, in 
matters of qeculntion,  is to find  truti, without being  much concerned 
whether my  own s  inning of it  out of mine,  or their s  inning of it out 
of  their awn thoq  K ts, helps me to it.  And how little faffect the honour 
q  an original, may  be secn at that place of  my  book, where, if  any where, 
t f  at itch of  vain-glory  was likeliest  to have  shown itself, had  I  been 60 
over-run  with it, as  to need  a  cure:  it is where  I  speak  of certainty, 
in these following  words,  taken notice of by  your  lordship, in another 
place:  'I  think 1 have show6 wherein it is that certainty,  real certainty, 
r  ;  which, whatever  it was to others, was, I  confess, to me, here- 
tofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.' 
Here, m  lo1 d, however new this seemed to me, (and the more so because 
possibly 1 Lad  in  vain hunted for  it  in the books  of  others)  et I  spoke 
0f1t as new,  only to myself; leaving others in  the undisturbeJpossession 
of what  either  by invention,  or  reading,  was  theirs  before,  without 
rnsuming to myself any other honour, but that of  my  own ignorance, till 
that time, if others before had  shown wherein certainty lay.  And yet, 
my  lord, if  I had,  upon this occasion,  been forward  to assume to myself 
the honour  of an original,  I  think I  had been pretty safe in it; since I 
should  have had  your lordship for  my  guarantee and  vindicator in that 
point,  who are pleased  to call it new, and, as such,  to write against it. 
And truly, my  lord, in  this respect, my  book has had ver  unlucky stars, 
since it hath had  the misfortune  to displease yourlordsKip, with many 
things in  it, for  their novelty; as new way of-' reasoning,  new hypolhesis 
about reason,  new sort  of certainty,  new  terms,  new way qf  ideas,  new 
method  qf  certainty, &c.  And yet, in  other places, your  lordship seems 
to think it worthy in me  of  your  lordship's reflection, for saying but what 
others have said before :  as where I say, '  In  the different  make of men's 
'  tempers, and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more 
'  on one,  and some  on another, for  the confirmation of the same truth.' 
Your lordship asks,  What is this d!rerent,from  what all  men of  under- 
standing have  said?  Again,  1 take it,  lordship meant not these 
words for a commendation of  my  book,  w  ere you say,  But $no more be 
meant by '  The  simple  ideas that come in  b  sensation,  or reflection, and 
their being  the foundation  of our knowle&e,'  but  that  our  notions  of 
things come  in, either ,from our  senses  OP the  exercise  of our  rnindP;  as 
there  is nothing extraordinary in the discovery,  so  your  lordship  is far 
enough  from opposing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed. 
And again, But what need all this great noise about ideas and certainty, 
true and real certainty by ideas, ifi after all, it comes only do  this ;  that our 
ideas  only  represent  to  us such  things, from  whence  we  bring  argu- 
ments to prove  the truth of  things ? 
But the world  huth beea  strangely amused  with ideas o  late;  and we 
have been told, that strange things might be done by the hep  of  ideas;  and  f  yet these ideas, at last, come to be, only common notions of things, which we 
must make use of in our reasoning-. And to the  like purpose  in  other places. 
Whether,  therefore,  at last,  your  lordship will resolve that it is new or 
no,  or more faulty by  its being new, must be left to your lordship.  This  1 find  by  it, that my  book  cannot avoid being condemned on the one side 
qr the other, nor do I aee a possibility  to  help it.  If  there be readers that 
like only new thoughts ;  or, on the  other side, others that can bear nothing 
but what  can be justified by  received  authorities in  rint-I  must desire 
them  to make themselves amends in that part which tiey  like, for the  dis- 
pleasure  they  receive  in the  other;  but if any should  be so exact, 
to find  fault with  both, truly I know  not well what to say to  them.  The 
case is a plain  case, the  book is all over naught, ana there is not q sentence 
1"  it, that is not, either for its  antiquity or novelty, to be condemned ;  and 
So  there is a short end of it.  From your lordship,  indeed, in  particular, 
I  can hope  for  somethin  better; for  your  lordship  thinks the general 
definn of  it so good, that tiat, I flatter myself, would prevail on your  lord- 
shlp to  preserve  it from the fire. But as to  the way,  your lordship thinks,  I should have taken to pre- 
vent the having it thou,@  nzy  invention,  ullzen  it u~as  common to  rile with 
others,  it unluckily so fell  out,  in  the suleect of  my Essay of  Human 
Understanding, that I could not look into the thoughts  of  other  men  to 
inform myself:  for my  design being,  as well as I could, to copy nature, 
and to give an account of the operations of  the n~ind  in thinking ;  I could 
look into nobody's  understanding  but my own,  to  see  how it wrought; 
nor have a prospect into other men's  minds, to view their thoughts  there, 
and observe what ste  s and motions  they took,  and  by what gradations 
they  proceeded  irt  tgeir  acquainting  themselves  with  truth,  and  their 
advance in knowledge:  what we  find of  their thoughts in books,  is but 
the result of  this,  and not the progress and working of  their minds,  in 
coming to the opinions or conclusions they set down and published. 
All therefore,  that I can say of  my book,  is,  that it is a copy of  my 
own mind,  in  its several ways  of  operation : and  all that I can  say for 
the publishing of  it is,  that I think the intellectual  faculties are made, 
and operate alike in most men; and that some, that I showed it to before 
I published it, liked it so well, that I was confirmed in that opinion.  And 
therefore, if  it should happen,  that it should not  be so,  but that some 
men should have  ways  of  thinking,  reasoning, or arriving  at certainty, 
different from  others,  and above those that I find my mind to use and 
acquiesce in,  I do not  see  of  what  use  my book  can be to them.  I can 
only make  it my humble request, in my own name,  and in the name of 
those that are of  my size, who find their minds work,  reason,  and know 
in the same low way that mine  does,  that  those  men of  a more happy 
genius would show us the way of  their  nobler flights ;  and particularly 
would discover to us their shorter or surer way to certainty, than by ideas, 
and the observing their agreement or disagreement. 
Your lordship adds,  But, now,  it seems, nothing is i~ztelligible  but what 
suits with the new  waay of  ideas.  My lord,  The new way  of  ideas,  and 
the old way  of  speaking intelligib(y, * was  always and  ever will be the 
same ;  and if I may take  the liberty to  declare my sense of  it,  herein it 
consists : 1. That a man use no words,  but such as he makes the signs of 
certain determined  objects of  his  mind in thinking, which he can make 
known to another.  2. Next, That he use the same word  steadily for the 
sign of  the same immediate object of his mind in thinking.  3.  That  he 
join  those words together  in  propositions, according to  the grammatical 
rules of  that language he speaks in.  4.  That he unite those sentences in 
a coherent discourse.  Thus, and thus only, I humbly  conceive,  any one 
may preserve himself from the  confines and suspicion of jargon, whether 
he pleases to call  those immediate objects of  his mind, which his words 
do,  or should stand for, ideas, or no. 
+  Mr. Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. 
CHAPTER  11. 
No  Innate Principles ia  the Mind. 
5  1. I~is  an  established opinion amongst  TI,, 
some men,  that there are in  the under-  shown how 
standing certain  innate ~rinci~les.  some  we  Vnle by 
L,  L  I  '  - - 
primary notions, xolvar ~vvolal  ; characters, as  any know- 
ledge,  suffi- 
it were, stamped upon  the mind  of man,  cient to 
which  the soul  receives  in  its very first  prove it not 
being,  and brings into the world Gith it.  innate. 
It  would be sufficient  to convince unprejudiced readers 
of  the falseness  of  this supposition, if I should only 
show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of  this 
discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural 
faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, 
without the help of any innate impressions : and may 
arrive at certainty, without any such original notions 
or principles.  For I imagine any one will easily grant, 
that it would  be impertinent to suppose the ideas of 
colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given 
sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from 
external objects;  and no less  unreasonable would it 
be  to attribute several truths to the impressions of 
nature, and innate  characters, when we  may observe 
in ourselves faculties, fit to attain as easy and certain 
knowledge  of  them,  as if  they  were  originally im- 
printed on the mind. 
But because  a man is not permitted without cen- 
sure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, 
when they lead him ever so little out of the common 
road; I shall set down the reasons  that  made  me 
doubt of  the truth of that opjnion,  as an excuse for 
my mistake, if I be in one ; which I leave to be con- 
sidered by those, who, with me, dispose themselves to 
embrace truth wherever they find it. 14  No  Innate Pri~zcipZes  in the Mind.  Book  1. 
General  as-  §  2.  There is nothing more commonly 
sent the  taken  for  granted,  than that there  are 
great argu-  certain  principles,  both  speculative  and 
ment.  practical  (for  they speak  of  both),  uni- 
versally agreed upon  by  all mankind;  which  there- 
fore, they argue, must needs be constant impressions, 
which the souls of  men receive  in their first beings, 
and which they bring  into  the world with  them  as 
necessarily and really as  they do any of  their inhe- 
rent faculties. 
5 3.  This argument, drawn from uni- 
Universal  versal consent, has this misfortune in it ; 
consent 
proves no-  that if it were true in matter of fact, that 
thing innate.  there  were  certain  truths,  wherein  all 
mankind agreed, it would not prove them 
innate,  if  there can  be  any other way  shown,  how 
men  may  come  to that universal  agreement in the 
things they do consent in ;  which I presume may be 
'done. 
,. What  is,  § 4.  But, which is worse, this argument 
is,''  and u it  of universal consent, which is made use of 
isimpossible  to prove innate principles, seems to me a 
for the same  demonstration that there are none such ; 
thing to be, 
,d  not  because there are none to  which all man- 
be," notuni-  kind  give  an universal  assent.  I  shall 
versally as-  begin -~ith  the speculative, and instance 
sentea to.  in  those magnified  principles  of demon- 
stration ; '' whatsoever is, is ;" and, "  it is impossible 
for the same thing to be, and not to be ;" which,  of 
all others, I think have the most allowed title to in- 
nate.  These have so settled a reputation of maxims 
universally received,  that it  will, no doubt, be thought 
strange, if any one should seem to question it.  But 
yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are 
so far from having an universal assent, that there are 
great part of mankind to whom they are not so much 
as known. 
Not  on  the  § 5.  For,  first,  it is evident,  that all 
mind  children and idiots have not the least ap- 
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prehension or thought of  them;  and the  mlly im- 
want  of  that is  enough  to destroy that  printed, be- 
universal  assent,  which  must  needs  be  cause not 
the necessary  concomitant  of  all innate  to 
truths: it  seeming  to  me  near  a  con-  chi'dren3 
idiots, &c.  tradiction,  to  say, that  there  are truths 
imprinted  on  the soul, which  it perceives  or under- 
stand~  not ;  imprinting, if it signify any thing, being 
nothing  else,  but the  making  certain  truths to  be 
perceived.  For  to imprint  any thing  on  the mind, 
without the mind's  perceiving it, seems to me hardly 
intelligible.  If therefore  children  and  idiots  have 
souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, 
they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily 
know  and assent  to these truths;  which, since they 
do not,  it is evident that there are no such impres- 
sions:  for  if  they  are  not  notions  naturally  im- 
printed,  how  can  they  be  innate ?  and  if  they  are 
notions imprinted,  how  can they be unknown ?  To 
say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at  the 
same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and 
never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression 
nothing.  No proposition can be said to be in the mind, 
which it never yet knew, which it was never yet cbn- 
scious  of:  for  if  any one  may,  then,  by  the same 
reason,  all propositions  that are true, and the mind 
is capable  of  ever assenting to, may be said to be in 
the mind, and to be imprinted :  since, if any one can 
be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew,it 
must be only, because it is capable of knowing it ;  and 
SO the mind is of all truths it ever shall know.  Nay, 
thus truths may be imprinted on the mind,  which ~t 
never  did, nor  ever  shall know : for  a man may live 
lon~,  and  die  at last  in ignorance of  many  truths, 
which  his  mind was  capable  of  knowing,  and  that 
with  certainty.  So that if the capacity of knowing 
be the natural impression contended for, all the truths 
a man ever  comes to know, will, by this account, be 
every one  of them innate;  and this great point will 16  No Innate Principles in the Mind. Book 1. 
amount to no more, but only to a very improper way 
of speaking ;  which, whilst  it pretends  to assert the 
contrary, says nothing different from those who deny 
innate  principles : for  nobody, I think,  ever  denied 
that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. 
The capacity, they say, is innate, the knowledge ac- 
quired.  But then to what end such contest for cer- 
tain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on 
the understanding without being perceived, I can see 
no  difference  there  can be  between  any truths the 
mind is capable of knowing,in respect of their original : 
they must  all be innate, or a11  adventitious :  in vain 
shall a man go about to distinguish them.  He, there- 
fore, that talks of innate notions in the understanding, 
cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) 
mean such truths to be in the understanding, as it never 
perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of: for if these 
words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, 
they signify to be understood : so that, to be in the 
understanding, and  not  to be understood-to  be in 
the mind, and never to be perceived-is  all one, as to 
say, any thing is,  and is not, in the mind or under- 
standing.  If therefore these two propositions, "  what- 
soever is, is,"  and "  it is impossible for the same thing 
to  be, and not to be,"  are by nature imprinted, children 
cannot be ignorant of them ;  infants, and all that have 
souls, must necessarily have them in their understand- 
ings, know the truth of them, and assent to it. 
That men  § 6. To  avoid this, it  is usually answered, 
know  them  That all men know and assent to them, 
when  they  when they come to the use of reason, and 
come  to  the  this is enough to prove  them innate.  1  - 
use of reason, 
- 
answered.  answer, 
6  7.  Doubtful  expressions,  that  have 
schrce any sig;ification,  go for dear reasons to those, 
who bc'  .:prepossessed,  take not the pains to examine 
even wha~  they themselves say.  For to apply this an- 
swer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, 
it must signify one of these two things : either, that, 
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as soon as men come to the use of reason, these supposed 
native inscriptions come to be known and observed by 
them;  or  else,  that  the  use  and  exercise  of  men's 
reason assists them in the discovery of these principles, 
and certainly makes them known to them. 
§ 8. If they mean,  that  by the use  of  If reason 
reason men may discover these principles,  tEg~,", 
and that this is  sufficient to prove  them  would not 
innate ; their way  of  arguing will  stand  prove then, 
thus :  viz. that whatever truths reason can  innate. 
certainly  discover  to us,  and make us  firmly  assent 
to,  those  are all  naturally  imprinted on  the mind; 
since that universal assent, which is made the mark of 
them, amounts to no more but this ;  that by the use of 
reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge 
of,  and  assent  to  them ; and,  by  this  means,  there 
will  be  no  difference  between  the  maxims  of  the 
mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them : 
all must  be  equally allowed  innate;  they  being  all 
discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that 
a  rational  creature may  certainly come to know,  if 
he apply his thoughts rightly that way. 
6 9. But how can these men think the use  Jtisfalsethat 
of ieason necessary to discover principles  ~~$~~~- 
that are su~~osed  innate. when reason (if 
we may beii'eve them)  is  nothing  else cut the faculty 
of deducing unknown  truths  from  principles, or pro- 
positions, that are already known? That certainly can 
llever be thought innate, which we have need of reason 
to  discover;  unless,  as I have  said, we will  have  all 
the certain truths that reason  ever teaches  us,  to be 
innate.  We may as well  think the use of  reason  ne- 
cessary to make our eyes discover  visible  objects,  as 
that there should  be need  of  reason,  or the exercise 
thereof,  to make  the understanding see what  is  ori- 
ginally engraven on it,  and cannot  be  in  the under- 
standing  before  it  be  perceived  by  it.  So that  to 
make reason  discover  those  truths  thus imprinted, is 
Say, that the use of reason discovers to a lna11  what 
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he  knew  before; and if  men  have those innate  im- 
pressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, 
and yet are always ignorant of  them, till they come 
to the use  of  reason; it is in  effect  to say,  that men 
know, and know them not, at the same time. 
§ 10.  It  will here perhaps be said, that mathemati- 
cal demonstrations,  and other  truths that are not in- 
nate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein 
they are distinguished from these  maxims, and other 
innate  truths.  I  shall have  occasion  to  speak  of 
assent upon the first proposing, more particularly, by 
and by.  I shall here only, and that very readily,  al- 
low, that these maxims and mathematical demonstra- 
tions are in this different; that the one have  need of 
reason,  lasing  of  proofs,  to make them  out,  and  to 
gain our assent ;  but the other, as soon as understood, 
are, without  any  the least  reasoning,  embraced  and 
assented to.  But I withal beg leave to observe,  that 
it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which re- 
quires the use of reason for the discovery  of these ge- 
neral truths ;  since it must be confessed, that in their 
discovery there is no use  made  of  reasoning  at all. 
And I think those who  give this  answer  will  not be 
forward to affirm, that the knowledge  of this maxim, 
"  That it is impossible  for the same thing to be,  and 
not  to  be,"  is  a  deduction  of  our  reason:  for  this 
would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem 
so'fond of, whilst  they make  the knowledge of those 
principles to depend  on  the labour  of  our thoughts. 
For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and re- 
quires pains  and  application ;  and how can it, with 
any tolerable  sense,  be  supposed,  that what was  im- 
printed by nature, as the foundation and guide of  our 
reason, should need the use of reason to discover it? 
§ 11. Those who will take the pains to reflect with 
a little attention on  the operativns of the understand- 
ing,  will find, that this  ready assent of  the mind  to 
some truths, depends not either on native inscription, 
or  the use  of reason; but on  a  faculty of  the mind 
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quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see here- 
after.  Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in pro- 
curing our assent to these maxims,  if, by saying that 
men know and assent to them when  hey come to the 
use of reason, be meant, that the use of  reason assists 
us  in  the knowledge  of these  maxims, it  is utterly 
false ;  and were it true, would prove them not to be 
innate. 
§  12. If by knowing and assenting to  The cohing 
them, when we come to the use of reason,  to the use of 
be  meant,  that  this  is  the time  when 
~es~'~~e  they come to be taken notice  of  by the  to 
mind ;  and that, as soon as children come  know these 
to the use  of  reason,  they  come  also  to  maxims. 
know  and  assent to these maxims ;  this also is false 
and frivolous.  First, it is false ;  because it is evident 
these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use 
of  reason,  and therefore  the coming  to the use  of 
reason  is  falsely assigned  as the time  of  their  dis- 
covery.  How many instances  of  the  use  of  reason 
may we observe in children, a  long time behre they 
have any knowledge  of  this maxim, "  That it is im~ 
possible for  the  same  thing  to be,  and not to be ?" 
And  a  great part  of  illiterate people,  and  savages, 
*  pass many years, even  of  their rational age, without 
ever thinking on  this,  and the like  general proposi- 
tions.  I grant, men  come not to the knowledge of 
these  general  and more  abstract truths,  which  are 
thought innate,  till they come to the use of reason ; 
and I  add,  nor  then  neither : which is so, because, 
till after they come to the useof reason, those general 
abstract ideas  are not  framed  in  the  mind,  about 
which those general maxims are, which  are mistaken 
for innate principles ;  but are indeed discoveries made, 
and verities introduced  and brought into the  mind 
hy the same way, and discovered by the same steps, 
several other propositions,  which  nobody was ever 
so extravagant as to sup ose innate.  This I hope to  P  make plain in  the seque  of  this discourse.  I allow 
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therefore  a  necessity  that men  should  come to the 
use of reason before they get the knowledge of those 
general truths, but  deny that men's  coming  to the 
use of reason is the time of their discovery. 
By this they  §  13.  In the mean  time  it is  obser- 
are not di-  vable, that this saying, That men  know 
stinguished 
from other  and  assent  to these  maxims when they 
knowable  come  to the use  of  reason, amounts, in 
truths.  reality of fact, to no more but this, That 
they are never known, nor taken notice of, before the 
use of reason,  but may possibly be assented to, some 
time  after, during a  man's life,  but when,  is uncer- 
tain ;  and so may all other knowable truths, as well as 
these;  which  therefore  have  no  advantage  nor  di- 
stinction from others, by  this  note  of  being  known 
when we  come to the use of reason,  nor are thereby 
proved to be innate, but quite the contrary. 
~f  to  5 14.  But, secondly, were it true that 
the use of  the  ~recise  time  of  their  being  known 
-  I 
reason were  and assented to were when meccome to 
the time of  the use  of  reason,  neither  would  that  thelr disco- 
rery,itaould  prove them innate.  This way of arguing 
not prove  is as frivolous as the supposition of  itself 
them innate-  is false.  For bv what kind of logic will 
it appear, that any notion is originally by natire im- 
printed in the mind in its first  constitution, because 
it comes first to be observed  and assented to, when a 
faculty of  the mind, which  has quite a  distinct pro- 
vince, begins to exert itself?  And therefore, tlle coming 
to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that 
these maxims are first assented to,  (which it may be 
with  as much truth as  the time when  men  come to 
the use of reason) would be as good a proof that they 
were innate,  as to say, they are innate, because men 
assent to them when they come to the use of reason. 
I agree then with these men of innate principles, that 
there is no  knowledge of these general and selgevi- 
dent maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise 
of  reason ;  but I deny that the  coming to the use of 
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reason is the precise time when  they are first taken 
notice of; and if that were  the precise time, I deny 
that it would prove them innate.  All that can, with 
any truth,  be  meant by  this proposition,  that men 
assent to them when they come to the use of reason, 
is no more but this ;  that the making of general abs- 
tract ideas, and the understahding of general names, 
being  a  concomitant  of  the  rational  faculty,  and 
growing up with it, children commonly get not those 
general ideas, nor learn the  names that stand for them, 
till,  having  for  a good while  exercised their  reason 
about familiar  and more  particular ideas,  they are, 
by their  ordinary discourse  and actions with  others, 
acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. 
If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the 
use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire 
it may be shown, or at least, how in this, or any other 
sense, it proves them innate. 
6 15. ~\e  senses at  first let  in particular  The stepsby 
ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet;  :zfzns 
and the mind by degrees growing familiar   sever,^ 
with some of them, they are lodged in the  truths. 
memory, and names gbt to them : after- 
wards, the mind, proceeding  farther,  abstracts them, 
and by degrees learns the use of  general names.  In 
this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas 
and language,  the materials  about which to exercise 
its discursive faculty;  and the use  of reason becomes 
daily more visible, as these materials, that give it em- 
ployment,  increase.  But though the having  of  ge- 
neral ideas, and the use of general words and reason, 
usually grow together,  yet,  I see not how this any 
way  proves  them innate.  The knowledge  of  some 
truths,  I confess,  is very early in the mind,  but in a 
way that shows them not to be  innate.  For, if we 
will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not 
innate, but acquired ;  it being about those first which 
are imprinted  by external things, with which infants 
have  earliest to do,  which make the most  frequent 9  No Innate Principles in the Mind.  Book 1. 
impressions on their  senses.  In ideas thus got, the 
mind  discovers  that  some  agree  and others  differ, 
 roba ably  as soon  as it has  any  use  of memory;  as 
soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. 
But whether it be then, or no,  this is certain ;  it does 
so long before it  has the use of words, or comes to  that, 
which we commonly call "the use of reason."  For a 
child knows as certainly, before  it can speak, the dif- 
ference between the ideas of  sweet and bitter,  (i. e. 
that sweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when 
it comes to speak) that wormwood  and  sugar-plums 
are not the same thing. 
§ 16.  A  child knows  not that three and four  are 
equal to seven, till he comes to  be able to count seven, 
and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, 
upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, 
or rather perceives the truth of that proposition.  But 
neither does  he then readily  assent, because it is an 
innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then, be- 
cause he wanted the use of  reason;  but the truth of 
it appears to him, as soon as he has settled in his mind 
the clear  and distinct ideas that these  names  stand 
for; and then he knows the truth of that proposition, 
upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that 
he knew before that a  rod  and a  cherry are not the 
same thing ;  and upon the same grounds also, that he 
may come to know afterwards, "  that it is impossible 
for the same thing to be,  and not to be:'  as shall be 
more fully shown hereafter.  So that the later it is beT 
fore any one comes to have those general ideas, about 
which those maxims are ;  or to  know the signification 
of  those general terms that stand  for  them; or  to 
put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the 
later also will it be before he comes to assent to those 
maxims, whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, 
being no more innate than thoae of a cat or a weasel, 
he must stay till time and observation have acquainted 
him with them ;  and then he will  be in a  capacity to 
know the truth of  these  maxims, upon  the first  oc- 
that shall  make  him put together those ideas 
in his mind, and  observe whether  they agree  or dis- 
agree, according as is expressed in those propositions. 
And therefore it is,  that a man knows  that eighteen 
and nineteen are equal  to thirty-seven,  by the same 
self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to 
three :  yet a child knows this not so soon as the other, 
not  for want  of the  use of  reason,  but because the 
ideas the words  eighteen,  nineteen, and thirty-seven 
stand for, are not  so  so011  got,  as those which  are 
signified by lone, two, and three. 
3 17.  This evasion therefore of general  Assenting as 
assent, when men come to the use of rea-  Pro- 
posed and 
son, failing as it does, and leaving no dif- 
ference  between  those  supposed innate,  proves  them 
and other truths that are afterwards ac-  not innate. 
quired and learnt, men have endeavoured 
to secure  an  universal  assent  to  those  they  call 
maxims, by saying,  they are generally assented to as 
soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in, 
understood :  seeing all men, even children, as soon as 
they hear and understand the terms,  assent to these 
propositions,  they think it is sufficient to prove them 
innate.  For since men never fail, after they have once 
understood the words, to acknowledge  them for  un- 
doubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these 
propositions were first lodged  in the understanding, 
which, without  any teaching,  the mind,  at the very 
first  proposal,  immediately closes with,  and  assents 
to, and after that never doubts again. 
§  18.  In  answer  to this,  I  demand  If such an  assent be  "  whether ready assent given to a propo-  amark of in- 
sition upon first hearing, and understand-  n.%  then 
ing the terms, be  a  certain  mark  of an  '<that one 
innate principle ?"  If it be not, such a ge-  and two are  equal to 
neral assent is in vain urged as a proof of  three,  that 
them :  if it be  said, that it is  a mark of  sweetnes,  is 
innate, they must then allow all such pro-  not Utter- 
positions to  be innate which are generally  uessy" anan 24  No  Innate Principles in the Mind.  Book 1. 
thousandthe  assented  to as  soon  as heard, whereby 
like, must be  they  will  find  themselves  plentifully 
innate.  stored with innate principles.  For upon 
the  same ground, viz.  of  assent  at firvt hearing and 
understanding the terms,  that men would have those 
maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several 
propositions about  numbers to be innate ; and thus, 
that one and two  are equal to three ;  that two and 
two are equal to four ;  and a  multitude of  other the 
like propositions in numbers,  that every body assents 
to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must 
have a place amongst these innate axioms.  Nor is this 
the prerogative of  numbers  alone,  and propositions 
made about several of them ;  but even natural philo- 
sophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions 
which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are 
understood.  That two bodies cannot be in the same 
place, is a truth that nobody any more sticks at, than 
at these  maxims, that it is impossible  for  the same 
thing to be,  and not to be;  that white is not black; 
that a  square is not  a  circle; that yellowness  is not 
sweetness :" these,  and a million of other such propo- 
sitions, (as many at least as we have distinct ideas of) 
every man in his wits,  at first hearing,  and knowing 
what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. 
If these men will be true to their own rule,  and have 
assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to 
be a mark of innate, they must allow, not only as many 
innate propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as 
Inany as men can make propositions, wherein different 
ideas are denied one of another.  Since every proposi- 
tion, wherein one  different idea is denied of another, 
will as certainly find assent at  first hearing and under- 
standing the  terms, as this general one, ''  it is irnpossi- 
ble for the same thing to be,  and not to be ;" or that 
which is the foundation of it, and is the easier under- 
stood  of  the two, '(  the same is  not  different :" by 
which account they will have legions of innate propo- 
sitions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. 
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But since no proposition can be innate,unless the ideas, 
about which it is,  be innate ;  this will  be, to suppose 
all our ideas of colours,  sounds,  taste, figure, &c.  in- 
nate, than which there cannot be any thing more op- 
posite to reason and experience.  Universal and ready 
assent,upon hearing and understanding the terms,is (I 
grant) a mark of self-evidence ;  but self-evidence, de- 
pending not on innate impressions, but on something 
else  (as we  shall show hereafter), belongs to several 
propositions, which nobody was yet so extravagant as 
to pretend to be innate. 
$19. Nor let it be said, that those more  such less 
  articular self-evident ~ro~ositions,  which  general pro- 
I.  positions 
bre assented to at  first hearing, as,that one  be- 
and two are equal to three ;  that green is  fore  these  .--  -  .  ~  ~- 
not  red, &c.;  are received  as  the conse-  universal 
quences of  those more  universal proposi-  maxims- 
tions, which are looked on as innate principles ; since 
any one, who will  but take the pains to observe what 
passes  in  the understanding, will certainly find,  that 
these, and the like less  general propositions,  are cer- 
tainly known, and firmly assented to, by those who are 
utterly ignorant of  those more general maxims ; and 
so,  being earlier in the mind  than those (as they are 
called) first principles;  cannot owe to them the assent 
wherewith they are received at first hearing. 
§ 20. If it be said, that "  these proposi-  Oneandon, 
tions, viz.  two and two are equal to four ;  equal to 
red  is  not  blue,  &c.;  are not  general  two,  kc. 
maxims, nor of any great use ;" I answer,  nor  "Ot  genera'  useful, 
that makes nothing to the  argument of uni-  an,we,,d~ 
versa1 assent,  upon  hearing  and under- 
standing: for,  if that be the certain mark of  innate, 
whatever  proposition can be found that receives ge- 
neral assent as soon as heard andunderstood, that must 
be admitted for an innate proposition,  as well as this 
maxim,  that it  is impossible for the same thing to be, 
and not to be ;" they being upon this ground equal. 
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makes this maxim  more  remote  from being innate; 
those general and abstract ideas being more strangers 
to our &st apprehensions, than those of more particular 
self-evident propositions,  and  therefore it is  longer 
before they are admitted and assented to by the grow- 
ing understanding.  And as to the usefulness of these 
magnified maxims,  that perhaps will not be found so 
great as is  generally conceived, when it comes in its 
due place to be more fully considered. 
These  §  21.  But we  have not yet done with 
maxims not  assenting  to propositions at first hearing 
beingknown  and understanding  their term;;  it is fit  sometimes 
tillproposed,  we first take notice, that this, instead of 
proves them  being  a mark  that they  are innate,  is  n 
not innate.  proof of  the contrary ;  since it supposes 
that several, who understand and know other things, 
are ignorant of  these principles, till they are proposed 
to them ;  and that one may be unacquainted with these 
truths,  till he hears them from others.  For if  they 
were innate, what need they he proposed in order to 
gaining assent ;  when, by being in the understanding, 
by s  natural and original impression,(if there were any 
such) they could not but be known before? Or doth 
the proposing  them print them clearer in the mind 
than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, 
that a man knows them better after he has been thus 
taught them than he did before.  Whence it  will follow, 
that these principles may be made more evident to us 
by  others teaching, than  nature  has made them by 
impression;  which will ill agree with the opinion of 
innate principles, and give but little authority to them; 
but,on the contrary, makes them unfit tobe the founda- 
tions of all our other knowledge, as they are pretended 
to be.  This cannot be denied; that men grow first 
acquainted  with  many  of  these  self-evident  truths, 
upon their being proposed : but it is clear, that who- 
soever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to 
know  a  proposition  which he knew not before,  and 
which, from thenceforth, he never questions ;  not be- 
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cause it was innate, but because the considelation of 
the nature of  the things  contained  in  those  words, 
would  not  suffer  him  to  think  otherwise, how  or 
whensoever he is brought to reflect on them:  and  if 
whatever is assented  to,  at first hearing and  under- 
standing the terms, must pass for an innate principle, 
every well-grounded  observation,  drawn  from  par- 
ticulars  into  a  general rule,  must  be  innate;  when 
yet it is certain, that not all, but only sagacious heads, 
light at first on these observations, and reduce them 
into  general propositions, not  innate,  but  collected 
from a preceding acquaintance, and reflection on par- 
ticular instances.  These, when observing men  have 
made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed 
to them, cannot refuse their assent to. 
5 98. If it be said, "  the understanding  Implicitly 
hath an implicit knowledge of these prin-  fzw;P- 
ciples, but not an explicit, before this first  sig- 
bearing," (as they must, who will say, cc that  nifies, that 
they are in the understanding before they  the mind is 
are known")  it will be hard  to conceive  g$!:::d- 
what is meant by a principle imprinted on  ing them,  or 
the understanding implicitly, unless it be  else signities 
this; that the mind is capable of  under-  nothing- 
standing and  assenting  firmly to such propositions. 
And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as 
'first principles, must be received as native impressions 
on the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them 
to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition, 
than assent to it  when demonstrated.  And few mathe- 
maticians will be forward to believe, that all the dia- 
grams they have drawn were but copies of  those in- 
nate characters which nature had engraven upon their 
minds.  --  - 
b 23. There is, I fear, this farther weak-  The arp-  - 
ment of as-  ness  in the  foregoing  argument,  which  _ting  on 
would  persuade  us,  that therefore those  firsthearing. 
02  maxims are to be thought  innate which  isuponafalse 
men admit at first hearing,  because they  su~~os~~~m No Innate  Princijdes in the Mind.  Book  I. 
of no precv-  assent to propositions,  which they are not 
dent teach-  taught, nor do receive from the forceof any 
ing.  argument or demonstration, but a bare ex- 
plication or understanding of the terms.  Under which, 
there seems to me to lie this fallacy;  that men are 
supposed not to be taught, nor to learn any thing de 
novo;  when,  in truth, they are taught,  and do learn 
something they were ignorant of before.  For first, it  is 
evident,  that they have learned the terms and their 
signification, neither of  which  was  born  with  them. 
But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case : 
the ideas themselves,  about which the proposition is, 
are not born with  them,  no more than their names, 
but got afterwards.  So that in all propositions that 
are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the pro- 
position,  their standing for such ideas,  and  the ideas 
themselves that they stand for, being neither of them 
innate,  I would  fain  know  what there is remaining 
in  such  propositions  that  is  innate.  For I  would 
gladly  have  any one  name  that proposition,  whose 
terms or ideas were either of them innate.  We by 
degrees get ideas and names,  and learn their appro- 
priated connexion one with another ;  and then to pro- 
positions made in such terms, whose signification we 
have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagree- 
ment we can perceive in our ideas, when put together, 
is expressed,we at  first hearing assent; though to other 
propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but 
which  are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily 
got, we are at  the same time no way capable of assent- 
ing.  For though a child quickly assents to this pro- 
position, "  that an apple is not fire,"  when, by familiar 
acquaintance, he has got the ideas of those two dif- 
ferent things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has 
learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them ; 
yet,  it will  be some years after,  perhaps, before the 
same child will assent to this proposition, "  that  t is 
impossible for the same thing to be,  and not to be ;" 
because, that though, perhaps, the words are as easy 
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to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more 
large, comprehensive, and abstract, than of the names 
annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do 
with, it is longer before he learns their precise mean- 
ing,  and it requires more time plainly to form in his 
mind those general ideas they stand for.  Till that be 
done,  you will in vain endeavour to make any child 
assent to a proposition made up of such general terms : 
but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned 
their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well 
as the other  of the forementioned propositions, and with 
both for the same reason;  viz.  because  he finds the 
ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, accord- 
ing as the words  standing for them are affirmed or 
denied one of another in the proposition.  But if pro- 
positions be brought to him in words, which stand for 
ideas he has not yet in his mind; to such propositions, 
however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords 
neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant : for words 
being but empty sounds,  any farther than they are 
signs of our ideas,  we cannot but assent to them, as 
they correspond to those ideas we have, but no farther 
than that.  But the showing by what steps and ways 
knowledge comes into our minds, and the grounds of 
several degrees of  assent,  being  the  business  of  the 
following discourse, it  may suffice to  have only touched 
on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those 
innate principles. 
$  24.  To conclude  this  argument  of  Not innate, 
universal consent, I agree, with these de-  kg,"~,;~; 
fenders of  innate principles,  that if they  .,,,,  ,,d  ,,,. 
are innate,  they  must  needs  have  uni- 
versal assent ;  for that a truth should be innate, and yet 
not assented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a mag 
to know  a truth, and be ignorant of it,  at the same 
time.  But then, by these men's  own confession, they 
cannot be innate ; since they are not assented to by 
those who understand  not the terms, nor by a great 
part of  those who do understand  them,  but have yet SO  No  Innate Principles in the   mind  Book I. 
never heard nor thought of those propositions; which, 
I think, is at least one half  of  mankind.  But were 
the number far less, it would  be  enough to destroy 
universal assent, and thereby show these propositions 
not to be innate,  if children alone were ignorant of 
them. 
These  Q 25. But that I may not be accused to 
maxims not  argue from the thoughts of infants, which 
the first  are unknown to us,  and to conclude from 
known.  what passes in their understandings before 
they express it ;  I say next, that these two general pro- 
positions are not the truths that first possess the minds 
of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and ad- 
ventitious notions ; which,  if they were innate,  they 
must needs be.  Whether we can determine it or no, 
it matters not; there is certainly a time when children 
begin to think, and their words and actions do assure 
us that they do so.  When therefore they are capable 
of thought, of knowledge,  of  assent, can it rationally 
be supposed they can  be ignorant of  those  notions 
that nature has imprinted, were there any such ? Can 
it be imagined, with ally appearance of  reason,  that 
they perceive  the impressions  from  things without, 
and be at the same time ignorant of those characters 
which  nature itself has taken care to stamp within? 
Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, 
and be ignorant of  those which  are supposed woven 
into the very principles of their being,  and imprinted 
there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and 
guide of  all  their  acquired  knowledge  and  future 
reasonings?  This  would  be  to  rnake  nature  take 
pains to no purpose,  or,  at least, to write very  ill; 
since its characters could  not be  read by those  eyes 
which saw other things very well ; and those are very 
ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the founda- 
tions of  all our knowledge, which are not first known, 
and without which the undoubted knowledge of several 
other things may be had.  The child certainly knows 
that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays 
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with,  nor  the blackmoor  it is  afraid  of;  that the 
wormseed  or mustard it refuses is not the apple or 
spgar it cries for ;  this it is certainly and undoubtedly 
assured  of: but will  any one  say, it is by virtue of 
this principle, "  that it is impossible for the same thing 
to be, and not to be,"  that it so firmly assents to these, 
and other parts of  its knowledge;  or that the child 
has any notion or apprehension of that proposition, at 
an age, wherein yet, it  is plain, it  knows a great many 
other truths? He that will  say,  children join  these 
general abstract speculations  with their sucking bottles 
aud their rattles, may, perhaps, with justice, be thought 
to have more pasqion and zeal for his opinion, but less 
sincerity and truth, than one of  that age. 
5 26. Though therefore there be several  And so not 
general propositions that meet with con-  innate. 
stant and ready assent,  as soon  as proposed  to men 
grown up, who have attained the use of more general 
and abstract ideas, and names standing for them ;  yet 
they not being to be found in those of  tender years, 
who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pre- 
tend to universal assent of intelligent persons,  and so 
by no means  can be  supposed innate; it being  im- 
possible, that any truth which is innate (if there were 
any  such)  should  be  unknown,  at least  to any  one 
who knows any thing else:  since, if there are innate 
truths, they  must be  innate thoughts;  there being 
nothing  a truth in the mind that it has never thought 
on-  Whereby it is evident,  if  there be  any innate 
truths in the mind,  they must necessarily be the first 
of any thought on ;  the first that appear there. 
§ $7.  ha?, the general maxims ye  are 
discoursing  of are not known to children, 
idiots,  and a  great part of  mankind, we 
have already sufficiently  proved ;  whereby 
it is evident, they have not an universal 
assent, nor are general impressions.  But 
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native and original impressions, should appear fairest 
and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no 
footsteps of them: and it is,  in my opinion, a strong 
presumption that they are not innate, since they are 
least known to those,  in whom,  if  they were innate, 
they must needs exert themselves with most force and 
vigour.  For children,  idiots,  savages,  and  illiterate 
people, being of all others the least corrupted by cus- 
tom or  borrowed  opinions,  learning  and  education 
having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds, 
nor,  by superinducing foreign and studied doctrines, 
confounded  those fair characters nature had written 
there;  one  might  reasonably  imagine,  that in their 
minds,  these innate notions should lie open fairly to 
every one's  view, as it is certain the thoughts of  child- 
ren do.  It might very well be expected, that these 
principles should be perfectly known to naturals, which 
being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these inen 
suppose) can have no dependence on the constitutions 
or organs of  the body,  the only confessed difference 
between them and others.  One would think, accord- 
ing to these men's  principles,  that all these  native 
beams of light (were there any such) should in those, 
who have no reserves,  no  arts of  concealment,  shine 
out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt 
of there being there, than we are of their love of plea- 
sure and abhorrence of pain.  But, alas ! amongst child- 
ren,  idiots,  savages,  and the grossly illiterate,  what 
general maxims are to be found ? what universal prin- 
ciples of knowledge ?  Their notions are few and nar- 
row, borrowed only from those objects they have had 
most to do with,  and which  have  made  upon  their 
senses the frequentest and strongest impressions.  A 
child knows his nurse and his cradle, and, by degrees, 
the play-things of a little more advanced age ; and a 
young savage has,  perhaps,  his head  filled with love 
and  hunting,  according  to the fashion  of  his  tribe. 
But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabit- 
ant of the woods, would expect these abstract maxims 
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and reputed principles  of  sciences, will,  I fear, find 
himself mistaken.  Such kind of general propositions 
are seldom mentioned in  the huts of  Indians, much 
less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, 
or any impressions of  them on the minds of  naturals. 
They are the language and business of  the schools 
and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that 
sort of  conversation or learning,  where disputes  are 
frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argu- 
mentation,  and useful  for conviction,  but  not  much 
conducing to the discovery of  truth or advancement 
of knowledge.  But of their small use for the improve- 
ment of  knowledge,  I shall have occasion  to speak 
more at large, 1.  4.  c. 7. 
$ 98. I know not how absurd this may  Recapitula- 
seem to the masters of demonstration: and  ti"n. 
probably it will hardly down with any body at first 
hearing.  I must therefore beg a little truce with pre- 
judice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been 
heard out in  the sequel of this discourse,  being very 
willing to submit to better judgments.  And since I 
impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to 
be  convinced  that I have been too fond of  my own 
notions ; which  I confess we are all apt to be, when 
application  and study have warmed our heads with 
them. 
Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to 
think these two speculative maxims innate, since they 
are not universally assented to; and the assent they 
so generally find is no other than what several pro- 
positions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in 
with them ;  and since the assent that is given them is 
produced  another way,  and comes not from natural 
inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the 
following  discourse.  And  if  these first principles  of 
knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no 
other speculative maxims can (I suppose) with better 
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CHAPTER  111. 
No  Innate  Practical Principles. 
NO moral  $1.  IF  those speculative msxims,where- 
principles so  of we discoursed in the foregoing chapter, 
dear, and so 
generallyre-  have not an actual universal  assent from 
ceived,asthe  all mankind, as we there proved, it  is much 
foremention-  more visible  concerning practical princi- 
ed 'pecula-  ples, that they come short of  an universal 
tive maxims.  reception : and I think it will be hard to 
instance any one moral rule which can pretend to so 
general and ready an assent  as,  "what  is,  is ;" or to 
be  so manifest  a truth as this, "  that it is impossible 
for the same thing to be,  and not to be."  Whereby 
it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title 
to be innate ;  and the doubt of their being native im- 
pressions  on the mind is stronger against those moral 
principles than the other.  Not  that it brings  their 
truth at all in question :  they are equally true, though 
not equally evident.  Those speculative maxims carry 
their own evidence with them:  but moral principles' 
require reasoning  and discourse,  and some exercise 
of the mind,  to discover the certainty of  their truth. 
They lie not open as natural characters engraven  on 
the mind ; which, if any such were,  they must needs 
be visible by  thems'elves, and by their  own light be 
certain and known to every body.  But this is no de- 
rogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it 
is to the truth or certainty of  the three angles  of  a 
triangle being equal to two right ones ;  hecause it is 
not so evident, as "the whole is bigger than a part ;" 
nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing.  It may 
suffice, that these moral rules are capable of demon- 
stration ;  and therefore it is our own fault if we come 
not to a certain knowledge of them.  But the ignor- 
ance wherein many men are of them, and the slowness 
of assent wherewith others receive them, are manifest 
that they are not innate, and such as offer them- 
selves to their view without searching. 
§ 9.  Whether there be any such moral  Faith and 
principles,  wherein  all men  do  agree,  I  justice not 
appeal to any, who have  been  but mode-  as 
principles by  rately conversant in the history of  man-  men. 
kind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke 
of their own chimneys.  Where is that practical truth, 
that is universally received  without doubt or question, 
as it must be, if innate ?  Justice, and keeping of con- 
tracts, is that which most men seem to agree in.  This 
is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the 
dens of thieves, and the confederacies of  the greatest 
villains ;  and they who have gone farthest towards the 
putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of 
justice one with another.  I grant that outlaws them- 
selves do this one amongst another ;  but it is without 
receiving these as  the innate laws of  nature.  They 
practise them as rules of  convenience within their own 
communities :  but it is impossible to conceive, that he 
embraces justice  as a  practical  principle,  who  acts 
fairly with his  fellow-highwayman,  and at the same 
time plunders or kills the next honest man  he meets 
with.  Justice and truth are the common ties of society; 
and, therefore, even  outlaws and robbers,  who break 
with all the world  besides,  must keep faith and rules 
of equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold 
together.  Rut will  any one say, that those that live 
by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and 
justice which they allow and assent to ? 
$ 3. Perhaps it will be urged,  that the  Objection. 
tacit assent of their minds aerees to  what  Thoughmen 
V 
their practice contradicts.  1  answer, first,  ~~~~~~~~ 
1  have always thought the actions of men  tice,yetthey 
the  best  interpreters of  their  thoughts.  admit them 
But since  it ii  certain. that  most  ;en's  in their 
thoughts,  practices, and some men's open professions, 
answered.  have  either  questioned  or  denied  these 
principles,  it is  impossible  to establish  an universal 
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consent  (though we should  look  for it only amongst 
grown men),  without  which it is impossible  to con- 
clude them innate.  Secondly, it is very strange and 
unreasonable,  to suppose  innate practical principles 
that terminate only in contemplation.  Practical prin- 
ciples derived from nature are there for operation, and 
must produce conformity of action,  not barely specu- 
lative  assent  to their truth, or else they are in vain 
distinguished  from  speculative  maxims.  Nature,  I 
confess, has put into man a desire of  happiness, and 
an aversion  to misery : these indeed  are innate prac- 
tical principles, which  (as practical principles ought) 
do  continue  constantly  to operate and influence  all 
our actions without ceasing : these may be observed, 
in all persons and all ages, steady and universal ;  but 
these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not im- 
pressions of truth on the understanding.  I deny not 
that there  are  natural tendencies imprinted on  the 
minds of men ;  and that, from the very first instances 
of sense and perception,  there  are some  things that 
are grateful,  and  others unwelcome to them;  some 
things that they incline  to,  and others that they fly : 
but this makes nothing for  innate characters on  the 
mind,  which  are to be  the principles of knowledge, 
regulating our practice.  Such natural impressions on 
the understanding  are so  far from  being  confirmed 
hereby, that this is an argument against them ;  since, 
if there were certain characters imprinted by nature 
on the understanding, as the prinoiples of knowledge, 
we  could not  but perceive  them  constantly operate 
in  us,  and influence  our knowledge,  as  we  do those 
others  on the will  and appetite;  which  never cease 
to be the constant  springs and motives  of  all our ac- 
tions, to which we perpetually feel them strongly im- 
pelling us. 
Moral rules  § 4.  Another  reason  that  makes  me 
need a proof,  doubt of any innate practical principles, is, 
ergo not  in- 
nate.  that I think there  cannot any one  moral 
rule be proposed, whereof  a man may not 
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justly  demand  a reason : which  would  be  perfectly 
and absurd, if they were innate, or so much 
as  self-evident ; which  every  innate  principle  must 
needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, 
nor want any reason to gain it approbation.  He  would 
be thought void of  common  sense, who asked on the 
one side, or on the other side went to give, a reason, 
why it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not 
to be.  It  carries its own  light  and evidence with it, 
and needs no  other proof:  he  that understands the 
terms,  assents to it for its own sake, or  else  nothing 
will ever be able to prevail  with  him to do it.  But 
should that most unshaken rule af morality, and foun- 
dation of all social virtue,  "that  one should do as he 
would be done unto,"  be  proposed  to one who never 
heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand 
its meaning,  might he not without any absurdity ask 
a  reason  why? And  were  not  he  that  proposed  it 
bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it 
to him ?  which plainly shows it not to be innate ; for 
if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof, 
but must needs (at least, as soon as heard and under- 
stood) be  received and assented to as an unquestion- 
able truth,  which a man  can  by  no  means  doubt of. 
So that the truth of  all these moral rules plainly de- 
pends upon some other antecedent to them, and from 
which they must be deduced ; which  could not be, if 
either they were innate, or so much as self-evident. 
6 5.  That men should keep their com-  Instance in 
is certainly s great and undeniable  keepins 
rule in morality.  But yet, if a Christian,  "Ornpacts. 
who has the view of happiness and misery in another 
life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will 
give this as a reason ;  because God, who has the power 
of eternal life and death, requires it of us.  Rut if an 
Hobbist be  asked  why,  he will  answer,  because  the 
public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you, 
if you do not.  And if one of the old philosophers had 
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dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to 
virtue, the highest perfection of  human nature, to do 
otherwise. 
Virtuegene-  $ 6.  Hence naturally  flows the great 
variety of opinions concerning moral rules 
ved,  not  be- 
cause innate,  which are to be found among men, accord- 
but because  ing to the different sorts of happiness they 
profitable.  have  a  prospect of,  or  propose  to them- 
selves : which could not be if practical principles were 
innate, and imprinted  in  our  minds  immediately by 
the hand of God.  I grant the existence of God is so 
many ways manifest,  and the obedience we owe  him 
so congruous to the light of reason, that a great part 
of mankind give testimony to the law of nature ; but 
yet I think  it must  be  allowed,  that several  moral 
rules  may receive  from  mankind  a  very general ap- 
probation,  without  either  knowing  or admitting the 
true ground of morality ; which  can only be the will 
and law of  a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his 
hand rewards and punishments,  and power enough to 
call to account  the proudest  offender : for God. hav- 
ing, by an  inseparable  connexion,  joined  virtue  and 
pnblic  happiness  together,  and  made  the  practice 
thereof necessary to the preservation  of society,  and 
visibly beneficial  to all with whom the virtuous man 
has to do, it is no wonder that every one  should not 
only allow,  but recommend and magnify, those  rules 
to others, from whose observance of them he is sure to 
reap advantage to himself.  He may, out of  interest 
as well  as conviction,  cry up  that for  sacred, which, 
if once trampled  on and profaned,  he himself cannot 
be safe nor  secure.  This,  though  it takes  nothing 
from  the moral  and eternal obligation  which  these 
rules  evidently have,  yet it shows that the outward 
acknowledgment men  pay  to them  in  their words, 
proves  not  that they  are innate principles;  nay,  it 
proves  not so much as  that men assent  to them in- 
wardly in their own minds,  as the inviolable rules of 
their own practice :  since we find that self-interest, and 
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the conveniences of this life, make many men own an 
outward profession  and  approbation of  them,  whose 
actions sufficiently prove that they very little consider 
the law-giver that prescribed these rules, nor the hell 
that he has ordained for the punishment of those that 
transgress them. 
6 7. For if  we will  not  in  civilitv al-  Men's  ac- 
10;  too much sincerity to the profes&ons  tions  con- 
of most men, but think their actions to be  Z~,"P,:/~ 
the interpreters of their thoughts, we shall  virtue is not 
find that they have  no such internal ve-  their inter- 
neration for t"hese rules, nor so full a per-  nal~rinci~le. 
suasion of the% certainty and obligation.  The great 
'  principle of morality,  "to  do  as one would  be done 
to,"  is  more  commended  than practised.  But the 
breach of  this rule cannot be  a greater vice  than to 
teach others that it is no moral rule,  nor obligatory, 
would be thought madness,  and contrary to that in- 
terest men sacrifice to, when they break it themselves. 
Perhaps conscience  will be  urged as checking us for 
such breaches, and so the internal obligation and esta- 
blishment of the rule be preserved. 
8. TO  which I answer,  that I doubt  Conscience 
not but,  without  being  written  on their  no proof  of 
hearts, many men ma$  by the same way  innate 
that they come to the knowledge of other 
moral rule. 
things,  Eome to assent to severval moral rules,  and be 
convinced of their obligation.  Others also may come 
to be of  the same mind,  from their education,  com- 
pany, and customs of their country ;  which persuasion, 
however  got,  will  serve  to set  conscience  on  work, 
which is nothing  else  but our own  opinion  or judg- 
ment of  the moral rectitude  or pravity of  our own 
actions.  And if conscience be a proof of innate prin- 
ciples, contraries may be innate principles ;  since some 
men, with the same bent of conscience, prosecute what 
others avoid. 
$ 9.  But I cannot  see how  any  men  Instances of 
should ever transgress  those moral rules,  enormitien A0  No Innate  Practical Principles.  Book 1. 
practised  with  confidence and  serenity,  were they 
wit'1out  re-  innate,  and  stamped  upon  their  minds.  morse.  View  but an  army  at the sacking of  a 
town,  and  see  what  observation  or  sense  of  moral 
principles,  or  what  touch  of  conscience  for  all  the 
outrages they do.  Robberies, murders, rapes, are the 
sports of men set at liberty from punishment and cen- 
sure.  Have there not been whole nations,  and those 
of the most civilised people,  amongst  whom  the ex- 
posing their children, and leaving them in the fields to 
perish by want or wild  beasts,  has been the practice, 
as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them ? 
Do they not still, in some countries, put them into the 
same graves with  their mothers,  if they die in child- 
birth ;  or despatch them, if a pretended astrologer de- 
clares them to have  unhappy stars ?  And are there 
not places where,  at  a certain age, they kill or expose 
their parents without any remorse  at all?  In a part 
of Asia, the sick, when their case comes to be thought 
desperate,  are carried out and laid on the earth,  be- 
fore they are dead;  and left there,  exposed  to wind 
and weather, to perish without assistance or pity (a). 
It is familiar among the Mingrelians, a people profess- 
ing christianity, to bury their children alive without 
scruple (b).  There are places where  they  eat their 
own childre11 (c).  The Caribbees were wont  to geld 
their children,  on  purpose  to fat and eat them  (d). 
And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru 
which were wont to fat and eat the children they got 
on their  female captives,  whom  they kept as concu- 
bines  for  that purpose ; and when  they  were past 
breeding, the mothers themselves were killed too and 
eaten (e).  The virtues whereby the Tououpinambos 
believed  they  merited  paradise  were  revenge,  and 
eating abundance of  their  enemies.  They have  not 
(n) Gruber apud Thevenot, part 4,  p. 13.  (b) Lambert apud 
Thevenot, p. 38.  (c)  Vossius de Nili Origine,  c. 18, 19. 
(d) P. Mart. Dec. 1.  (e) Hist. des Incas,  1. 1. c. 12. 
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so much as a name for God (f  ), and have no religion, 
no worship.  The saints who  are canonised amongst 
the Turks lead lives which  one cannot with modesty 
relate.  A remarkable passage to this purpose, out of 
the voyage of Baumgarten, which is a book not every 
day to be met with,  I shall set down  at large in the 
language it is published in.  Ibi (sc. prope  Belbes in 
Bgypto) vidimus sanctum unurn Saracenicurn inter are- 
narum curnulos, ita ut ex utero matris prodiit,  nudum 
sedentem.  Mos  est, ut  didicimus, Mahometistis, ut eos, 
qui  amentes et sine ratione  sunt, pro  sanctis colant et 
venerentur.  Insuper et eos, qui cum diu vitarn egerint 
inqui?zatissirnam, voluntariarn  demum pmnitentzarn  et 
paupertatem,  sanctitate  venerandos deputant.  Ejus- 
modi ver6genus hominurn libertatenz quandarn efrctnern 
habent, domos quas volunt intrandi, edendi, bibendi, et 
quod mGus est, concumbendi ;  ex  quo concubitu siproles 
secuta  fuerit, sancta similiter habetz~r. His ergo homi- 
nibus dum vivunt, rnagnos  exhibent honores; rnortuis 
ver6  vel  ternpla  vel rnonurnepzta  extrztunt  amplissirna, 
eosque contingere ac sepelire maxirne fortune  ductcnt 
loco.  Audivimus hctc dicta et dicenda per interpretern h 
Mucrelo nostro.  Insuper sanctum illurn, quern eo  loco 
vidimus, publicitus  apprirnd commendari, eum esse ho- 
minem sa?zctum, divinum ac integritate prcecipuurn ;  eo 
pod, nec  f~minarum  unquarn esset, nec puerorum, sed 
tanturnrnodo  asellarum  concubitor  atque  mularum.- 
Peregr. Baumgarten,  1. 2.  c.  1. p. 73.  More  of  the 
same kind,  concerning these precious saints amongst 
the Turks, may be seen in Pietro della Valle,  in his 
letter of the 25th of January, 1616.  Where then are 
those  innate  principles  of  justice,  piety,  gratitude, 
equity, chastity ?  Or, where is that universal consent, 
that assures us there are such inbred rules ?  Murders 
in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are 
committed  without  remorse  of  conscience;  nay,  in 
many places, innocence in this case is the greatest ig- 
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nominy.  And if we look abroad, to take a view of men 
as they are, we  shall find that they have remorse in 
one place for  doing  or  omitting that, which  others, 
in another place, think they merit by. 
Men have  Q  10. He that will carefully peruse the 
contrary  history of mankind, and look  abroad into 
Practical  the several tribes of men,  and with indif- 
principles.  ferency survey their actions, will be able 
to satisfy himself that there is  scarce  thatl principle 
of  morality  to be  named,  or  rule of  virtue  to  be 
thought on (those only excepted  that are absolutely 
necessary to hold  society together, which commonly, 
too, are neglected betwixt distinct societies), which is 
not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned hy 
the general fashion  of whole  societies  of  men,  go- 
verned by practical opinions and rules of  living quite 
opposite to others. 
Whole na-  g 11. Here, perhaps, it  will be objected, 
tions reject  that it is no argument that the rule is not 
several  known, because it is broken.  I grant the 
objection good where men,  though they 
transgress,  yet disown  not  the law; where fear  of 
shame,  censure,  or punishment,  carries  the mark of 
some awe it has upon them.  But it is impossible to 
conceive that a whole nation of men should all pub- 
licly  reject  and renounce what every  one  of  them, 
certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law ;  for so they 
must, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. 
It is  possible men may sometimes own  rules of mo- 
rality which,  in their  private  thoughts,  they do not 
believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputa- 
tion  and esteem  amongst  those who  are persuaded 
of their obligation.  But it is not to be imagined that 
a  whole  society  of  men  should  publicly  and  pro- 
fessedly disown and cast off a rule, which they could 
not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was 
a law ;  nor be ignorant that all men they should have 
to do with  knew  it to be  such : and therefore  must 
every  one  of  them  apprehend  from  others  all  the 
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contempt and abhorrence due to one  who professes 
himself void of humanity ;  and one, who,  confounding 
the known and natural measures of right and wrong, 
but  be  looked on  as the professed  enemy of 
their peace and happiness.  Whatever practical prin- 
ciple is innate cannot but be known to every one to 
be just  and good.  It is  therefore little less  than a 
contradiction to suppose that whole  nations  of  men 
should, both in their professions  and practice, unani- 
mously  and universally  give the lie to what,  by the 
most invincible evidence,  every one of them knew to 
be true, right, and good.  This is enough to satisfy us 
that no practical rule, which is any where universally, 
and  with  public  approbation  or  allowance,  trans- 
gressed, can be  supposed  innate.  Hut I have some- 
thing further to add, in answer to this objection. 
Q  la. The breaking of a  rule, say you,  is no argu- 
ment that it is unknown.  I grant it: but the gene- 
rally allowed breach of it any where, I say, is a proof 
that it is not innate.  For example :  let us take any 
ofthese rules,  which being  the most  obvious  deduc- 
tions of human reason, and conformable to the natural 
inclination of the greatest part of men, fewest people 
have had  the impudence  to deny, or  inconsideration 
to doubt of.  If any can be thought to be  naturally 
imprinted, none,  I think,  can have a  fairer pretence 
to be innate than this ;  cc parents, preserve and cherish 
your children."  When therefore you say that this is 
an innate rule, what do you mean ?  Either that it is 
an innate principle, which upon  all occasions excites 
and directs the actions of all men;  or else that it is a 
truth, which all men have imprinted on  their minds, 
and which therefore they know and assent to.  But in 
neither of these  senses is it innate.  First, that it is 
not a principle which  influences  all men's  actions, is 
what I  have  proved  by the examples  before cited: 
nor need we seek so far as Mingrelia or Peru to find 
instances of such as neglect,  abuse, nay, and destroy 
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brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when 
we remember that it was a familiar and uncondemned 
practice amongst the Greeks and Romans to expose, 
without pity or remorse, their innocent infants.  Se- 
condly, that it is an innate truth, known  to all men, 
is also false.  For, "  parents, preserve your children," 
is  so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at 
all ;  it being a command, and not a proposition, and 
so  not  capable  of  truth or falsehood.  To make  it 
capable of  being assented  to as true, it must be re- 
duced to some  such proposition  as  this : '<  it is the 
duty of parents to preserve their children."  But what 
duty is  cannot  be  understood  without  a  law; nor 
a law be known,  or  supposed, without  a law-maker, 
or without reward and punishment : so that it is im- 
possible  that this,  or  any other  practical principle, 
should  he  innate,  i. e. be  imprinted  on  the  mind 
as  a  duty, without  supposing  the ideas  of  God,  of 
law,  of obligation, of punishment, of a life after this, 
innate :  for that punishment  follows not, in this life, 
the breach of  this rule,  and consequently, that it has 
not  the  force  of  a  law  in  countries  where the ge- 
nerally alloweci practice runs counter to it, is in itself 
evident.  But these ideas (which must be all of  them 
innate, if any thing as a  duty be so)  are so  far from 
being innate, that it is not every studious  or think- 
ing man, much less  every one  that is  born, in whom 
they are  to be  found  clear  and  distinct:  and that 
one of them, which of all others seems most likely to 
be innate, is not so (I mean the idea of God) I think, 
in the next  chapter, will  appear very evident to any 
considering man. 
13.  From what has  been  said, I  think we  may 
safely  conclude, that whatever  practical  rule  is,  in 
any place, generally and with allowance broken,  can- 
not be supposed innate ;  it being impossible that men 
should,  without  shame  or  fear,  confidently and se- 
renely break  a  rule,  which  they could  not  but evi- 
dently know that God had set up, and would certainly 
Ch. 3.  No  Innate Practical Principles.  45 
punish  the breach  of  (which  they must,  if  it were 
innate) to a degree to make  it a very ill bargain to 
the transgressor.  Without such a knowledge as this 
a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. 
Ignorance, or doubt of  the law,  hopes to escape the 
knowledge  or power of  the law-maker,  or  the like, 
may make men give way to  a present appetite ; but 
let any one see the fault, and the rod  by it, and with 
the transgression a fire ready to punish it ;  a pleasure 
tempting,  and the hand of  the Almighty visibly held 
up,  and prepared to take vengeance  (for  this  must 
be  the  case,  where  any  duty is  imprinted  on  the 
mind) ;  and then tell me whether it be  possible for 
people, with such a  prospect,  such a  certain  know- 
ledge as this, wantonly, and without scruple, to  offend 
against a law, which  they carry about them in inde- 
lible  characters,  and  that  stares them  in  the  face 
whilst  they  are breaking  it? Whether men, at the 
same time that they feel in  themselves the imprinted 
edicts of an omnipotent law-maker, can with assurance 
and  gaiety slight  and trample  under foot  his  most 
sacred  injunctions ?  And, lastly, whether  it be  pos- 
sible, that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to 
this  innate law  and supreme law-giver,  all the by- 
standers,  yea,  even the governors  and rulers of  the 
people,  full of  the same  sense  both of  the law and 
law-maker, should silently connive, without testifying 
their dislike,  or laying the least  blame on it? Prin- 
ciples of  actions indeed there are lodged in men's  ap- 
petites,  but these are so  far from being innate moral 
principles, that, if  they were left to their full swing, 
they would carry men  to the overturning, of all mo- 
rality.  Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to 
these exorbitant desires, which they cannot be but by 
rewards and punishments,  that will  overbalance  the 
satisfaction  any one shall propose to  himself  in  the 
breach  of  the law.  If therefore  any  thing be  im- 
printed  on the  minds  of  all men as a law, all  men 
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certain and unavoidable  punishment will  attend the 
breach of it.  For if men  can  be  ignorant or doubt- 
ful of what  is  innate,  innate  principles  are insisted 
on  and  urged  to no  purpose;  truth and  certainty 
(the  things  pretended)  are  not  at all  secured  by 
them; but  men  are in the same uncertain, floating 
estate with, as without them.  An evident indubitable 
knowledge of unavoidable punishment,. great enough 
to make  the transgression very uneligible,  must  ac- 
company an  innate law ;  unless, with  an innate law, 
they can suppose an innate gospel too.  I would not 
here be mistaken, as if, because I deny an innate law, 
I thought there were none but positive laws.  There 
is a great deal of  difference  between an innate law, 
and a  law of  nature;  between  something imprinted 
on  our minds  in  their very original,  and  something 
that we  being ignorant of may attain to the know- 
ledge of  by the use  and due application  of  our  na- 
tural faculties.  And I think they equally forsake the 
truth,  who,  running into  contrary extremes,  either 
affirm  an  innate law,  or deny that  there  is  a  law 
knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help 
of positive revelation. 
Those who  $ 14. The difference  there is amon~st 
maintain in-  men in their practical principles is so cvi- 
nate prtC-  dent, that, I think, I need say no more to  tical prin- 
ciDles tell  evince that it will  be impossible  to find 
ui  not what  any innate moral  rules iy  this  mark  of 
they are.  general assent :  and it is enough to make 
one suspect that the supposition of  such innate prin- 
ciples is but an opinion  taken up at pleasure,  since 
those who talk so confidently of  them are so sparing 
to tell us which they are.  This might with justice be 
expected  from  those men who  lay stress  upon  this 
opinion; and it gives occasion to distrust either their 
knowledge  or  charity, who  declaring  that God  has 
imprinted  on the minds  of  men  the foundations  of 
knowledge, and the rules  of  living,  are yet so  little 
favourable to the information of  their neighbours, or 
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the  quiet of mankind,  as not to point out to them 
which they are in the variety men are distracted with. 
~ut,  in truth, were  there  any such innate principles, 
there would be no need to teach them.  Did men find 
such innate propositions stamped on their minds, they 
would easily be able to distinguish ,them  from other 
truths,  that  they  afterwards  learned,  and  deduced 
from them ; and there would  be  nothing more  easy 
than to know what, and how many they were.  There 
could  be  no more doubt  about  their  number  than 
there is about the number  of  our  fingers ;  and it is 
like then every system would  be  ready to give them 
us by tale.  But since nobody, that I know, has ven- 
tured yet to give  a  catalogue of  them,  they cannot 
blame  those who  doubt  of  these innate principles; 
since even they who require men to believe that there 
are such innate propositions, do not tell us what they 
are.  It  is easy to foresee, that if different men of dif- 
ferent sects should go about to give us a list of those 
innate practical principles, they would set down only 
such as suited their distinct hypotheses, and were fit 
to support the doctrines of their particular schools or 
churches;  a plain  evidence  that there  are no  such 
innate truths.  Nay,  a great part of men are so far 
from finding any such innate moral principles in them- 
selves,  that by  denying  freedom  to mankind,  and 
thereby  making men no other than  bare  machines, 
they take away not  only innate but  all moral rules 
whatsoever,  and leave nqt a possibility to believe any 
such,  to those  who  cannot conceive  how  any  thing 
can be capable of a law that is not a free agent :  and, 
upon  that ground,  they must necessarily  reject  all 
principles  of  virtue,  who  cannot  put morality  and 
mechanism together ;  which are not very easy to be 
reconciled, or made consistent. 
$ 15. When I had writ this,  being in-  Lord Her- 
bert's innate  formed that my lord Herbert had,  in his  pinciples 
book  de  Veritate, assigned  these  innate  emmimd. 
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hoping to find, in a man of so great parts, something 
that might satisfy me  in  this point, and put an  end 
to my inquiry.  In his chapter de Instinctu Naturali, 
p. 72, edit. 1650, I met with these  six  marks  of  his 
Notitict. Communes :  1. Prioritas.  2. Independentia. 
3.  Universalitas.  4. C'ertitudo.  5. Necessitas,  i. e. 
as he explains it, faciunt  ad  hominis conservationem. 
6. Modus  conformationis,  i. e.  Assensus  nulld  inter- 
yositd  mord.  And at the latter end of his little trea- 
tise, De Religione Laici, he says  this of  these innate 
principles : Adeo ut non  uniuscujusvis  religionis con- 
$nio  arctentur qu~  uubipue vigent veritates.  Sunt enim 
in ipsd  mente celitz~s  descript~,  nullisque traditioniubzu, 
sive scriptis, sive non scriptis, obnoxie, p. 3.  And, Veri- 
fates nostrct? catholica que tanquam indubia Dei e$"ata 
i?z,fOro interiori  descri11ta?.  Thus having @en  the 
marks of the innate principles or common not~ons,  and 
asserted their  being imprinted on the minds of  men 
by the hand of God,  he proceeds  to set them down ; 
and they are these : 1. Esse aliguod supremum numen. 
2. Numen illud coli debere.  3. Virtutem cum pietate 
conjunctam  optimum  esse  rationem  culths divini.  4. 
Resi3ivendz~m  esse 0 peccatis.  5. Dari pramiunz  vel 
penam post  hanc vitam transactam.  Though I  allow 
these  to be  clear truths, and  such  as,  if  rightly ex- 
plained,  a  rational creature can  hardly avoid giving 
his assent to ;  yet I think he is far from proving them 
innate impress~ons  in foro  interiori descrkta.  For I 
must take leave to observe, 
5 16. First, that  these  five propositions are either 
not all, or more than  all,  those common notions writ 
on our minds by the finger of  God, if it were reason- 
able to believe any at all to be so written :  since there 
are other propositions,  which, even by his own rules, 
have as just a pretence to such an original, and may 
be as well  admitted for  innate principles, as at least 
some  of  these  five he enumerates, viz.  "  do  as thou 
wouldest be done unto ;" and, perhaps, some hundreds 
of others, when well considered. 
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$17.  Secondly, that all his marks are not to be found 
in each of his  five propositions, viz.  his first,  second, 
and third marks agree perfectly to neither of them ; 
and the first,  second, third, fourth,  and sixth marks 
agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth propositions. 
For besides that we are assured from history of many 
men, nay, whole nations, who doubt or disbelieve some 
or all of  them, I cannot see how the third, viz. "that 
virtue joined with piety is the best worship of God," 
can he an innate principle, when the name, or sound, 
virtue, is so hard to be understood ;  liable to so much 
uncertainty in its signification ;  and the thing it stands 
for so much contended about, and difficult to  be known. 
And therefore this cannot be but a very uncertain rule 
of human practice, and serve but very little to the con- 
duct of our lives, and is therefore very unfit to be as- 
signed as an innate practical principle. 
18. For let us consider  this proposition as to its 
meaning  (for it is the sense,  and not sound,  that is 
and must  be the principle  or  common  notion),  via. 
"virtue is the best worship of God ;"  i.e. is most accept- 
able to him;  which if virtue be taken,  as most com- 
monly it is,  for those actions which,  according to the 
different opinions of  several countries, are accounted 
laudable, will be a proposition so far from being cer- 
tain, that it will not be true.  If virtue be taken for 
actions conformable to God's will,  or to the rule pre- 
scribed by God,  which  is the true and only measure 
of virtue, when virtue is used to signify what is in its 
own  nature right and good;  then this proposition, 
"  that virtue is the best worship of God,"  will be most 
true and certain, but of very little use in human life : 
since it will  amount to no more but this, viz. "  that 
God is pleased with the doing of what he commands;" 
which a man may certainly know to be true, without 
knowing  what it is that God doth command;  and so 
be as far from any rule or principle  of  his actions as 
he was before.  And I think very few will take a pro- 
position  which  amounts  to no more  than this,  viz. 
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that God is pleased with the doing of  what he him- 
self commands,  for an innate moral principle writ on 
the  minds of  all men  (however  true and certain it 
may he),  since it teaches so little.  Whosoever  does 
so, will have reason to think hundreds of propositions 
innate principles ; since  there are many, which have 
as good a title as this to be received for such, which 
nobody yet ever put into that rank of innate principles. 
$19. Nor is the fourth proposition (viz. "men must 
repent of their sins") much more instructive, till what 
those actions are, that are meant by sins, be set down. 
For the word peccata,  or sins, being put, as it usually 
is,  to signify in general ill  actions,  that will  draw 
punishment  upon the doers,  what great principle  of 
morality can that be,  to tell us we  should be sorry, 
and cease to do that which will bring mischief  upon 
us,  without  knowing what  those  particular  actions 
are, that will do so? Indeed, this is a very true pro- 
position,  and fit to be inculcated on,  and received  by 
those, who are supposed to have been taught, what 
actions in all kinds are sins ;  but neither this nor the 
former can be imagined  to be innate principles,  nor 
to be of any use, if they were innate, unless the par- 
ticular measures and bounds of  all virtues  and vices 
were engraven in men's  minds,  and were innate prin- 
ciples also ;  which I think is very much to be doubted. 
And therefore, I imagine, it will scarce seem possible 
that God should engrave principles in men's minds, in 
words of  uncertain signification, such as virtues and 
sins,  which,  amongst  different  men,  stand  for  dif- 
ferent things:  nay,  it cannot be  supposed  to be in 
words at all ;  which, being in most of these principles 
very  general names,  cannot  be  understood,  but by 
knowing the particulars comprehended under them. 
And in the practical instances,  the measures must be 
taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves, 
and the rules of them,  abstracted from words, and an- 
tecedent to the knowledge of  names;  which  rules a, 
man must know, what language soever  he chance to 
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learn, whether English or Japan, or if he should learn 
no language at all,  or never  should understand the 
use of words, as happens in the case of dumb and deaf 
men.  When it shall be made out that men ignorant 
of words, or untaught by the laws and customs of their 
country, know  that it is part of  the worship of  God 
not to kill another man; not to know more women 
than  one ; not  to procure  abortion;  not  to expose 
their children ;  not to take from another what is his, 
though we want it ourselves,  but,  on the contrary, 
relieve and supply his wants ;  and whenever we have 
done the contrary we ought to repent,  be sorry, and 
resolve to do so no more:  when, I say, all men shall 
be proved actually to know and allow all these and a 
thousand other such rules, all which come under these 
two general words made use of  above, viz. "virtutes 
et peccata,"  virtues  and  sins,  there  will  be  more 
reason  for  admitting these and the like for  common 
notions and practical principles.  Yet,  after all, uni- 
versal consent (were there any in moral principles) to 
truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained sther- 
wise, would scarce prove them to be innate ;  which is 
all I contend for. 
6 20. Nor will it he of  much moment  Obj. Innate 
heie to offer that very ready, but not very  P$p:r- 
material answcr,(viz.) that the innate prin-  r,pted,  an- 
ciples of  morality may, by education and  swered.  .  * 
custom, and the kenera1 opinion of  those 
amongst whom we converse, be darkened, and at last 
quite worn out of the minds of men.  Which assertion 
of  theirs,  if true,  quite takes away the argument of 
universal  consent,  by which  this  opinion  of  innate 
principles  is endeavoured to be proved : unless those 
men  will think it reasonable  that their private per- 
suasions,or that of their party, should pass for universal 
consent:  a  thing not unfrequently done,  when men, 
presuming themselves to be the only masters of right 
reason,  cast  by the votes and opinions of  the rest of 
mankind,  as  not  worthy the reckoning.  And  then 
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their  argument stands thus : "  the principles  which 
all mankind  allow  for  true are innate;  those  that 
men of  right reason admit, are the principles allowed 
by all mankind ; we,  and those of our mind, are men 
of  reason ; therefore we  agreeing,  our principles are 
innate ;" which  is a very pretty way of  arguing, and 
a short cut to infallibility.  For otherwise it will  be 
very  hard  to understand,  how  there  be  some  yrin- 
ciples, which all men do acknowledge and agree in ; 
and yet there are none of those principles, which are 
not  by  depraved  custom,  and ill education,  blotted 
out of the minds of  many men : which is to say, that 
all men admit, but yet many men do deny, and dissent 
from them.  And indeed the supposition of such first 
principles will serve us to very little purpose ;  and we 
shall be as much  at a loss with,  as without them,  if 
they may, by any human power, such as is the will of 
our teachers, or opinions of our companions, be altered 
or lost in us:  and notwithstanding all this boast of 
first principles and innate light, we shall be as much 
in the dark and uncertainty as if  there were no such 
thing at all:  it being all one, to have no rule, and 
one that will warp any way ;  or, amongst various and 
contrary rules, not to know which is the right.  But 
concerning  innate principles,  I desire these men  to 
say, whether they can,  or  cannot, by  education and 
custom,  be blurred  and blotted  out :  if they cannot, 
we  must  find  them in  all mankind  alike,  and they 
must be clear in every body:  and if they may suffer 
variation  from  adventitious  notions,  we  must  then 
find them clearest and most perspicuous, nearest the 
fountain, in children and illiterate people, who have 
received least impression from foreign opinions.  Let 
them take which side they please,  they will certainly 
find  it inconsistent  with  visible  matter  of  fact  and 
daily observation. 
Contrary  § 21. I easily grant that there are great 
principles in  numbers of  opinions,  which,  by  men  of 
the  different countries, educations,  and tem- 
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pers,  are received and embraced as first and unques- 
tionable principles ; many whereof, both for their ab- 
surdity, as well  as oppositions  to one another,  it is 
impossible should be true.  But yet all those propo- 
sitions, how remote soever from reason, are so sacred 
somewhere  or other,  that men even  of  good  under- 
standing in other matters will  sooner part with their 
lives,  and  whatever  is  dearest to them,  than  suffer 
themselves  to doubt,  or others to question, the truth 
of them. 
$  22.  This,  however  strange  it, may  HOW  men 
seem, is that which every day's experience  comlnpnly  .  " 
confirms ; and  will  not,  perhaps;  appear 
so wonderful, if we consider the ways and  ,;,,I,, 
steps by which  it is brought about; and 
how  really it may come to pass,  that doctrines that 
have  been derived  from no. better original than the 
superstition of  a  nurse,  or  the authority of  an old 
woman, may, by length of time, and consent of neigh- 
bours, grow up to the dignity of principles in religion 
or moral~ty. For  such who  are careful (as they call 
'it) to principle  children well  (and few there be who 
have  not  a  set  of  those  principles  for ,them,  which 
they  believe  in) instil  into the unwary,  and as yet 
unprejudiced understanding (for white paper receives 
any characters), those doctrines they would have them 
retain and profess.  These being taught them as soon 
as they have any apprehension ;  and still as they grow 
up confirmed  to them, either by the open profession, 
or tacit consent,  of  all they have to do with; or  at 
least by those, of whose wisdom, knowledge, and piety, 
they have  an opinion, who never suffer these propo- 
sitions  to be  otherwise mentioned,  but as the basis 
and foundation on which they build their religion and 
manners ; come, by these means,  to have the reputa- 
tion of unquestiouable, self-evident, and innate truths. 
§ 23. To which we may add, that when men, so in- 
structed, are grown up, and reflect on their own minds, 
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those opinions which were taught them before their 
memory began to keep a register of  their actions, or 
date the time when any new thing appeared to them; 
and therefore make no scruple to conclude, that those 
propositions,  of  whose  knowledge  they  can  find  in 
theinselves no original, were certainly the impress of 
God  and  nature upon  their  minds,  and not taught 
them by any one else.  These they entertain and sub- 
mit to, as many do to their parents, with veneration ; 
not because it is natural ;  nor do children do it, where 
they  are not  so  taught;  but because,  having been 
always so educated,  and having  no remembrance  of 
the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural. 
§  24. This will  appear very likely, and almost un- 
avoidable to come to pass,  if we  consider the nature 
of  mankind,  and the constitution  of  human  affairs; 
wherein  most  men  cannot  live  without  employing 
their time in the daily labours of  their callings ;  nor 
be  at quiet in  their minds without some foundation 
or principle to rest their thoughts on.  There is scarce 
anyone so floating and superficial in his understanding, 
who  hath not  some  revetenced  propositions,  which 
are to him  the principles  on which  he bottoms his 
reasonings;  and by which  he judgeth  of  truth and 
falsehood,  right  and  wrong : which  some,  wanting 
skill and leisure, and others the inclination, and some 
being taught that they ought not  to examine,  there 
are few to be  found who  are not  exposed  by their 
ignorance, laziness, education, or precipitancy, to take 
them upon trust. 
5 25. This is evidently the case of  all children and 
young folk ;  and custom, a greater power than nature, 
seldom failing to make them worship for divine what 
she hath inured them to bow their minds, and submit 
their understandings  to,  it is no wonder that grown 
men,  either perplexed in the necessary affairs of  life, 
or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should not seriously 
sit down to  examine their own tenets ;  especially when 
one of their principles is, that principles ought not to 
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be questioned.  And had men leisure, parts, and will, 
who is there almost  that dare shake the foundations 
of  all  his  past  thoughts and actions,  and endure to 
bring upon himself the shame of having been a long 
time wholly in mistake and error ? Who is there hardy 
enough to contend with the reproach which is every 
where prepared for those who dare venture to dissent 
from the received opinions of their country or party ? 
And where is the man to be found that can paticntly 
prepare himself  to bear the name of whimsical, scep- 
tical, or atheist, which  he is  sure to meet with, who 
does ill the least scruple any of the common opinions? 
And  he will be much  more  afraid to question those 
principles,  when he shall think them, as most men do, 
the standards set up by God in his mind,  to be the 
rule and touchstone of  all other opinions.  And what 
can hinder him from thinking them sacred, when he 
finds them the earliest of  all his  own thoughts,  and 
the most reverenced by others ? 
§ 96. It  is easy to imagine how by these means it 
comes to pass that men worship  the idols  that have 
been set up in their minds ;  grow fond of the notions 
they have been long acquainted with there ;  and stamp 
the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors, 
become  zealous votaries  to bulls and monkeys;  and 
contend too, fight, and die in defence of their opinions : 
"  Dum solos credit habendos esse deos, quos ipse colit." 
For since the reasoning faculties of the soul, which are 
almost constantly, though not always warily nor wisely, 
employed, would not know how to move, for want of 
a foundation and footing, in most men ;  who through 
laziness or avocation  do not,  or for want of  time,  or 
true helps, or for other causes, cannot penetrate into 
the principles  of knowledge,  and trace truth to its 
fountain  and  original;  it is natural for  them,  and 
almost unavoidable,  to take up with some borrowed 
principles : which being reputed and   resumed to be 
the evident proofs of  other things, are thought not to 
need any other proof themselves.  Whoever shall re- 56  No  Innate Practical Principles.  Book 1. 
ceive any of  these into his mind,  and entertain them 
there, with the reverence usually    aid  to ~rinci~les, 
never venturing  to examine them,  but accustoming 
himself to  believe them, because they are to be believed, 
may take up from his education, and the fashions of 
his country, any absurdity for innate principles ;  and by 
long  poring on the same objects,  so dim his sight, as 
to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images 
of  the Deity, and the workmanship of his hands. 
Principles  3 27. By this progress how many there 
must be  are who  arrive at principles  which  they 
believe  innate  may  be  easily  observed, 
in the variety  of  opposite  principles  held  and  con- 
tended for by all sorts and degrees of men.  And he 
that shall deny this to be the method  wherein  most 
men proceed to the assurance they have of  the truth 
and evidence of their principles, will perhaps find it a 
hard matter any other way to account for the contrary 
tenets which are firmly believed, confidently asserted, 
and which great numbers are ready at any time to seal 
with their blood.  And, indeed,  if it be the privilege 
of  innate  principles  to be  received  upon  their  own 
authority, without examination, I know not what may 
not be believed,  or how  any  one's  principles  can be 
questioned.  If they may, and ought to be examined, 
and tried, I desire to know how first and innate prin- 
ciples can be tried ; or at least it is reasonable to de- 
mand the marks and characters, whereby the genuine 
innate principles  may be  distinguished  from others; 
that so, amidst the great variety of pretenders, I may 
be kept from mistakes,  in so material a point as this. 
When this is done, I shall be ready to embrace such 
welcome and useful propositions ;  and till then I may 
with modesty  doubt,  since I fear universal  consent, 
which is the only one produced,  will  scarce prove a 
sufficient mark to direct my choice, and assure me of 
any innate principles.  From what  has been said, I 
think it  past doubt that there are  no practical principles 
wherein all men agree, and therefore none innate. 
CHAPTER  IV. 
Other  Considerations  concerning  Innate  Principles, 
both Speculative and Practical. 
8 1. HAD  those  who  would  nersuade  Principles 
us illat there  are innate princfples  not  :$:rzt;r 
taken  them  together  in  gross,  but con-  ideas be in- 
sidered separately the parts out of which  nate. 
those proposition"s are made, they would not, perhaps, 
have been so forward to believe they were innate: since, 
if  the ideas which made up those truths were not, it 
was impossible that the propositions made up of then1 
should  be innate, or the knowledge of  them be born 
with us.  For if  the ideas be not innate,  there was a 
time when the mind was without those principles ;  and 
then they will not be innate, but be derived from some 
other  original.  For where the ideas themselves are 
not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental 
or verbal propositions about them. 
4 2. If we will attentively consider new-  Ideas,  espe- 
born children, we shall have little reason  ~~~~?~~o 
to think that they bring many ideas into  principles, 
the world with them.  For bat in^ ~erhans  notbornwith 
some faint ideas of hunger and &&st, ah  clrildren. 
warmth, and some  which they may have felt in 
the womb,  there is not the least  appearance of  any 
settled ideas  at all in them; especially of ideas,  an- 
swering  the terms  which  make  up those  universal 
propositions, that are esteemed innate principles.  One 
may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come 
into their minds ; and that they get no more, nor no 
other, than what experience,  and the observation of 
things that come  in  their way,  furnish them  with: 
which  might be enough to satisfy us  that they  are 
not original characters, stamped on the mind. 
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not to be,"  is  certainly  (if there be any such)  an  in- 
nate principle.  But can  any one think, or will  any 
one say, that impossibility and identity are two innate 
ideas ?  Are they such as all mankind have, and bring 
into the world with them?  And are they those which 
are the first  in  children,  and antecedent to ill ac- 
quired ones ?  If they are innate, they must needs be 
so.  Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity 
before it has of white or black, sweet or bitter?  And 
is it from the knowledge of this principle that it con- 
cludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not 
the same taste that it used  to receive  from thence? 
Is it the  actual knowledge of "  im~ossibile  est idem 
esse, et non esse,"  that makes a child distinguish be- 
tween its mother  and a stranger? or that makes it 
fond of  the one and fly the other ?  Or does the mind 
regulate  itself  and its assent by ideas that it never 
yet  had ?  or  the  understanding  draw  conclusions 
from principles  which  it never  yet knew  or  under- 
stood ?  The names impossibility and identity stand 
for two ideas, so far from being innate, or born with 
us,  that I think it requires great care and attention 
to form them right in our understandings.  They are 
so far from 'being brought into the world with us,  so 
remote from the thoughts of  infancy and childhood, 
that I believe, upon examination it will be found, that 
many grown men want them. 
Identity,  an  § 4.  If identity (to instance in that alone) 
idea not in-  be a native impression,  and consequently 
nate.  so clear and obvious to us, that we must 
needs know it even from our cradles,  I would gladly 
be  resolved  by  one  of  seven,  or  seventy  years  old, 
whether a man,  being  a  creature  consisting  of  soul 
and body, be the same man when his body is changed, 
Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras, having had the 
same  soul,  were  the same  men,  though  they  lived 
several ages asunder ?  Nay,  whether  the cock  too, 
which  had  the same  soul,  were not  the same with 
both of them  ?  Whereby, perhaps, it will appear that 
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our idea of  sameness is not so settled and clear  as to 
deserve to be thought innate in us.  For if  those in- 
nate ideas are not clear and distinct, so as to be uni- 
versally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot 
be  subjects of  universal and undoubted truths ; but 
will be the unavoidable  occasion  of perpetual uncer- 
tainty.  For, I suppose,  every one's  idea  of  identity 
will  not be the same  that Pythagoras  and others of 
his followers have : And  which  then  shall be  true ? 
Which innate ?  Or are there two different ideas of 
identity, both innate  ? 
$  5.  Nor  let any  one  think that the questions  I 
have  here  proposed  about  the identity  of  man  are 
bare empty speculations ;  which if they were,  would 
be enough to show that there was in the understand- 
ings of men no innate idea of identity.  He that shall, 
with a little attention, reflect on the resurrection, and 
consider that divine justice will bring to judgment, at 
the last day, the very  same persons,  to be  happy or 
miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life ; 
will find it perhaps not  easy to resolve with  himself 
what makes  the same man,  or wherein  identity con- 
sists:  and will not be forward to think he, and every 
one, even children themselves,  have naturally a  clear 
idea of it. 
§ 6.  Let us  examine  that principle of  Whole and 
mathematics, viz.  cc that the whole is big-  part not in- 
ger than a part."  This, I take it, is reckon-  nate ideas. 
ed  amongst  innate principles.  I am sure it has as 
good a title as any to be thought so; which yet no- 
body can think it to be,  when he  considers the ideas 
it comprehends in it, "  whole and part:'  ale perfectly 
relative: but the positive  ideas,  to which  they yto- 
perly  and  immediately  belong,  are  extension  and 
number, of which alone whole and part are relations. 
So that if  whole and part are innate ideas, extension 
and number must be  so too;  it being  impossible to 
have an idea of  a  relation, without having any at all 
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founded.  Now whether the minds of men have natu- 
rally imprinted  on  them the ideas  of  extension and 
number,  I leave  to be  considered  by those who  are 
the patrons of  innate principles. 
Idea of wor-  tj 7.  66 That God is to be worshipped," 
ship not in-  is, without doubt, as great a truth as any 
nate.  can enter into  the mind of man, and de- 
serves the first place amongst all practical principles. 
But yet it can by no means be thought innate, unless 
the ideas of God and worship are innate.  That t,he 
idea the term worship stands for  is not in the under- 
standing of children,  and a character stamped on the 
mind in its first original, I think, will be easily granted, 
by any one that considers how few there be, amongst 
grown men, who have a clear and distinct notion of it. 
And, I suppose, there cannot be any thing more ridi- 
culous than to say that children  have  this  practical 
principle  innate, "  that God is  to be  worshipped;" 
and yet,  that they  know  not what  that worship  of 
God is,  which is their duty.  But to pass by this: 
Idea of God  tj 8.  If  any  idea  can be  imagined in- 
not innate.  nate, the idea, of  God may,  of  all others, 
for marly reasons be thought so ;  since it 
is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral 
principles without an innate idea of a Deity :  without 
a notion  of  a  law-maker,  it is impossible  to have  a 
notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it.  Be- 
sides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients, 
and left branded upon the recqrds of history, hath not 
navigation discovered,  in these  later ages, whole aa- 
tions, at the bay of  Soldania (a), in Brazil (b), in Bo- 
randay (c),  and in the Caribbee islands, &c. amongst 
whom there was to be found no notion of  a God,  no 
religion ?  Nicholaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria 
de  Caaiguarum  conversione,  has these  words  (d) : 
(a)  Roe apud Thevenot, p. 2.  (6)  Jo, de Lery, c. 16. 
(c) Martiniere z. Terry  & g<T.  Ovington +I;. 
(d)  Relatio triplex de rebus Indicis Caaiguarum s. 
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66 Reperi  eam  gentem nullum  nomen  habere,  quod 
66 Deum & hominis anirnam significet, nulla sacra ha- 
66 bet,  nulla idola."  These  are instances  of  nations 
where uncultivated nature has been left to itself, with- 
out the help  of  letters,  and discipline,  and  the im- 
provements of arts and sciences.  But there are others 
to be found,  who have  enjoyed these in a very great 
measure ; who yet,  for want of  a due application of 
their thoughts this way, want the idea and knowledge 
of God.  It  will, I doubt not, be a surprise to others, 
as it was to me, to find  the Siamites of  this number. 
But for  this,  let them  consult  the king of  France's 
late envoy thither (e), who gives no better account of 
the Chinese themselves (f  ).  And  if  we will not be- 
lieve La Loubere, the missionaries of China, even the 
Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the Chinese, 
do all to a man agree, and will convince  us that the 
sect of the literati, or learned, keeping to the old reli- 
gion of  China,  and the ruling party there,  are all of 
them  atheists.  Vid. Navarette,  in the collection  of 
voyages, vol. the first, and Historia cultus Sinensium. 
And perhaps if  we  should,  with attention, mind  the 
lives and discourses of people not so far off, we should 
have too much reason to fear, that many in more civi- 
lised countries have no very strong and clear impres- 
sions of  a deity upon their minds ;  and that the com- 
plaints  of  atheism,  made  from  the  pulpit,  are  not 
without  reason.  And  though  only  some  profligate 
wretches  own it too barefacedly now;  yet perhaps 
we should hear more  than we  do  of  it from others, 
did not the fear  of  the magistrate's  sword,  or  their 
neighbour's  censure, tie up people's  tongues : which, 
were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken 
away, would as openly proElaim their atheism, as their 
lives do (2). 
(6)  La Loubere du Royaume de Siam, t. 1, c. 9, sect. 15, and c. 20, 
wct.22, and c. 22, sect. 6.  (f')  Ib. t. 1, c.  20,  sect. 4,  and c. 23 
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$ 9.  But had all mankind, every where, a notion of 
a God  (whereof yet history tells us the contrary)  it 
would not from thence  follow,  that the idea of  him 
was innate.  For though no nation were to be found, 
without a name,  and some few  dark notions of  him, 
yet that would not prove them to be natural impres- 
blame hath been laid ;  because  it seems to invalidate an argument 
commonly used to prove the being of a God, viz. universal consent : 
to which our author*  answers,  I think  that t,he universal consent 
of mankind,  as to the being of  a God,  amounts to thus much, that 
the vastly greater majority of mankind have in all ages of the world 
actually believed  a God;  that the majority  of  the remaining  part 
have not actually disbelieved it; and consequently  those  who  have 
actually opposed the belief of  a God  have truly been very few.  SO 
that comparing those that have actually disbelieved, with those'who 
have actually believed a God, their number is so inconsiderable, that 
in respect of this incomparably greater majority,  of  those who have 
owned the belief of a God, it  may be said to be the universal consent 
of mankind. 
This is all the universal consent which truth or matter of  fact will 
allow;  and therefore all  that can  be made use of  to prove a God. 
But if  any one mould  extend it farther,  and speak  deceitfully for 
God;  if this universality  should  be  urged in a  strict sense, not for 
much the majority, but for a general consent of every one, even to a 
man,  in all ages and countries;  this would  make it  either no arp- 
ment, or a  perfectly  useless and unnecessary  one.  For if  any one 
deny a God, such  a universality of consent is destroygd ;  and if no- 
body does deny a God, what need of  arguments to convince atheists  ? 
I would crave leave to ask your lordship, were  there ever in the 
world any atheists or no?  If there were not,  what need is there of 
raising a question about the being of  a God, when nobody questions 
it  ?  What need of provisional arguments against a fault, from which 
niankind are so wholly free, and which,  by an universal consent, they 
may be presumed to be secure from ?  If you  say,  (aa I doubt not 
but you will) that there have been atheists in the world,  then your 
lordship's  universal consent reduces itself  to only a great  majority; 
and then make that majority as great as you will,  what I have said 
in the place quoted by your lordship  leaves it in its full force ;  and 
I have not said one word that does in the least invalidate this argu- 
ment for a God.  The argument I was  upon  there  was  to show, 
that the idea of God was not innate;  and to my purpose it was suf- 
ficent,  if there were  but a less number found in the world, who had 
no idea of  God, than your lordship will allow there have been of pro- 
fessed atheists;  for  whatsoever  is innate,  must be universal In  the 
* In his third letter to the Bishop of Worcester. 
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sion~  on the mind,  any more  than the names of fire, 
or the sun, heat, or number,  do prove the ideas they 
stand for to be  innate : because the names of  those 
things,  and the ideas of  them,  are so universally re- 
ceived  and known  amongst  mankind.  Nor,  on  the 
contrary, is the want of  such a name, or the absence 
strictest sense.  One exception is a  sufficient  proof  against it.  So 
that all that I said, and which was quite to another purpose,  did not 
at all tend, nor can be made use of,  to invalidate the argument for a 
Deit  grounded on such an universal consent, as your lordship, and 
all tgt  build on it, must own ;  which is only a very disproportioned 
majority:  such an universal consent my argument there neither af- 
firms nor requires  to be  less  than  you  will be pleased  to allow it. 
Your lordship therefore  might,  without  any prejudice  to those de- 
clarations  of  good-will  and favour  you have  for  the author of  the 
cc Essay of Human Understanding,"  have spared the mentioning his 
quoting authors that are in print, for matters of  fact to quite another 
purpose,  "as  going about to invalidate  the argument for a Deity, 
from the universal consent  of mankind;"  since  he leaves  that uni- 
versal consent as entire and as large as you yourself do,  or can own, 
or suppose it.  But here I have  no reason  to be  sorry that your 
lordship has given me this occasion for the vindication of this passage 
of m  book;  if there should  be  any one besides your lordship,  who 
shou f  d so far mistake it,  as to think it in the least invalidates the 
argument for a God, from the universal consent of mankind. 
But because you question the credibility of  those authors I have 
quoted,  which  you  say were  very  ill-chosen;  I will crave leave to 
say, that he whom I relied on for his testimony concerning the Hot- 
tentots of  Soldania,  was no less a man than an ambassador from the 
king of England to the Great Mogul :  of whose  relation,  monsieur 
Thevenot, no ill judge in the case,  had so  great an esteem, that he 
was at  the pains to translate into French, and publish it in his (which 
is counted no  injudicious)  collection  of  travels.  But to intercede 
with your lordship for  a  little more favourable  allowance of credit 
to Sir Thomas Roe's  relation ;  Coore,  an inhabitant of the country, 
who could speak English, assured Mr. Terry*,  that they of  Soldania 
had no God.  But if he too have the ill luck to find  no credit with 
you, I hope you will be a little more  favourable  to a  divine of  the 
church of  England,  now living,  and admit of his testimony in con- 
firmation of  Sir Thomas Roe's.  This worthy gentleman, in the re- 
lation of his voyage to  Surat, printed but two years since,  speaking 
?f the same people,  has these words :  +  'c  They are sunk even below 
ldolatryJ are destitute of  both  riest and temple,  and saving a little 
show of rejoicing, which is ma&  at  the full and new moon,  have lost 
* Terry's Voyage,  p. 17, 2s.  + Mr. Ovington, p. 489. 64  No  Innate Principks.  Book 1. 
of such  a  notion  out of men's minds,  any argument 
against the being of  a God ; any more than it would 
be a   roof that there was  no  loadstone in the world, 
beca;se  a great e art of mankind had neither a notion 
V 
of any such tlliny, nor a name for it; or be any show 
of argument to prove,  that there are no distinct and 
various species of  angels or  intelligent beings above 
us. because we have no ideas of such distinct species, 
or'names  for  them : for  men  being  furnishes  with 
U 
words,  by the common  language of their own coun- 
tries,  can scarce avoid having some kind of  ideas of 
those things, whose names  those they converse with 
have occasion frequently to mention to them.  And if 
they carry with it the notion of excellency, greatness, 
or something extraordinary ;  if apprehension and con- 
all kind of  religious  devotion.  Nature  has  so  richly provided  for 
their convenience  in  this life, that they have drowned  all sense of 
the God of it,  and are grown quite careless of the next." 
But to provide against the clearest  evidence  of  atheism in these 
people,  you say, "that  the account given of them makes them not fit 
to be a standard for the sense of mankind."  This, I think, may pass 
for nothing,  till somebody be found,  that makes them to be  a stan- 
dard for the sense  of  mankind.  All the use I niade of them was to 
show, that there were men in the world that had no innate idea of a 
God.  But t~  keep something like an argument going (for what will 
not that do?) you go near denying those Cafers to be men.  What 
else do these  words signify  ?  "  a people so  strangely bereft of  com- 
mon sense, that they can hardly be reckoned among mankind,  as ap- 
pearr by the best accounts of  the Cafers of  Soldania, &c"  I hope, 
~f  any of them were  called Peter, James,  or John, it would be  past 
scruple that they were men : however Courwee, Wewena, and Cow- 
sheda, and those others who had names,  that had  no places in your 
nomenclator, would hardly pass muster with your lordship. 
My lord, I should not mention  this,  but  that what you yourself 
say here may be a motive  to you  to consider,  that what you have 
laid such a stress on concerning the general nature of man, as a real 
being, and the subject of  properties, amounts to nothing for the di- 
stinguishing of species; since you p ourself own that there may be  in- 
dividuals,  wherein there is a common nature with a particular sub- 
sistence Proper to each  of  them ;  whereby  you  are so  little able to 
know of which of  the ranks or sorts they are, into which you say God 
has ordered beings,  and which  he hath distinguished  by essential 
properties,  that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckoned 
among mankind or no. 
cernment accompany it ; if  the fear of absolute  and 
irresistible power set it on upon the mind, the idea is 
likely to sink  the  deeper,  and  spread  the  farther : 
especially if it be such an idea as  is  agreeable to the 
common light of reason,  and naturally deducible from 
every part of  our knowledge, as that of a God is.  For 
the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power 
appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that 
a rational  creature, who will but seriously reflect on 
them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity.  And the 
influence that the discovery of such a being must ne- 
cessarily have on the minds of all, that have but once 
heard of it, is so great, and carries such a weight  of 
thought  and  communication  with  it,  that  it seems 
stranger to me that a whole nation of men should be 
any where found so brutish  as to want the notion of 
a God,  than that they should be without any notion 
of numbers or fire. 
10.  The name of God  being once mentioned  in 
any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful, 
wise, invisible being, the suitableness of  such a notion 
to the principles of  common reason,  and the interest 
men will always have to mention it often, must neces- 
sarily spread it far and wide, and continue it down to 
all generations ;  though yet the general reception  of 
this name,  and some imperfect and unsteady notions 
conveyed thereby to the unthinking part of mankind, 
prove not the idea to be innate ; but only that they 
who made the discovery had made a right use of their 
reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and 
traced them to their original ;  from whom  other less 
considering people having once received so important 
a notion, it could not easily be lost again. 
$ 11. This is all could be inferred from the notion 
of a God,  were  it to be found  universalty in all the 
tribes  of  mankind,  and generally  acknowledged  by 
men  grown  to maturity in  all  countries.  For the 
generality of  the acknowledging of s God, as I ima- 
gine, is extended no farther than that ;  which if it be 
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sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well 
prove the idea of fire innate ;  since, I think, it may be 
truly said, that there is  not  a  person  in  the world 
who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea 
of fire.  I doubt not, but if a colony of young children 
should be placed in an island where no fire was, they 
would  certainly  neither  have  any  notion  of  such a 
thing,  nor name for it,  how generally soever  it were 
received  and known in all the world  besides:  and 
perhaps  too  their  apprehensions would be as far re- 
moved from any name,  or  notion of a God,  till some 
one amongst them had employed  his thoughts, to in- 
quire into the constitution and causes of things, which 
would easily lead him to the notion of a God ;  which 
having once taught to others, reason,  and the natural 
propensity of their  own  thoughts,  would  afterwards 
propagate, and continue amongst them. 
Suitable to  $ 12. Indeed it is urged, that it is suit- 
~~,-y~~~~d-  able  to the goodness  of  God to imprint 
ness, that all  upon  the minds  of  men  characters  and 
men should  notions of himself, and not to leave them 
have an idea 
ofbim,there-  in the dark and doubt in so grand a con- 
fore natural-  cernment ;  and also by that means to se- 
ly imprinted  cure to himself  the homage  and venera- 
by himy  an-  tion due from so intelligent a creature as 
swered.  man ;  and therefore he has done it. 
This argument,  if it be  of  any  force,  will  prove 
much more than those who use it in this case expect 
from it.  For  if  we may  conclude  that God  hath 
done  for  men  all  that men  shall judge  is best for 
them, because it is suitable to his goodness so to do ; 
it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the 
minds of  men  an idea of  himself,  but that he hath 
plai~lly  stamped there, in fair characters, all that men 
ought to know or believe of him,  all that they ought 
to do in obedience to his will;  and that he hath given 
them a will  and affections  conformable  to it.  This, 
no doubt, every one will  think better for men,  than 
that they should in the dark grope after knowledge, 
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as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God, Acts xvii. 
27,  than that their wills  should  clash with their un- 
derstandings,  and  their  appetites  cross  their  duty. 
The Romanists say, it is best for men, and so suitable 
to the goodness of God, that there should be an infal- 
lible judge of controversies  on earth; and therefore 
there is one.  And I, by  the same  reason,  say,  it is 
better for men that every man himself should  be in- 
fallible.  I leave them  to consider,  whether  by  the 
force of  this argument  they shall think,  that every 
man is so.  I think it a very good  argument to say 
the infinitely wise God hath made it so ;  and therefore 
it is best.  But it seems to me a  little too much con- 
fidence  of our own wisdom,  to say, '' I think it best, 
and therefore God hath made it so ;"  and, in the mat- 
ter in hand,  it will  be in vain  to argue from such a 
topic that God hath done so, when certain experience 
shows us that he hath not.  But the goodness of God 
hath not been wanting to men without such original 
impressions of  knowledge,  or ideas stamped  on the 
mind:  since he hath furnished man with those facul- 
ties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all 
things requisite  to the end  of such a being.  And I 
doubt not but to show that a  man,  by the right use 
of his natural abilities, may, without any innate prin- 
ciples, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things 
that concern him.  God having endued man with those 
faculties  of  knowing which  he  hath,  was  no  more 
obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions 
in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, 
and materials, he should build 4im bridges or houses ; 
which  some people in the world,  however,  of good 
parts,  do either totally want,  or are but ill provided 
of,  as well as others are wholly without ideas of God, 
and principles of morality ;  or at least have but very 
ill ones.  The reason  in both cases being, that they 
never employed their parts, faculties,  and powers in- 
dustriously that way, but contented themselves  with 
the opinions, fashions, and things of their country as 
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they found them, without looking any farther.  Had 
you or I been born  at the bay of  Soldsnia, possibly 
our  thoughts  and  notions  had  not  exceeded  those 
brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there :  and 
had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in 
England,  he had been perhaps  as knowing a divine, 
and as good a mathematician,  as any in it.  The dif- 
ference between  him  and a more improved English- 
man lying barely in this, that  the exercise of his facul- 
ties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions 
of his own country, and never  directed to any other 
or farther inquiries:  and if he had not any idea of  a 
God, it was only because he pursued not those thoughts 
that would have led him to it. 
Ideasof Gad  $ 13.  1 grant that if  there  were  any 
various in  idea to be found imprinted  on the minds 
different  of men, we have reason to expect it  should 
men.  be the notion of his Maker, as a mark God 
set on his own workmanship,  to mind man of  his de- 
pendence and duty ;  and that herein  should appear 
the first instances of  human knowledge.  But how 
late is  it before  any  such notion  is discoverable  in 
children 2  And when we find it there, how much more 
does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher 
than represent the true God?  He  that shall observe 
in children  the progress  whereby their  minds attain 
the knowledge they have,  will think that the objects 
they do first  and most familiarly converse  with  are 
those that make the first impressions on their under- 
standings :  nor will he find the least footsteps of any 
other.  It is  easy to take notice  how their  thoughts 
enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquaint- 
ed with a greater variety of sensible objects, to retain 
the ideas of them in  their memories ;  and to get the 
skill to compound and enlarge them, and several ways 
put them together.  How by these means they come 
to frame in their minds an idea men have of  a Deity 
I shall hereafter show. 
§ 14. Can it be thought that the ideh  men have of 
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~~d  are  the  characters  and  marks  of  himself,  en- 
graven on their  minds  by his  own finger,  when we 
see that in the same country, under one and the same 
name, men have far different,  nay, often contrary and 
inconsistent  ideas  and  conceptions  of  him ?  Their 
agreeing in a name, or sound, will scarce prove an in- 
llate notion of him. 
$ 15. What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could 
they have,  who  acknowledged and worshipped  hun- 
dreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an 
infallible  evidence  of  their ignorance of  him, and a 
proof  that they had  no  true notion  of  God, where 
unity, infinity, and eternity were excluded.  To  which 
if we  add their  gross  conceptions of corporeity, ex- 
pressed in their  images  and representations of  their 
deities ; the amours,  marriages,  copulations,  lusts, 
quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them 
to their  gods; we shall haye  little reason  to think, 
that the heathen world, i. e. the greatest part of man- 
kind,  had  such  ideas of  God  in  their minds, as he 
himself, out of  care that they should not be mistaken 
about him,  was author of.  And this universality  of 
.consent, so  much  argued, if  it hrove  any native im- 
pressions, it will be only this,  that God imprinted on 
the minds  of all men, speaking  the same  language,* 
a  name  for  himself,  bnt  not  any idea; since those 
people, who agreed in the name, had at  the same time 
far different apprehensions  &bout the thing signified. 
If they say, that the variety of deities worshipped by 
the heathen world  were but figurative ways  of  ex- 
pressing the several  attributes of  that incomprehen- 
sible being, or several parts of his providence ; I an- 
swer,  what they might be in the  original I will not 
here inquire ;  but that they were so in the thoughts 
of  the vulgar, I  think  nobody will  affirm.  And he 
that will consult the voyage  of the bishop of Beryte, 
c. 13. (not to mention other testimonies) will find that 
the theology of  the Siamites professedly owns a plu- 
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ciously remarks,  in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 
+++, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at 
all. 
If it be said, that wise  men of  all nations came to 
have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the 
Deity, I grant it.  But then this, 
First, Excludes universality of consent in any thing 
but the name; for  those wise  men  being  very  few, 
perhaps  one of  a  thousand,  this  universality  is very 
narrow. 
Secondly, It seems to me plainly to prove, that the 
truest and best notions men had of God were not im- 
printed, but acquired by thought and meditation, and 
a right use of their faculties ;  since the wise and con- 
siderate men of the world, by a right and careful em- 
ployment of their thoughts and reason,  attained true 
notions in this as well as other things; whilst the lazy 
and inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater 
number, took up their notions by chance,  from com- 
mon tradition  and vulgar conceptions, without much 
beating their heads about them.  And if it be a reason 
to think  the notion  of  God innate,  because  all wise 
men had it,  virtue too must be  thought  innate, for 
that also wise men have always had. 
5 16. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism: 
nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahome- 
tans,  who  acknowledge but one God,  this  doctrine, 
and the care taken  in  those  nations to teach men to 
have true notions of a God, prevailed so far as to make 
men to have the same, and the true ideas of him.  How 
many, even amongst us, will be  found, upon inquiry, 
to fancy him in the shape of a man sitting in heaven, 
and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions 
of him? Christians, as well as Turks, have had whole 
sects owning and contending earnestly for it, and that 
the Deity was  corporeal,  and of human shape: and 
though we find few  amongst  us who  profess  them- 
selves  anthr~pomor~hites  (though some I have  met 
with that own  it) yet, I believe, he that will  make it 
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his business may find, amongst the ignorant and unin- 
structed Christians, many of  that opinion.  Talk but 
with country people, almost of any age, or young peo- 
ple of almost  any condition ; and you shall find that 
though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, 
yet the notions  they apply this name to are so odd, 
low, and pitiful, that nobody can  imagine they were 
taught by a rational man, much  less  that they were 
characters written by the finger of God himself.  Nor 
do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of 
God,  that he has given  us  minds  unfurnished  with 
these ideas of himself,  than that he hath sent us into 
the world with bodies unclothed,  and that there is no 
art or skill born with us :  for, being fitted with facul- 
ties to attain these, it is want of  industry  and con- 
sideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have 
them not.  It is as certain that there is a God, as that 
the opposite angles,  made  by the intersection of  two 
straight lines, are equal.  There was  never  any  ra- 
tional creature, that set himself  sincerely to examine 
the  truth of  these  propositions,  that could  fail  to 
assent to them ;  though yet it be past doubt that there 
are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts 
that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. 
If any one think fit to call this  (which is  the utmost 
of its extent) universal consent,  such an one I easily 
allow;  but such an universal consent as  this proves 
not the idea of God, any more than it does  the idea 
of such angles,  innate. 
$17. Since then, though the knowledge  If the idea of 
of a God be the most natural discovery of  Ezz ::t 
human reason, yet the idea of him is not  other can be 
innate,  as, I thmk, is  evident  from what  supposed in- 
has been said ; I imagine there will scarce  nate. 
be any other idea found, that can pretend ta it :  since 
if God hath  sent any impression,  any character  on 
the understanding  of  men,  it is  most reasonable  to 
expect it should have  been some  clear  and uniform 
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capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an 
object.  But our  minds  being at first void  of  that 
idea, which we  are most  concerned  to have, it is  a 
strong presumption  against all other innate charac- 
ters.  I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find 
none, and would be glad to be informed by any other. 
Idea of  sub-  $ 18. I  confess there  is  another  idea, 
stance not  which would  be of general use  for man- 
innate.  kind to have, as it is of  general tall<, as if 
they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which 
we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflec- 
tion.  If  nature  took  care to provide  us  any ideas, 
we might well expect they should be  such as by our 
own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves ;  but we 
see, on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby 
our ideas are brought into our minds,  this is not, we 
have no such  clear idea  at all,  and therefore signify 
nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain 
supposition  of we  know not what, i. e. of something 
whereof we have no particular distinct positive idea, 
which we  take to be the  substratum,  or support, of 
those ideas we know. 
No  proposi-  19.  Whatever  then  we  talk  of  in- 
tions can be  nate, either speculative or practical, prin- 
innate, since  ciples, it may, with  as much probability, 
noideasare  be said, that a man hath 1001. sterling in 
innate.  his pocket, and yet  denied,  that he hath 
either penny,  shilling, crown,  or other coin,  out of 
which the sum is to be made up, as to think that cer- 
tain propositions  are innate,  when  the ideas  about 
which they are  can  by no means  be supposed to be 
so.  The general reception and assent  that is given 
doth not at all prove that the ideas expressed in them 
are innate :  for in many cases, however the ideas came 
there, the assent to words,  expressing the agreement 
or disagreement of such ideas, will necessarily follow. 
Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worship, 
will assent to this proposition, "that God is to  be wor- 
shipped:'  when  expressed  in  a  language he under- 
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stands :  and every rational man, that hath not thought 
on it to-day,  may he  ready to assent  to this proposi- 
tion to-morrow;  and yet millions of men may be well 
supposed  to  want  one  or  both those  ideas  to-day. 
For if we  will allow savages and most country people 
to have ideas of  God  and worship  (which  conversa- 
tion with them will not make one forward to believe), 
yet I think  few  children  can  be  supposed  to have 
those ideas, which therefore they must begin to have 
some time or other;  and then they will also begin to 
assent to that proposition,  and make very little ques- 
tion of it ever after.  But such an assent upon hear- 
ing no  more  proves  the ideas to be  innate than  it 
does that one  born blind  (with cataracts, which will 
be couched  to-morrow)  had  the innate  ideas  of  the 
sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow ;  because, when his 
sight is  cleared,  he will certainly assent  to this pro- 
position, "  that the sun is lucid, or that saffron is yel- 
low ;" and therefore, if  such an assent upon hearing 
cannot prove  the ideas innate, it can  much  less the 
propositions made up of those ideas.  If they have any 
innate ideas,  I would be glad  to be  told  what, and 
how many they are. 
§ 20.  To which let me add: If there be  No innate 
any innate ideas,  any ideas in  the mind, 
which the mind  does  not  actually think  memory. 
on, they must  be  lodged  in  the memory,  and  from 
thence must be brought  into view by remembrance ; 
i.  e.  must be  known, when  they are remembered,  to 
have been perceptions in  the mind  before,  unless re- 
membrance can be without remembrance.  For to re- 
member  is  to perceive  any  thing with memory,  or 
with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived 
before:  without  this,  whatever  idea  comes  into the 
mind is new, and not remembered ;  this consciousness 
of its having been in the mind before being that which 
distinguishes  remembering  from  all  other  ways  of 
thinking.  Whatever idea was never perceived by the 
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the mind, is either an actual perception, or else, having 
been an actual perception,  is so  in the mind, that by 
the  memory  it can  be made  an  actual  perception 
again.  Whenever there is  the actual perception  of 
an idea without memory,  the idea appears perfectly 
new  and  unknown  before  to  the  understanding. 
Whenever  the memory  brings any idea  into  actual 
view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there 
before,  and was  not wholly a  stranger to the mind. 
Whether this  be  not so, I appeal to every one's  ob- 
servation; and then I desire  an instance  of  an idea, 
pretended to be innate, which (before any impression 
of  it  by  ways  hereafter  to be  mentioned)  any  one 
could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly 
known ;  without which consciousness of  a former per- 
ception there is no remembrance ;  and whatever idea 
comes into the mind without that consciousness is not 
remembered, or  comes  not  out of  the memory,  nor 
can be said to be in the mind before that appearance: 
for what is not either actually in view,  or in the me- 
mory, is in the mind no way at all,  and is all one as 
if it had never  been there.  Suppose a child had the 
use of  his  eyes,  till  he knows  and  distinguishes co- 
lours ;  but then cataracts shut the windows,  and he 
is  forty or fifty  years  perfectly in the dark, and in 
that time perfectly loses  all memory of  the ideas of 
colours he once  had.  This was  the case  of a blind 
man I once  talked with, who  lost  his  sight by the 
small-pox when he was a child, and had no more no- 
tion of  colours than one born blind.  I ask, whether 
any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours 
in his  mind,  any more  than one  born blind ?  And I 
think nobody will say that either of  them had in his 
mind any idea  of  colours at all.  His cataracts are 
couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remem- 
bers  not)  of  colours,  de  novo,  by his  restored  sight 
conveyed to his mind, and that without any conscious- 
ness of a former acquaintance: and these now he can 
revive and call to mind in the dark.  In this case all 
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these ideas of colours, which when out of view can be 
revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance, 
being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. 
The use I make of  this is,  that whatever idea, being 
not actually in view,  is in  the mind, is there only by 
being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, 
it is not in the mind ; and if  it be in the memory, it 
cannot  by the memory be  brought  into actual view, 
without a perception that it comes out of the memory ; 
which is this,  that it had  been  known before, and is 
now remembered.  If therefore there be  any innate 
ideas, they must be  in the memory, or  else nowhere 
in the mind ; and if they be in the memory, they can 
be revived without any impression from without ;  and 
whenever  they are brought  into the mind,  they are 
remembered,  i.  e. they br~ng  with them a perception 
of their not being wholly new to it.  This being a con- 
stant and  distinguishing  difference  between what is, 
and what is not in the memory,  or in the mind ;  that 
what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, 
appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what 
is  in  the  memory,  or  in the mind,  whenever  it is 
suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but 
the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there be- 
fore.  By this it may be tried, whether  there be any 
innate ideas in the mind, before impression from sen- 
sation or reflection.  I would fain meet with the man 
who,  when he  came to the use of  reason, or  at any 
other  time,  remembered  any  one  of  them;  and  to 
whom, after he was  born,  they were never  new.  If 
any one will say there are ideas in the mind that are 
not in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, 
and make what he says intelligible. 
$ 21.  Besides what I have already said,  Principles 
there is another reason why I doubt that  not innate, 
neither these nor any other principles are  ~~~eu~s~for 
innate.  I that  am fully persuaded  that  litde eer- 
the infinitely wise  God made  all things  tainty. 
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why he should be  supposed  to print upon the minds 
of men some universal principles ;  whereof those that 
are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of 
no great use;  and those  that  concern  practice,  not 
self-evident, and neither of them distinguishable from 
some other truths not allowed  to be innate.  For to 
what  purpose  should  characters  be  graven on  the 
mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there 
than those which  are afterwards  introduced, or can- 
not be  distinguished  from  them ?  If any one  thinks 
there are such innate  ideas and propositions,  which 
by their clearness  and usefulness  are distinguishable 
from all  that is  adventitious  in  the mind,  and  ac- 
quired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us 
which they aTe, and then every one will be a fit judge 
whether they be so or no ; since  if there be such in- 
nate ideas and impressions,  plainly different from all 
other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find 
it true in himself.  Of the evidence of these supposed 
innate maxims I have spoken already; of their useful- 
ness I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. 
Difference  $22.  TO  conclude :  some ideasforwardly 
of men's dis-  offer themselves to a11  men's  understand- 
cove?ies  de-  ings ;  some sorts of truths result from any 
pends upon 
the different  idEas;  as soon as the mind puts them intb 
application  ;  other truths require a train 
of their fa-  of ideas nlaced in order. a due cornaarin~  -- - 
culties.  of  then1,land  deductiois made with  a; 
tention, before  they can be  discovered  and assented 
to.  Some of the first  sort, because of  their general 
and easy reception, have  been  mistaken  for  innate; 
but the truth is, ideas  and notions are no more born 
with us than arts and sciences, though some of them 
indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily 
than others,  and therefore  are more  generally  re- 
ceived;  though that too  be  according as the organs 
of our bodies and powers  of our minds happen to be 
employed:  God having fitted men with faculties and 
means to discover, receive, and retain truths, nccord- 
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ing as they are employed.  The great difference that 
is to be found in the notions of  mankind  is  from the 
different use they put their faculties to ; whilst some 
(;mnd  those the most)  taking things  upon  trust, mis- 
employ  their  power  of  assent,  by  lazily  enslaving 
their minds to the dictates'and  dominion of others in 
doctrines, which it is their duty carefully to examine, 
and not blindly,  with  an implicit faith,  to swallow; 
others,  employing  their  thoughts  only  about  some 
few things,  grow  acquainted  sufficiently with them, 
attain great degrees of  knowledge in  them, and are 
ignorant of all other, having never  let their thoughts 
loose in the search of other inquiries.  Thus, that the 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, 
is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think 
more evident than many of those propositions that go 
for  principles; and  yet  there  are millions, however 
expert in other things, who  know not this at all, be- 
cause they never  set their  thoughts  on work  about 
such angles ;  and he that certainly knows this propo- 
sition  may yet  be  utterly ignorant of  the  truth of 
other propositions,  in  mathematics  itself, which  are 
as clear and evident as this, because, in his  search of 
those mathematical truths, he  stopped  his  thoughts 
short,  and went not  so far.  The same  may happen 
concerning the notions  we have  of  the  being  of  a 
Deity: for though there be no truth which a man may 
more evidently make out to himself than the existence 
of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things 
as he finds  them, in this world,  as  they minister  to 
his  pleasures  and passions,  and not make inquiry a 
little farther  into their causes,  ends,  and admirable 
contrivances,  and  pursue the thoughts thereof with 
diligence  and attention,  may live  long without  any 
notion of such  a  being.  And  if any person hath by 
talk put such a notion into his head,  he may perhaps 
believe  it; but  if  he  hath  never  examined  it,  his 
knowledge  of it will  be  no  perfecter  than his,  who 
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are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, with- 
out examining the demonstration;  and may yield his 
assent as a probable opinion,  but hath no knowledge 
of the truth of it ;  which yet his faculties, if carefully 
employed,  were  able  to make clear  and evident  to 
him.  But this  only by  the by,  to show how much 
our knowledge  depends upon the right use  of  those 
powers nature hath bestowed  upon us,  and how little 
upon such innate principles,  as are in vain  supposed 
to be in  all mankind  for  their  direction;  which all 
men could not but know,  if  they were there,  or else 
they would be there to no purpose ;  and which  since 
all men do not know,  nor can distinguish from other 
adventitious truths,  we may well conclude there are 
no such. 
Men must  5 123.  What censure doubting thus of 
think and  innate principles may deserve from men, 
know for  who will be apt to call it pulling up the 
old  foundatiins of  knowGdge  and cer- 
tainty, I cannot tell ; I persuade myself at least, that 
the way I have pursued,  being conformable to truth, 
lays those  foundations  surer.  This I  am certain,  I 
have not made it my business either to quit or follow 
any  authority in  the ensuing  discourse : truth has 
been my only aim,  and wherever that has appeared 
to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, with- 
out minding  whether  the footsteps  of  any other lay 
that way no no.  Not that I want a  due respect  to 
other men's  opinions;  but, after  all,  the greatest re- 
verence is  due to truth:  and I hope it will  not be 
thought  arrogance  to say  that  perhaps  we  should 
~nake  greater progress  in  the discovery  of  rational 
and contemplative knowledge,  if we sought it in the 
fountain,  in the consideration  of  things  themselveh 
and made use rather of  our own thoughts than other 
men's  to find  it : for I think  we  may  as rationally 
hope to see with other men's  eyes,  as to know  by 
other men's understandings.  So much as we ourselves 
consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much 
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we possess of real and true knowledge.  The floating 
of other men's  opinions in our  brains  makes  us  not 
one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be 
true.  What in them was science, is in us but opinia- 
trety;  whilst we give up our assent only to reverend 
names, and do not, as they did,  employ our own rea- 
son to understand  those  truths which gave them re- 
putation.  Aristotle  was  certainly  a  knowing  man, 
but nobody ever thought him  so because he blindly 
embraced,  or confidently vented, the opinions of  an- 
other.  And if the taking up another's principles, with- 
out examining them,  made not him  a philosopher,  I 
suppose it will hardly make any body else so.  In  the 
sciences, every one has  so  much  as he really knows 
and comprehends :  what he believes only,  and takes 
upon  trust,  are but shreds ;  which,  however  well in 
the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his 
stock who gathers them.  Such borrowed wealth, like 
fairy-money,  though it were gold in the hand from 
which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when 
it comes to use. 
§ 924.  When  men  have  found  some  Whence the 
general propositions,  that could  not be  ?pinion of 
doubted of as soon as understood, it was,  z;iF  PrIn- 
I know, a short and easy way to conclude 
them innate.  This being once received,  it eased  the 
lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry 
of the doubtful concerning  all that was  once  styled 
innate.  And it was  of  no small advantage to those 
who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this 
the principle of principles, "  that principles must not 
be questioned :" for having once established this tenet, 
that there are innate principles, it put their followers 
upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such ; 
which was to take them off from the use of their own 
reason and judgment, and put them on believing and 
taking them upon trust, without farther examination : 
in which  posture of  blind  credulity they might be 
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sort of men,  who had the skill and office to principle 
and guide them.  Nor is it a small power it gives one 
man  over  another,  to have the authority to be  the 
dictator of principles,  and teacher  of  unquestionable 
truths ;  and to make a man swallow that for an innate 
principle, which may serve to his purpose who teacheth 
them :  whereas had they examined the ways whereby 
men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, 
they would have ,found them to result in the minds of 
men from  the being of things themselves,  when duly 
considered;  and that they  were  discovered  by  the 
applicatioii of those faculties,  that were fitted by na- 
ture to receive  and judge  of  them,  when duly  em- 
 loved about them. 
I  * 
Conclusion.  $ 25.  To show how the understanding 
proceeds herein  is the design of  the fol- 
lowing  disc6urse ; which I shall proceid to,  when I 
have first premised, that hitherto, to clear my way to 
those foundations, which I conceive are the only true 
ones whereon  to establish those notions we can have 
of our own knowledge, it hath been necessary for me 
to give an account  of  the reasons I had to doubt  of 
innate principles.  And  since  the  arguments which 
are against them do some of them rise  from common 
received opinions,  I have been  forced to take several 
things for granted,  which  is hardly avoidable to any 
one, whose task it is to show the falsehood or impro- 
bability  of  any tenet: it happening in controversial 
discourses, as it does in assaulting of towns,  where if 
the ground  be  but  firm whereon  the batteries  are 
erected, there is no farther inquiry of whom it is bor- 
rowed, nor whom it belongs to,  so it affords but a fit 
rise for  the present purpose.  But in the future part 
of this discourse, designing to raise an edifice uniform 
and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience 
and observation will  assist me,  I hope to erect it on 
such a basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with 
props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begged 
foundations ;  or at least, if mine prove a castle in the 
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air,  I will endeavour  it shall be all of  a piece,  and 
hang together.  Wherein I warn the reader  not  to 
expect  undeniable  cogent  demonstrations,  unless I 
may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by 
others, to take my principles for granted ;  and then, I 
doubt not, but I can demonstrate too.  All that I shall 
say  for  the principles I proceed  on  is,  that I can 
only  appeal to men's  own  unprejudiced  experience 
and observation, whether they be true or no ;  and this 
is enough for  a  man who  professes  no more than to 
lay  down  candidly  and  freely  his  own  conjectures, 
concerning  a  subject  lying somewhat  in  the  dark, 
without any other design  than  an unbiased  inquiry 
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CHAPTER I. 
Of  Ideas in general, and tlzeir Original. 
Idea is the  $ 1.  EVERY  man  being  conscious  to 
object of  himself that he thinks, and that which his 
mind  is  applied  about,  whilst  thinking, 
being the ideas that are there,  it is past doubt, that 
men have  in  their minds  several  ideas,  such  as are 
those  expressed  by  the words  whiteness,  hardness, 
sweetness,  thinking,  motion,  man,  elephant,  army, 
drunkenness, and others.  It is in the first place then 
to be inquired,  how he comes by them.  I know it is 
a received doctrine,  that men have native ideas  and 
original characters stamped upon their minds in their 
very first being.  This opinion I have, at large, exa- 
rsined already ;  and, I suppose, what I have  said,  in 
the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, 
when I have shown  whence the understanding may 
get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees 
they may come into the mind ;  for which I shall ap- 
peal to every one's  own observation and experience. 
All ideas  9 2. Let us then suppose the mind to 
come from  be,  as we say, white paper, void of all cha- 
sensation or  racters, without any ideas ; how comes it 
reflection.  to be furnished ?  Whence comes  it by 
that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of 
man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety ? 
Whence has it all the materials of  reason and know- 
ledge ?  To this I answer,  in one word, from experi- 
ence :  in that all our knowledge is founded, and from 
that it ultimately derives itself.  Our observation em- 
ployed either about external sensible objects, or about 
the internal operations  of  our  minds, perceived  and 
reflected on by ourselves,  is that which supplies our 
understandings with  all  the  materials of  thinking. 
These  two  are the  fountains  of  knowledge,  from 
whence all the ideas we have,  or can naturally have, 
do spring. 
9 3. First, Our senses, conversant about  ~h,  obje&s 
particular sensible objects, do convey into  of sensation 
the mind  several  distinct perceptions  of  ?nesourceof 
things,  according  to those  various ways  ~deas. 
wherein  those  objects  do affect  them: and thus we 
come  by those ideas we have of  yellow,  white,  heat, 
cold,  soft,  hard,  bitter,  sweet,  and all  those  which 
we call sensible qualities ;  which when I say the senses 
convey into the mind, I mean, they from external ob- 
jeds convey into the mind what produces there those 
perceptions.  This great source of  most of the ideas 
we have,  depending wholly upon our senses,  and de- 
rived by them to the untierstanding, I call SENSATION. 
fj 4.  Secondly, The other fountain from  The opera- 
which  experience  furnisheth  the under-  tion, ,f  ,,, 
standing with ideas,  is the perception of  lilinds the 
the operations of our own,mind within us, 
as it is employed  about the ideas it has  of them. 
got;  which  operations when  the soul comes  to re- 
flect  on and consider,  do furnish  the anderstanding 
with another set of ideas, which could not be had from 
things  without;  and such are perception, thinking, 
doubting, believing,  reasoning, knowing, willing,  and 
all  the different  actings  of  our own  minds;  which 
we being conscious  of  and observing in ourselves, do 
from these receive into our understandings as distinct 
ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses.  This 
source of ideas every man has wholly in himself:  and 
though  it be not sense, as having nothing to do with 
external objects, yet it is very like it, and might pro- 
perly enough be called internal sense.  But as I call 
the other  sensation,  so I call this  REFLECTION,  the 
ideas it affords  being  such  only as the mind gets by 
reflecting  on its own operations within itself.  By re- 
flection, then, in the following part of this discourse, 
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I would be understood to mean that notice which the 
mind takes of its own operations, and the manner  of 
them; by  reason whereof  there come  to be ideas of 
these operations in the understanding.  These two, I 
say, viz.  external material  things,  as the objects of 
sensation ;  and the operations of our own minds within, 
as the objects of reflection;  are to me the only ori- 
ginals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. 
The term operations here I use  in a large sense,  as 
comprehending not  barely  the actions  of  the mind 
about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising some- 
times from  them,  such  as is  the satisfaction or  un- 
easiness arising from any thought. 
Allourideas  § 5. The understanding  seems  to me 
areoftheone  not to have the least glimmering of  any 
Or  the other  ideas, which it doth not receive from one 
of these.  of  these two.  External objects  furnish 
the mind  with the ideas of  sensible  qualities,  which 
are all those different perceptions they produce in us : 
and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas 
of its own operations. 
These,  when we have  taken a full survey of them 
and their several modes, combinations,  and relations, 
we shall find to contain all our whole  stock of  ideas ; 
and that we have nothing in our minds which did not 
come in one of these two ways.  Let any one examine 
his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his un- 
derstanding;  and then let him tell me,  whether  all 
the original ideas he has there are any other than of 
the objects of  his  senses,  or of  the operations  of  his 
mind, considered as objects of his reflection : and how 
great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines  to be 
lodged there, he will,  upon  taking a  strict view,  see 
that he has not any idea in his mind, but what one of 
these two have  imprinted; though perhaps with in- 
finite variety compounded and enlarged by the under- 
standing, as we shall see hereafter. 
Observable  § 6.  He that attentively considers the 
inchildren.  state of  a  child,  at his  first coming into 
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the world,  will have little reason to think him stored 
with plenty of ideas,  that are to be the matter of his 
future knowledge : it is by degrees he comes to be 
furnished with them.  And though  the ideas  of ob- 
vious and familiar qualities imprint themselves before 
the memory begins to  keep a register of time or order, 
yet it is often  so late before  some  unusual qualities 
come in the way, that there are few men that cannot 
recollect  the  beginning  of  their  acquaintance  with 
them:  and  if  it were  worth while, no doubt a child 
might be so ordered as to have but a very few even of 
the ordinary ideas,  till he were grown up to a man. 
But all that are born into the world being surrounded 
with bodies that perpetually and diversly affect them, 
variety of ideas, whether care be taken of it or no, are 
imprinted  on the minds  of  children.  Light a~d  co- 
lours are busy at hand every where,  when the eye is 
but open ;  sounds and some tangible qualities fail not 
to solicit their proper senses, and force an entrance to 
the mind :  but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, 
that if a child were kept in  a place where he never 
saw any other but black and white till he were a man, 
he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than 
he that from his  childhood never tasted an oyster or 
a pine-apple has of those particular relishes. 
$ 7.  Men then  come  to be furnished  M,,  ,,  aif- 
with fewer or more simple ideas from with-  ferently fur- 
out, according as the objects they converse  nishedwith 
with afford  greater or less  variety;  and ~~~~~; 
from the operations of their minds within,  the different 
according  as  they  more  or  less  reflect  objects they 
on  them.  For though he that contem- 
plates the operations of  his mind cannot  with. 
but have plain and clear ideas of them ;  yet unless he 
turns his thoughts that way,  and considers them at- 
tentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas 
of  all the operations of his mind, and all that may be 
observed therein,  than he will have all the particular 
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a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with at- 
tention heed all the parts of it.  The picture or clock 
may be  so placed,  that they  may  come  in his  way 
every day ;  but yet he will have but a confused idea 
of all the parts they are made up of,  till he applies 
himself with attention to consider  them each in par- 
ticular. 
Ideas of re-  6  8. And hence we see the reason, whv 
flection  it & ~rettv  late before most  children rrit 
later>  cause *-  they  ideas'of t6e operations of their own minYds; 
need atten.  and some have not any  very clear qr perfect 
tion.  ideas of the greatest part of them all their 
lives :  because though they pass there continually, yet, 
like floating visions,  they make not deep impressions 
enough to leave in their mind  clear, distinct, lasting 
ideas, till the understanding turns'inward upon itself, 
reflects on its own operations,  and makes them the 
objects of its own contemplation.  Children when they 
come first into it, are surrounded with a world of new 
things, which, by a constant solicitation of their senses, 
draw the mind constantly to them, forward to take 
notice of new, and apt to be delighted with the variety 
of changing objects.  Thus the first years are usually 
employed  and  diverted  in  looking  abroad.  Men's 
business in them is to acquaint themselves with what 
is to be found without : and so growing up in a con- 
stant attention to outward sensations,  seldom make 
any considerable reflection on what passes within them 
till they come to be of  riper years ;  and some scarce 
ever at all. 
The soul be  5  9- To ask  at what  time  a'  man  has 
gins to  have  finit any ideas, is to ask when he bepins 
-4---  ideas> when  to perciive ;  having ideas, and pereeptlon,  it begins to 
perceive.  being  the same  thing.  I know  it is  an 
opinion,  that the soul alwavs thinks. and 
that it has the actual perception of idea;  in itself con- 
stantly as long as it exists ;  and that actual thinking 
is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is 
from the body ;  which if true, to inquire after the be- 
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ginning  of  a man's  ideas  is  the same  as  to inquire 
after  the beginning  of his  soul :  for by this  account 
soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin 
to exist both at the same time. 
$10. But  whether the soul be supposed  ~h~ 
to exist antecedent to,  or coeval with, or  thinks not 
some time after the first rudiments of or-  dwa~s;  for 
this wants 
ganization, or the beginnings of life in the  pmofa. 
body, I leave to be disputed by those who 
have better thought of that matter.  I confess myself 
to have one of those dull souls, that doth not perceive 
itself always to contemplate ideas,  nor can  conceive 
it any more necessary  for the soul always to think, 
than for the body always to move ;  the perception of 
ideas being (as I conceive)  to the soul, what motion 
is to the body,  not its essence,  but one  of  its opera- 
tions.  And therefore,  though thinking be  supposed 
ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is 
not  necessary  to suppose  that it should  be always 
thinking, always in action.  That perhaps is the pri- 
vilege of the infinite Author  and Preserver of things, 
who never slumbers nor sleeps ;  but it is not competent 
to any finite being,  at least not to the soul of  man. 
We  know certainly by experience that we sometimes 
think,  and thence draw this  infallible  consequence, 
that there is something in us that has a power to think: 
but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, 
we can be no farther assured than experience informs 
us.  For to say that actual thinking is essential to 
the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in 
question, and not to prove it by reason ;  which is ne- 
cessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposi- 
tion.  But whether this, "  that the soul always thinks," 
be a self-evident proposition,  that every body assents 
to at  first hearing, I appeal to mankind.  It is doubted 
whether I thought at  all last night or no ;  the question 
being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring, 
as a proof for it, an hypothesis, which is the very thing 
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and it is but supposing that all watches,  whilst  the 
balance  beats,  think ; and  it is  sufficiently proved, 
and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night. 
But he that would not deceive himself, ought to build 
his hypothesis on matter of  fact, and make it out by 
sensible  experience,  and not  presume  on  matter  of 
fact because  of  his  hypothesis ; that is,  because he 
supposes it to be so:  which way of  proving amounts 
to this,  that I must necessarily think all last night, 
because  another supposes I always  think,  though I 
myself cannot perceive that I always do so. 
But men in love with their  opinions may not only 
suppose what is in question, but allege wrong matter 
of fact.  How else could any one make it an inference 
of mine,  that a thing is not,  because we are not sen- 
sible of it in our sleep ?  I do not say there is no soul 
in a man, because he is not sensible of it in his sleep : 
but I do say, he cannot think at any time, waking or 
sleeping,  without being  sensible  of  it.  Our being 
sensible of it is not necessary to any thing, but to our 
thoughts;  and  to them  it is,  and  to them  it will 
always be necessary,  till we can think without being 
conscious of it. 
~t is not  $ 11. I grant that the soul in a waking 
always con-  man is never without thought, because it  is 
sciOus of it.  the condition of being awake :  but whether 
sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the 
whole man,  mind  as well as body,  may be worth a 
waking man's  consideration;  it being  hard  to con- 
ceive  that any thing should think,  and not be  con- 
scious of it.  If the soul doth think in a sleeping man 
without being conscious of  it, I ask, whether during 
such  thinking it has any pleasure or pain,  or be ca- 
pable of happiness or misery? I am sure the man is 
not,  any more than the bed or earth he lies on.  For 
to be happy or miserable without being c~nscious  of 
it,  seeins to me utterly  inconsistent  and impossible. 
Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body 
is  sleeping,  have  its thinking,  enjoyments  and con- 
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cerns,  its pleasure  or pain,  apart, which the man is 
not  conscious  of  nor  partakes in; it is certain that 
Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same 
person :  but his soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the 
man, consisting of  body and soul when he is waking, 
are two persons ;  since waking Socrates has no know- 
ledge of, or concernment for, that happiness or misery 
of his  soul which  it enjoys alone by itself  whilst he 
sleeps,  without perceiving  any thing of  it, any more 
than he has  for the happiness or misery of  a man in 
the Indies,  whom  he  knows  not.  For  if  we  take 
wholly  away  all  consciousness  of  our  actions  and 
sensations,  especially of  pleasure  and pain,  and the 
concernment  that accompanies it,  it will  be hard to 
know wherein to place personal identity. 
$ la. <'  The soul,  during sound  sleep,  ~f a sleeping 
thinks:'  sav these men.  Whilst it thinks  man thinks  -, 
and perceives,  it is  capable certainly  of  rE:~i  it, 
those of delight or trouble, as well as any  the sleeDinE 
other perceptions; and it must necessarilv  and waiin; " 
be codscio&  of its own ~erceptions.  I3;t  man are two 
it has all this apart; the sleeping man, it  Persona. 
is plain,  is conscious of nothing of  all this.  Let us 
suppose then the soul of Castor, while he is sleeping, 
retired from  his  body;  which  is no impossible sup- 
position  for the men I have here to do with, who so 
liberdly allow life, without a thinking soul, to all other 
animals.  These men cannot then judge it impossible, 
or a contradiction, that the body should live without 
the soul ;  nor that the soul should subsist and think, 
or have perception,  even perception of  happiness or 
misery, without the body.  Let us then, as I say, sup- 
pose  the soul of  Castor separated, during his  sleep, 
from his  body,  to think apart.  Let us suppose too, 
that it chooses for its scene of  thinking the body of 
another man,  v. g. Pollux, who is  sleeping without a 
soul: for if  Castor's soul can think, whilst  Castor is 
asleep,  what  Castor is  never  conscious  of,  it is  no 
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here then the bodies of  two men with only one soul 
between  them,  which  we  will  suppose to sleep and 
wake  by  turns ; and  the soul  still thinking in  the 
waking man, whereof the sleeping man is never con- 
scious,  has  never the least  perception.  I ask then, 
whether Castor and Pollux, thus,  with only one soul 
between  them,  which  thinks  and  perceives  in  one 
what the other is never conscious of, nor is concerned 
for,  are not  two as  distinct  persons  as  Castor  and 
Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether 
one of them might not be very happy, and the other 
very miserable ?  Just by the same reason they make 
the soul and the man two persons, who make the soul 
think apart what the man is not conscious of.  For I 
suppose nobody will make identity of persons to consist 
in the soul's being united to the very same numerical 
particles of matter; for if that be necessary to identity, 
it will be impossible, in that constant flux of the par- 
ticles of our bodies, that any man should be the same 
person two days, or two moments together. 
Impossible  5 13. Thus, methinks, every drowsy nod 
to convince  shakes their doctrine, who teach, that the 
those  that  soul is always thinking.  Those at least,  sleep with- 
,t  aream,  who do at any time sleep without dream- 
ing, that  ing,  can  never  be  convinced  that their 
they think.  thoughts  are sometimes  for  four  hours 
busy  without  their knowing  of  it; and if  they  are 
taken in the very  act,  waked  in the middle  of  that 
sleeping contemplation,  can  give  no manner  of  ac- 
count of it. 
That men  Q 14. It will perhaps be said, "  that the 
dream with-  soul thinks even in the soundest sleep, but 
,  the memory retains it  not."  That  the soul 
urged.  in a sleeping man should be this moment 
busy a thinking, and the next moment in 
a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect 
one jot of all those thoughts, is very hard to be con- 
ceived, and would need  some better proof than bare 
assertion to make it be believed.  For who can with- 
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out any more ado, but being barely told so,  imagine, 
that the greatest part of men do, during all their lives, 
for several hours every day, think of something, which 
if they were asked, even in the middle of these thoughts, 
they could remember nothing at all of? Most men, I 
think, pass a great part of their sleep without dream- 
ing.  I once knew a man that was bred a scholar, and 
had  no  bad  memory,  who  told  me,  he  had  never 
dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then 
newly recovered of,  which was about the five or six- 
and-twentieth year of  his age.  I suppose the world 
affords more  such instances : at least every one's  ac- 
quaintance will furnish him with examples enough of 
such as pass most of their nights without dreaming. 
5 15. To think often, and never to re-  Upon this 
tain it so much as one moment, is a very  hypothesis 
useless sort of thinking ; and the soul, in  EEfzfgi 
such a state of thinking, does very little, if  ,,,  ought 
at  all, excel that of a looking-glass, which  to be most 
constantly  receives variety of  images, or  rational. 
ideas, but retains none ;  they disappear and vanish, and 
there remain no footsteps of them ;  the looking-glass 
is never the better for such ideas, nor the soul for such 
thoughts.  Perhaps it will be said, <c that in a waking 
man the materials of the body are employed, and made 
use of, in thinking ;  and that the memory of thoughts 
is retained by the impressions that are made on the 
brain,  and the traces there left  after such thinking ; 
but that in the thinking of the soul, which is not per- 
ceived in a sleeping man, there the soul thinks apart, 
and, making no use of the organs of the body, leaves 
no impressions on it, ahd consequently no memory of 
such  thoughts.''  Not  to mention  again the absur- 
dity of two distinct persons,  which follows from this 
supposition,  I  answer  farther,  that whatever  ideas 
the mind  can receive  and  contemplate without the 
help of  the body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can 
retain without the help of the body too; or else the 
soul,  or any separate spirit, will  have  but little ad- 99  Men think not always.  Book 2. 
vantage by thinking.  If it has no memory of its own 
thoughts; if it cannot lay them up for its own use, 
and be able to recall them upon occasion ;  if it cannot 
reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former 
experiences, reasonings, and contemplations ;  to what 
purpose does it think ?  They, who  make the soul a 
thinking thine,  at this rate, will  not make it a much 
more noble being, than those do, whom they condemn, 
for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of 
matter.  Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath 
of  wind  effaces;  or  impressions  made  on  a heap of 
atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful,  and 
render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of  a soul 
that perish in thinking; that once out of  sight are 
gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves be- 
hind them.  Nature never makes excellent things for 
mean or no uses :  and it  is hardly to be conceived, that 
our infinitely wise Creator should make so admirable 
a faculty as the power of thinking, that faculty which 
comes  nearest  the excellency  of  his  own  incompre- 
hensible being,  to be so idly and uselessly employed, 
3t least a fourth part of its time here, as to think can- 
stantly, withovt remembering any of  those thoughts, 
without doing any good to itself or others,  or being 
any way useful to any other part of the creation.  If 
we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose,  the 
motion of dull and senseless matter, any where in the 
universe, made so little use of,  and so wholly thrown 
away. 
On this hy-  4  16. It is true, we have sometimes in- 
PO~~RS~S  the  stances of perception whilst we are asleep, 
soul must 
have ideas  and retain the memory of those thoughts; 
not derived  but how extravagant and incoherent for 
from sensa-  the most  part tKey  are,  how  little con- 
tion or re-  formable to the pe;fectibn  and order of  a 
flection, of 
which there  rational being, those who are acquainted 
is noaDDem-  with  dreams need  not be told.  This I 
I I 
ance.  would willingly  be satisfied  in,  whether 
the soul,  when  it thinks thus apart,  and  as it were 
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separate from the body, acts less rationally than when 
conjointly with it or no.  If its separate thoughts be 
less rational,  then these men must say,  that the soul 
owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body : 
if it does not, it is wonder that our dreams should be, 
for the most part, so frivolous and irrational ;  and that 
the soul should  retain none  of  its more rational so- 
liloquies and meditations. 
5 17. Those who so confidently tell us,  ~f I think 
that "  the soul alwavs actually thinks," I  when I know 
would they would also tell us %hat those  ~o~~;l~;n 
ideas are that are in  the soul of  a child,  know it.  -  ..  .  - -. 
before, or just at  the union with the body, 
before it hath received  any by sensation.  The dreams 
of sleeping men are,  as I'tnge  it,  all made up of  the 
waking man's  ideas,  though for the most part oddly 
put together.  It  is strange if the soul has ideas of its 
own, that it derived not from sensation or reflection 
(as  it must  have if it thought before it received  any 
iipyressions from the body), that it should never, in its 
private thinking (so private, that the man himself per- 
ceives it not) retain any of them,  the very moment it 
wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with 
new discoveries.  Who can find it reasonable that the 
soul should,  in its retirement,  during sleep,  have so 
many hours' thoughts,  and yet never light on any of 
those  ideas  it borrowed  not  from  sensation  or  re- 
flection ;  or at least preserve the memory of none but 
such, which,  being occasioned  from the body,  must 
needs be less natural to a spirit  ? It is strange the soul 
should never once in a man's whole life recall over any 
of its pure native thoughts, and those ideas it had be- 
fore it  borrowed any thing from the body ;  never bring 
into the waking man's view any other ideas but what 
have  a tang of  the cask,  and manifestly  derive  their 
original from that union.  If it always thinks, and so 
had ideas before it was united,  or before  it received 
any from the body, it is not to be supposed  but that 
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that retirement  from  communicating with  the body, 
whilst it thinks by itself,  the ideas it is busied about 
should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and 
congenial ones which it had in itself, underived from 
the body, or its own operations about them ;  which, 
since the waking man never remembers, we must from 
this hypothesis conclude, either that the soul remem- 
bers something that the man does not,  or else  that 
memory belongs only to  such ideas as are derived from 
the body, or the mind's operations about them. 
How knows  $18. I would be glad also to learn from 
any one that  these men, who so confidently pronounce, 
the soul al-  that the human soul, or, which is all one, 
~ay~thinks?  that a man always thinks, how they coma 
For if it be 
not a self-  to know it; nay, how they come to know 
evident pro-  that they  themselves  think,  when  they 
position, it  themselves  do not  perceive it.  This,  I 
proof*  am afraid, is to be sure without proofs; 
and to know,  without  perceiving:  it is,  I suspect, a 
confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis; and 
none of those clear  truths, that either their  own evi- 
dence forces us to admit, or common experience makes 
it impudence to deny.  For the most that can be said 
of it is, that it is possible the soul may always think, 
but not always retain it in memory :  and I spy, it is 
as possible that the soul may not always think; and 
much  more probable  that it should  sometimes  not 
think, than that it should often think, and that a long 
while together, and not be conscious to itself the next 
moment after, that it had thought. 
That a man  $19. TO  suppose the SOU] to think, and 
should be  the man not to perceive it, is, as has been 
busy in  said,  to make two persons in one  man; 
thinking, 
and yet not  and if one considers well these men's way 
retain it the  of  speaking,  one  should  be  led  into a 
next mo-  suspicion that they do so.  For they who 
merit, very  tell us  that the soul  always  thinks,  do 
improbable.  never,  that I remember,  say that a  man 
always thinks.  Can the soul think, and not the man? 
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or a man think, and not be conscious of it?  This per- 
haps would be suspected of jargon in others.  If they 
say, the man  thinks always, but is  not always con- 
scious of  it; they may  as well  say,  his  body is  ex- 
tended without having parts : for it is  altogether as 
intelligible to say,  that a body is  extended without 
parts,  as that any thing thinks  without being  con- 
scious of it, or perceiving that it does so.  They who 
talk thus may, with as  much reason,  if  it be  neces- 
sary to their hypothesis, say,  that a  man  is  always 
hungry, but that he does not always feel it: whereas 
hunger  consists  in that very sensation,  as  thinking 
consists in  being conscious  that one thinks.  If they 
say,  that a  man is always  conscious  to  himself  of 
thinking, I ask, how they know it.  Consciousness is 
the perception  of what  passes in a man's  own  mind. 
Can another man perceive that I am conscious of any 
thing, when I perceive it not myself? No man's know- 
ledge here can go beyond  his  experience.  Wake a 
man out of a sound sleep,  and ask him, what he was 
that moment thinking of.  If he himself be conscious 
of nothing he then thought on, he must  be a notable 
diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was 
thinking:  may he not with more reason  assure him 
he was not  asleep ?  This is something  beyond philo- 
sophy;  and  it cannot  be  less  than  revelation  that 
discovers to another thoughts in my mind, when I can 
find none there myself:  and they must needs have a 
penetrating sight, who can certainly see that I think; 
when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare 
that I do not ;  and yet can see that dogs or elephants 
do not think, when they give  all  the demonstration 
of it imaginable, except only telling  us that they do 
so.  This some may suspect to be  a step beyond the 
Rosecrucians ; it seeming  easier  to  make one's  self 
invisible to others, than  to make  another's  thoughts 
visible to me, which  are not visible to himself.  But 
it is but  defining the soul to be "  a substance  that 
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finition be of any authority, I know not what it can 
serve for, but to make  many men  suspect, that they 
have  no  souls  at all, since  they find a  good part of 
their lives pass  away without  thinking.  For no de- 
finitions,  that I know,  no  suppositions  of  any sect, 
are of force enough to destroy constant experience ; 
and perhaps it is  the affectation  of knowing beyond 
what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute 
and noise in the world. 
NO  ideas but  $ 20. I see no  reason  therefore to be- 
from  sensa-  lieve,  that  the  soul  thinks  before  the 
tion Or  re-  senses  have  furnished  it with  ideas  to  flection evi- 
dent- ifw,  think on ;  and as those are increased and 
---->  --  .. - 
observechil-  retained, so it comes, by exercise, to im- 
dren.  prove  its faculty of  thhking, in  the se- 
veral parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compound- 
ing those ideas,  and reflecting on its own operations; 
it increases its stock, as well as facility, in remember- 
ing, imagining, reasoning,  and  other modes of think- 
ing. 
$ 21.  He that will suffer himself to be informed by 
observation  and  experience,  and not make  his  own 
hypothesis the rule of nature, will find few signs of a 
soul accustomed to much thinking in a new-born child, 
and much fewer  of  any reasoning  at all.  And yet 
it is hard to imagine,  that the rational  soul should 
think so much,  and not reason at all.  And he that 
will consider that infants, newly come into the world, 
spend the greatest part of their time in sleep, and are 
seldom awake, but when  either hunger  calls for the 
teat, or some pain (the most importunate of all sensa- 
tions),  or some  other  violent  impression  upon  the 
body  forces the mind to perceive  and attend to it : 
he, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find reason 
to imagine, that a fmtus in the mother's womb differs 
not much from the state of  a vegetable ; but passes 
the greatest part  of  its  time without  perception  or 
thought, doing very little in a  place where it  needs 
not  seek  for  food,  and  is  surrounded  with  liquor, 
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equally soft,  and  near  of  the same  temper; 
where the eyes  have no  light,  and the ears,  so shut 
up,  are not  very  susceptible of  sounds;  and where 
there is  little or  no  variety, or change  of  objects to 
move the senses. 
$ 22. Follow a child from its birth, and observe the 
alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the 
mind by the senses  comes more  and more  to be fur- 
nished  with  ideas,  it comes  to be  more  and  more 
awake ;  thinks more, the more it has matter to think 
on.  After some time  it begins to know the objects, 
which, being most familiar with it, have made lasting 
impressions.  Thus it comes by degrees to know the 
persons it daily converses with,  and distinguish them 
from strangers ;  which are instances and effects of its 
coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses 
convey to it.  And so we may observe how the mind, 
by degrees,  improves in these,  and advailces  to the 
exercise of  those  other faculties  of  enlarging,  com- 
pounding, and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning 
about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which I 
shall have occasion to speak more hereafter. 
5 23. If it shall be demanded, then, when a man be- 
gins to have  any ideas, I  think the true answer is, 
when  he  first  has  any  sensation.  For  since  there 
appear not tcr  be  any ideas  in the mind,  before the 
senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in 
the understanding  are coeval with  sensation;  which 
is such an impression or motion, made in some part 
of the body,  as produces some perception  in the un- 
derstanding.  It  is about these impressions made on 
our senses by outward objects,  that the mind  seems 
first to employ itself in such operations as we call per- 
ception, remembering, consideration, reasoning, &c. 
$24.  In time the mind comes to reflect  ~h, 
on its own operations about the ideas got  of all our 
by sensation, and thereby stores itself with  ''nowledge. 
a  new  set of  ideas, which I  call  ideas  of  reflection. 
These are thc ilnprcssions that are made on onr senses 
VOL.  I.  El 98  Men  think not alzt~ays.  Book 4. 
by outward objects that  are extrinsical to the mind, 
and its own  operations,  proceeding from powers  in- 
trinsical  and proper  to itself;  whlch when  reflected 
on by itself,  becoming  also objects of its contempla- 
tion, are, as I have said, the original of all knowledge. 
Thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the 
mind is fitted to receive  the impressions made on it, 
either through  the senses  by outward objects,  or by 
its own operations when it reflects on them.  This is 
the first step a  man makes  towards the discovery of 
any thing, and the ground-work whereon  to build all 
those  notions which  ever  he shall  have  naturally  in 
this world.  All those sublime thoughts which tower 
above the clouds,  and reach  as high  as heaven itself, 
take their rise and footing here :  in all that good ex- 
tent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote spe- 
culations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not 
one jot beyond  those ideas which  sense  or reflection 
have offered for its contemplation. 
In the re-  § 25. In this part the understanding is 
ception of  merely passive;  and whether or no it will 
simp'e  ideas  have  these  beginnings,  and  as it were  the under- 
standing  is  materials of knowledge, is not in its own 
for the most  power.  For the objects of our senses do, 
part passive.  many of  them,  obtrude  their  particular 
ideas upon our minds whether we will or no; and the 
operations of our minds will not let us be without, at 
least, some obscure notions of them.  No man can be 
wholly  ignorant  of  what  he  does  when  he  thinks. 
These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the un- 
derstanding can no more  refuse  to have, nor  alter, 
when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make 
new ones  itself, than a  mirror  can  refuse,  alter,  or 
obliterate the images or ideas which  the objects  set 
before it do therein produce.  As the bodies that sur- 
round us do  diversly  affect our organs,  the mind is 
forced to receive the impressions,  and cannot avoid 
the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them. 
CHAPTER 11. 
Of  Sinple  Ideas. 
tj 1. THE  better to understand the na-  uncom, 
ture,  manner,  and  extent  of  our know-  pounded ap- 
ledge, one thing is carefully to be observed  pearances- 
concerning the ideas we have ;  and that is, that some 
of them are simple, and some complex. 
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in 
the things themselves,  so  united  and blended,  that 
there is no separation, no distance between them ;  yet 
it is  lain the ideas they produce in the mind  enter 
by t  l!  e  senses  simple  and unmixed:  for though the 
sight and touch often take in from the same object, 
at the same time,  different  ideas,  as  a  man sees at 
once motion and colour,  the hand feels softness and 
warmth in the same piece of wax ;  yet the simple ideas, 
thus united in the same subject, are as perfectly di- 
stinct as those that come  in  by different senses :  the 
coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of 
ice being  as distinct ideas in the mind  as the smell 
and whiteness of a lily ; or as the taste of sugar, and 
smell of a rose.  And there is nothing can be plainer 
to a  man than the clear  and distinct perception he 
has of those simple ideas ;  which, being each ia itself 
uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform 
appearance or conception  in the mind, and is not di- 
stinguishable into different ideas. 
9 2. These simple  ideas,  the materials  The mind 
of all our knowledge,  are suggested  and  ~~k~f~'~- 
furnished  to the mind only by those two 
ways above-mentioned,  viz. sensation and 
reflection.  (])When the understanding is once stored 
(1) Against this, that the materials of all our knowledge are sug- 
gested  and furnished to the  mind only by sensation and  reflection, 
the Bishop of Worcester makes use of the idea of substance in these 
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with these simple ideas,  it has the power to repeat, 
compare, and unite them,  even to an almost infinite 
variety;  and so can make at pleasure new  complex 
ideas.  But it is  not in  the Dower  of  the most ex- 
alted wit or enlarged underskuding, by  any quick- 
ness  or variety  of  thought,  to invent  or frame one 
new  simple  idea in  the mind,  not  taken in  by  the 
words :  If the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident 
reason,  then we must allow an idea of substance, which comes not in 
by sensatiou or reflection;  and so we may be certain  of  something 
which we have not by these ideas." 
To which  our author* answers:  These words of  your lordship's 
contain  nothing as I see in them against me:  for I never said that 
the general idea of substance comes in by sensation and reflection,  or 
that it  is a simple idea of sensation or reflection, though it  be ultimately 
founded  in them ;  for  it is a coniplex  idea,  made up of  the general 
idea of something, or being, with the relation of a support to accidents. 
For general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection, 
but are the creatures or inventions of  the understanding, as I think 
I have shown t; and also how the mind makes them from ideas which 
it has got by sensation and reflection;  and as to the ideas of  rela- 
tion, how the mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and 
ultimately terminate in, ideas of sensation and reflection, I have like- 
wise shown. 
But that I may not be  mistaken, what I mean, when  I speak of 
ideas of  sensation  and reflection,  as the materials of  all our know- 
ledge;  give me leave,  my lord,  to set down here a place or two,  out 
of my book,  to explain myself;  as I thus speak of  ideas of sensation 
and reflection : 
''  That  these, when we have taken a full survey of  them, and their 
~everal  modes, and the compositions made out of  them, we shall find 
to contain all our whole stock of  ideas, and we have nothing in our 
minds, which did not come in one of these two ways$."  This  thought, 
in another place, I express thus. 
"  These are the most considerable of those simple ideas which the 
mind  has,  and out of  which  is made all its other knowledge;  all 
which it receives by the two forementioned ways of sensation and re- 
flection $."  And, 
"  Thus I have,  in a  short draught,  given  a view of  our original 
ideas,  from whence all the rest are derived,  and of which  thev are 
made up  11." 
This, and the like,  said in other places,  is what I have thought 
* In his first letter to the Bishop of Worcester.-+  B. 3. c. 3. 
B. 2.  C.  25. & c. 28. $  18.--$  B. 2. C.  1. 5 5.-$  B. 2. c. 7.  $ 10. 
-11  B. 2. C.  21.  $ 73. 
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ways  aforementioned: nor can any force of the un- 
derstanding destroy  those  that are there.  The do- 
minion of  man,  in this little world of his own under- 
standing, being much-what  the same as it is in  the 
great world of visible things.;  wherein his power, how- 
ever managed by art and sklll, reaches no farther than 
to compound and divide the materials that are made 
concerning ideas of  sensation and reflection,  as the foundation and 
materials of all our ideas,  and consequently of  all our knowledge : I 
have  set down these  particulars out of  my book,  that the reader, 
having a full view of my opinion herein,  may the better see what in 
it is liable to your lordship's  reprehension.  For that your lordship 
is not very well satisfied with it, appears not only by the words under 
consideration,  but by these also: ''  But we  are still told,  that our 
understanding can have no other ideas, but either from sensation or 
reflection." 
Your lordship's  argument,  in the passage we  are  upon,  stands 
thus:  If the general idea of  substance be  grounded upon plain and 
evident reason, then we must allow an idea of substance,  which comes 
not in by sensation or reflection.  This is a consequence which,  with 
submission, I think will not hold, viz.  That reason and ideas are in- 
consistent; for if that supposition be not true, then the general idea 
of substance may be grounded on plain and evident reason;  and yet it 
will not follo~v  from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and 
derived from ideas which come  in by sensation or reflection,  and so 
cannot be  said to come in by sensation or reflection. 
TO  explain myself,  and clear my meaning in this matter.  All the 
ideas of  all the sensible qualities of  a cherry coiile into my mind  by 
sensation ;  the ideas  of  perceiving,  thinking,  reasoning,  knowing, 
&c.  come into my mind by reflection.  The ideas of  these qualities 
and actions,  or powers,  are perceived  by the mind to be  by then]- 
selves inconsistent with existence ;  or, as your lordship well expresses 
it, we find that we cau have no true conception of  any modes or ac- 
cidents,  but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, whereln they 
are, i. e. That they cannot exist or  subsist of  themselves.  Hence 
the mind perceives their necessary connexion with inherence or being 
supported ;  which being a relative idea, superadded to the red colour 
in a cherry, or to thinking in a man,  the mind frames the correlative 
idea of a support.  For I never denied that the mind could frame to 
itself  ideas of  relation,  but have  showed the quite contrary in my 
chapters about relation.  But because a relation cannot be founded in 
nothing,  or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here related as 
a supporter, or a  support,  is not represented  to the ml:d  by  any 
clear and distinct idea ;  therefore  the obscure and indlstlflct vague 
Idea of thing, or something, is all that is left to be  the posltlve ldea, 
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to his hand ; but can do nothing towards the making 
the least particle of  new matter,  or destroying one 
atom of what is already in being.  The same inability 
will every one find in himself, who shall go about to 
fashion in his understanding any simple idea,  not re- 
ceived in by his senses from external objects,  or by 
reflection from the operations of his own mind about 
them.  I would have any one try to fancy any taste, 
which  had never  affected  his  palate; or  frame the 
idea of a scent he had never smelt:  and when he can 
do this,  I will  also  conclude that a blind  man  hath 
ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions 
of sounds. 
cidents ;  and that general indetermined idea of something is, by the 
abstraction of the mind,  derived also from the simple ideas of  sensa- 
tion and reflection:  and thus the mind,  from  the positive,  simple 
idea  got by sensation and reflection,  wmes to the general relative 
idea  of  substance,  which,  without  these  positive  simple  ideas,  it 
would never have. 
This your lordship (without giving by  retail all  the particular 
steps of  the mind in this business) has well expressed  in this more 
familiar way:  rr We find  we  can have  no true conception  of  hny 
modes or accidents,  but we must conceive a substratum,  or subject, 
wherein  they are;  since it is a repugpancy  to our conceptions of 
things,  that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves." 
Hence your lordship calls it the rational  idea of  substance:  and 
says,  r'  I grant that by sensation and reflection  we  come to know 
the powers and properties of things;  but our reason is satisfied that 
there n~ust  be something beyond these,  because it  is impossible that 
they should  subsist by themselves:"  so that if this be  that which 
pour lordship means by the rational idea of substance, I see nothing 
there is in it  against what I have said,  that it is founded on simple 
ideas of sensation or reflection, and that it is a very obscure idea. 
Your lordship's  conclusion from your foregoing words is, "  and so 
we may be certain of some things which we have not by those ideas;" 
which is a proposition, whose precise meaning your lordship will for- 
give me,  if I profess,  as it stands there, I do not understand.  For 
it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship means, we may certainly 
know the existence of something, which we have not by those ideas; 
or certainly know  the distinct properties of  something,  which  we 
have not by those ideas;  or certainly know the truth of  some pro- 
position,  which  we  have  not by  those  ideas:  for  to be  certain  of 
something may signify either of these.  But in which soever of these 
it be  meanti,  I do not see how I am concerned in it. 
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5 3. This is the reason why, though we cannot be- 
lieve it impossible to God to make a  creature with 
other organs,  and  more ways to convey into the un- 
derstanding the notice of corporeal things than those 
five, as they are usually counted, which he has given 
to man: yet I think it is not possible for any one to 
imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever con- 
stituted, whereby they can be taken notice of,  besides 
sounds,  tastes,  smells, visible  and tangible qualities. 
And had mankind  been  made  but with four senses, 
the qualities  then which  are the object of  the fifth 
sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, 
and  conception,  as now  any belonging  to a  sixth, 
seventh,  or  eighth  sense  can  possibly  be : which, 
whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts 
of this vast  and stupendous universe,  may not have, 
will be a great presumption  to deny.  He that will 
not set himself proudly at the top of all things,  but 
will consider  the immensity  of  this  fabric,  and the 
great variety that is to be found in this little and in- 
considerable  part of it which he has to do with, may 
be  apt to think,  that in  other mansions of  it there 
may be other and different intelligent beings, of whose 
faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension, as 
a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the 
senses or understanding of  a man : such variety and 
excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of 
the maker.  I have here followed the common opinion 
of man's having but five senses ;  though, perhaps, there 
way be justly counted more : but either supposition 
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CHAPTER 111. 
Of  Idens of  one Sense. 
Division of  $ 1. THE  better to conceive the ideas 
simple ideas.  we receive from sensation, it may not be 
amiss for us to consider them in reference to the dif- 
ferent ways whereby they make their approaches to 
our minds, and make themselves perceivable by us. 
First,  Then, there are some which  come into our 
minds by one sense only. 
Secondly, There are others that convey themselves 
into the mind by more senses than one. 
Thirdly, Others that are had from reflection only. 
Fourthly,  There are some  that make  themselves 
way,  and are suggested to the mind by all the ways 
of sensation and reflection. 
We shall  coilsider them apart under their several 
heads. 
Ideas of one  First, There are some ideas which have 
Sense,  co-  admittance only through one sense, which 
lours, of see- 
ing, sound,  is  peculiarly  adapted  to receive  them. 
of hearing,  Thus  light  and  colours,  as  white,  red, 
&c.  yellow,  blue,  with their  several degrees 
or  shades  and  mixtures,  as  green,  scarlet,  purple, 
sea-green,  and the rest,  come in only by  the eyes: 
all kinds  of  noises, sounds,  and  tones,  only  by  the 
ears: the several tastes and smells, by the nose and 
palate.  And if these organs, or the nerves, which are 
the conduits  to convey  them  from without  to their 
audience in the brain, the mind's presence-room  (as I 
may so call it) are any of them so disordered,  as not 
to perform  their functions,  they have  no postern  to 
be admitted by;  no  other way  to bring themselves 
into view, and be perceived by the understanding. 
The most considerable  of  those  belonging  to the 
touch are heat and cold, and solidity :  all the rest, con- 
sisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as 
smooth and rough, or elsc more or less firm adhesion 
of the parts, as  hard and soft, tough and brittle, are 
obvious enough. 
$ 2. I think it will be needless to enu-  Few simple 
merate all the particular simple ideas be-  ideas have 
longing to each sense.  Nor indeed is it  names. 
possible, if we would ; there being a great many more 
of them belonging to most of the senses, than we have 
names for.  The variety of smells, which are as many 
almost, if not more, than species of bodies in the world, 
do  most  of  them want  names.  Sweet and stinking 
commonly  serve  our  turn for  these  ideas,  which  in 
effect is little more than to call them pleasing or dis- 
pleasing;  though the smell of a rose and violet, both 
sweet, are certainly very distinct ideas.  Nor are the 
different tastes, that by our palates we  receive ideas 
of, much better provided with names.  Sweet, bitter, 
sour, harsh,  and salt,  are almost  all the epithets we 
have to denominate that numberless variety of relishes 
which  are to be found  distinct,  not only in almost 
every sort of  creatures,  but in the different parts of 
the same plant, fruit, or animal.  The same may be 
said of colours and sounds.  I shall therefore,  in the 
account of simple ideas I am here giving, content my- 
self  to set down  only such,  as are most material to 
our present purpose,  or are in themselves less apt to 
be  taken notice of,  though they are very frequently 
the ingredients of our complex ideas, amongst which, 
I think, I may well account solidity ;  which therefore 
I shall treat of in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV. 
Of  Solidity. 
$1. THE  idea of solidity we receive by  We receive 
our touch ;  and it arises from  the resist-  this idea 
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trance of  any other body into the place it possesses, 
till it has left it.  There is  no idea which we receive 
more constantly from sensation than solidity.  Whe- 
ther we move or rest,  in what posture soever we are, 
we always feel something under  us that supports us, 
and hinders our farther sinking downwards ;  and the 
bodies which we daily handle make us perceive, that, 
whilst they remain between them,  they do by an in- 
surmountable force hinder the approach of  the parts 
of our hands that press them.  That which thus hin- 
ders the approach of two bodies, when they are moved 
one towards  another,  I call solidity.  I will not dis- 
pute  whether  this acceptation  of  the word  solid be 
nearer  to its original  signification  than that which 
mathematicians use it in: it suffices, that I think the 
common notion of  solidity will  allow,  if  not justify, 
this use of it ;  but,  if any one think it better to call 
it impenetrability,  he has my consent.  Only I have 
thought the term solidity the more proper to express 
this idea,  not  only because  of  its vulgar use in that 
sense, but also because it carries  something more of 
positive in it than impenetrability, which is negative, 
and is  perhaps more a  consequence of  solidity than 
solidity itself.  This, of all other, seems the idea most 
intimately connected with and essential to body, so as 
nowhere  else  to be found  or imagined,  but only in 
matter.  And though our senses take no notice of it, 
but in masses of matter,  of  a bulk sufficient to cause 
a sensation in us ;  yet the mind, having once got this 
idea  from such grosser sensible bodies,  traces it far- 
ther; and considers it,  as well  as  figure, in the mi- 
nutest particle of matter that can exist:  and finds it 
inseparably  inherent in  body,  wherever  or  however 
modified. 
Solidity fills  § 2.  This is the idea which  belongs to 
space.  body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. 
The idea of which filling of space is, that, 
where we imagine any space taken up by a solid sub- 
stance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes 
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all other solid  substances ;  and will for  ever hinder 
any other two bodies, that move towards one another 
in a straight line,  from coming to touch one another, 
unless it removes from between  them,  in a  line not 
parallel  to that which they move in.  This idea of it 
the bodies  which  we  ordinarily  handle  sufficiently 
furnish us with. 
tj 3. This resistance,  whereby it keeps  Distinct  other bodies out of the space which it  pos-  f,.,  space. 
sesses, is so great, that no force, how great 
soever, can surmount it.  All the bodies in the world, 
pressing  a  drop of  water on all sides,  will  never  be 
able to overcome the resistance which  it will make, 
soft as it is,  to their approaching one another,  till it 
be removed out of their way :  whereby our idea of so- 
lidity is distinguished both from pure space, which is 
capable  neither of  resistance  nor  motion,  and from 
the ordinary idea of hardness.  For a man may con- 
ceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach 
one another, without touching or displacing any solid 
thing, till their superficies come to meet : whereby, I 
think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity. 
For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular 
body)  I ask, whether a man cannot have the idea of 
the motion of one single body alone without any other 
succeeding  immediately into its place ?  I think it is 
evident he can:  the idea of  motion in one body no 
more including the idea of motion in another, than the 
idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea 
of a square figure in another.  I do not ask, whether 
bodies do so exist that the motion  of  one body can- 
not really be without the motion of another?  To  de- 
termine this either way,  is to beg the question for or 
against a vacuum.  But my question is,  whether one 
cannot have the idea of one body moved whilst others 
are at  rest?  And I think this no one will  deny.  If 
so, then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure 
space without solidity, whereinto any other body may 
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thing.  When  the sucker  in a  pump is drawn,  the 
space it filled in the tube is  certainly the same whe- 
ther any other body follows the motion of the sucker 
or not :  nor  does it imply a  contradiction that, upon 
the motion of one body, another that is only contigu- 
ous to it should not follow it.  The necessity of such 
a motion  is  built  only  on  the supposition  that  the 
world is full, but not on the distinct ideas of space and 
solidity;  which are as different as resistance and not 
resistance ; protrusion  and not protrusion.  And that 
men have ideas of  space  without a body,  their very 
disputes about a vacuum  plainly demonstrate;  as is 
showed in another place. 
From hard-  $ 4.  Solidity is hereby also differenced 
ness.  from hardness, in that solidity consists in 
repletion,  and so  an  utter exclusion  of 
other bodies out of  the space it possesses ; but hard- 
ness, in a firm cohesion of  the parts of matter, making 
up masses of a sensible bulk, so that the whole does 
not easily change its figure.  And  indeed,  hard and 
soft are names that we give to things only in relation 
to the constitutions  of  our  own bodies;  that being 
generally called hard by us which will put us to pain 
sooner than change figure by the pressure of  any part 
of our bodies;  and that on  the contrary soft,  which 
changes the situation of  its parts upon an easy  and 
unpainful touch. 
But this difficulty of  changing the situation of the 
sensible parts amongst themselves, or of the figure of 
the whole, gives no inore solidity to the hardest body 
in the world,  than to the softest;  nor is an adamant 
one jot more solid  than water.  For though the two 
flat sides of two pieces of marble will more easily ap- 
proach each other,  between  which  there is nothing 
but water or air, than if there be a diamond between 
them: yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are 
more solid than those of water, or resist more ;  but be- 
cause, the parts of water being more easily separable 
from each other, they will, by a side-motion, be more 
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easily removed, and give way to the approach of the 
two pieces of marble.  But if they could be kept from 
making place by  that side-motion,  they  would eter- 
nally hinder the approach of these two pieces of mar- 
ble as much as the diamond ;  and it would be as im- 
possible by any force to surmount their resistance,  as 
to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. 
The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist 
the coming together of any other two bodies,  if it be 
not put out of the way, but remain between them, as 
the hardest that can be found or imagined.  He that 
shall fill a yielding soft body well with air  or water, 
will  quickly  find its resistance:  and he that thinks 
that nothing but bodies  that are hard  can  keep his 
hands from approaching one another, may be pleased 
to make a  trial with  the air  inclosed  in a foot-ball. 
The experiment,  I have  been told,  was made at Flo- 
rence, with a hollow globe  of  gold filled with water 
and exactly  closed,  which  farther  shows the solidity 
of so soft a body as water.  For the golden globe thus 
filled being put into a press which was driven by the 
extreme force of screws,  the water made itself way 
through the pores of that very close metal ;  and, find- 
ing no room  for  a  nearer  approach of  its particles 
within, got to the outside,  where it  rose  like a dew, 
and so fell in drops, before the sides of the globe could 
be made to yield  to the violent  compression  of  the 
engine that squeezed it. 
$ 5.  By this idea of solidity,  is the ex-  on  solidity 
tension  of  body  distinguished  from  the  depend im- 
extension of space :  the extension of body  pulse, resist- 
ance, and  being nothing but tlie  cohesion or conti-  p,tmsion. 
nuity of solid, separable, moveable parts ; 
and the extension of space,  the continuity of unsolid, 
inseparable, and immoveable parts.  Upon the solidity 
of bodies also depend their mutual impulse, resistance, 
and protrusion.  Of  pure space then,  and solidity,. 
there  are  several  (amongst  which I confess  myself 
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distinct ideas ;  and that they can think on space, with- 
out any thing in it that resists or is protruded by body. 
This is the idea of pure space, which they think they 
have as clear as any idea they can have of the exten- 
sion of body;  the idea of  the distance between  the 
opposite parts of  a concave superficies being equally 
as clear without as with  the idea  of  any solid parts 
between : and on the other side they persuade them- 
selves, that they have, distinct from that of pure space, 
the idea of something that fills space, that can be pro- 
truded by the impulse of  other bodies,  or resist their 
motion.  If there be  others that have not these two 
ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one 
of them,  I know  not  how men,  who have  the same 
idea under different names,  or different ideas under 
the same name,  can in that case talk with one  an- 
other ;  any more than a man, who, not being blind or 
deaf, has distinct ideas of  the colour  of  scarlet, and 
the sound of a trumpet,  could  discourse concerning 
scarlet colour with the blind man I mention in another 
place, who fancied  that the idea of  scarlet was  like 
the sound of a trumpet. 
What it is.  $ 6.  If any one ask me,  what this so- 
lidity is ?  I send him to his senses to in- 
form him :  let him put a flint or a foot-ball between 
his hands,  and then endeavour to join  them,  and he 
will know.  If he thinks this not a sufficient explica- 
tion of  solidity, what it is,  and wherein it consists, I 
promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, 
when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it  eon- 
s&~  ;  or explains to me  what extension or motion is, 
which perhaps seems much easier.  The simple ideas 
we have are such as experience teaches them us,  buk 
if, beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them 
clearer in the mind,  me  shall succeed no better than 
if we went  about to clear up the darkness of a blind 
man's  mind by talking ;  and to discourse into him the 
ideas of light and colours.  The reason of this I shall 
show in another place. 
CHAPTER V. 
Of Simple Ideas of  divers Senses. 
THE  ideas we get by  more than one  sense  are of 
space, or extension, figure, rest, and motion ;  for these 
make perceivable  impressions,  both on the eyes and 
touch : and we can receive and convey into our minds 
the ideas of the extension, figure, motion, and rest of 
bodies, both by seeing and feeling.  But having occa- 
sion to speak more at large of these in another place, 
I here only enumerate them. 
CHAPTER VI. 
Of Simple Ideas of Refiction. 
9 I.  THE  mind,  receiving  the ideas,  Simpleideas 
mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from  are the ope- 
without,  when  it turns its view  inward  rationsofthe 
mind about  upon itself,  and observes its own actions  its other 
about those ideas it  has, takes from thence  ideas. 
other ideas,  which  are as capable to be 
the objects of its contemplation as any of those it re- 
ceived from foreign things. 
$ 2.  The two great and principal  ac-  The idea of 
tions  of  the mind,  which  are most fre-  perception, 
quently  considered,  and  which  are  so   if^^^ 
frequent, that every one that pleases may  I,,,,  from 
take notice  of  them in himself,  are these  reflection. 
two :  perception  or  thinking ; and voli- 
tion or willing.  The power of thinking is called the 
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will;  and these two powers  or abilities in the mind 
are denominated faculties.  Of some of the modes of 
these simple ideas of reflection,  such  as  are remem- 
brance,  discerning,  reasoning,  judging,  knowledge, 
faith, &c.,  I shall have occasion to speak hereafter. 
CHAPTER VII. 
Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and ReJEection. 
Pleasure and  $1. THERE  be other simple ideas which 
pain.  convey themselves into the mind  by  all 
the ways of  sensation  and reflection, viz. 
pleasure or delight,  and its opposite, pain  or uneasi- 
ness, power, existence, unity. 
5 2.  Delight or  uneasiness,  one  or other of them, 
join themselves to almost all our ideas, both of  sensa- 
tion and reflection : and there is scarce any affection 
of our senses from  without,  any retired thought of 
our mind within,  which is not able to produce in us 
pleasure or pain.  By pleasure and pain I would  be 
understood to signify whatsoever delights or molests 
us most; whether it arises from the thoughts of  our 
minds,  or any thing operating on  our bodies.  For 
whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, hap- 
piness,  &c. on  the one  side; or uneasiness,  trouble, 
pain, torment, anguish, misery, &c. on the other ;  they 
are still but different degrees of  the same thing,  and 
belong to the ideas of  pleasure and pain,  delight  or 
uneasiness ; which  are the names I shall most  com- 
monly use for those two sorts of ideas. 
5 3. The  infinitely wise author of our being having 
given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to 
move or keep them at rest as we think fit; and also, 
by the motion of  them,  to move ourselves and other 
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contiguous bodies,  in which consist all the actions of 
our body ;  having also given a power to our minds in 
several instances, to choose,  amongst its ideas, which 
it will think on,  and to pursue the inquiry of  this or 
that subject with  consideration and attention,  to ex- 
cite us to these  actions of  thinking and motion that 
we are capable of; has been pleased to join to ssveral 
thoughts,  and several sensations,  a perception of  de- 
light.  If this  were  wholly  separated  from  all  our 
outward sensations  and inward  thoughts,  we should 
have no reason to prefer one thought or action to an- 
other ;  negligence to attention; or motion to rest.  And 
so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our 
minds, but let our thoughts  (if I may so call it)  run 
adrift, without any direction or design ;  and suffer the 
ideas of our minds, like unregarded shadows, to make 
their appearances there,  as it happened, without at- 
tending to them.  In which state man, however fur- 
nished  with the faculties of  understanding and will, 
would be a very idle unactive creature,  and pass his 
time only in a lazy, lethargic dream.  It  has therefore 
pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, 
and the ideas which we receive from them,  as also to 
several of our thoughts,  a concomitant pleasure,  and 
that in several objects, to several degrees; that those 
faculties which he had endowed us with might not re- 
main wholly idle and unemployed by us. 
$ 4.  Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on 
work that pleasure has, we being as ready to employ 
our faculties to avoid that,  as  to pursue this:  only 
this is worth our consideration, that pain is often pro- 
duced  by  the same  objects  and ideas that produce 
pleasure in us.  This their near  conjunction,  which 
makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we 
expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring 
the wisdom  and  goodness  of  our Maker;  who,  de- 
signing the preservation  of  our being,  has annexed 
pain to the application of many things to our bodies, 
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to warn us of  the harm that they will do,  and as ad- 
vices to withdraw from them.  But he not designing 
our preservation barely, but the preservation of every 
part and organ in its perfection,  hath, in many cases, 
annexed pain to those very ideas which  delight us. 
Thus heat, that is very agreeable to us in one degree, 
by a little greater increase of  it,  proves no ordinary 
torment ;  and the most pleasant of  all sensible objects, 
light itself,  if  there be  too much of  it,  if increased 
beyond a due proportion  to our eyes,  causes  a very 
painful sensation.  Which is wisely and favourably so 
ordered by nature, that when  any object does by the 
vehemency of  its operation disorder the instruments 
of sensation, whose structures cannot but be very nice 
and delicate, we might by the pain be warned to with- 
draw before the organ be quite put out of order, and 
so be  unfitted for its proper function for the future. 
The  consideration of those objects that produce it  may 
well persuade us,  that this is the end or use of pain. 
For though great light be insufferable to our  eyes, 
yet the highest  degree  of  darkness  does  not at all 
disease them ;  because that causing no disorderly mo- 
tion in it, leaves that curious organ unharmed in its 
natural state.  But yet excess of cold as well as heat 
pains us,  because it is equally destructive to that tem- 
per which is necessary to the preservation of life, and 
the exercise of  the several functions of the body,  and 
which consists in a moderate degree of warmth ;  or,if 
you please,  a  motion  of  the insensible  parts of our 
bodies, confined within certain bounds. 
$ 5.  Beyond all this we  may find  another  reason, 
why God hath scattered up and down several degrees 
of pleasure  and pain, in  all the things  that environ 
and affect us,  and blended  them together  in almost 
all that our thoughts and  senses have  to do with; 
that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want 
of complete happiness,  in all  the enjoyments which 
the creatuies  can afford us, might be led to seek it in 
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the enjoyment of  him, with whom  there is fulness of 
joy,  and at whose right hand  are pleasures for  ever- 
more. 
$ 6. Though what I have here said may  Pleasureand 
not perhaps make the ideas of  pleasure  pain. 
and pain clearer to us than our own experience does, 
which is the only way that we are capable of  having 
them; yet the consideration  of the reason  why they 
are annexed  to so many  other ideas,  serving  to give 
us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the 
Sovereign Disposer of  all things, maynot be unsuit- 
able to the main  end of  these inquiries;  the know- 
ledge and veneration of  him being  the chief  end  of 
all our thoughts,  and  the proper business  of all un- 
derstandings. 
§ 7.  Existence and unity are two other  Existence 
ideas  that are suggested  to  the under-  and unity. 
standing  by  every  object  without,  and  every  idea 
within.  When ideas .are  in our  minds, we  consider 
them as being  actually there, as well as we consider 
things to be actually without us ;  which is, that they 
exist,  or have  existence ;  and whatever we can  con- 
sider  as  one  thing, whether  a  real  being  or  idea, 
.suggests to the understanding the idea of unity. 
$ 8.  Power also is  another  of  those  Power. 
simple  ideas  which  we  receive  from 
sensation and reflection.  For observing in ourselves, 
that we  can  at pleasure move  several parts of our 
bodies which were at rest, the effects also that natural 
bodies are able to produce in one  another occurring 
every moment to our senses, we both these ways get 
the idea of power. 
$ 9. Besides these there is another idea,  Succession. 
which,  though  suggested by  our senses, 
yet is more constantly offered  to  us by what passes 
in our minds ;  and that is the idea of succession.  For 
if we look immediately into ourselves,  and  reflect on 
what is observable  there, we shall find our ideas al- 
ways,  whilst  we  are  awake,  or  have  any  thought, 
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passing in train, one going and another coming, with- 
out intermission. 
Simple ideas  10. These, if they are not all,  are at 
thernaterials  least (as I  think) the most  considerable 
of a11  our  of those simple ideas which the mind has, 
and  out of  which  is made  all its other 
knowledge ;  all which it receives only by the two fore- 
mentioned ways of sensation and reflection. 
Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for 
the capacious mind of man to  expatiate in, which takes 
its flight farther than the stars, and cannot be confined 
by the limits of  the world ;  that extends its thoughts 
often even  beyond  the utmost  expansion  of matter, 
and  makes  excursions  into  that  incomprehensible 
inane.  I grant all this, but desire any one to assign 
any simple  idea which  is  not  received  from  one  of 
those  inlets before-mentioned,  or any  complex  idea 
not made out of those simple ones.  Nor will it be so 
strange to think  these  few simple  ideas sufficient to 
employ  the  quickest  thought,  or  largest  capacity, 
and to furnish the materials of all that various know- 
ledge,  and more  various  fancies  and opinions  of all 
mankind,  if  we  consider  how  many words  may be 
made out of  the various composition of  twenty-four 
letters ;  or if,  going one step farther,  we will but re- 
flect  on  the variety  of  combinations  may  be made 
with  barely  one  of  the  above-mentioned  ideas,  viz. 
number, whose  stock  is  inexhaustible  and truly in- 
finite;  and what a  large and immense field L:th  ex- 
tension alone afford the mathematicians ! 
Ch. 8.  Simple Ideas. 
CHAPTER VIII. 
Some farther  Considerations concerning ozcr  Simple 
Ideas. 
$ 1. CONCERNING  the simple  ideas of  positive 
sensation it is to be considered, that what-  ideas from 
soever is so  constituted in nature  as to  privative 
be able, by affecting our senses, to cause 
any perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in 
the understanding a simple idea, which, whatever be 
the externaI  cause of  it, when it comes  to be taken 
notice of by our discerning faculty, it is by the mind 
looked on and considered there to be a  real positive 
idea  in  the understanding,  as  much  as  any  other 
whatsoever,  though perhaps the cause of  it be but a 
privation of the subject. 
$ 2. Thus the idea of heat and cold, light and dark- 
ness, white  and black,  motion  and rest,  are equally 
clear and positive ideas in the mind,  though perhaps 
some of  the causes  which  produce  them  are barely 
privations in subjects,  from whence our senses derive 
those ideas.  These the understanding, in its view of 
them, considers all as distinct positive  ideas, without 
taking notice of the causes that produce them';  which 
is an inquiry not belonging to the idea, as it is in the 
understanding, but to the nature of  the things exist- 
ing without us.  These are two very different things, 
and carefully to be distinguished ;  it being one thing 
to perceive and know the idea of white or black, and 
quite another to examine what kind of particles they 
must be, and how ranged in the superficies, to make 
any object appear white or black. 
$ 3. A  painter  or  dyer,  who  never  inquired  into 
their causes, hath the ideas  of white  and black, and 
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his understanding, and perhaps more distinctly, than 
the philosopher, who hath busied himself in consider- 
ing their natures, and thinks he knows how far either 
of them is in its cause positive or privative ; and the 
idea of black is no less positive in his mind than that 
of white, however the cause  of that colour in the ex- 
ternal object may be only a privation. 
$ 4. If it were the design  of my present undertak- 
ing to inquire into the natural causes and manner of 
perception, I should offer this  as a reason why a pri- 
vative eanse might, in some  cases  at least, produce a 
positive idea, viz. that all sensation being produced in 
11s  only by different degrees  and modes of motion  in 
our animal spirits, variously  agitated by external ob- 
jects,  the abatement  of  any former  motion  must as 
necessarily produce a new sensation, as the variation 
or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which 
depend8  only  on  a  different  motion  of  the  animal 
spirits in that organ. 
5 5. But whether this be  so or no, I will  not here 
determine, but appeal to every one's  own experience, 
whether the shadow of  a  man, though it consists of 
nothing but the absence of light  (and  the more the 
absence of light is, the more discernible is the shadow) 
does not, when a man looks on it, cause as clear and 
positive  idea in his  mind,  as a  man  himself,  though 
covered over with clear sunshine ?  and the picture of 
a shadow is a positive thing.  Indeed, we  have nega- 
tive  names,  which  stand  not  directly  for  positive 
ideas, but for their absence,  such  as insipid,  silence, 
nihil,  &c.  which  words  denote  positive  ideas;  v.  g. 
taste, sound, being, with  a  signification  of  their ab- 
sence. 
Positive  5 6. And thus one may truly be said to 
ideas from  see darkness.  For supposing a hole per- 
p"vative  fectly dark, from whence  no light is re- 
causes.  flected,  it is  certain  one  may  see  the 
figlire of it, or it may be painted ;  or whether the ink 
I  write  with  makes  any  other idea, is  a  question. 
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The privative causes I have here assigned of positive 
ideas  are according  to the common  opinion; but in 
truth it will be hard  to determine whether there be 
really any ideas from a  privative  cause, till it be de- 
termined whether rest be any more a privation than 
motion. 
$7. To discover the nature of our ideas  Ideas  in the 
the better, and to discourse of  them in-  mind, cpali- 
telligibly,  it  will  be  convenient  to  di-  ties in bo- 
stinguish them as they are ideas or  per-  dies* 
ceptions in  our minds, and as they are modifications 
of matter in the bodies  that cause such perceptions 
in us ; that so me may not think  (as perhaps usually 
is done) that they are exactly the images and resem- 
blances  of  something inherent in the subject ;  most 
of those of sensation  being  in the mind no more the 
likeness  of  something existing without  us,  than  the 
names  that stand for  them are the likeness  of  our 
ideas, which yet upon  hearing they are apt to excite 
in us. 
9 8. Whatsoever the mind  perceives in itself,  or is 
the immediate object  of perception,  thought, or un- 
derstanding, that I call idea ;  and the power to pro- 
duce any idea in  our mind I call quality of  the sub- 
ject wherein that power is.  Thus a snow-ball having 
the power to produce in us the ideas of  white,  cold, 
and round, the powers to produce those  ideas in us, 
as they are in  the snow-ball, I call qualities ;  and as 
they are sensations or perceptions in our understand- 
ings, I call them ideas; which ideas, if I speak of some- 
times as in the things themselves, I would be under- 
stood  to mean those  qualities  in  the  objects which 
produce them in us. 
§ 9. Qualities thus considered in bodies  Pdmarg 
are, first, such as are utterly inseparable  qualities. 
from the body, in what  estate soever  it 
be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, 
all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; 
and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of 120  Simple Ideas.  Book a. 
matter which has  bulk  enough to be  perceived,  and 
the mind  finds  inseparable  from  every  particle  of 
matter, though less than to make itself singly be per- 
ceived  by our  senses ; v.  g.  take a  grain  of  wheat, 
divide it into two parts,  each part has  still  solidity, 
extension,  figure,  and mobility;  divide it again, and 
it retains still the same qualities,  and so divide it on 
till the parts become insensible, they must retain still 
each of  them all those qualities :  for division (which 
is all that a  mill,  or pestle,  or any other body does 
upon another, in reducing  it to insensible parts) can 
never take away either solidity,  extension, figure, or 
mobility from any body, but only makes two or more 
distinct separate masses  of matter of  that which was 
but one  before ;  all which  distinct  masses, reckoned 
as so many distinct bodies, after division  make a cer- 
tain number.  These I call original or primary qua- 
lities  of body, which I think we may observe  to pro- 
duce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, 
motion or rest, and number. 
Secondary  § 10. Secondly, such qualities which in 
qualities.  truth are nothing  in  the objects  them- 
selves,  but  powers  to  produce  various 
sensations in us by their primary qualities,  i.  e. by the 
bulk, figure,  texture, and  motion  of their  insensible 
parts,  as colour,  sounds,  tastes, &c. these I  call se- 
condary qualities.  To these might be added a third 
sort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though 
they are as much real qualities in the subject as those 
which I, to comply with the common way of  speak- 
ing, eall qualities, but for distinction, secondary qua- 
lities.  For the power in fire to produce a new colour, 
or consistency, in wax or clay, by its primary qualities, 
is  as much a  quality in fire as the power  it has to 
produce in me a new idea  or sensation of warmth or 
burning, which I felt not before, by the same primary 
qualities, viz. the bulk, texture,  and motion of its in- 
serrsible parts. 
How  pri-  5 11. The next thing to be considered 
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is, how  bodies produce ideas in us; and  mary qua- 
that is  manifestly  by impulse,  the only  lities pro- 
duce their  way  which  we  can  conceive  bodies  to  ideas. 
operate in. 
tj 19. If then external objects be not united to our 
minds, when  they produce ideas therein, and yet we 
perceive these  original  qualities in such  of them  as 
singly fall under  our  senses, it is  evident  that some 
motion  must  be  thence  continued  by our  nerves or 
animal spirits,  by  some  parts  of  our  bodies, to  the 
brain,  or the  seat  of  sensation, there to produce in 
our minds the particular ideas we have of them.  And 
since the extension,  figure,  number,  and  motion  of 
bodies,  of an observable bigness, may be perceived at 
a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly im- 
perceptible bodies must come from  them to the eyes, 
and thereby convey to the brain some motion, which 
produces these ideas which we have of them in us. 
§ 13. After the same  manner that the 
ideas of these  original  qualities  are pro- 
duced  in us, we  may conceive  that the 
ideas of secondary qualities are also produced, viz. by 
the operations of  insensible  particles  on  our senses. 
For it being manifest that there are bodies, and good 
store  of  bodies,  each whereof  are so small that we 
cannot,  by  any of  our  senses,  discover  either  their 
bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles 
of  the air and water,  and others  extremely smaller 
than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles 
of air and water as the particles of  air and water are 
smaller than peas or hail-stones:  let us suppose at 
present, that the different  motions  and figures, bulk 
and number of  such  particles,  affecting  the several 
organs of  our senses, produce in  us  those  different 
sensations, which we have from the colours and sinells 
of  bodies ;  v. g. that a violet,  by the impulse of such 
insensible particles  of matter  of peculiar  figures and 
bulks, and in different  degrees and modifications  of 
their motions, causes the ideas of  the blue colour and 102  What  Ideas Resemblnnces.  Book 2. 
sweet  scent  of  that  flower  to be produced  in  our 
minds, it being no more  impossible  to conceive that 
God should annex  such ideas to such motions, with 
which  they have  no  similitude, than  that he should 
annex  the idea  of  pain  to the motion  of a piece  of 
steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no 
resemblance. 
$  14.  What  I have  said  concerning  colours  and 
smells may be understood  also  of  tastes and sounds, 
and other the like sensible qualities ;  which, whatever 
reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth 
nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to pro- 
duce various sensations in  us,  and  depend on  those 
primary qualities, viz.  bulk,  figure, texture, and mo- 
tion of parts, as I have said. 
Ideas of pri-  $  1.5.  From whence I think it easy to 
maquai  draw this  observation, that the ideas  of 
ties are re-  primary  qualities  of  bodies  are  resem- 
semblances;  blances of  them,  and  their  patterns  do 
of  really exist in the bodies themselves ;  but 
not.  the ideas  produced  in  us  by  these  se- 
condary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. 
There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies 
themselves.  They are in the bodies, we denominate 
from them, onIy a power to produce those  sensations 
in us; and what is  sweet, blue,  or warm  in idea,  is 
but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insen- 
sible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so. 
$ 16. Flame is  denominated  hot  and light ;  snow 
white and cold ;  and manna white and sweet, from the 
ideas they produce in us : which qualities  are com- 
monly thought to be  the same in those bodies  that 
those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance 
of the other, as they are in  a mirror;  and it would 
by most men be judged very extravagant if one should 
say otherwise.  And  yet he that will  consider that 
the same fire, that at one distance produces in us the 
sensation of warmth, does at a  nearer  approach pro- 
duce in us the far  different  sensation of pain, ought 
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to bethink  himself what  reason  he has  to  say, that 
his  idea  of  warmth, which was  produced  in him  by 
the fire, is actually in the fire ; and his  idea of pain, 
which the same fire  produced  in  him  the same way, 
is not in the fire.  Why are whiteness  and  coldness 
in snow, and pain not, when  it produces the one and 
the other idea in us,  and  can do  neither  but by the 
bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts? 
$ 17. The particular bulk, number, figure, and mo- 
tion of the parts of  fire, or snow, are really in them, 
whether  any one's  senses  perceive them or no; and 
therefore  they may be  called  real qualities,  because 
they  really  exist  in those  bodies:  but light,  heat, 
whiteness,  or  coldness, are no  more  really in  them 
than sickness or pain  is in  manna.  Take away the 
sensation of  them; let not the eyes  see light or co- 
lours, nor  the ears hear  sounds; let the palate not 
taste,  nor  the nose  smell;  and  all  colours,  tastes, 
odours, and sounds, as they are sueh particular ideas, 
vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, i. e. 
bulk, figure, and motion of parts. 
$ 18. A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to 
produce  in  us the idea of a  round  or square figure, 
and, by being removed from one place to another, the 
idea of motion.  This idea  of motion represents it as 
it really is  in the manna moving:  a  circle or square 
are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the mind 
or in the manna ;  and this both motion and figure are 
really in the manna, whether we take notice of them 
or no :  this every body is ready to agree to.  Besides, 
manna by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of its 
parts, has a power to produce the sensations of sick- 
ness, and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us. 
That these ideas of sickness  and pain  are not in  the 
mcnna, but effects of its operations on us, and are no- 
where when we feel  them not:  this  also  every one 
readily  agrees  to.  And  yet men  are hardly  to be 
brought to think,  that sweetness and whiteness  are 
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operations of manna, by the motion,  size,  and figure 
of its particles on the eyes and palate ; as the pain 
and sickness csused by manna are confessedly nothing 
but the effects of its operations on the stomach and 
guts, by the size, motion,  asd figure of  its insensible 
parts (for by nothing else can a body operate, as has 
been proved) ;  as if  it could  not operate on the eyes 
and palate,  and thereby produce  in  the mind  par- 
ticular distinct ideas, which in itself it has not, as well 
as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach, 
and thereby produce distinct  ideas, which in itself it 
has not.  These ideas  being all effects  of  the opera- 
tions of manna, on several parts of our bodies, by the 
size, figure, number, and motion of its parts ;  why those 
produced  by the eyes  and palate  should rather  be 
thought to be  really in  the manna than those  pro- 
duced by the stomach and guts ;  or why the pain and 
sickness, ideas that are the effect  of manna,  should 
be  thought  to be nowhere when  they are  not  felt; 
and yet the sweetness  and whiteness,  effects  of  the 
same manna  on  other parts  of  the body,  by  ways 
equally as unknown,  should be thought to exist in 
the manna, when they are not  seen or  tasted, would 
need some reason to explain. 
Ideas of pri-  g 19. Let us consider the red and white 
quali-  colours  in porphyry:  hinder  light  from 
ties are  re-  striking on it, and its colours vanish,  it 
no longer produces any such ideas in us;  of secondary, 
not.  upon the return of light it produces these 
appearances on us again.  Can  any one 
think any real alterations are made in  the porphyry 
by the presence  or  absence of  light ;  and that those 
ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry 
in the light, when  it is plain it has no colour in the 
dark? It has,  indeed,  such a  configuration  of par- 
ticles, both night and day,  as are apt, by the rays of 
light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone, 
to produce in us the idea of redness, and from others 
the idea  of whiteness ;  but whiteness  or  redness are 
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not in it at any time,  but such a texture,  that hath 
the power  to produce such a sensation in us. 
5 80. Pound an almond, and the clear white colour 
will be  altered into a dirty one,  and the sweet taste 
into an oily one.  What real alteration can the beat- 
ing of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration 
of the texture of it  ? 
5  81. Ideas  being  thus  distinguished  and under- 
stood,  we  may be  able to give an account how  the 
same water,  at the same time,  may produce the idea 
of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas 
it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were 
really in it,  should at the same tirne be both hot and 
cold :  for if we imagine warmth, as it is in our hands, 
to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion 
in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits, 
we may understand how  it is possible that the same 
water may,  at the same time, produce the sensations 
of heat in one hand, and cold in the other ; which yet 
figure never does, that never producing the idea of a 
square by one  hand, which has produced  the idea of 
a globe by another.  But if the sensation of heat and 
cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the 
motion of  the minute parts of  our bodies,  caused by 
the corpuscles of  any other body,  it is easy to be un- 
derstood,  that if  that motion be greater in one hand 
than in the other; if  a body  be applied to the two 
hands, which has in its minute particles a greater mo- 
tion, than in those of one of the bands, and a less than 
in those of  the other; it will increase the motion of 
the one hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause 
the different sensations of  heat and cold that depend 
thereon. 
5 $29. I have in what just goes before been engaged 
in physical inquiries a little farther than perhaps I in- 
tended.  But it being necessary to make the nature of 
sensation a little understood, and to  make the difference 
between the qualities in bodies, and the ideas produced 
by them in the mind, to be distinctly conceived, with- Secondary Qualities.  Book a. 
out which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly 
of them,  I hope I shall be  pardoned  this little ex- 
cursion into natural philosophy, it being necessary in 
our present  inquiry to distinguish  the primary  and 
real  qualities  of  bodies,  which  are  always  in  them 
(viz. solidity,  extension,  figure,  number,  and motion, 
or rest ;  and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when 
the bodies they are in are big enough singly to be dis- 
cerned) from those secondary and imputed  qualities, 
which are but the powers of  several combinations of 
those primary ones, when they operate, without being 
distinctly  discerned ; whereby we may also come to 
know what ideas are, and what are not, resemblances 
of  something  really  existing  in  the bodies  we  de- 
nominate from them. 
Tilree sorts  $  23. The qualities  then  that are in 
of qualities  bodies,  rightly  considered,  are of  three 
in bodies.  sorts. 
First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and mo- 
tion,  or rest of  their solid parts; those are in them, 
whether we perceive them or no ;  and when they are 
of that size that we  can discover  them, we have by 
these an idea of the thing, as it is in itself, as is plain 
in artificial things.  These I call primary qualities. 
Secondly, The power that is in any body, by reason 
of  its insensible primary qualities, to operate after a 
peculiar  manner on any of  our senses,  and  thereby 
produce in us the different ideas of  several colours, 
sounds,  smells, tastes,  &c.  These are usually called 
sensible qualities. 
Thirdly, The power that is in any body, by reason 
of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, 
to make  such a change in the bulk,  figure, texturc, 
and motion of another body, as to make it operate on 
our senses, differently from what it did before.  Thus 
the sun has a power to make wax white,  and fire to 
make lead fluid.  These are usually called powers. 
The first of these, as has been said, I think may be 
properly called real, original, or primary qualities, be- 
Ch. 8.  Secondary Qualities.  127 
cause they are in the things themselves, whether they 
are perceived or no; and upon their different modifica- 
tions it is, that the secondary qualities depend. 
The other two are only powers  to act differently 
upon other things, which powers result from the dif- 
ferent modifications of  those primary qualities. 
6 24.  But though the two latter sorts  The first 
,I --  " 
of  qualities  are powers  barely,  and no-  are resem- 
blances.  thing but powers, relating to several other  The second 
bodies,  and  resulting from the different  thought  re- 
modifications  of  the  original  qualities,  semblances,  -- 
yet they are generally otGrwise  ihought  but are not* 
The third  of: for  the second sort, viz.  the powers  are.  . -- 
to produce  several  ideas  in  us  by  our  nor are  * 
senies,  are looked upon as real quilities,  thought so. 
in the things thus affecting us ;  but the third sort are 
called and  esteemed  barely powers,  v.  g. the idea of 
heat, or light, which we receive by our eyes or touch 
from the sun,  are commonly  thought real qualities, 
existing in the sun,  and something more than mere 
powers in it.  But when we consider the sun, in re- 
ference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we  look 
on the whiteness  and softness produced  in the wax, 
not as qualities in the sun,  but effects produced  by 
powers  in  it:  whereas,  if  rightly  considered,  these 
qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions 
in me when I am warmed or enlightened by the sun, 
are no otherwise in the sun,  than the changes made 
in the wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the 
sun.  They are all of them equally powers in the sun, 
depending on its primary qualities ;  whereby it is able, 
in the one case,  so to alter the bulk,  figure, texture, 
or motion of some of  the insensible parts of  my eyes 
or hands,  as thereby to produce  in  me  the idea  of 
light or heat;  and in the other, it is able so to alter 
the bulk,  figure, texture, or motion of the insensible 
parts of  the wax, as to make them fit to produce in 
me the distinct ideas of  white and fluid. 
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for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, 
seem to be,  because the ideas we  have  of  distinct 
colours, sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them 
of  bulk,  figure,  or motion,  we  are not apt to think 
them the effects of these primary qualities, which ap- 
pear not, to our senses, to operate in their production; 
and with which they have not any apparent congruity, 
or conceivable connexion.  Hence it is that we are so 
forward to imagine,  that those ideas are the resem- 
blances  of  something  really  existing  in  the objects 
themselves :  since sensation discovers nothing of bulk, 
figure, or motion of parts in their production ;  nor can 
reason  show how  bodies, by  their  bulk,  figure,  and 
motioh, should produce in the mind the ideas of  blue 
or yellow,  &c.  But in the other case,  in the opera- 
tions of bodies, changing the qualities one of another, 
we  plainly discover,  that the quality produced hath 
commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing 
producing it ;  wherefore we look on it as a bare effect 
of  power.  For though receiving the idea of heat or 
light from the sun,  we  are apt to think it is a per- 
ception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun; 
yet when we see wax, or a fair face, receive change of 
colour  from the sun,  we  cannot imagine that to be 
the reception or resemblance of any thing in the sun, 
because we find not those different colours in the sun 
itself.  For our senses being able to observe a likeness 
or unlikeness of  sensible qualities in two different ex- 
ternal objects, we forwardly enough conclude the pro- 
duction of  any sensible quality in any subject to be 
an effect of  bare power,  and not the communication 
of any quality, which was really in the efficient, when 
we find no such sensible quality in the thing that pro- 
duced it.  But our senses not being able to discover 
any unlikeness  between the idea produced in us,  and 
the quality of  the object producing it,  we  are apt to 
imagine, that our ideas and resemblances of something 
in the objects,  and not the effects of  certain powers 
placed in the modification of  their  primary qualities, 
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with  which primary qualities the ideas produced  in 
us have no resemblance. 
$ 26. To  conclude, beside those before-  Secondary 
mentioned  primary  qualities  in  bodies,  qualities 
twofold ;  viz. bulk, figure,  extension, number, and  first  imme- 
motion of their solid parts;  all the rest  diat;ly  per- 
whereby  we  take notice  of  bodies,  and  ceivable; 
disting;ish  them  one  from another,  are  secondly, 
nothing else but several powers in them  p$$&e. 
de~ending  on  those  primary  qualities; 
w6ereby hey  are fittid, eitger by  immediately ope- 
rating on our bodies, to produce several different ideas 
in us;  or  else,  by  operating on other bodies,  so to 
change  their  primary  qualities,  as  to render  them 
capable of producing ideas in us different from what 
before  they did.  The former of these, I think,  may 
be called s&ondary qualities, immediately perceivable: 
the latter, secondary qualities, mediately perceivable. 
CHAPTER IX., 
Of  Perception. 
5 1. PERCEPTION,  as it  is the first faculty  Pe,c,ption 
of the mind, exercised about our ideas ;  so  the first 
it is the first  and simplest idea we have  simple idea 
from  reflection,  and is  by  some  called 
of reflection. 
thinking  in  general.  Though thinking,  in the pro- 
priety of the English tongue, signifies that sort of ope- 
ration in the mind about its ideas, wherein the mind 
is active;  where  it,  with  some degree of  voluntary 
attention, considers any thing.  For in bare naked per- 
ception, the mind is,  for the most part,  only passive ; 
and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving. 
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18  when  5 2. What perception is, every one will 
the mind re-  know better by reflecting on what he does 
ceives the  himself, what he sees, hears,  feels, &c. or 
impression.  thinks,  than by  any discourse  of  mine. 
Whoever  reflects  on what  passes  in his  own  mind, 
cannot miss it :  and if he does not reflect, all the words 
in the world cannot make him have any notion of it. 
§ 3. This is certain, that whatever  alterations are 
made in the body,  if they reach not the mind ;  what- 
ever impressions are made on the outward  parts, if 
they are not taken notice of within ; there is no per- 
ception.  Fire may  burn our bodies,  with no other 
effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be con- 
tinued to the brain,  and there the sense of  heat,  or 
idea of  pain,  be produced in the mind, wherein con- 
sists actual perception. 
5 4.  How often may a man observe in himself, that 
whilst his mind is intently employed  in the contem- 
plation of some objects, and curiously surveying some 
ideas that are there, it takes no notice of  impressions 
of sounding bodies  made upon the organ of  hearing, 
with the same alteration that uses to be for the pro- 
ducing the idea of  sound ?  A sufficient impulse there 
may be on the organ ;  but if not reaching the observa- 
tion  of  the mind,  there  follows no perception;  and 
though the motion that uses to produce the idea of 
sound  be  made in the ear,  yet no  sound is heard. 
Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any de- 
fect in the organ,  or that the man's  ears are less af- 
fected than at other times when he does hear: but 
that which  uses  to produce  the idea,  though  con- 
veyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice 
of in the understanding, and so imprinting no idea 
in  the mind,  there  follows  no  sensation.  So that 
wherever  there is sense,  or  perception,  there  some 
ides is actually produced,  and present in the under- 
standing. 
Children,  5 5. Therefore I doubt not but.children, 
thollgh they  by the exercise of  their senses about ob- 
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jects  that affect them  in  the womb,  re-  llaveibm in 
ceive some few ideas before they are born;  the womb, 
as the unavoidable  effects,  either of  the  ha'e  innate.  none 
bodies that environ them, or else of those 
wants or diseases they suffer:  amongst which (if one 
may conjecture concerning things not very capable of 
examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth 
are two;  which  probably  are some of  the first that 
children have,  and which they scarce ever  part with 
again. 
$ 6.  But though it be reasonable to imagine that 
children receive some ideas before they come into the 
world, yet those simple ideas are far from those innate 
principles which some contend for, and we above have 
rejected.  These here mentioned being the effects of 
sensation,  are only from some affections of  the body, 
which happen to them there, and so depend on some- 
thing exterior to the mind ;  no otherwise differing in 
their manner of  production from other ideas derived 
from sense, but only in the ~recedency  of time ;  whereas 
those innate principles are supposed to be quite of an- 
other nature,  not  coming into the mind by any  ac- 
cidental alterations in, or operations on, the body, but, 
as  it were,  original  characters impressed  upon  it in 
the very first moment of its being and constitution. 
$ 7.  As there are some ideas which we  Which ideas 
may  reasonably  suppose  may  be intro-  first, is not 
duced into the minds  of  childrer, in the  evident. 
womo,  subservient to the necessities of their life and 
being  there ;  so,  after they are born,  those ideas are 
the earliest imprinted which happen to be the sensible 
qualities which  first occur  to them : amongst which, 
light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest 
efficacy.  And how covetous the mind is to be furnished 
with all such ideas as  have no pain accompanying them, 
may be a little guessed by what is observable in child- 
ren new-born, who always turn their eyes to that part 
from whence the light comes, lay them how you please. 
But the ideas that are most familiar at  first being va- 
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rious,  according to the divers circumstances of child- 
ren's first entertainment in the  world, the order wherein 
the several  ideas come at first  into the mind  is very 
various and uncertain also ;  neither is it much material 
to know it. 
Ideas of sen-  $ 8. We are further to consider  con- 
sation oftell  cerning perception, that the ideas we re- 
changed by  ceive  by  sensation  are  often  in  grown 
the judg-  people altered by the judgment,  without 
ment .  our  taking  notice  of  it.  When we  set 
before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, 
u. g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea 
thereby  imprinted  in  our  mind  is  of  a  flat  circle 
variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and 
brightness coming to our eyes : but we having by use 
been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance 
convex  bodies  are wont to make in us,  what altera- 
tions are made in the reflections of  light by the dif- 
ference of  the sensible  figures  of  bodies,  the judg- 
ment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the ap- 
pearances into their causes ; so that from that which 
is  truly variety  of  shadow or  colour,  collecting the 
figure,  it  makes  it pass  for  a  mark  of  figure,  and 
frames to itself the perception of a convex fieure and 
an uniform  colour;  when  the idea  we  receive  froin 
thence is only  a plane variously  coloured,  as is evi- 
dent in painting.  To which  purpose I shall here in- 
sert a  problem  of  that very ingenious  and studious 
promoter of  real knowledge, the learned and worthy 
Mr. Molineaux, which he was pleased to send me in a 
letter some months since ; and it is this : Suppose a 
man  born  blind  and  now  adult,  and taught by  his 
touch  to distinguish between  a cube and a  sphere of 
the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as 
to tell. when  he felt one and the other, which  is the 
cube, which  the sphere.  Suppose then the cube and 
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made 
to see :  quaere, "  whether by his sight, before he touched 
them, he could now  distinguish and tell which is  the 
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globe,  which the cube?" to which the acute and ju- 
dicious proposer answers : Not.  For though he has 
obtained the experience of  how a globe,  how a cube 
affects his touch ; yet he has not yet obtained the ex- 
perience,  that what affects his touch so or so,  must 
affect his sight so or so ;  or that a protuberant angle 
in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall ap- 
pear to his eye as it does in the cube.  I agree wit11 
this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my 
friend,  in his answer to this his problem;  and am of 
opinion, that the blind man,  at first sight, would  not 
be  able with certainty to say  which  was  the globe, 
which the cube, whilst he only saw them :  though he 
could  unerringly name  them  by his  touch,  and cer- 
tainly  distinguish  them  by  the  difference  of  their 
figures felt.  This I have set down,  and  leave with 
my  reader,  as  an occasion  for him to consider how 
much  he may  be  beholden  to experience,  improve- 
ment,  and acquired notions, where 11e  thinks he had 
not the least use of or help from them :  and the rather, 
because this observing  gentleman further adds, that 
having, upon the occasion of  my book,  proposed this 
to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with 
one, that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks 
true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced. 
$ 9.  But this is not,  I think,  usual in  any  of  our 
ideas but those received by sight :  because sight, the 
most  comprehensive of  all our senses,  conveying to 
our minds  the ideas of  light and colours,  which  are 
peculiar only to that sense ;  and also the far different 
ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties 
whereof change the appearances of its proper object, 
viz. light and colours ;  we bring ourselves  by use to 
judge of the one by the other.  This, in many cases, 
by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent 
experience,  is performed so constantly and so quick, 
that we take that for the perception of our sensation 
which  is an idea formed  by  our judgment;  so  that 
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other, and is  scarce taken notice of  itself:  as a man 
who reads or hears with attention and understanding, 
takes little notice of  the characters or sounds, but of 
the ideas that are excited in him by them. 
$ lo. Nor need  we wonder  that this is done with 
so little notice,  if  we  consider  how  very  quick the 
actions  of  the mind  are performed:  for  as itself  is 
thought to take up no space, to have no extension; so 
its actions seem to require no time, but many of them 
seem to be crowded into an instant.  I speak this in 
comparison to the actions of the body.  Any one may 
easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take 
the pains to reflect on them.  How, as it were in an 
instant, do our minds with one glance see all the parts 
of a demonstration, which may very well be called a 
long one,  if  we  consider  the time it will  require to 
put it into words, and step by step show it another ! 
Secondly, we shall not be so much surprised that this is 
done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the 
facility which we get of doing things, by a custom of 
doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. 
Habits, especially such as are begun very early, come 
at last to produce actions in us which often escape 
our observation.  How  frequently do we,  in a day, 
cover our eyes with  our eyelids, without perceiving 
that we are at all in the dark!  Men that by custom 
have got the use of a by-word, do almost in every sen- 
tence pronounce sounds which,  though taken notice 
01 by~others,  they themselves neither hear nor observe : 
and therefore it is not so strange that our mind should 
often change the idea of its sensation into that of its 
judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, 
without our taking notice of it. 
Perce  tion  $ 11.  This faculty of perception seems 
puts tie  air.  to me to be that which puts the distinction 
ference be-  betwixt the animal kin  dom and the in- 
tween  ferior parts of nature.  @or  however vege-  mals and in- 
fedorbeings.  tables haw, many of them, some degrees 
of motion,  and upon the different  appii- 
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cation of  other bodies to them,  do very briskly alter 
their figures and motions,  and so have  obtained  the 
name  of  sensitive plants,  from  a  motion  which  has 
some resemblance  to that which  in animals  follows 
upon  sensation;  yet I suppose it is all bare mecha- 
nism,  and  no  otherwise produced than the turning 
of a wild oat-beard, by the insinuation of the particles 
of moisture,  or the shortening of a rope, by the affu- 
sion of water:  all which  is done  without  any sensa- 
tion  in the subject,  or the having or  receiving  any 
ideas. 
§ 12. Perception, I believe, is in some degree in all 
sorts of animals ;  though in some, possibly, the avenues 
provided by nature for the reception of sensations are 
so few, and the perception they are received with so 
obscure and dull, that it comes extremely short of the 
quickness and variety of sensation which are in other 
animals ;  but yet it  is sufficient for, and wisely adapted 
to, the state and condition of that sort of animals who 
are thus made : so  that the wisdom and goodness of 
the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stu- 
pendous fabric, and all the several degrees and ranks 
of creatures in it. 
§ 13. We may, I think, from the make of an oyster 
or cockle, reasonably conclude that it has not so many 
nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals; 
nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of 
transferring itself  from one place to another, be bet- 
tered by them.  What good would sight and hearing 
do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from 
the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or 
evil?  And  would not quickness of  sensation be  an 
inconvenience to an animal that must lie still,  where 
chance has once placed it ;  and there receive the afflux 
of colder or warmer, clean or foul water, as it  happens 
to come to it? 
$ 14. But yet J cannot but think there is some small 
dull perception, whereby they are distinguished from 
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plain instances even in mankind itself.  Take one, in 
whom  decrepit old  age has blotted out the memory 
of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas 
his mind  was formerly stored with;  and has, by de- 
stroying his  sight, hearing,  and smell quite, and his 
taste to a  great degree,  stopped up almost all the 
passages for new ones to enter ;  or, if there be  some 
of the inlets yet half open, the impressions made are 
scarce perceived,  or not at  all retained.  How far such 
an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of  innate 
principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual facul- 
ties above the condition of  a  cockle or an oyster,  I 
leave to be considered.  And if a man had passed sixty 
years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well 
as three days,  I wonder what difference there would 
have  been,  in  any intellectual perfections,  between 
him and the lowest degree of animals. 
Perception  5 15.  Perception  then being  the first 
the inlet of  step and degree towards knowledge,  and 
the inlet  of  all the materials  of  it,  the 
fewer senses any man,  as well  as any other creature, 
hath, and the  fewer and duller the impressions are that 
are made  by them,  and the duller the faculties are 
that are employed about them,  the more remote are 
they from  that knowledge  which  is to be found in 
some  men.  But this  being in great  variety  of  de- 
grees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot cer- 
tainly be discovered in the several species of animals, 
much less in their particular individuals.  It  suffices 
me only to have remarked here, that perception is the 
first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the 
inlet of  all knowledge in our minds:  and 1 am apt 
too to imagine, that it is perception, in the lowest de- 
gree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals 
and the inferior ranks of creatures.  But this I men- 
tion only as my conjecture by the by;  it being indif- 
ferent to the matter in hand  which way  the learned 
shall determine of it. 
CHAPTER X. 
Of  Retention. 
$ 1.  THE  next  faculty  of  the  mind,  Contempla- 
whereby it makes  a  farther progress to-  tion. 
wards knowledge, is that which I call re- 
tention, or the keeping of  those  simple  ideas  which 
from sensation or  reflection it hath  received.  This 
is done two ways ;  first, by keeping the idea, which is 
brought into it, for some time actually in view ;  which 
is called  contemplation. 
$ 2.  The other way of  retention is the 
power to revive again in our minds those 
ideas which after imprinting have disappeared, or have 
been as it were laid aside out of  sight : and thus we 
do when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, 
the object being removed.  This is memory, which is as 
it were the store-house of our ideas.  For the narrow 
mind of man not being capable of having many ideas 
under view and consideration at once, it was necessary 
to have a repository to lay up those ideas, which at an- 
other time it might have use of.  But our ideas being 
nothing  but actual perceptions  in the mind,  which 
cease to be any thing when there is no perception of 
them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of 
the memory signifies no more but this, that the mind 
has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which 
it has once had, with this additional perception annex- 
ed to them, that it has had them before.  Andin this 
sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memo- 
ries, when indeed they are actually nowhere, but only 
there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive 
them again, and as it were paint them anew on itself, 
though some  with more,  some  with  less  difficulty; 
some more  lively,  and others more  obscurely.  And 
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to have all those ideas in our understandings, which, 
though we  do not  actually contemplate, yet we can 
bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the ob- 
jects of our thoughts, without the help of  those sen- 
sible qualities which first imprinted them there. 
Attention,  § 3. Attention and repetition help much 
repetition,  to the fixing  any ideas in the memory : 
pleasureand  but those which naturally  at first make 
pain,  the deepest  and most lasting impression 
ideas.  are  those  which  are accompanied  with 
pleasure or pain.  The great business  of the senses 
being to make us take notice of what hurts or advan- 
tages the body, it is wisely ordered by nature (as has 
been shown)  that pain should accompany the recep- 
tion of  several ideas ; which,  supplying the place of 
consideration and reasoning  in  children, and acting 
quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both 
the old  and young avoid  painful objects  with  that 
haste which is necessary for their preservation;  and, 
in both, settles in the memory a caution for the future. 
Ideas fade in  § 4.  Concerning the several degrees of 
the memory.  lasting, wherewith ideas are imprinted on 
the memory, we may observe,  that some 
of them have been produced in the understanding by 
an object affecting the senses once only, and no more 
than once ;  others,  that have more than once offered 
themselves to the senses,  have yet been little taken 
notice of: the mind either heedless,  as in children,  or 
otherwise empl.oyed,  as in men,  intent only  on  one 
thing, not setting the stamp deep into itself:  and in 
some, where they are set on with care and repeated 
impressions,  either through the temper of  the body, 
or some other  fault,  the memory is very weak.  In 
all these cases,  ideas in the mind  quickly fade, and 
often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no 
Inore footsteps or remaining characters of themselves 
than shadows do flying over fields of  corn; and the 
mind is as  void  of  them as  if  they had never been 
there. 
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$ 5. Thus many  of  those ideas  which  were  pro- 
duced in the minds  of  children, in the beginning  of 
their  sensation  (some of  which perhaps,  as of  some 
and pains,  were before they were born, and 
others in their infancy), if in the future course of their 
lives they are not repeated again, are quite lost, with- 
out the least glimpse remaining of  them.  This may 
be observed in those who by sorne mischance have lost 
their sight when they were very young, in whom the 
ideas of  colours having been but slightly taken notice 
of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out ; so 
that some  years  after  there is no  more  notion  nor 
memory  of  colours left in  their minds than in those 
of people born blind.  The memory of some, it is true, 
is  very  tenacious,  even to a miracle:  but yet there 
seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas, even of 
those wl~ich  are struck deepest, and in minds the most 
retentive ; so that if they be not sometimes renewed 
by  repeated  exercises  of  the senses, or reflection  on 
those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them, 
the print wears out, and at  last there remains nothing 
to be  seen.  Thus the ideas,  as well  as children,  of 
our youth often die  before us : and our minds repre- 
sent to us those tombs to which we are approaching ; 
where though the brass  and marble remain,. yet the 
inscriptions  are  effaced  by  time,  and  the  imagery 
moulders  away.  The pictures  drawn in our minds 
are laid in fading colours,  and, if not sometimes  rc- 
freshed,  vanish  and disappear.  How mnch the con- 
stitution of  our bodies and the make of  our animal 
spirits are concerned in this,  and whether the temper 
of  the brain makes this difference, that in some it re- 
tains the characters drawn on it like marble, in othel-s 
like freestone,  and in others little better than sand, 
1 shall not here inquire ;  though it may seem proba- 
ble, that the constitution of the body does sometimes 
influence the memory;  since we  oftentimes  find  a 
disease quite strip the mind of  all its ideas,  and the 
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to dust and confusion, which seemed to be as lasting 
as if graved in marble. 
Constantly  5 6.  But concerning  the ideas  them- 
selves, it is easy to remark that those that 
ideas can 
scarce be  are oftenest refreshed (amongst which are 
lost.  those that are conveyed into the mind by 
more ways than one)  by a frequent return of  the ob- 
jects or actions that produce them, fix themselves best 
in the memory, and remain clearest and longest there : 
and therefore those which are of the original qualities 
of bodies, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion,  and 
rest;  and those that almost constantly affect our bo- 
dies, as heat and cold ; and those which are the affec- 
tions of all kinds of beings,  as existence, duration, and 
number,  which  almost every object that affects  our 
senses, every thought which employs our minds, bring 
along with them : these, I say, and the like ideas, are 
seldom  quite lost whilst  the mind retains any ideas 
at all. 
In remem-  5 7. In this secondary perception,  as I 
bering, the  may so call it, or viewing again the ideas 
mindisoften  that are lodged in the memory, the mind 
active.  is oftentimes  more  than barely passive ; 
the appearance of  those dormant pictures depending 
sometimes  on the will.  The mind  very  often  sets 
itself  on work  in  search  of  some  hidden  idea,  and 
turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it; though 
sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own 
accord,  and  offer  themselves  to the understanding; 
and very often are roused and tumbled out of  their 
dark cells into open daylight by turbulent and tem- 
pestuous passions, our affections bringing ideas to our 
memory,  which  had  otherwise lain  quiet  and unre- 
garded.  This farther is to be observed, concerning 
ideas lodged  in the memory,  and upon occasion re- 
vived by the mind, that they are not only (as the word 
revive imports) none of them new ones ;  but also that 
the mind takes notice of them, as of a former impres- 
sion, and renews its acquaintance with them as with 
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ideas it had known before : so that though ideas for- 
merly imprinted  are not  all constantly in view, yet 
in  remembrance  they  are  constantly  known  to  be 
such as  have  been  formerly imprinted, i.  e. in view, 
and taken notice of before by the understanding. 
5 8.  Memory,  in  an intellectual crea- 
Two  defects  ture, is  necessary in the next  degree to  in the me- 
perception.  It  is of so great moment, that  mory, obli- 
where it is wanting,  all the rest  of  our  vion and 
faculties are in a great measure useless ;  slOwness* 
and we,  in our thoughts, reasonings,  and knowledge, 
could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not 
for the assistance of our memories, wherein there may 
be two defects. 
First, That it loses the idea quite, and so far it pro- 
duces perfect  ignorance ;  for since we can know no- 
thing farther than we  have  the idea of it, when that 
is gone, we are in perfect ignorance. 
Secondly, That it moves  slowly, and retrieves not 
the ideas that it has,  and are laid up in store, quick 
enough to serve the mind upon occasion.  Thu, if it 
be to a great degree, is stupidity; and he who, through 
this default in h~s  memory, has not the ideas that are 
really preserved  there ready at hand when need and 
occasion calls for them, were almost as good be with- 
out them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. 
The dull man, who loses the opportunity whilst he is 
seeking in his mind for those ideas  that should serve 
his turn, is not much  more happy in his  knowledge 
than one that is  perfectly ignorant.  It is  the busi- 
ness therefore of  the memory to furnish to the mind 
those  dormant ideas  which it has present  occasion 
for;  in the having  them ready at hand  on all occa- 
sions  consists  that which  we  call  invention,  fancy, 
and quickness of parts. 
5 9.  These are defects, we may observe, in the me- 
mory of one man  compared with  another.  There is 
another defect which we  may conceive  to be in  the 
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perior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty 
may so far excel man, that they may have constantly 
in view the whole  scene  of  all  their  former  actions, 
wherein no  one of  the thoughts they have ever  had 
may slip out of their sight.  The omniscience of God, 
who knows all things, past, present, and to come, and 
to whom the thoughts of men's hearts always lie open, 
may satisfy us of the possibility of this.  For who can 
doubt hut God may communicate  to those  glorious 
spifits, his  immediate  attendants, any of  his  perfec- 
tions, in what proportions he pleases,  as far as created 
finite  beings can be capable? It is reported of  that 
prodigy  of parts,  Monsieur Pascal,  that till  the de- 
cay of his health had impaired his memory, he forgot 
nothing of  what he had  done,  read,  or  thought,  in 
any part of  his  rational  age.  This is  a privilege so 
little known to most men, that it seems almost incre- 
dible to those who, after the ordinary way,  measure 
all others  by themselves ; but yet, when  considered, 
may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards greater 
perfection of it in superior ranks of  spirits.  For this 
of Mr. Pascal was still with the narrowness  that hu- 
man  minds  are confined  to here,  of  having  great 
variety of  ideas  only by succession,  not all at once; 
whereas the several degrees of angels may probably 
have larger views, and some of them be endowed with 
capacities able to retain together,  and constantly set 
before them, as  in  one  picture, all their  past  know- 
ledge at once.  This, we may conceive, would  be no 
small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man, 
if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be always 
present  to  him:  and  therefore  we  may  suppose  it 
one of those wavs wherein the knowledge of separate  - 
spirits may exceedingly surpass ours. 
- 
Brutes have  $ 10. This faculty of laying up and re- 
memorv.  taining  the ideas that are brought  into 
Ch. 10.  Retention.  143 
one may observe in them to hit the notes 
right,  put it past doubt with  me  that they have per- 
ception, and retain ideas in their memories, and use 
them for patterns :  for it seems to me impossible that 
they  should  endeavour  to conform  their  voices  to 
notes  (as it is  plain  they do) of which  they had  no 
ideas.  For though I should grant sound may mecha- 
nically cause a  certain motion  of the animal  spirits, 
in the brains of those birds, whilst the tune is actually 
playing ;  and that motion may be continued on to the 
muscles of  the wings,  and so  the bird  mechanically 
be  driven  away by certain  noises, because  this may 
tend to the bird's  preservation ;  yet that can never be 
supposed a reason why it should cause mechanically, 
either whilst the tune was playing, much less after it 
has ceased, such a motion  of the organs in the bird's 
voice, as  should conform it to the nota of a  foreign 
sound, which imitation can be of  no use to the bird's 
preservation.  But, which is more, it cannot with any 
appearance of reason be supposed (much less proved) 
that birds, without sense and memory,  can approach 
their notes nearer  and nearer  by degrees  to a  tune 
played yesterday, which  if  they have no  idea of  in 
their memory, is  nowhere, nor  can be  a  pattern for 
them  to imitate,  or which  any repeated  essays  can 
bring them nearer to :  since there is no  reason why 
the sound of a pipe should leave traces in their brains, 
which  not  at  first,  but  by  their  after-endeavours, 
should produce the like sounds ;  and why the sounds 
they make themselves should not make traces which 
they should  follow,  as well  as those of  the pipe  is 
impossible to conceive. 
the mrnd,  several other  animals  seem to 
have to a  great degree,  as well as man:  for, to pass 
by other instances, birds learning of  tunes,  and the Ch. 11.  Discerning.  1M 
CHAPTER  XI. 
Of Discerning, and other Operations of  the Mind. 
No know-  $  1.  ANOTHER  faculty  we  may  take 
ledge with-  notice of in our minds, is that of  discern- 
out discern-  ing and distinguishing between  the se- 
ment .  veral ideas it has.  It  is  not enough to 
have a confused perception of something in general : 
unless the mind had a distinct perception of  different 
objects and their  qualities,  it would  be  capable  of 
very little knowledge, though the bodies  that affect 
us were as  busy about  us as  they are now, and the 
mind  were  continually  employed  in thinking.  On 
this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another 
depends the evidence and certainty of  several, even 
very general propositions, which have  passed  for in- 
nate truths, because men, overlooking the true cause 
why those propositions find  universal assent, impute 
it wholly to native  uniform  impressions ;  whereas  it 
in truth depends upon  this  clear  discerning faculty 
of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the 
same or different.  But of this more hereafter. 
The differ-  $2.  How rhuch the imperfection of ac- 
ence of wit  curately  discriminating  ideas  one  from 
andjudg-  another  lies  either  in  the  dulness  or 
ment.  faults of the organs of  sense,  or  want of 
acuteness,  exercise,  or  attention in the understand- 
ing,  or hastiness and precipitancy,  natural to some 
tempers, I will not here examine ;  it suffices to take 
notice,  that  this  is  one  of  the operations  that the 
mind  may reflect  on and  observe in itself.  It is of 
that consequence to its other  knowledge, that so far 
as this faculty is in itself  dull,  or not rightly made 
use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another, 
so far our notions are confused, and our reason and 
judgment disturbed or misled.  If in having our ideas 
in the memory ready at hand  consists  quickness  of 
parts ;  in this of  having them unconfused, and being 
nicely  to distinguish  one  thing from another, 
*here  there is but the least  difference, consists, in a 
measure, the exactness of judgment and clear- 
ness of reason, which  is to be  observed  in one man 
above  another.  And  hence  perhaps  may  be  given 
some reason  of  that common  observation, that  men 
who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, 
have  not  always the  clearest judgment  or  deepest 
reason :  for wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, 
and  putting  those  together with  quickness  and va- 
riety, wherein can be found any resemblance or con- 
gruity,  thereby  to make  up pleasant  pictures  and 
agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the con- 
trary, lies quite on the other side, in separating care- 
fully, one from another, ideas, wherein can be found 
the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by 
similitude, and  by affinit  to take  one  thing for an- 
other.  This is  a way o [  proceeding quite contrary 
to metaphor and allusion, wherein  for the most part 
lies that entertainment  and pleasantry of  wit which 
strikes so lively on the fancy, and therefore  is so ac- 
ceptable to all people, because its beauty appears at 
first sight, and there is required no labour of thought 
to examine what truth or reason  there is in it.  The 
mind,  without  looking  any  farther,  rests  satisfied 
with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety 
of the fancy ;  and it is a kind of an affront to go  about 
to examine it by the severe  rules of  truth and good 
reason ;  whereby it appears that it consists in  some- 
thing that is not perfectly conformable to them. 
$ 3.  To the  well  distinguishing  our  clearne, 
ideas, it chiefly contributes that they be  alone hin- 
clear and determinate ; and where they  ders con- 
are so, it will not breed any confusion or  fusion. 
mistake  about  them,  though the  senses  should  (as 
sometimes they do)  convey them from  the same ob- 
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ject differently on different occasions, and so seem to 
err: for though a man in  a fever  should from sugar 
have a bitter taste, which at another time would pro- 
duce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that man's 
mind would be as clear and distinct from the idea of 
sweet, as if he had tasted only gall.  Nor does it make 
any more  confusion between  the two ideas of sweet 
and bitter,  that the same sort of  body produces  at 
one time one,  and at another  time  another idea by 
the taste, than it makes  a  confusion in two ideas of 
white and sweet, or white  and round, that the same 
piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at  the 
same time.  And the ideas of orange-colour  and azure 
that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of 
the infusion of  lignum nephriticum,  are no less  di- 
stinct ideas than those of the same colours taken from 
two very different bodies. 
Comparing.  § 4.  The comparing  them  one  with 
another,  in  respect  of  extent,  degrees, 
time,  place,  or  any other  circumstances,  is  another 
operation  of  the mind  about its ideas,  and  is that 
upon  which  depends  all that  large  tribe  of  ideas 
comprehended under relations ;  which of  how vast an 
extent it is, I shall have  occasion  to consider here- 
after. 
Brutes com-  Q 5.  How  far brutes  partake in this 
pare but h-  faculty is not easy to determine ; I ima- 
perfectly.  gine they have it not in any great degree : 
for  though  they  probably have  several 
ideas distinct enough, yet it seems  to me  to be the 
prerogative  of  human  understanding,  when  it has 
sufficiently distinguished  any ideas so as to perceive 
them to be  perfectly different, and  so  consequently 
two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances 
they are capable  to be  compared ; and  therefore, I 
think,  beasts  compare  not  their  ideas  farther  than 
some sensible  circumstances  annexed  to the objects 
themselves.  The other power  of comparing, which 
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may be observed in men, belonging to general ideas, 
and useful  only to abstract reasonings, we may pro- 
bably conjecture beasts have not. 
§ 6.  The next  operation we  may  ob-  Compound- 
serve in the mind about its ideas is com-  ing- 
osition,  whereby  it puts  together several  of  those 
$mple  ones it has received from sensation and reflec- 
tion, and combines  them into complex ones.  Under 
this of composition may be  reckoned also that of en- 
larging, wherein though the composition does not so 
much  appear  as  in  more  complex  ones,  yet  it is 
nevertheless a putting several  ideas together, though 
of the same kind.  Thus by adding several  units to- 
gether, we  make  the idea of  a  dozen; and putting 
together  the  repeated  ideas  of  several  perches, we 
frame that of a furlong. 
$7.  In this also, I suppose, brutes come  Brut,, 
far short of  men ;  for though they take in  ound but 
and retain together several combinations 
of simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell, and voice 
of  his master  make up the complex  idea  a  dog has 
of him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby 
he knows him;  yet I do not think  they do of them- 
selves  ever  compound  them,  and  make  complex 
ideas.  And perhaps even  where we  think they have 
complex ideas,  it is only one simple one that directs 
them in the knowledge  of  several things, which pos- 
sibly  they  distinguish  less  by  their  sight  than  we 
imagine:  for I have  been  credibly informed  that a 
bitch  will  nurse,  play with,  and  be  fond  of  young 
foxes, as much as, and in place of, her puppies, if you 
can but get them once to suck her so long that her 
milk may go through them.  And those animals which 
have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear 
not  to  have  any  knowledge  of  their  number;  for 
though they are mightily concerned  for any of their 
Young  that  are  taken  from  them  whilst  they  are 
sight or hearing,  yet if  one  or  two  of  them  be 
stolen from them in their  absence, or without noise, 
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they appear not to miss  them, or  to have  any sense 
that their number is lessened. 
Naming.  $ 8. When children have,  by repeated 
sensations, got ideas fixed in their memo- 
ries, they begin  by degrees to learn the use of  signs. 
And when they have got the skill to apply the organs 
of  speech  to the framing  of  articulate sounds, they 
begin to make use  of words  to signify their ideas to 
others.  These verbal  signs  they sometimes borrow 
from others,  and sometimes make themselves,  as one 
mav observe among the new and unusual names chil- 
drln often give to &ngs  in the first use of language. 
Abstraction.  $ 9.  The use  of  words  then  being to 
stand as outward marks of  our  internal 
ideas,  and  those  ideas being  taken  from  particular 
things, if every particular idea that we take in should 
have  a  distinct name,  names  must be  endless.  To 
prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, re- 
ceived  from particular  objects,  to become  general ; 
which is done by considering them as they are in the 
mind,  such appearances, separate from all other ex- 
istences, and  the circumstances  of  real  existence, as 
time, place, or any other concomitant ideas.  This is 
called  abstraction,  whereby  ideas,  taken from  par- 
ticular beings, become general representatives  of all 
of  the same kind,  and  their  names  general names, 
applicable  to  whatever  exists  conformable  to such 
abstract ideas.  Such precise  npked  appearances in 
the mind, without  considering how, whence,  or with 
what others they came  there, the understanding lays 
up (with names  commonly annexed  to them)  as the 
standard to rank  real existences  into  sorts,  as they 
agree with these  patterns,  and to denominate them 
accordingly.  Thus the same colour  being observed 
to-day  in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday re- 
ceived from milk, it considers that appearance alone 
makes it a  representative of  all  of  that kind; and 
having given it the name whiteness,  it by that sound 
signifies the same quality, wheresoever to be imagined 
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or met with : and thus universals,  whether ideas  or 
terms,  are made. 
$ 10. If it may be  doubted, whether  Brutes abs- 
beasts compound and enlarge their ideas  tract not. 
that way to any degree ;  this, I think, I may be positive 
in, that the power of abstracting is not at  all in them; 
and that, the having of general ideas, is that which puts 
perfect  distinction betwixt man and brutes,  and is 
an excellency which the faculties of  brutes do by no 
means attain to.  For it( is evident we observe no foot- 
steps in them of making use of general signs for uni- 
versal ideas ;  from which we have reason to imagine, 
that  they have not the faculty  of abstracting, or making 
general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any 
other general signs. 
$ 11. Nor  can it be imputed to their want of fit 
organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no 
use  or knowledge  of  general words;  since  many of 
them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce 
words distinctly enough, but never with any such ap- 
plication.  And on the other side, men, who through 
some defect in the organs want words, yet fail not to 
express their  universal  ideas by  signs,  which  serve 
them instead of  general words;  a faculty which we 
see beasts come short in.  And therefore I think we 
may  suppose,  that it is in this  that the species  of 
brutes  are diseriminated  from man; and it is  that 
proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, 
and which at last widens to so vast a distance :  for if 
they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines 
(as some would have them) we cannot deny them to 
have some reason.  It seems as evident to me,  that 
they do some of them in certain instances reason,  as 
that they have sense ;  but it is only in particular ideas, 
just  as they received them from their senses.  They 
are the best  of  them tied  up within  those  narrow 
bounds,  and have not (as 1 think) the faculty to en- 
large them by any kind of abstraction. 150  Discerning.  Book 2. 
Idiots and  t$  12. How far idiots are concerned  in 
madmen.  the want or weakness of any or all of the 
foregoing faculties,an exact observationof their several 
ways of faltering would no doubt discover :  for those 
who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that 
come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily ex- 
cite or compound them, will have little matter to think 
on.  Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abs- 
tract, would hardly be able to understand and make 
use of  language,  or judge or reason to any tolerable 
degree ;  but only a little and imperfectly about things 
present,  and very  familiar to their senses.  And  in- 
deed  any of  the forementioned faculties, if wanting, 
or out of  order,  produce  suitable effects  in men's 
understandings and knowledge. 
$ 13. In fine, the defect in naturals seems to pro- 
ceed from want of quickness,  activity, and motion in 
the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of 
reason;  whereas madmen, on the other side, seem to 
suffer by the other extreme :  for they do not appear to 
me to have lost the faculty of reasoning ;  but having 
joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake 
them for truths, and they err as men do that argue 
right from wrong principles.  For by the violence of 
their  imaginations,  having  taken  their  fancies  for 
realities,  they  make  right  deductions  from  them. 
Thus you shall find  a  distracted man fancying him- 
self a king, with a right inference require suitable at- 
tendance,  respect  and obedience : others,  who  have 
thought  themselves  made  of  glass,  have  used  the 
caution  necessary  to preserve  such  brittle  bodies. 
Hence it comes to pass that a man, who is very sober, 
and of a right understanding in all other things, may 
in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam ;  if 
either by any sudden very strong impression, or long 
fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent 
ideas have been cemented together so powerfully, as 
to remain united.  But there are degrees of madness, as 
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of folly ;  the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in 
some more,  some less.  In short,  herein seems to lie 
the difference between idiots and madmen, that mad- 
men put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong 
propositions,  but argue and reason right from them ; 
but idiots make very few or no propositions, and rea- 
qnn  scarce at all.  ---- - - 
$ 14. These, I think, are the first facul-  Method. 
ties and operations of  the mind which it 
makes use of in understanding ;  and though they are 
exercised  about all its ideas in general, yet the in- 
stances  I have hitherto given  hive bee;  chiefly  in 
simple ideas : and I have subjoined the explication of 
these faculties  of  the mind  to that of  simple ideas, 
before I come to what I have to say concerning com- 
plex ones, for these following reasons. 
First, Because, several of  these faculties being ex- 
ercised  at first  principally  about  simple  ideas,  we 
might,  by following  nature in its ordinary method, 
trace and discover  them in their rise,  progress,  and 
gradual improvements. 
Secondly,  Because  observing  the faculties  of  the 
mind how they operate about simple ideas, which are 
usually,  in most men's  minds,  much more clear, pre- 
cise,  and distinct,  than complex  ones;  we  may  the 
better examine and learn how the mind abstracts, de- 
nominates,  compares,  and  exercises its other opera- 
tions about those which are complex, wherein we are 
much more liable to mistake. 
Thirdly, Because these very operations of the mind 
about ideas, received from sensations, are themselves, 
when reflected on, another set of ideas,  derived from 
that other source of  our knowledge which I call re- 
flection, and therefore fit to  be considered in this place 
after the simple ideas of sensation.  Of compounding, 
comparing, abstracting, &c.,  I have but just spoken, 
having  occasion  to treat of  them  more  at large in 
other places. 152  Discerning.  Book 2. 
Thesearethe  $ 15. And  thus I  have given a short, 
beginnings  and, I think, true history of the first be- 
humae  ginnings of  human  knowledge,  whence 
knowledge.  the mind  has  its first  objects,  and  by 
what steps it makes its progress to the Laying in and 
storing up those ideas, out of  which is to be framed 
all the knowledge it is capable of; wherein  I must 
appeal to experience and observation, whether I am 
in the right; the best  way to come  to truth being 
to examine things as really they are, and not to con- 
clude they are, as we fancy of ourselves, or have been 
taught by  others to imagine. 
Appeal to  5  16. To deal truly, this is the only way 
experience.  that I can discover, whereby the ideas of 
things are brought into the understanding : if other 
men  have  either innate ideas,  or infused  principles, 
they have reason to enjoy them ;  and if they are sure 
of it, it is impossible  for others to deny them the pri- 
vilege that they have above their neighbours.  I can 
speak but of what I find in myself,  and is agreeable 
to those notions ;  which, if we will examine the whole 
course  of  men in their  several  ages,  countries,  and 
educations, seem to depend on those foundations which 
I have laid, and to correspond with this method in all 
the pasts and degrees thereof. 
Dark room.  5 17. I pretend not to teach, but to in- 
quire,  and therefore  cannot but confess 
here again,  that external and internal sensation are 
the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the 
understanding.  These alone, as far as I can discover, 
are tfie windows by which light is let into this dark 
room:  for  methinks the understanding is not much 
unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some 
little  opening left,  to let in external visible  resem- 
blances,  or ideas of  things without:  would  the pic- 
tures coming into such a dark room  but stay there, 
and lie so orderly as  to be  found upon occasion, it 
would  very  much  resemble  the understanding  of  a 
Ch. 12.  Complex Ideas.  153 
man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas 
of them. 
These are my guesses concerning the means whereby 
the understanding  comes to have  and retain simple 
ideas, and the modes of them, with some other opera- 
tions  about them.  I proceed  now  to examine some 
of  these simple ideas,  and their modes,  a little mQre 
particularly. 
,C H A P T  E R  XII. 
Of Compkx Ideas. 
5  1. WE have hitherto considered those  ~~d~  by the 
ideas,  in the reception whereof the mind  mind out of 
is  only  passive,  which  are those  simple  simple ones. 
ones  received  from  sensation and  reflection  before- 
mentioned,  whereof  the mind  cannot  make  one  to 
itself, nor have any idea which does not wholly consist 
of them.  But as the mind is wholly passive in the re- 
ception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts 
of  its own,  whereby out of  its simple ideas,  as the 
materials  and foundations of the rest,  the other are 
framed.  The acts of  the mind, wherein it exerts its 
power over its simple ideas,  are chiefly these three: 
1. Combining several simple ideas into one compound 
one,  and thus all complex ideas are made.  8. The 
second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or com- 
plex, together, and setting them by one another, so as 
to take a view of them at  once, without uniting them 
into one ;  by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 
3.  The third is separating them from all other ideas 
that accompany them in their real existence ; this is 154  Complex Ideas.  Book 2. 
called abstraction : and thus all its general ideas are 
made.  This shows man's power, and its ways of opera- 
tion,  to be much-what the same in the material and 
intellectual world :  for  the materials in both  being 
such as he has no power over,  either to make or de- 
stroy,  all that man can do is either to unite them to- 
gether, or to set them by one another, or wholly sepa- 
rate them.  I shall here begin with the first of  these 
in the consideration of  complex  ideas,  and come to 
the other two in their  due places.  As  simple ideas 
are observed to exist in several combinations united 
together, so the mind has a power to consider several 
of  them united  together  as one  idea;  and that not 
only as they are united  in  external objects,  but as 
itself has joined them.  Ideas thus made up of several 
simple ones put together, I call complex ;  such as are 
beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which 
though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex 
ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind 
pleases, considered each by itself as one entire thing, 
and signified by one name. 
Made voIun-  5  2.  In this  faculty of  repeating and 
tarily.  joining  together its ideas, the mind has 
great power in varying and multiplying the objects 
of its thoughts infinitely beyond what sensation or re- 
flection  furnished it with; but all this still confined 
to those simple ideas which it received from those two 
sources, and which  are the ultimate materials of all 
its compositions :  for simple ideas are all from things 
themselves,  and of  these the mind can have no more 
nor other than what are suggested to it.  It can have 
no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come 
from without by the senses, nor any ideas of other kind 
of  operations  of  a thinking substance than what it 
finds in itself; but when it has once got these simple 
ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what 
offers itself from without : it can, by its own power, 
put together those ideas it has,  and make new com- 
plex ones, which it ncver received so united. 
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3.  Complex  ideas,  however  com-  Are either 
pounded and decompounded, though their  modes,  sub- 
be infinite,  and the variety end-  stances, or 
less, wherewith they fill and entertain the 
thoughts of men ;  yet, I think, they may be all reduced 
under  these three heads : 1. Modes.  2.  Substances. 
3. Relations. 
5 4.  First,  Modes I call such complex 
ideas, which,  however aompounded, con- 
tain  not  in  them  the  supposition  of  subsisting  by 
themselves,  but are considered as dependences on, or 
of  substances:  such as are ideas signified 
by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, &c.  And if 
in this I use the word mode in somewhat a different 
sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; 
it being unavoidable in discourses,  differing from the 
ordinary received notions, either to make new words, 
or to use old words in somewhat a new signification : 
the latter whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the 
more tolerable of the two. 
5  5.  Of  these  modes,  there are two  simpleand 
sorts which deserve distinct consideration.  mixed 
First, there are some which  are only va-  modes- 
riations,  or different combinations of the same simple 
idea,  without the mixture of  any other; as a dozen 
or score ;  which are nothing but the ideas of so many 
distinct units added together: and these I call simple 
modes,  as being contained within  the bounds of  one 
simple idea. 
Secondly,  There are others compounded of simple 
ideas of several kinds, put together to make one com- 
plex  one ;  a. g. beauty,  consisting  of a  certain com- 
position of  colour and figure,  causing delight in  the 
beholder ;  theft, which,  being the concealed change 
of the possedsion of any thing, without the consent of 
the proprietor,  contains,  as is visible, a combinatiorl 
of  several  ideas  of  several  kinds:  and these  I call 
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substances  Q 6.  Secondly, The ideas of substances 
single or  are such combinations of simple ideas as 
are taken to represent distinct particular 
things subsisting by themselves;  in which  the sup- 
posed  or confused  idea of  substance,  such as it is,  is 
always the first and chief.  Thus if  to substance be 
joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish colour, 
with certain  degrees of  weight,  hardness,  ductility, 
and fusibility, we have the idea of lead, and a combina- 
tion  of the ideas of  a certain sort of  figure with the 
powers of motion.  Thoyght and reasoning, joined  to 
substance, make the ordinary idea of a man.  Now of 
substances also there are two sorts of  ideas; one of 
single  substances,  as  they exist  separately,  as of  a 
man,  or a  sheep; the other of  several  of  those  put 
together,  as  an  army  of  men,  or  flock  of  sheep: 
which collective ideas of several substances thus put 
together,  are as much each of  them one single idea, 
as that of a man, or an unit. 
Relation.  Q 7.  Thirdly,  The last sort of complex 
ideas is that we call relation, which con- 
sists  in  the consideratio11 and  comparing  one  idea 
with another.  Of these several kinds we shall treat 
in their order. 
The abs-  $  8.  If we  trace the progress of  our 
trusevt ideas  minds,  and with  attention observe  how 
from the two  it repeats,  adds together,  and unites its 
*urCe66  simple ideas  received  from sensation or 
reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps 
we should have imagined.  And  I believe  we  shall 
find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, 
that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever 
they may seem from sense, or from any operations of 
our own minds,  are yet only such as the understand- 
ing frames to itself by repeating and joining together 
ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from 
its own operations  about them:  so that those  even 
large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or 
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being no other than what the mind, by the 
ordinary use  of  its own  faculties,  employed  about 
ideas  received  from  objects  of  sense, or  from  the 
operations it observes in itself about them,  may and 
does attain unto.  This I shall endeavour to show in 
the ideas we have of  space,  time,  and infinity,  and 
some  few  others,  that seem  the most  remote  from 
those originals. 
CHAPTER  XIII. 
Of Simple Modes, and$,-st  cfthe Simple Modes 
Space. 
$  1.  THOUGH  in  the  foregoing  part  Simple 
1  have  often  mentioned  simple  ideas,  bfodes. 
which are truly the materials  of  a11  our knowledge ; 
yet  having  treated  of  them  there  rather  in  the 
way  that they come  into the  mind,  than  as distin- 
guished  from  others  more  compounded,  it will  not 
be  perhaps  amiss  to take  a  view  of  some  of  them 
again  under  this  consideration,  and  examine  those 
different modifications of  the same  idea ; which  the 
mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make 
within itself, without the help of  any extrinsical ob- 
ject,  or any foreign suggestion. 
Those modifications of any one simple idea (which., 
as has been said, I call simple modes) are as perfectly 
different and dist,inct ideas in the mind as those of the 
greatest distance or contrariety.  For the idea of two 
is as distinct from that of  one, as blueness from heat, 
or  either  of  them from  any  number:  and  yet it is 
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peated ; and repetitions  of  this kind joined  together 
make those distinct simple modes, of a dozen, a gross, 
a million. 
Idea of  5 9. I shall begin with the simple idea 
space.  of space.  I have showed above, chap. 4. 
that we get the idea of  space both by our sight and 
touch;  which I think is so  evident, that it would be 
as needless to go to prove that men perceive, by their 
sight,  a distance between bodies of  different colours, 
or between the parts of  the same body, as  that they 
see colours themselves ;  nor is it less obvious that they 
can do so in the dark by feeling and touch. 
Space and  5  8.  This space  considered  barely  in 
extension.  length between any tt~o  beings,  without 
considering any thing else between them, 
is called  distance; if  considered in  length, breadth, 
and thickness, I think it  may be called capacity.  The 
term extension is usually applied to it in what manner 
soever considered. 
Immensity.  5 4.  Each different  distance  is  a  dif- 
ferent  modification  of  space;  and  each 
idea of any different distance or space is a simple mode 
of this idea.  Men for the use and by the custom  of 
measuring,  settle in their  minds  the ideas of certain 
stated lengths, such as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, 
mile,  diameter  of  the earth, &c. which  are so  many 
distinct ideas made up only of space.  When any such 
stated lengths or measures of  space are made familiar 
to men's  thoughts, they can in their minds repeat them 
as often  as they will,  without  mixing  or joining  to 
them the idea of  body or any thing else ; and frame 
to themselves the ideas of long, square, or cubic, feet, 
yards, or fathoms, here amongst the bodies of the uni- 
verse, or else beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies ; 
and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their 
ideas of  space  as much as they please.  The power 
of repeating or doubling any idea we have of any di- 
stance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, 
Ch. 13.  Simple Modes of  Space.  159 
being ever able to come to any stop or stint, 
let us enlarge it as much  as we will,  is  that which 
gives us the idea of immensity. 
$ 5. There is  another  modification of  Figure, 
this idea,  which  is nothing but the rela- 
tion which the parts of  the termination of  extension 
or circumscribed space have amongst themselves.  This 
the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose extremi- 
ties come within  our reach;  and the eye takes both 
from bodies and colours, whose boundaries are within 
its view : where observing how the extremities termi- 
nate either in straight lines, which meet at discernible 
angles, or in crooked lines, wherein  no angles can be 
perceived,  by considering these as they relate to one 
another, in all parts of the extremities of any body or 
space, it has that idea we call figure, which affords to 
the mind infinite variety.  For besides the vast num- 
ber  of  different  figures that do really  exist  in  the 
coherent  masses  of  matter,  the stock  that the mind 
has in its power,  by varying  the idea  of  space,  and 
thereby making still new compositions,  by repeating 
its own ideas,  and joining them as it pleases,  is per- 
fectly inexhaustible ;  and so it can multiply figures in 
infinitum. 
5 6  For the mind having  a  power  to  Figure, 
repeat  the idea  of  any length  directly 
stretched out,  and join  it to another in the same di- 
rection, which is to double the length of that straight 
line,  or  else  join  another  with  what  inclination  it 
thinks fit, and so make what sort of angle it pleases ; 
and being able also to shorten any line it  imagines, by 
taking from it one-half, or one-fourth, or what part it 
pleases, without being able to come to an end of any 
such divisions, it can make an angle of any bigness : 
so also  the lines that are its sides, of what length it 
pleases ;  which joining again to other lines of different 
lengths, and at different angles,  till it has wholly in- 
closed  any space,  it is  evident  that it can multiply 
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all which are but so many different simple  modes  of 
space. 
The same that it can do with  straight lines it can 
also do with crooked, or  crooked  and straight toge- 
ther;  and the same it can do in lines it can also in 
superficies:  by  which  we  may  be  led  into  farther 
thoughts of  the endless variety  of  figures that the 
mind has a power to make,  and  thereby to multiply 
the simple modes of space. 
Place.  $ 7. Another  idea coming  under  this 
head, and belonging to this tribe, is that 
we call place.  As in simple space we consider the re- 
lation of  distance between any two bodies or points ; 
so in our idea of place we consider the relation of di- 
stance betwixt any thing and any two or more points, 
which are considered  as keeping  the same  distance 
one with another,  and so considered  as at rest:  for 
when we  find  any thing  at the same  distance now 
which it was yesterday, from any two or more points, 
which have not since changed their distance one with 
another, and with which we then compared it, we say 
it hath kept the same place;  but if  it hath sensibly 
altered its distance with either of those points, we say 
it hath changed its place : though vulgarly speaking, 
in the common notion of  place, we  do not always ex- 
actly observe the distance from these precise points, 
but from larger portions of sensible objects, to which 
we consider the thing placed to bear relation, and its 
distance from which we have some reason to observe. 
S 8.  Thus a company of  chess-men standing on the 
same squares of the chess-board where we left them, 
we say they are all in the same place,  or unmoved; 
though perhaps the chess-board hath been in the mean 
time carried out of  one room into another; because 
we compared them only to the parts of the chess-board 
which keep the same distance one with another.  Thc 
chess-board, we also say, is in the same place it was, 
if it remain in the same part of the cabin, though per- 
haps the ship which  it is in sails all the while : and 
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the  is said to be in the same place,  supposing it 
kept the same distance with the parts of the neigh- 
bouring land, though perhaps the earth hath turned 
round : and so both chess-men, and board,  and ship, 
have every one changed place,  in respect of  remoter 
bodies, which have kept the same distance one with 
another.  But yet the distance from certain parts of 
the board being that which  determines the place of 
the chess-men ; and the distance from the fixed parts 
of the cabin  (with ~hich  we made the comparison) 
being that which determined the place  of  the chess- 
board ;  and the fixed parts of the earth that by which 
we determined the place of the ship ;  these things may 
be said  to be  in the same  pl~ce  in  those  respects: 
though their distance from some other things,  which 
in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they 
have undoubtedly changed place in that respect ;  and 
we ourselves shall think so when we have occasion to 
compare them with those other. 
$ 9.  But this modification of distance we call place 
being made by men for their common  use, that by lt 
they might be able to design the particular position of 
things, where they had occasion for such designation ; 
men consider and determine of this place by reference 
to those adjacent things which  best served  to their 
present  purpose,  without  considering other  things, 
which to answer another purpose would better deter- 
mine the place of the same thing.  Thus, in the chess- 
board, the use of the designation of the place of each 
chess-man  being  determined  only  within  that  che- 
quered piece of wood, it would cross that purpose to 
measure it by ally  thing else : but when these very 
chess-men are put up in a bag, if any one should ask 
where the black king is,  it would be proper to deter- 
mine the place by the parts of the room it was in, and 
not by  the chess-board;  there being another use  of 
designing the place it is now in than when in play it 
was on the chess-board,  and so must be determined 
by  other bodies.  So if  any one  should ask,  in what 
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place  are the verses  which report the story of Nisus 
and Euryalus, it would be very improper ,to determine 
this place by saying, they were in such a part of the 
earth, or in Bodley's library :  but the right designa- 
tion of  the place would  be  by  the parts of  Virgil's 
works;  and the proper  answer would  be,  that these 
verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his 
Bneid ;  and that they have been always constantly in 
the same place ever  since Virgil was printed ;  which 
is true, though the book itself hath moved a thousand 
times ;  the use of the idea of place here being to know 
in what part of  the book  that story is,  that so upon 
occasion we may know where to find it,  and have re- 
course to it for use. 
Place.  $ 10.  That our idea of place is nothing 
else but such a  relative  position  of  any 
thing, as I have before mentioned, I think is plain, and 
will be easily admitted, when we consider that we can 
have no idea of the place of  the universe, though we 
can of all the parts of it ;  because beyond that we have 
not the idea of  any fixed,  distinct,  particular beings, 
in reference to which we  can imagine it to have any 
relation of distance ;  but all beyond it is one uniform 
space or expansion, wherein the mind finds no variety, 
no marks.  For to say that the world is  somewhere, 
means no more than that it does exist :  this, though n 
phrase borrowed from place, signifying only its exist- 
ence, not location;  and when  one  can find  out and 
frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly,  the place of 
the universe, he will be able to tell us whether it  moves 
or stands still in the undistinguishable inane of infi- 
nite space :  though it be true that the word place has 
sometimes a more confused sense, and stands for that 
space which any body takes up ; and so the universe 
is in a place.  The idea therefore of place we have by 
the same means that we get the idea of space (where- 
of this is but a particular  limited consideration),  viz. 
by our sight and touch ;  by either of which we receive 
into our minds the ideas of extension or distance. 
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6 11. There are some that would per-  Extension  a- 
suade us that body and extension are-the  and body not 
same thing; who  either change the sig-  the Same- 
nificati~n  of  words,  which I would  not  suspect them 
of,  they having so severely condemned the philosophy 
of  others, because it hath been too much placed in the  -  - 
meaning or deceitful obscurity of doubtful 
or  insignificant  terms.  If therefore  they  mean  by 
body and extension  the same  that other people do, 
viz. by  body,  something that is solid  and extended, 
whose  parts  are  separable  and  moveable  different 
ways;  and by extension,  only the space that lies be- 
tween the extremities of  those solid coherent parts, 
and which is possessed by them ; they confound very 
different ideas  one  with  another.  For I appeal to 
every man's  own thoughts, whether the idea of space 
be not as distinct from that of  solidity as it is from 
the idea of scarlet colour ?  It  is true, solidity cannot 
exist  without  extension,  neither  can  scarlet  colour 
exist withou textension ;  but this hinders not but that 
they are distinct ideas.  Many ideas require others as 
necessary to tlieir existence or conception,  which yet 
are very distinct ideas.  Motion can neither be, nor be 
conceived without space ;  and yet motion is not space, 
cor space motion :  space can exist without it, and they 
are very distinct ideas ;  and so, I think, are those of 
space and solidity.  Solidity is so inseparable an idea 
from body, that upon that depends its filling of space, 
its  contact,  impulse,  and  communication  of  motion 
upon impulse.  And  if it be a reason to prove  that 
spirit is different from body, because thinking includes 
not  the idea of extension in it,  the same reason will 
be as valid, I suppose, to prove that space is not body, 
because it includes not the idea of solidity in it ;  space 
and  solidity being  as  distinct ideas as thinking and 
extension,  avd as wholly  separable in the mind  one 
from another.  Body, then, and extension, it is evident, 
are two distinct ideas.  For, 
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9 18.  First, Extension includes no solidity, nor re- 
sistance to the motion of body,  as body does. 
tj 13. Secondly,  The parts of pure space are inse- 
parable  one  from the other;  so that the continuity 
cannot be separated, neither really nor mentally.  For 
I demand of  any one to remove any part of  it from 
another,  with which it is continued, even  so much as 
in thought.  To divide and separate actually, is,  as 
I think, by removing the parts one from another, to 
make two superficies, where before there was a conti- 
nuity; and to divide mentally, is to make in the mind 
two superficies, where before there was a continuity, 
and consider  them as removed  one  from the other; 
which can only be done in things considered by the 
mind as capable of  being separated,  and, by separa- 
tion, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they 
then have not, but are capable of; but neither of these 
ways of  separation,  whether  real  or  mental, is,  as I 
think, compatible to pure space. 
It is true, a man may consider  so  much of  such a 
space  as is  answerable  or  commensurate  to a  foot, 
without considering the rest ;  which is indeed a partial 
consideration, but not so much as mental separation or 
division;  since a man can no more  mentally  divide, 
without considering two superficies separate one from 
the other, than he can actually divide, without making 
two superficies disjoined  one  from the other: but a 
partial consideration is not separating.  A man may 
consider  light in the sun, without its heat ;  or mobi- 
lity in body, without its extension, without thinking of 
their separation.  One is only a partial consideration, 
terminating in  one  alone; and the other is a  consi- 
deration of both, as existing separately. 
$ 144.  Thirdly,  The parts of  pure space  are im- 
moveable,  which  follows  from  their  inseparability; 
motion being nothing but change of distance between 
any two things:  but  this  cannot be  between  parts 
that are inseparable,  which therefore must needs be 
at perpetual rest one amongst another. 
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Thus the determined  idea of  simple  space distin- 
pishes it plainly  and  sufficiently from  body;  since 
its parts are inseparable, immoveable, and without re- 
sistance to the motion of body. 
9 15. If any one ask me what this space  The defini- 
I  speak  of  is ?  I will  tell him, when  he  tionofexten- 
tells  me  what his  extension  is.  For to  ~~~~P~~~~~ 
say, as is usually done,  that extension is 
to have partes extra partes, is to say only that exten- 
sion is extension :  for what am I the better informed 
in the nature of  extension when 1 am told,  that ex- 
tension is to have parts that are extended exterior to 
parts that are extended, i. e.  extension consists of ex- 
tended parts ?  As if one asking what a fibre was ?  I 
should  answer him, that it was  a  thing made up of 
several fibres :  would he thereby be enabled to under- 
stand what a fibre was better than he did before ?  Or 
rather,  would  he not have reason to think that my 
design was to make sport with him, rather than seri- 
ously to instruct him ? 
$16.  Those who contend that space and  Division of 
body are the same,  bring  this  dilemma :  bein@ into 
bodies and  either this space is something or nothing ;  spirits 
if  nothing  be  between  two bodies, they  proves not 
must necessarily touch ;  if it be  allowed  space and 
to be something, they ask whether  it be  the 
body  or  spirit?  To which I answer  by 
same. 
another question,  who  told  them that there was or 
could be  nothing but solid  beings which  could  not 
think, and thinking beings  that were not extended? 
which  is  all  they  mean  by  the  terms  body  and 
spirit. 
$  J 7.  If it be demanded  (as usually it  substance 
is) whether this space, void  of  body,  be  which we 
substance or accident, I shall readily an-  know not, 
swer, I know not ;  nor  shall be ashamed :sf 
to own my ignorance, till they that ask  space withl 
show  me  a  clear  distinct  idea of  sub-  out body. 
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$ 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my- 
self from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon 
ourselves by  taking words  for  things.  It helps not 
our ignorance to feign  a  knowledge where we  have 
none,  by making a  noise with  sounds, without  clear 
and distinct significations.  Names made at pleasure 
neither alter the nature of  things nor make us under- 
stand them, but as they are signs of and stand for de- 
termined ideas :  and I desire  those who  lay so much 
stress on the sound of  these two syllables, substance, 
to consider whether  applying it,  as  they do, to the 
infinite incomprehensible God, to finite spirit, and to 
body, it be in the same sense ;  and whether it stands 
for the same  idea, when  each  of  those  three so dif- 
ferent  beings  are called  substances.  If so, whether 
it will  thence  follow  that  God,  spirits,  and  body, 
agreeing in  the same  common  nature of substance, 
differ not any otherwise than  in a bare different mo- 
dification of that substance ;  as a tree and a pebble be- 
ing in the same sense body, and agreeing in the com- 
mon nature of body,  differ only in a bare modification 
of  that common matter ;  which will be a very harsh 
doctrine.  If they  say that  they  apply  it to  God, 
finite  spirit, and matter, in three different  significa- 
tions ; and that it stands  for one idea, when God is 
said to be a substance ; for another, when the soul is 
called substance;  and for  a  third,  when  a  body  is 
called so :  if the name substance stands for three se- 
veral  distinct  ideas,  they  would  do  well  to  make 
known those  distinct ideas, or  at least to give three 
distinct names to them,  to prevent, in so important a 
notion,  the confusion  and errors that will  naturally 
follow  from  the promiscuous  use  of  so doubtful  a 
term ; which is so far from  being  suspected  to have 
three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one 
clear distinct signification :  and if they can thus make 
three distinct ideas of  substance, what  hinders why 
another may not make a fourth ? 
Eubstance  § 19.  They who first  ran into the no- 
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tion of accidents, 3s a sort  of real beings  ,,a  ,,;, 
that needed something to inhere in, were  dents, of 
forced to find out the word  substance to  little use in 
support them.  Had the poor Indian phi-  philOsophy* 
losopher  (who imagined  that the earth also wanted 
something to bear  it up)  but  thought  of  this word 
substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble 
to find an elephant  to support it, and a  tortoise to 
support his elephant :  the word substance would have 
done it effectually.  And he that inquired might have 
taken it for  as good an answer from an Indian phi- 
losopher, that substance, without knowing what it is, 
is that which supports the earth, as we  take it for a 
sufficient answer and good  doctrine from  our Euro- 
pean philosophers, that substance, without knowing 
what it is, is that which  supports accidents.  So that 
of substance we have  no idea of what  it is, but only 
a confused obscure one of what it does. 
20. Whatever a learned man may do here, an in- 
telligent American, who inquired into the nature of 
things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, 
if desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told 
that a pillar was a thing supported by a basis, and a 
basis something that supported a pillar.  Would he not 
think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an 
account as this? And  a  stranger to them would  be 
very liberally instructed in the nature of  books, and 
the things they contained, if he should be told, that all 
learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that 
letters were  things  inhering in  paper,  and  paper  n 
thing that held forth letters ;  a notable way of having 
clear ideas of letters and paper!  But were the Latin 
words inhcerentia  and substantia put into the plain 
English ones  that  answer  them,  and  were  called 
~4icking  on  and under-propping,  they would better 
discover to us the very great clearness there is in the 
doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what 
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A vac~ium  $  21.  But to return to  our  idea  of 
beyond the  space.  If body be not supposed infinite, 
utmost 
bounds of  which I think no one will affirm, I would 
body.  ask, Whether, if God placed a man at  the 
extremity of  corporeal  beings,  he could 
not stretch his hand  beyond  his body ?  If he  could, 
then he would  put his  arm where  there was  before 
space without body, and if there he spread his fingers, 
there  would  still be  space  between  them  without 
body.  If he could not stretch out his  hand, it must 
be because of some external hinderance ;  (for we sup- 
pose  him  alive,  with  such  a  power  of  moving  the 
parts of  his  body that he hath now, which is not in 
itself impossible, if God so  pleased  to have it ;  or at 
least it is not impossible for God so to move him): and 
then I ask, Whether that which hinders his hand from 
moving outwards be substance or accident, something 
or nothing ?  And when they have resolved that, they 
will be able to resolve themselves what that is, which 
is or may be between two bodies  at a  distance, that 
is not body, and has no solidity.  In the mean  time, 
the argument is at least as good, that where nothing 
hinders (as  beyond  the utmost bounds of a11  bodies) 
a body put in motion may move on; as where there is 
nothing  between, there two bodies must  necessarily 
touch;  for pure space between  is  sufficient to take 
away  the  necessity  of  mutual  contact;  but  bare 
space  in the way  is  not  sufficient  to stop motion. 
The truth is, these men  must  either own  that they 
think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it 
out, or else affirm that space i~,  not body.  For I would 
fain  meet with  that thinking  man,  that can  in his 
thoughts set any bounds  to space more  than he can 
to duration, or by thinking hope to arrive at the end 
of either :  and, therefore, if his  idea of eternity be in- 
finite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite 
or infinite alike. 
The power  $ 22. Farther, those who assert the im- 
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possibility of space existing without mat-  ofannihila- 
ter,  must  not  only make  body  infinite,  Proves 
a vacuum.  but must  also  deny a power  in God  to 
annihilate any part  of  matter.  No  one,  I suppose, 
will deny that God can put an end to all motion that 
is in matter, and fix all the bodies  of the universe in 
a perfect quiet  and rest, and continue them so long 
as he  pleases.  Whoever  then will  allow  that God 
can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this 
book, or the body of him  that reads it,  must neces- 
sarily admit the possibility of a vacuum'; for it is evi- 
dent that the space that was filled by the parts of the 
annihilated  body  will  still  remain,  and  be  a  space 
without body :  for the circumambient bodies being in 
perfect rest, are a wall of  adamant, and in that state 
make it a perfect impossibility for  any other body to 
get into that space.  And indeed the necessary motion 
of one particle of matter into the place from whence 
another particle of matter is removed, is but a conse- 
quence from the supposition of plenitude;  which will 
therefore  need  some  better proof  than  a  supposed 
matter  of  fact,  which  experiment  can  never  make 
out : our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfy- 
ing us that there is  no necessary connexion between 
space  and  solidity,  since  we  can  conceive  the one 
without  the  other.  And  those  who dispute  for  or 
against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct 
ideas  of  vacuum  and  plenum,  i. e. that they  have 
an idea  of  extension  void  of  solidity,  though they 
deny its existence, or else they dispute about nothing 
at all.  For they who so much alter the significatiorl 
of words as to call extension body, and consequently 
make the whole  essence  of  body to be  nothing  but 
pure  extension without  solidity, must  talk  absurdly 
whenever they speak of vacuum, since it is impossible 
for extension  to be without  extension: for vacuum, 
whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies space 
without  body,  whose very existence no one can deny 
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take  from God  a  power  to annihilate any  particle 
of it. 
Motion  $23.  But not  to go so  far  as beyond 
proves a va-  the utmost bounds of body in the universe, 
mum.  nor appeal to God's  omnipotency to find 
a vacuum, the motion  of  bodies  that are in our view 
and neighbourhood  seems to me plainly to evince it. 
For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any 
dimension he pleases,  as to make it possible for the 
solid parts to move  up and  down  freely every way 
within the bounds of  that superficies, if there be not 
left  in it a void  space as big as the least  part  into 
which  he has  divided  the said  solid  body.  And  if 
where the least  article of  the body divided is as big 
as a mustard-seed,  a void  space equal to the bulk  of 
a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free 
motion  of  the parts of  the divided  body within  the 
bounds of its su~erficies,  where the particles of matter 
are  100,000,000  less  than  a  mustard-seed,  there 
must also be  a  space void  of solid  matter  as big  as 
100,000,000 part of a  mustard-seed ;  for if it hold in 
one it will hold in the other,  and so  on in inJinitum. 
And let this void  space  be as little as it will,  it de- 
stroys the hypothesis of plenitude :  for if there can be 
a space void  of  body equal to the smallest separate 
particle  of  matter  now existing in  nature,  it is  still 
space without body, and makes as great a difference 
between space and body,  as  if  it were  pQya~au~a,  a 
distance as wide as any in nature.  And  therefore if 
we  suppose not the void  space necessary to motion 
equal to the least parcel  of  the divided solid matter, 
but  to -il,  or ,ln  of  it, the same  consequence will 
always follow of space without matter. 
The ideas of  §  '24- But  the question  being  here 
space and  '' whether the idea of space or extension 
body di- 
stinct.  be the same with the idea of body,"  it is 
not necessary to prove the real existence 
of a vacuum, but the idea of it ;  which it is plain men 
have, when they  inquire and dispute  whether  there 
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be a vacuum or no:  for  if they had  not the idea of 
space without body, they could  not make a question 
about its existence ;  and if their  idea of body did not 
include in  it something more than  the bare  idea of 
space, they could have no  doubt about the plenitude 
of the world;  and  it would be as  absurd  to demand 
whether there were  space without  body,  as whether 
there  were  space  without  space,  or  body  without 
body,  since these  werec but  different  names  of  the 
same idea. 
$ 25. It is  true, the idea of  extension  Extension 
joins itself so inseparably with all visible  being inse- 
and most tangible qualities, that it suffers  parable from 
us  to  see no  one,  or feel  very  few  ex-  Proves 
it not the  ternal objects, without taking in impres-  same, 
sions of extension too.  This readiness of 
extension  to make itself be  taken  notice  of so  con- 
stantly  with  other  ideas has  been  the occasion,  I 
guess,  that  some  have made  the whole  essence  of 
body to consist in extension ;  which is not much to be 
wondered  at,  since  some have had  their  minds,  by 
their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our senses), so 
filled with the idea of extension, and as it were wholly 
possessed with it, that they allowed  no  existence to 
any thing that had  not  extension.  I shall not now 
argue with those men who take the measure and pos- 
sibility of all being only from their narrow and gross 
imaginations ;  but having here  to do only with those 
who conclude the essence of body to be extension, be- 
cause they say they cannot imagine any sensible qua- 
lity of any body without extension, I shall desire them 
to consider, that had  they reflected  on their ideas of 
tastes and smells  as  much as  on those  of  sight and 
touch ;  nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger 
and thirst, and several other  pains, they would have 
found that they included in them no idea of extension 
at all ;  which is but an affection of body, as well as the 
rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute 
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$ 26. If those ideas which  are constantly joined  to 
all  others  must  therefore  be  concluded  to  be  the 
essence of  those things which  have  constantly those 
ideas joined  to them, and are inseparable from them, 
then unity is without doubt the essence of every thing: 
for there is not  any object of sensation or reflection 
which does not carry with it the idea of one ;  but the 
weakness of  this kind  of  argument we  have already 
shown sufficiently. 
Ideas of  27. To  conclude, whatever men shall 
space and  think  concerning the existence  of  a va- 
solidity di-  cuum, this is plain  to  me,  that we  have 
stinct.  as clear  an idea of  space  distinct from 
solidity, as we have of  solidity distinct from motion, 
or motion from  space.  We  have  not  any two more 
distinct  ideas,  and we  can  as  easily  coiiceive  space 
without  solidity,  as we  can  conceive body or  space 
without  motion, though  it  be  ever so  certain  that 
neither body nor motion can exist without space.  But 
whether any one will take space to be only a relation 
resulting from the existence of  other beings at a di- 
stance,or whether they will think the words of the most 
knowing king Solomon,  '<  The heaven, and the heaven 
of  heavens,  cannot  contain thee,"  or those more em- 
phatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, (<  In 
him we live, move, and have our being,"  are to be un- 
derstood in a literal sense, I leave  every one  to con- 
sider: only our idea of space is, I think, such as I have 
mentioned, and distinct from that of body.  For whe- 
ther we consider in matter itself the distance of its co- 
herent solid parts, and call' it, in respect of those solid 
parts extension;  or whether,  considering it as lying 
between  the extremities of  any body in  its  several 
dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; 
or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies 
or positive beings, without any consideration whether 
there be  any matter or no between,  we  call it di- 
stance: however named or considered, it is always the 
same uniform  simple idea  of  space, taken  from ob- 
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jects  about which our senses have  been  conversant ; 
having  settled  ideas in our minds, we  can 
revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often 
as  we will,  and consider  the space  or  distance  so 
imagined  either as filled with solid parts, so that an- 
other body cannot come there without displacing and 
thrusting out the body that was there before, or else 
as void of  solidity, so that a  body  of  equal  dimen- 
sions to that empty or pure space may be placed in 
it without  the removing  or expulsion  of  any thing 
that was there.  But, to avoid confusion in discourses 
concerning this matter, it were possibly to be wished 
that the name  extension were  applied only to mat- 
ter,  or  the distance of  the extremities of  particular 
bodies ;  and the term expansion to space in general, 
with or without solid matter possessing it, so as to say 
space is expanded, and body extended.  But in  this 
every one has liberty : I propose it only for the more 
clear and distinct way of speaking. 
5 28. The knowing precisely what our 
Men differ  words stand for, would, I imagine, in this  littlein 
as  well  as  a  great many  other  cases,  simpleideas. 
quickly end the dispute :  for I am apt to 
think  that men,  when  they come  to examine them, 
find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though 
in discourse with one another they perhaps confound 
one  another  with  different names.  I imagine  that 
men  who  abstract their  thoughts,  and do well  ex- 
amine  the ideas  of  their  own minds,  cannot  much 
differ  in thinking, however  they may perplex  them- 
selves with words, according to the way of  speaking 
of the several schools or sects they have been bred up 
in:  though  amongst  unthinking men,  who examine 
not scrupulously and carefully their  own ideas,  and 
strip them not from the marks men use for them, but 
confound them with words, there must be endless dis- 
pute,  wrangling,  and jargon;  especially  if  they  be 
learned bookish men,  devoted  to  some sect, and ac- 
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talk after others.  Rut if  it should happen that any 
two thinking men should really have different ideas, I 
do not see how they could discourse or argue one with 
another.  Here I must not be mistaken, to think that 
every  floating  imagination  in  men's  brains  is  pre- 
sently of that sort of ideas I speak of.  It is not easy 
for the mind to put off those  confused  notions  and 
prejudices it has imbibed  from custom, inadvertency, 
and common conversation :  it requires pains and assi- 
duity to examine its ideas, till  it resolves them  into 
those  clear  and distinct  simple  ones,  out  of  which 
they are compounded ;  and to see which, amongst its 
simple ones, have or have  not  a necessary connexion 
and dependence one upon another.  Till a man doth 
this in the primary and  original notion of  things, he 
builds  upon  floating  and  uncertain  principles,  and 
will often find himself at a loss. 
CHAPTER XIV. 
Of  D~iration,  and its simple Modes. 
Duration is  $ 1. THERE  is another  sort of distance 
fleeting ex-  or length,  the  idea whereof we  get not 
tension-  from the permanent parts of  space,  but 
from the fleeting  and  perpetually perishing  parts of 
succession.  This we call duration, the simple modes 
whereof  are any different  lengths  of  it whereof we 
have  distinct ideas,  as hours,  days, years,  &c. time 
and eternity. 
~ts  idea  ES 2. The answer of a great man to one 
from reflec-  wh;  asked what time w&,  Si non rogns  tion on the 
train ofour  intelligo,''  (which  amounts  to  this,  the 
ideas.  more I set myself to think of it, the less I 
understand it) might  persuade one that time, 
which reveals all other  things, is itself not to be dis- 
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covered.  Duration, time, and eternity, are not with- 
out  reason thought to have something very abstruse in 
their nature.  But however  remote these  may seem 
from our  comprehension, yet if we  trace them right 
to  their  originals,  I  doubt  not  but  one  of  those 
sources  of all  our  knowledge, viz. sensation  and re- 
flection, will be able to furnish us with these ideas as 
clear and distinct  as  many other which  are thought 
much less obscure ;  and we shall find that the idea of 
eternity itself is derived  from the same  common ori- 
with the rest of o%r ideas. 
$ 3.  To understand  time  and  eternity aright, we 
ought with attention  to consider what  idea  it is we 
have of duration, and how we  came by it.  It  is evi- 
dent to any one, who will but observe what passes in 
his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which con- 
stantly succeed one another in his understanding as 
long as he is awake.  Reflection on these appearances 
of  several ideas,  one  after  another, in our minds, is 
that which  furnishes us with the idea of succession ; 
and the  distance  between  any parts of that succes- 
sion, or between the  appearance of  any two ideas in 
our  minds,  is  that we  call duration : for whilst we 
are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several 
ideas in our minds, we know  that we do exist; and 
so we  call the existence,  or the continuation  of  the 
existence  of  ourselves,  or  any  thing  else,  commen- 
surate to the succession  of any ideas in  our minds, 
the duration  of  ourselves, or  any  such  other  thing 
co-existent with our thinking. 
$ 4.  That we  have  our notion  of  succession  and 
duration from this original, viz. from reflection on the 
train of  ideas which we  find to appear  one after an- 
other in our own minds, seems plain to me,in that we 
have no perception of duration, but by considering the 
train of ideas that take their turns in our understand- 
ings.  When that succession of ideas ceases, our per- 
ception  of  duration ceases with it ;  which every one 
clearly experiments in himself,whilst he sleeps soundly, 176  Duration, and  its simple Modes.  Book 8. 
whether  an hour  or a  day, a month  or  a  year:  of 
which  duration of things, while  he sleeps  or thinks 
not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to 
him ;  and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, 
till the moment he begins  to  think  again, seems  to 
him to have no distance.  And so I doubt not it  would 
be to a waking  man,  if it were  possible for him  to 
keep only one idea in his mind, without variation and 
the succession  of  others.  And we see that one  who 
fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to 
take but little notice of  the succession  of ideas that 
pass  in his  mind,  whilst  he is taken up with  that 
earnest contemplation, lets slip out of  his  account a 
good part of  that  duration,  and  thinks  that  time 
shorter than it is.  But if sleep commonly unites the 
distant parts  of  duration, it is because  during that 
time we  have  no succession  of  ideas in our minds : 
for if a man, during his sleep, dreams,  and variety of 
ideas  make  themselves perceptible  in his  mind  one 
after another, he hath then, during such dreaming,  a 
sense of duration, and of  the length of it :  by which 
it is to me very clear, that men derive  their ideas of 
duration  from their  reflections  on  the train  of  the 
ideas they obsexve to succeed one another in their own 
understandings ;  without which observation they can 
have no notion of duration, whatever may happen in 
the world. 
The idea of  5. Indeed a man  having, from reflect- 
duration ap-  ing on the succession  and number of his 
plicable  Own thoughts, got the notion or idea of 
things 
we  duration,  he  can  apply  that notion  to 
sleep.  things which exist while he does not think; 
as he that has got the idea of  extension from bodies 
by his sight or touch, can apply it to distances where 
no body is seen or felt.  And therefore though a man 
has no perception  of  the length of  duration,  which 
passed whilst he slept or thought not, yet having ob- 
served the revolution  of  days and nights,  and found 
the length of their  duration to be in appearance re- 
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plar  and constant, he can, upon the supposition that 
that revolution has proceeded  after the same manner 
whilst he was asleep or thought not as it used to do 
at other times ;  he can, I say, imagine and make al- 
lowance  for  the length of  duration whilst  he slept. 
But if Adam and Eve  (when  they were alone in the 
world),  instead  of  their  ordinary  night's  sleep,  had 
pssed the whole twenty-four hours in one continued 
sleep, the duration of that twenty-four hours had been 
irrecoverably lost to them,  and been for ever left out 
of their account of time. 
9 6. Thus, by reflecting on the appear-  ~h,  idea of  ing of various ideas one after another in  succession 
our understandings, we  get the notion of  not ?om 
succession ; which, if any one would think  motlon. 
we  did rather get from our observation of  motion by 
our senses, he will perhaps be  of my mind  when  he 
considers, that even motion produces in his  mind  an 
idea of  succession  no  otherwise  than  as it produccs 
there a continued train of distinguishable ideas.  For 
a man looking upon a body really moving,  perceives 
yet 110  motion  at all,  unless  that motion  produces  a 
constant train  of  successive  ideas : v. g.  a  man  be- 
calmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day, may 
look on the sun, or sea, or ship, a whole hour together, 
and perceive no motion at all in either ;  though it be 
certain that two,  and perhaps all of them, have moved 
during that time a great way.  But as soon as he per- 
ceives either of  them to have changed  distance with 
some other body, as soon as this motion produces any 
new idea in him, then he perceives that there has been 
motion.  But wherever  a  man is,  with all things at 
rest about him, without perceiving any motion at all ; 
if during this hour of  quiet he has been thinking, he 
will perceive  the various  ideas  of  his  own thoughts 
in  his  own mind,  appearing one  after  another,  and 
thereby observe and find  succession  where he could 
observe no motion. 
$ 7.  And  this,  I think,  is the reason why motions 
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very slow, though they are constant, are not perceived 
by us ;  because, in their remove from one sensible part 
towards another, their change of  distance is so slow, 
that it causes no new ideas in us, but a god  while one 
after another : and so not causing a constant train of 
new  ideas  to follow one  another  immediately in our 
minds, we have no perception of motion ;  which con- 
sisting in  a  constant succession, we cannot perceive 
that succession without a constant succession of vary- 
ing ideas arising from it. 
§ 8.  On the contrary, things that move so swift as 
not to affect the senses distinctly with several distin- 
guishable distances of  their motion, and so  cause not 
any train of ideas in the mind, are not also perceived 
to move : for  any thing that moves round about in a 
circle in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed 
one another in our minds,  is not ~erceived  to move, 
but seems to be  a perfect entire circle of that matter 
or colour, and not a part of a circle in motion. 
The train of  $ 9.  Hence I leave it to others to judge 
ideas has a  whether it be not probable that our ideas 
certain de-  do, whilst we are awake, succeed one ano- 
gree of  ther in our minds at certain distances, not 
quickness.  much unlike the images in the inside of a 
lantern turned round by the heat of  a candle.  This 
appearance of theirs in train, though perhaps it may 
be  sometimes  faster  and  sometimes  slower,  yet,  I 
guess, varies not very much in a waking man :  there 
seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slow- 
ness of the succession of those ideas one to another in 
our minds,  beyond which they can neither delay nor 
hasten. 
$ 10.  The reason I have for this odd  conjecture is 
from observing that in the impressions made upon Any 
of our senses we can but to a certain degree perceive 
any succession ;  which,  if exceeding quick, the sense 
of succession is lost, even in cases where it is evident 
that there is a real succession.  Let a  cannon-bullet 
pass through a room,  and in its way take with it any 
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limb or fleshy parts of a man ;  it is as clear as any de- 
monstration can be,  that it must strike successively 
the two sides of the room.  It  is also evident, that it 
lnust touch one part of the flesh first, and another after, 
and  so in succession : and yet I believe nobody who 
ever felt the pain  of  such a  shot, or  heard the blow 
against the two distant walls, could perceive any suc- 
cession either in the pain or sound of so swift a stroke. 
Such a part of duration as this, wherein we perceive 
no succession, is  that which we  may call an instant, 
and is that which  takes up the time of only one idea 
in our minds without the succession of another, where- 
in therefore we perceive no succession at all. 
$ 11.  This also  happens  where  the motion  is so 
slow as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to 
the senses as fast as the mind is capable of receiving 
new  ones  into  it;  and  so  other  ideas  of  our  own 
thoughts, having  room to come into our minds,  be- 
tween those offered to our senses by the moving body, 
there the sense of motion is lost ;  and the body, though 
it really moves, yet not changing perceivable distance 
with some other bodies as fast as the ideas of our own 
minds  do naturally  follow  one  another in train,  the 
thing seems to stand still,  as is evident in the hands 
of clocks and shadows of sun-dials, and other constant 
but slow motions ; where, though after certain inter- 
vals,  we  perceive  by the change of distance that it 
hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not. 
$ 1% SO  that to me it seems that the  This train 
constant  and regular succession of  ideas  the measure 
in a waking man is,  as it were,  the mea-  of othermc- 
sure and standard of all other successions :  cessions. 
whereof if any olle either exceeds the pace of our ideas, 
as where two sounds or  pains, &c. take up  in their 
succession the duration of but one idea, or else where 
any motion or succession  is so slow as that it keeps 
not pace with the ideas in our minds, or the 
in which they take their turns ;  as when  any one  or 
more ideas,  in  their  ordinary  course,  come into our 
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mind between those which are offered to the sight by 
the different perceptible distances of  a body in motion, 
or between sounds or smells following  one  another ; 
there also the sense of a constant continued succession 
is lost,  and we perceive  it not but with certain gaps 
of rest between.  - - 
The mind  $ 13. If it be  so  that the ideas of our 
cannot fix  minds, whilst we have any there, do con- 
long on one  sta,ntly change  and  shift  in  a  continual 
invariable  succession, it would  be  impossible,  may 
idea.  anv one say,  for  a man to think long of 
any one thing.'  By wGich,  if it be meant that a man 
may have one self-same single idea a long time alone 
in his  mind,  without  any variation at all, I think,  in 
mattcr of fact, it is not possible ; for which (not know- 
ing how the ideas of  our minds  are framed, of  what 
materials  they  are made,  whence  they  have  their 
light, and how they come to make their appearances) 
I  can give  no  other reason  but  experience :  and  I 
would  have  any  one  try whether  he can  keep  one 
unvaried single idea  in his  mind, without  any other, 
for any considerable time together. 
$  14. For trial, let him take any figure, any degree 
of light or whiteness, or what other he pleases; and he 
will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other ideas 
out  of  his  mind: but that some,  either  of  another 
kind, or various  considerations of  that idea  (each of 
which considerations  is  a  new  idea)  will constantly 
succeed  one  another  in  his  thoughts, let him be as 
wary as he can. 
$ 15. All that is in  a man's  power  in this case, I 
think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are 
that take their turns in his understanding;  or else to 
direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or 
use of: but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, 
I think, he cannot,  though he may commonly choose 
whether he will heedfully observe and consider them. 
Ideas, how-  5 16. Whether these several ideas in a 
ever made,  man's mind  be  made by certain motions, 
Ch. 14.  Duratio~l,  and  its sinqde ill/  odes.  18  1 
I will not here dispute :  but this I am sure,  include Ilo 
that they  include  no  idea  of  motion  in  sense of nlo- 
their appearance ; and if  a  man had not  tion. 
the idea of  motion otherwise,  I think he would  have 
none at all; which is enough to my present purpose, 
and sufficiently shows that the notice we  take of  the 
ideas  of  our  own  minds,  appearing  there one  after 
another, is that which gives us the idea of succession 
and duration, without which we should have no such 
ideas at all.  It is not then motion,  but the constant 
train of ideas in our minds, whilst we are waking, that 
furnishes us with the idea  of  duration;  whereof mo- 
tion no otherwise gives us  any perception than as it 
causes in our minds a constant succession of  ideas, as 
I have  before showed : ancl we have as clear an idea 
of  succession and duration, by the train sf other ideas 
succeeding one another in our minds, without the idea 
of  any motion, as by the train of ideas caused  by the 
uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two 
bodies, which we have from motion ;  and therefore we 
should as well have the idea of  duration were there 
no sense of motion at all. 
$ 17. Having thus got the idea of  dura-  Time  is 
tion, the next thing natural for the mind  duration set 
to do is to get some measure of this com-  :::eL~ 
mon duration, whereby it might judge of 
its different lengths,  and consider  the distinct  order 
wherein  several  things exist,  without which  a great 
part of our knowledge would be confused, and a great 
part of history be rendered very useless.  This consi- 
deration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and 
marked by certain measures or epochs, is that, I think, 
which most properly we call time. 
5 18.  In the measuring  of  extension  A good mea- 
there is  nothing  more  required  but the  sure of time 
must divide  application of the standard or measure we 
itswhole 
make use of to the thing of whose exten-  duratioIlinto 
sion we would be informed.  But in the  equal pe- 
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because  no  two different  parts of  succession can be 
ptxt together to measure one  another : and nothing 
being a measure of duration but duration, as nothing 
is of  extension but extension,  we cannot keep by us 
any standing unvarying  measure of  duration, which 
consists in a constant fleeting succession, as we can of 
certain lengths of extension, as inches, feet, yards, &c. 
marked out in permanent parcels of matter.  Nothing, 
then, could serve well for a convenient measure of time 
but what has divided the whole length of its duration 
into apparently equal portions, by constantly repeated 
periods.  What portions  of  duration  are not distin- 
guished, or considered as distinguished and measured 
by such periods,  come not so properly under the no- 
tion of time, as appears by such phrases as these, viz. 
before all time,  and when time shall be no more. 
The revolu-  5 19. The diurnal and  annual revolu- 
tions of the  tions of  the sun, as having been, from the 
and  beginning of nature, constant, regular, and  moon,  the 
properest  universally observable by all mankind, and 
measures of  supposed equal to one another, have been 
time.  with reason made use of  for the measure 
of duration.  But the distinction  of  days and years 
having depended  on  the motion  of  the sun,  it has 
brought this mistake with it, that it  has been thought 
that motion  and duration were  the measure one  of 
another :  for men, in  the measuring of the length of 
time, having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes, 
hours, days, months, pears, &c. which they found them- 
selves upon any mention of time or duration presently 
to think on,  all which portions of time were measured 
out by the motion of those heavenly bodies ;  they were 
apt to confound time and motion, or at least to think 
that they had a necessary connexion one with another : 
whereas  any constant periodical appearance or alter- 
ation of ideas in seemingly equidistant spaces of dura- 
tion,  if  constant  and univetsally  observable,  would 
have as well distinguished the intervals of time as those 
that have been made use of,  For supposing the sun, 
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which some have taken to be a fire, had been lighted 
up at the same distance of time that it now every day 
comes about to the same meridian, and then gone out 
again about twelve hours after, and that in the space 
of  an annual revolution  it had sensibly increased in 
brightness and heat, and so decreased again;  would 
not such regular appearances serve to measure out the 
distances of duration, to a11  that could observe  it, as 
well without as with motion ?  For if the appearances 
were constant,  universally observable,  and in equidi- 
stant periods, they would serve mankind for measure 
of time as well, were the motion away. 
5 20. For the freezing of water, or the  B~~ nd  by 
blowing  of  a plant, returning at equidi-  theirmotion, 
stantperiods in all partsof the earth,would  but periodi- 
as well serve men to reckon their years by  =h:[parr 
as the motions of  the sun : and in  effect 
we  see  that some  people  in America  counted their 
years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at 
their certain seasons, and leaving them at  others.  For 
a fit of an ague, the sense of hunger or thirst, a smell 
or a taste,  or any  other idea returning constantly at 
equidistant periods,  and making itself  universally he 
taken notice of,  would  not fail  to measure  out the 
course of succession, and distinguish the distances of 
time.  Thus we see  that men born blind count time 
well enough by years, whose revolutions yet they can- 
not distinguish by motions that they perceive not :  and 
1 ask whether a blind man, who distinguished his years 
either by the heat of  summer or cold of winter;  by 
the smell of  any flower of  the spring, or taste of any 
fruit of  the autumn; would not have  a  better mea- 
sure of time than the Romans had before the refo~m- 
ation  of  their  calendar  by  Julius  Czsar,  or  many 
other people, whose years, notwithstanding the motion 
of the sun,  which  they pretend  to make use of,  are 
very irregular ?  And it adds  no small  difficulty  to 
chronology,  that the exact lengths  of  the years that 
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differing very much  one  from another, and I think I 
may say all of them from the precise motion of the sun. 
And if the sun moved  from the creation to the flood 
constantly in the equator, and so equally dispersed its 
light and heat to all the habitable parts of the earth, 
in days  all  of  the same  length,  without  its annual 
variations  to the tropics,  as a  late ingenious  author 
supposes *; I do not think it very easy to imagine that 
(notwithstanding the motion of  the sun) men should, 
in the antediluv~an  world,  from the beginning, count 
by years, or measure their time by periods,  that had 
no sensible marks very obvious to distinguish them by. 
No  two parts  $ 21.  But perhaps it will be said, with- 
ofduration  out a regular motion, such as of  the sun 
can be cer-  or some other, how could it ever be known 
tainlyknown  that such periods were equal  ?  To  which 
to be  equal.  I answer,  the equality  of  any  other  re- 
turning appearances might be known by the same way 
that that of  days was known or presumed to be so at 
first ;  which was only by judging of them by the train 
of  ideas which  had  passed  in  men's minds in the in- 
tervals :  by which train of ideas discovering inequality 
in the natural days, but none in the artificial days, the 
artificial days or ru~eip~pa  were guessed  to be equal, 
which  was  sufficient  to make them serve for a mea- 
sure : though exacter search has since discovered in- 
equality in the diurnal revolutions of the sun, and we 
know  not  whether  the  annual  also be  not unequal. 
These yet, by their presumed and apparent equality, 
serve as well to reckon time by  (though not to mea- 
sure the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be 
proved to be exactly equal.  We  must therefore care- 
fully distinguish betwixt duration itself, and the mea- 
sures we make use of to judge of its length.  Duration 
in itself is to be considered as going on in one constant, 
equal, uniform course :  but none  of  the measures  of 
it,  which  we make use  of,  can be  known to do so; 
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nor  can we be  assured  that their  assigned parts or 
are equal in duration one to another ;  for two 
successive lengths of duration, however measured, can 
never be demonstrated  to be equal.  The motion  of 
the sun, which  the world  used  so long and so confi- 
dently for an exact measure of duration, has, as I said, 
been found  in its several parts unequal :  and though 
men have of late made use of a pendulum,  as a more 
steady and regular  motion  than that of  the sun,  or 
(to speak more  truly)  of  the earth; yet if  any one 
should be asked how he certainly knows that the two 
successive swings of a  pendulum are equal, it would 
be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so : 
since we cannot be sure that the cause of that motion, 
which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally ; 
and we are sure that the medium in which  the pen- 
dulum moves is  not  constantly the same:  either of 
which varying, may alter the equality of  such periods, 
and  thereby  destroy the certainty and  exactness  of 
the measure by motion,  as well  as any other periods 
of other appearances ; the notion of  duration still re- 
maining  clear, though our measures of it cannot any 
of them be demonstrated to be exact.  Since then no 
two portions of succession can be brought together, it 
is impossible  ever  certainly  to know  their  equality. 
All that we can do for  a measure of  time is to take 
such as have continual successive appearances at  seem- 
ingly equidistant periods ;  of which seeming equality 
we  have  no  other measure but such as the train of 
our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the 
concurrence of other probable reasons, to persuade us 
of their equality. 
$ 5%.  One thing seems strange to me,  Timenotthe 
that whilst all men manifestly measured  measure of 
time by the motion of the great and visible  motion. 
bodies of  the world, time yet should be defined to be 
the "  measure  of  motion;"  whereas  it is obvious to 
every  one  who  reflects  ever  so little  on  it,  that,  to 
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measure  motion,  space  is  as  necessary  to be  con- 
sidered as time :  and those who look a little farther, 
will find also the bulk of  the thing moved necessary 
to be taken into the computation by any one who will 
estimate or measure motion, so as to judge right of it. 
Nor indeed does motion any otherwise conduce to the 
measuring  of  duration,  than as it constantly brings 
about the return of certain sensible ideas, in seeming 
equidistant  periods.  For if  the motion  of  the sun 
were  as  unequal  as  of  a  ship  driven  by  unsteady 
winds, sometimes very slow, and at others irregularly 
very  swift;  or if,  being  constantly equally  swift,  it 
yet was not circular,  and produced  not the same ap- 
pearances,  it would not at all help  us  to measure 
time, any more than the seeming unequal  motion of 
a comet does. 
Minutes,  § 23. Minutes, hours, days, and years, 
l~ours,  days,  are  then  no more neeessary  to time or 
and Years,  duration,  than  inches,  feet,  yards,  and 
not ne- 
cessary  miles, marked out in any matter,  are to 
sures of  extension: for though we in this  part of 
duration.  the universe,  by the constant use of  them, 
as of periods set out by the revolutions of  the sun, or 
as known parts of  such periods,  have fixed  the ideas 
of such lengths of  duration in our minds,  which we 
apply to all parts of  time,  whose lengths we would 
consider;  yet there may be other parts of  the uni- 
verse, where they no more use these measures of ours 
than in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles ;  but 
yet something analogous to them there must be.  For 
without some regular periodical returns, we could not 
measure ourselves,  or signify to others the length of 
any duration, though at the same time the world were 
as full of  motion  as it is now,  but no part of  it dis- 
posed  into  regular  and  apparently  equidistant  re- 
volutions.  But the different measures that may be 
made  use  of  for  the account of  time do  not at all 
alter the notion of duration,  which  is the thing to be 
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no more than the different standards of  a 
foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension to those 
who make use of those different measures. 
§ $4.  The mind having once got such  ourme,,, 
measure of time as the annual revolution  of time ap- 
of the sun, can apply that measure to du-  plicable to 
ration, wherein that measure itself did not  czeee. 
&st,  and with which, in the reality of its 
being, it had nothing to do ; for should one say, that 
Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred 
and twelfth year of the Julian ~eriod,  it is altogether 
as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the 
world,  though there were  so  far back  no motion of 
the sun, nor any motion at  all.  For though the Julian 
period be supposed to  begin several hundred years be- 
fore  there were  really  either days,  nights,  or years, 
marked  out by  any revolutions  of  the sun; yet we 
reckon  as right,  and  thereby measure  durations  as 
well, as if really at that time the sun had existed, and 
kept  the same  ordinary motion  it doth  now.  The 
idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of  the 
sun,  is as easily applicable  in our thoughts to dura- 
tion, where no sun nor motion was,  as the idea of  a 
foot or yard, taken from bodies here,  can be applied 
in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines  of 
the world, where are no bodies at all. 
§ 25. For supposing it were five thousand six hun- 
dred and thirty-nine miles,  or millions of  miles,  from 
this place to the remotest body of  the universe (for, 
being  finite, it must  be at a certain distance) as we 
suppose it to be five thousand six hundred and thirty- 
nine years from this time to the first existence of any 
body in the beginning of  the world ;  we  can, in our 
thoughts,  apply this measure  of  a  year  to duration 
before the creation,  or beyond the duration of  bodies 
or motion, as we can this measure of  a mile to  space 
beyond  the utmost bodies;  and by the one measure 
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other measure  space in our thoughts, where there is 
no body. 
$ 26. If it be objected to me here, that, in this way 
of  explaining of time,  I have  begged what I should 
not, viz. that the world is neither eternal nor infinite; 
I answer, that to my present purpose it is not needful, 
in this place, to make use of arguments to evince the 
world to be finite,  both in duration and extension; 
but it being at  least as conceivable as the contrary, I 
have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any 
one hath to suppose the contrary:  and I doubt not 
but that every one that will  go about it,  may easily 
conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, though 
not of  all duration,  and so may come to a stop and 
non ultra  in his consideration of  motion.  So also in 
his  thoughts he may set limits to body,  and the ex- 
tension  belonging to it,  but not to space where  no 
body is; the utmost bounds  of  space  and duration 
being  beyond  the reach  of  thought,  as well as the 
utmost bounds of number are beyond the largest com- 
prehension of the mind ;  and all for the same reason, 
as we shall see in another place. 
Eternity.  $ 27. By thesame means therefore, and 
from the same original that we  come to 
have the idea of  time,  we ha6  also that idea which 
we call eternity; viz. having got the idea of succession 
and duration,  by reflecting  on the train of  our own 
ideas, caused in us either by the natural appearances 
of those ideas coming  constantly  of  themselves into 
our waking thoughts,  or else caused by external ob- 
jects  successively  affecting our senses ; and  having 
from the revolutions of  the sun got the ideas of cer- 
tain lengths of duration, we can in our thoughts add 
such lengths of duration to  one another, as often as we 
please, and apply them, so added, to  durations past or 
to come:  and this we can continue to do on, without 
bounds or limits, and proceed in inaniturn, and apply 
thus  the length of  the annual motion of  the sun to 
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duration,  supposed  before  the  sun's,  or  any  other 
motion had  its being; which  is no more  difficult or 
absurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving 
of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial to the 
duration of something last night, V. g. the burning of 
a candle, which  is now absolutely separate  from  all 
actual  motion :  and it is as impossible for the duration 
of that flame for an hour last night to co-exist with 
any motion that now  is,  or for  ever  shall be,  as for 
any part of duration,  that was before the beginning 
of the world,  to co-exist with  the motion of  the sun 
now.  But yet this hinders not,  but that having the 
idea of  the length of  the motion of the shadow on a 
dial  between  the marks  of  two hours,  I can  as  di- 
stinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of  that 
candle-light last night,  as I can the duration of  any 
thing that does now exist:  and it is no more than to 
think,  that had the sun shone  then on the dial,  and 
moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on 
the dial would  have passed from one hour-line to an- 
other, whilst that flame of the candle lasted. 
$ 28.  The notion of  an hour, day,  or  year,  being 
only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical 
regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all 
at once exist, but only in the ideas I have of them in 
my memory derived from my senses or reflection;  I 
can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply 
it in my thoughts to duration  antecedent to all man- 
ner  of motion,  as well  as to any thing that is but a 
minute,  or a  day,  antecedent to the motion,  that at 
this very moment the sun is in.  All things past are 
equally and perfectly at rest ;  and to this way of con- 
sideration  of  them  are all one,  whether  they  were 
before the beginning of  the world, or but yesterday : 
the measuring of  any duration by some  motion de- 
pending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing 
to that motion,  or  any  other periods  of  revolution, 
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periodical known motion,  or other intervals of  dura- 
tion in my mind,  and applying that to the duration 
of the thing I would measure. 
§ 29. Hence we  see,  that some  men imagine the 
duration of  the world,  from its first existence to this 
present year 1689, to  have been five thousand six hnn- 
dred and thirty-nine years,  or equal to five thousand 
six hundred and thirty-nine annual revolutions of the 
sun, and others a great deal more ;  as the Egyptians 
of old, who in the time of Alexander counted twenty- 
three thousand years from the reign of  the sun;  and 
the Chinese now, who account the world three millions, 
two hundred  and sixtyrnine thousand  years  old,  or 
more : which longer duration of the world,  according 
to their computation,  though I should not believe to 
be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them,  and 
as truly understand,  and say one is longer than the 
other,  as  I understand,  that Methusalem's  life  was 
longer than Enoch's.  And if the common reckoning 
of  five thousand  si::  hundred and thirty-nine should 
be true (as it may be as well as any other assigned), it 
hinders  not  at all my imagining what others mean 
when they make the world one thousand years older, 
since  every one  may with the same facility imagine 
(I do not  say believe) the world  to be fifty thousand 
years  old,  as five  thousand  six hundred  and thirty- 
nine ; and may as well  conceive the duration of  fifty 
thousand  years,  as  five  thousand  six  hundred  and 
thirty-nine.  Whereby  it appears,  that to the mea- 
suring the duration of any thing by time, it is not re- 
quisite that that thing should  be  co-existent  to the 
motion we  measure by,  or any other periodical  revo- 
lution ;  but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the 
idea of  the length of  any regular periodical  appear- 
ances,  which  we  can in our minds  apply to dura- 
tion,  with  which  the  motion  or  appearance  never 
co-existed. 
tj 30. For as in the history of  the creation, delivered 
ch. 14.  Duration,  and  its simple Modes.  Ig1 
by Moses, I can imagine that light existed three days 
before the sun was, or had any motion, barely by think- 
ing, that the duration of light, before the sun was cre- 
ated, was so long as (if the sun had moved then, as it 
doth now) would have been equal to three of his di- 
urnal revolutions ;  so by the same way I can have an 
idea of the chaos, or angels being created, before there 
was either light,  or any continued motion,  a minute, 
an hour, a day, a year, or one thousand years.  For if 
I can but consider duration equal to one minute, be- 
fore either the being or motion of any body, I can add 
one minute more till I come to sixty; and by the same 
way of adding minutes, hours,  or years (i.  e.  such or 
such parts of the sun's  revolutions,  or any other pe- 
riod  whereof I have  the idea) proceed  in  inznituvz, 
and suppose a duration exceeding as many such pe- 
riods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will :  which 
I think is  the notion  we  have of  eternity,  of  whose 
infinity we have no other notion than we have of  the 
infinity of number, to which we can add for ever with- 
out eid. 
§ 31.  And thus I think it is plain,  that from those 
two fountains of all knowledge before-mentioned,  viz. 
reflection and sensation, we get ideas of duration, and 
the measures of it. 
For, first, By observing what passes  in our minds, 
how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish, 
and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of 
succession. 
Secondly, By observing  a  distance in the parts of 
this succession, we get the idea of duration. 
Thirdly,  By  sensation  observing  certain  appear- 
ances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant pe- 
riods; we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures 
of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c. 
Fourthly, By being  able to repeat those measures 
of  time,  or ideas of stated length of  duration in our 
minds,  as often as we will,  we can come to imagine 
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and thus we imagine to-morrow,  next year,  or seven 
years hence. 
Fifthly, By being able to repeat ideas of any length 
of time, as of  a minute, a year, or an age, as often as 
we will, in our own thoughts,  and adding them one to 
another, without ever  coming to the end of  such ad- 
dition any nearer than we can to the end of  number, 
to which we can always add ;  we come by the idea of 
eternity,  as the future eternal duration of  our souls, 
as well  as the eternity of  that infinite  Being,  which 
must necessarily have always existed. 
Sixthly,  By  considering  any part of  infinite dura- 
tion,  as set out by periodical  measures, we  come by 
the idea of what we call time in general. 
CHAPTER  XV. 
Of Duration and Expansion, considered together. 
Bothcapable  5 1. THOUGH  we have in the precedent 
of greater  chapters dwelt pretty long on  the con- 
less.  siderations  of  space  and  duration ; yet 
they being ideas of  general concernment,  that have 
something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature, 
the comparing  them  one with  another may perhaps 
be of use for their illustration ; and we may have the 
more clear and distinct conception of them, by taking 
a view of  them  together.  Distance  or  space,  in its 
simple abstract conception,  to avoid confusion, I call 
expansion, to distinguish it from extension, which by 
some is used  to express this distance only as it. is in 
the solid parts of  matter, and so includes, or at least 
intimates, the idea of body :  whereas the idea of pure 
distance includes no such thing.  I  prefer  also  the 
word  expansion to space,  because  space is often ap- 
plied  to distance of  fleeting  successive  parts, which 
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never  exist  together,  as well  as  to those which  are 
permanent.  In both these  (viz.  expansion and dura- 
tion)  the mind  has  this  common  idea  of  continued 
lengths, capable  of  greater or less  quantities : for a 
nlan has as clear an idea of the difference of the length 
of an hour and a day, as of  an inch and a foot. 
$ a.  The mind having got the idea  of  Expansion 
the length of  any part  of  expansion, let  not bounded 
it be a  span  or  a  pace,  or what length  by matter. 
you will,  can,  as  has  been  said,  repeat 
that idea; and so, adding it to the former, enlarge its 
idea  of length, and make it equal  to two spans  or 
two paces,  and so  as  often  as  it will,  till it equals 
the distance  of any parts of  the earth one  from  an- 
other,  and increase thus,  till it amounts  to the di- 
stance of  the sun or  remotest  star.  By such  a pro- 
gression as this, setting out from the place where  it 
is,  or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond 
all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going 
on,  either in,  or without  body.  It is true, we  can 
easily, in our thoughts, come  to the end  of solid ex- 
tension ;  the extremity and bounds of all body we have 
no difficulty  to arrive at :  but when the mind is there, 
it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless 
expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any 
end.  Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of 
bocly there is nothing  at all,  unless he will  confine 
God within the limits of matter.  Solomon, whose un- 
derstanding  was  filled  and  enlarged  with  wisdom, 
seems to have other thoughts, when he says, "heaven, 
and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee :" and 
he, I think, very  much  magnifies  to himself  the ca- 
pacity of his own understanding, who persuades him- 
self that he can extend his thoughts farther than God 
exists, or imagine any expansion where he is not. 
$ 3.  Just  so  is  it in  duration.  The  Nor dura- 
mind, having got the idea of any length  tion by mo- 
of  duration,  can  double,  multiply,  and  tion. 
enlarge it, not  only beyond its own, but beyond the 
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existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures 
of  time,  taken  from the great bodies  of  the world 
and their motions.  But yet every one easily admits, 
that though we make duration boundless, as certainly 
it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being.  God, 
every one  easily allows,  fills  eternity, and it is hard 
to find  a reason why any one  should doubt  that he 
likewise  fills immensity.  His  infinite  being is  cer 
tainly as boundless one way as another, and methinks 
it ascribes a little too much to matter  to say where 
there is no body, there is nothing. 
Why men  9 4. Hence, I think, we  may learn the 
more easily  reason  why  every  one  familiarly,  and 
admit in-  without  the least hesitation,  speaks  of,  finite dura- 
tion than in-  and supposes  eternity, and sticks not to 
finite expan-  ascribe infinity to duration ;  but it is with 
sion.  more  doubting and reserve  that  many 
admit or suppose  the infinity of  space.  The reason 
whereof seems to me to be  this ;  that duration and 
extension being used as names of affections belonging 
to other  beings, we  easily  conceive  in God infinite 
duration, and we cannot  avoid doing so ;  but not at- 
tributing to  him extension, but only to matter, which 
is  finite, we  are  apter to  doubt of  the existence  of 
expansion  without  matter,  of  which  alone  we  com- 
monly suppose it an  attribute.  And therefore when 
men pursue their  thoughts  of  space, they are apt to 
stop at the confines  of body,  as if space were  there 
at an end  too,  and reached  no farther.  Or if  their 
ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they 
term what is beyond the limits of the  universe imagi- 
nary space; as  if  it were  nothing, because  there is 
no body existing in it : whereas duration, antecedent 
to all body,  and to the motions which it is measured 
by, they never  term  imaginary,  because  it is  never 
supposed void of some other real existence.  And if the 
names of things may at all direct our  thoughts  to- 
wards the originals  of men's  ideas  (as I am apt to 
think  they may very much),  one  may have occasion 
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to think by  the name  duration,  that the colltinua- 
tion of existence, with a kind of resistance to any de- 
structive force, and the continuation of solidity (which 
is apt to be confounded with, and, if we will look into 
the minute anatomical parts of matter,is little different 
from, hardness) were thought to have  some analogy, 
and gave occasion to words so near of kin  as  durare 
and durum esse.  And  that dural-e is applied to the 
idea of hardness as well  as that of  existence, we see 
in Horace, epod. xvi. <'few0  duravit secula."  But be 
that as it will, this is certain ;  that whoever pursues his 
own thoughts, will find  them  sometimes launch  otlt 
beyond the extent of  body into the infinity of  space 
or expansion ;  the idea whereof is distinct and separate 
from body and all other things:  which may (to those 
who please) be a subject of farther meditation. 
§ 5.  Time in general is to duration as  T;,, 
place to expansion.  They are so much  duration is 
of those boundless oceans of eternity and  as place to 
immensity as is set out and distinguished  expansion. 
from the rest,  as it were,  by land-marks ;  and so are 
made use of to denote the position of finite real beings, 
in  respect  one to another,  in those  uniform  infinite 
oceans  of  duration and space.  These, rightly consi- 
dered, are only ideas of determinate  distances, from 
certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible 
things,  and supposed  to keep the same distance one 
from another.  From such points fixed in sensible be- 
ings we reckon,  and from them we measure our por- 
tions of those infinite quantities ;  which, so considered, 
are that which we call time and place.  For duration 
and space being in themselves uniform and boundless, 
the order and position of things, without such known 
settled points, would be lost in them,  and all things 
would lie jumbled in an incurable confusion. 
$6.  Time and pIace, taken thus for de-  Time and 
terminate disting$shable  portions of those  fLznrr  _ 
infinite abysses of space and duration, set  much of ,,i- 
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set out by  the rest by marks and known boundaries, 
theexistence  have  each  of  them  a  two-fold  accepta- 
and motion  tion. 
of bodies.  First,  Time  in general  is  commonly 
taken for so much of infinite duration as is measured 
by, and co-existent with, the existence and motions of 
the great bodies of the universe, as far as we know any 
thing of them : and in this sense time begins and ends 
with  the frame of  this  sensible world,  as  in  these 
phrases  before-mentioned,  before  all time,  or  when 
time shall be no more.  Place likewise is taken some- 
times  for  that  portion  of  infinite  space  which  is 
possessed by, and comprehended within the material 
world,  and is thereby distinguished from the rest of 
expansion ;  though this may more properly be called 
extension than place.  Within these two are confined, 
and by the observable parts of them are measured and 
determined, the particular time or duration,  and the 
particular extension and place, of  all corporeal beings. 
Sometimes  Q 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word time 
for so much  is used in a larger sense, and is applied to 
of either, as  parts of  that infinite  duration,  not  that 
we design by 
measures  were  really distinguished  and measured 
taken from  out by this real existence, and periodical 
the bulk or  motions  of  bodies  that were  appointed 
motionof  from the beginning to be for  signs,  and 
bodies.  for seasons,  and for days, and years, and 
are accordingly our measures of time ;-but  such other 
portions too of that infinite uniform duration,which we, 
upon any occasion, do suppose equal to certain lengths 
of measured time ; and so  consider them as bounded 
and determined.  For if we should suppose the crea- 
tion, or fall of the angels, was at the beginning of the 
Julian period, we should speak properly enough, and 
should be understood,  if  we  said, it is a longer time 
since the creation of  angels than the creation  of the 
world by seven thousand six hundred and forty years ; 
whereby we  would  mark  out so much  of  that undi- 
stinguished duration as we suppose equal to,and would 
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have admitted seven thousand six hundred and forty 
annual revolutions of  the sun,  moving  at the rate it 
now does.  And thus likewise we sometimes speak of 
place, distance, or bulk, in the great inane beyond the 
confines of  the world, when  we  consider so much of 
that space as is equal to or capable to receive a body 
of  any assigned  dimensions, as  a  cubic  foot ; or  do 
suppose a point in it at such a  certain distance from 
any part of the universe. 
5 8. Where and when are questions be-  They belong 
longing to all finite existences,  and are  to "11  be- 
by us always reckoned fiom some known  ings. 
parts of  this  sensible world,  and from  some  certain 
epochs  marked out to us  by the motions  observable 
in it.  Without some such fixed parts or periods,  the 
order of things would be lost to our finite understand- 
ings, in the boundless  invariable  oceans  of  duration 
and expansion,  which comprehend in them all finite 
beings,  and in  their  full extent belong only to the 
Deity.  And therefore we are not to wonder that we 
comprehend them not,anddo so often find our thoughts 
at a loss,  when we would  consider  th-m  either  abs- 
tractly in themselves,  or as any way attributed to the 
first  incomprehensible Being.  But when  applied  to 
any particular finite beings, the extension of any body 
is so much of  that infinite  space as the bulk of  the 
body takes up ;  and place is the position of any body, 
when considered at a certain distance from some other. 
As the idea of the particular duration of any thing is 
an  idea  of  that portion  of  infinite  duration  which 
passes during the existence of that thing ;  so the time 
when the thing existed, is  the idea of  that space  of 
duration which passed between some known and fixed 
period of duration, and the being of that thing.  One 
shows the distance  of  the extremities  of  the bulk or 
existence of the same thing, as that it is a foot square, 
or  lasted two years ; the other shows the distance of 
it in  place  or  existence from  other  fixed  points  of 
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coln's-inn-fields,  or the first degree of  Taurus, and in 
the year of  our Lord 1671,  or the 1000 year  of  the 
Julian period :  all which distances we measure by pre- 
conceived ideas of  certain lengths of space and dura- 
tion, as inches, feet, miles,  and degrees ;  and in the 
other, minutes, days, and years, kc. 
All the parts  $ 9.  There is one  thing more  wherein 
of extension  mace and duration have a areat conform- 
are exten-  iiy; and that is, though txey are justly  sion ;  and all 
the parts of  reckoned  amongst  our  simple ideas, yet 
duration are  none  of  the  distinct  ideas  we  have  of 
duration,  either is without all manner of  composi- 
tion*;  it is the very nature of both of them to consist 
of  parts :  but their parts being all of the same kind, 
and without  the mixture  of  any other idea,  hinder 
them not from having a place  amongst simple ideas. 
* It has been  objected to Mr. Locke,  that if  space consists of 
parts,  as it is confessed in this place, he should not have reckoned it 
in the number of  simple ideas;  because  it seems to be  inconsistent 
with what he  says elsewhere,  that a simple idea is uncompounded, 
and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception 
of  the mind,  and is not  distinguishable  into different ideas.  It is 
farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the eleventh chap- 
ter of  the second book,  where he begins to speak of  simple ideas, an 
exact definition of  what  he understands by the word  simple ideas. 
To these  difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus:  To begin with  the 
last, he declares that he has not treated his subject in an order per- 
fectly scholastic, having not had much familiarity with those sort of 
books during the writing of  his,  and not remembering  at all the 
method in which they are written ;  and therefore his readers ought 
not to expect definitions regularly placed  at the beginning of  each 
new subject.  Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principal 
terms that he uses,  so  that from  his  use  of  them  the reader may 
easily comprehend what  he  means by them.  But with  respect to 
the term simple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the 
place cited in the objection ;  and therefore there is no reason to sup- 
ply that defect.  The question then is to know, whether the idea of 
extension agrees with this definition  ?  which will effectually agree to 
it, if it be understood in the sense which Mr. Locke had principally 
in his view;  for that  composition which  he designed to exclude in 
that definition was a composition of  different ideas in the mind, and 
not a composition of  the same kind in a thing whose essence consists 
in having parts of  the same kind,  where  you can  never  come to a 
part  entirely exempted  from this composition.  So that if the idea 
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Could  the mind,  as in number,  come  to so small a 
part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility, 
that would be,  as it were, the indivisible unit or idea; 
by repetition of which it  would make its more enlarged 
ideas of extension and duration.  But since the mind 
is  not  able  to frame an idea of  any  space  without 
parts,  instead  thereof  it makes  use  of  the common 
measures,  which by familiar use, in each country, have 
imprinted themselves  an the memory  (as inches and 
feet, or cubits and parasangs ;  and so seconds, minutes, 
hours,  days, and years in duration):  the mind makes 
use,  I say, of such ideas as these, as simple ones ;  and 
these are the component parts of  larger ideas, which 
the mind,  upon  occasion,  makes  by the addition  of 
such known lengths which it is acquainted with.  On 
the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have 
of  extension consists in having  partes extra partes  (as the schools 
speak),  it is always, in the sense of  Mr. Locke,  a simple idea;  be- 
cause the idea of  having partes  extra partes cannot be resolved into 
two other ideas.  For the remainder of  the objection made to Mr. 
Locke, with respect to the nature of  extension, Mr. Locke was aware 
of  it, as may be  seen in § 9, chap. 15, of  the second book,  where he 
says, that "the  least portion of space or extension, whereof we have 
a clear and distinct idea, may perhaps be  the fittest to be  considered 
by us as a simple idea of  that kind, out of which our com  lex modes 
of  space  and extension are made up."  So that, accor i  ing to Mr. 
Locke, it  may very fitly be called a simple idea,  since it is the least 
idea of  space that the mind can form  to itself,  and that cannot be 
divided by the mind into any less, whereof it  has in itself an 
mined perce  tion.  From whence  it follows,  that it is to t e mind  X  K deter- 
one simple i  ea;  and that is sufficient to take away this objection : 
for it is not the design  of  Mr. Locke, in this place,  to discourse of 
any thing but concerning the idea of  the mind.  But if  this is not 
sufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, 
but that if the idea of  extension is so peculiar that it cannot exactly 
agree with the definition that he has given of  those simple ideas, so 
that it differs in some manner from all others of that kind, he thinks 
It is better to leave it there exposed to this difficulty, than to make 
a new division  in his favour.  It is enough for Mr. Loclte that his 
meaning can be  understood.  It is very common  to observe intelli- 
gible dicourses spoiled by too much subtilty in nice divisions.  We 
ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrine cad:  but, 
after all,  several things will not be  bundled up together under our 
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of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the 
mind by  division would reduce them into less fractions. 
Though on both sides, both in addition and division, 
either of space or duration, when the idea under con- 
sideration becomes very big or very small, its precise 
bulk  becomes  very obscure  and confused; and it is 
the number of its repeated additions or divisions that 
alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear 
to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast 
expansion of  space or divisibility  of  matter.  Every 
part of  duration is  duration too ; and  every part of 
extension is extension, both of  them capable of  addi- 
tion or  division in inznitum.  But the least portions 
of either of them,  whereof we have clear and distinct 
ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us 
as the simple  ideas of  that kind,  out of  which  our 
complex modes of space, extension, and duration, are 
made up, and into which they can again be distinctly 
resolved.  Such a small part in duration may be called 
a moment, and is the time of  one idea in our minds 
in the train of their ordinary succession  there.  The 
other, wanting  a  proper name,  I know not whether 
I may be allowed to call a  sensible point,  meaning 
thereby the least particle of  matter or space we can 
discern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the 
sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a cir- 
cle, whereof the eye is the centre. 
Their parts  $ 10. Expansion and duration have this 
inseparable.  farther agreement, that though they are 
both considered by us as having parts,yet their parts 
are not separable  one from another, no not even  in 
thought ;  though the parts of bodies from whence we 
take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, 
or rather the succession of  ideas in our minds, from 
whence we take the measure of the other, may be in- 
terrupted and separated; as the one is often by rest, 
and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too. 
Duralion is  $ 11.  But there is  this  manifest  dif- 
as a line, ex-  ference between them ;  that the ideas of 
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length, which we have of  expansion, are  pansion  as a 
turned every way, and so make figure, and  solid- 
breadth, and thickness ;  but duration is but as it were 
the length of one straight line, extended in ininiturn, 
not capable of  multiplicity, variation,  or  figure ; but 
is one common measure  of  all existence whatsoever, 
wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. 
For this present moment is common to all things that 
are now in being, and equally comprehends that part 
of their existence, as much as if they were all but one 
single being ; and we may truly say, they all exist in 
the same moment of  time.  Whether angels and spirits 
have  any analogy to this, in respect of  expansion, is 
beyond  my comprehension : and perhaps for us,  who 
have understandings and comprehensions suited to our 
own  preservation,  and the  ends of  our  own  being, 
but not to the reality and extent of all other beings ; 
it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have 
an idea of any real being,  with a perfect negation of 
all manner of expansion-as  it is to have the idea of 
any real existence, with a perfect negation of all man- 
ner of duration ;  and therefore what spirits have to do 
with space, or how they communicate in it, we  know 
not.  All that we know is, that bodies do each singly 
possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent 
of solid parts;  and thereby exclude  all other bodies 
frorn having  any share in  that particular  portion  of 
space, whilst it remains there. 
$ 12. Duration,  and time  which  is  a 
Duration  part of it, is the idea we have of perishing  has 
distance, of which no two parts exist toge-  two parts to- 
ther, but follow each other in succession ;  gether>  ex- 
pansion all  as  expansion  is  the  idea  of  lasting  di-  together. 
stance, all whose parts exist together, and 
are not capable of succession.  And therefore though 
we cannot conceive  any duration without succession, 
nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any be- 
ing does now exist to-morrow, or possess at once more 
than  the present  moment  of  duration;  yet  we  can 902  Number.  Book 2. 
conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far dif- 
ferent from  that of  man, or  any other finite being: 
because man  comprehends not  in his knowledge, or 
power, all past  and future things;  his  thoughts are 
but of yesterday,  and he knows  not what to-morrow 
will bring forth.  What is once past he can never re- 
cal, and what is yet to come he cannot make present. 
What I say of  man I say of  all finite beings;  who, 
though they may far exceed man in knowledge  and 
power, yet are no more than the meanest creature, in 
comparison with God himself.  Finite of  any magni- 
tude holds not any proportion to infinite.  God's in- 
finite duration being accompanied with infinite know- 
ledge and infinite power, he sees all things past and 
to come ;  and they are no more distant from his know- 
ledge no farther  removed  from his  sight,  than the 
present :  they all lie under the same view ;  and there 
is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment 
he pleases.  For the existence of all things depending 
upon his good pleasure, all things exist every moment 
that he thinks fit to have them exist.  To conclude, 
expansion  and  duration  do  mutually  embrace  and 
comprehend each other ;  every part of space being in 
every part of duration, and every part of  duration in 
every part of expansion.  Such a combination of two 
distinct ideas is,  I suppose, scarce to be found in all 
that great variety we  do or can conceive, and may 
afford matter to farther speculation. 
CHAPTER  XVI. 
Of  Number. 
Number the  $ 1. AMONGST  all the ideas we have, as 
simplest and  there is none  suggested  to the mind by 
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more ways, so there is none more simple  most mi- 
than that of  unity,  or  one.  It  has  no  versal idea. 
shadow of variety or composition in it; every object 
our senses are employed about, every idea in our un- 
derstandings, every thought of our minds, brings this 
idea along with it ; and therefore  it is the most inti- 
mate to our thoughts, as well as it  is, in its agreement 
to all other things,  the most universal idea we  have. 
For  number  applies  itself  to men,  angels,  actions, 
thoughts, every thing that either doth exist or can be 
imagined. 
$2.  By repeating this idea in our minds,  I~S  modes 
and adding the repetitions  together, we  made by ad- 
come by the complex ideas of  the modes  dition. 
of it.  Thus by adding one to one, we have the com- 
plex idea of a couple ;  by putting twelve units toge- 
ther, we have the complex idea of a dozen ;  and so of 
a score, or a million, or any other number. 
3.  The simple modes of numbers are  Each mode 
of all other the most  distinct ;  every the 
distinct.  least variation, which is  an unit, making 
each combination as clearly different from that which 
approacheth nearest to it,  as the most  remote:  two 
being as  distinct from one as two hundred ;  and the 
idea of  two as distinct from the idea of  three as the 
magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. 
This is not so in other simple modes, in which it is not 
so easy, nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish be- 
twixt two approaching ideas, which yet are really dif- 
ferent,  For who will undertake to find  a  difference 
between the white of this paper, and that of the next 
degree to it; Qr can form distinct ideas of every the 
least excess in extension ? 
§ 4.  The clearness  and distinctness of  Therefore 
each mode of number from all others. even  demonstra- 
those that approach nearest, makes me ar>t  tions in  . 
numbers the  to think thii  demonstrations in numbers,  most preeik. 
if  they are  not more  evident and exact 
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use, and more  determinate in their application ; be- 
cause the ideas of  numbers are more precise  and di- 
stinguishable than in extension, where every equality 
and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured; 
because  our  thoughts cannot in space arrive at any 
determined smallness, beyond which  it cannot go, as 
an unit ; and therefore the quantity or proportion of 
any the least excess cannot be discovered : which  is 
clear otherwise in number,  where,  as has been said, 
ninety-one  is  as distinguishable from ninety as from 
nine thousand, though ninety-one  be the next imme- 
diate excess to ninety.  But it is not so in extension, 
where whatsoever is more than just a foot or an inch, 
is not distinguishable from the standard of  a foot or 
an inch ;  and in lines which appear of an equal length, 
one  may be  longer  than the other by  innumerable 
parts; nor can any one assign an angle which  shall 
be the next biggest to a right one. 
Names ne-  $ 5. By the repeating, as has been said, 
cessary to  the idea of  an unit,  and joining it to an- 
numbers.  other unit, we make thereof one collective 
idea, marked by the name two.  And whosoever can 
do this,  and proceed on still, adding one more to the 
last collective idea which he had of  any number, and 
give a name to it, may count or have ideas for several 
collections of units, distinguished one from another, as 
far as he hath a series of names for following numbers, 
and a memory to retain that series, with their several 
names ;  all numeration  being but still the adding of 
one unit more, and giving to the whole together, as 
comprehended in one idea, a new or distinct name or 
sign, whereby to know it from those before and after, 
and distinguish it from every smaller or greater mul- 
titude of units.  So that he that can add one to one, 
and so to  two, and so go on with his tale, taking still 
with him the distinct names  belonging to every pro- 
gression ;  and so  again, by subtracting an unit  from 
each collection, retreat and lessen them ;  is capable of 
all the ideas  of  numbers within  the compass of  his 
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language,  or  for  which he  hath names,  though not 
perhaps of  more.  For  the several simple  modes  of 
numbers, being in our minds but so many combinations 
of units, which have no variety, nor are capable of any 
other difference but more or less, names or marks for 
each distinct combination  seem more necessary than 
in any other sort of ideas.  For without  such names 
or marks we can hardly well make use of numbers in 
reckoning,  especially where the combination is made 
up of any great multitude  of units ; which put toge- 
ther without a name or mark, to distinguish that pre- 
cise collection, will hardly be kept from being a heap 
in confusion. 
$ 6.  This I think to be the reason why some Ame- 
ricans I have  spoken  with  (who  were  otherwise  of 
quick and rational parts enough), could not, as we do, 
by any means count to one thousand, nor had any di- 
stinct idea of that number, though they could reckon 
very well to twenty;  because  their  language being 
scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessaries 
of a needy simple life, unacquainted either with trade 
or mathematics, had no words in it to stand for one 
thousand ; so that when they were discoursed with of 
those  great numbers,  they would  show  the hairs  of 
their head  to express a  great multitude which they 
could  not  number;  which  inability, I suppose,  pro- 
ceeded from their want of names.  The  Tououpinambos 
had no names for  numbers above five;  any number 
beyond that they made out by showing their fingers, 
and the fingers of others who were present*.  And I 
doubt not but we  ourselves might  distinctly number 
in words  a  great deal farther  than we  usually  do, 
would we find out but some fit denomination to sig- 
nify them by; whereas  in  the way  we  take now  to 
name them by  millions of  millions of millions, &c. it 
is hard to go beyond  eighteen, or  at most  four and 
* Histoire  d'un  voyage,  fait en  la terre du  Brasil, par  Jean de 
Lery, c. 20. :g.  . a06  Number.  Book a. 
twenty decimal progressions, without confusion.  But 
to show how much distinct names conduce to our well 
reck~ning,  or having useful ideas of  numbers, let us 
set all these following  figures in one  continued line, 
as the marks of  one number ;  V. g. 
Nonillions.  Octillions.  Septillions.  Sextillions.  Quintrillions. 
857324  162486  345896  437918  433147 
QuatriZZions.  'liillions.  Billions.  Millions.  Units. 
248106  235421  261734  368149  683137 
The ordinary way of naming this number in English 
will be  the often  repeating  of  millions,  of  millions, 
of millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, of  mil- 
lions, of millions  (which  is  the denomination  of  the 
second  six  figures.)  In which  way  it mill  be very 
hard to have any distinguishing notions of  this num- 
ber :  but whether,  by giving every six figures a new 
and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great 
many more figures in progression, might not easily be 
counted distinctly, and ideas of  them both got more 
easily to ourselves, and more plainly signified to others, 
I leave it to be considered.  This I mention only to 
show how necessary distinct names are to numbering, 
without pretending to introduce new ones of  my in- 
vention. 
Why chil-  5 7. Thus children, either for want of 
drenmmber  names to mark the several progressions of 
"Ot  ear*ier.  numbers, or not having yet the faculty to 
collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range 
them in a regular order, and so retain them in their 
memories, as is necessary to reckoning ;  do not begin 
to number very  early, nor proceed in it very far or 
steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished 
with good store  of  other ideas:  and one  may often 
observe them discourse  and reason  pretty well,  and 
have very clear  corlceptions  of  several  other  things, 
before they can tell twenty.  And some, through the 
default of their memories, who  cannot retain the se- 
veral combinations of  numbers, with their names an- 
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nexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of 
so  long a  train of  numeral  progressions,  and their 
one to another, are not able all their life-time 
to reckon  or regularly go over any moderate series 
of numbers.  For he that will count twenty, or have 
any idea of  that  number,  must  know that nineteen 
went before,  with the distinct name or sign of every 
one of them,  as they stand marked in their order; for 
wherever this fails, a gap is made,  the chain  breaks, 
and the progress in numbering can go no farther.  So 
that to reckon right, it is required,  1. That the mind 
distinguish carefully two ideas, which are different one 
from  another only by the addition or subtraction of 
one unit.  2.  That it retain in memory the names or 
marks of  the several  combinations,  from an unit  to 
that number;  and that not confusedly,  and at ran- 
dom, but in that exact order that the numbers follow 
one another: in either of which, if it trips, the whole 
business  of  numbering will be disturbed,  and there 
will remain only the confused idea of  multitude, but 
the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be 
attained to. 
9 8.  This farther is observable in num-  Number 
bers, that it is that which the mind makes  measures 
measura-  use of in measuring all things that by us 
are measurable, which principally are ex- 
pansion and duration ; and our idea  of  infinity, even 
when applied to those,  seems to be nothing but the 
infinity of  number.  For what  else  are our ideas of 
eternity and immensity, but the repeated additions of 
certain ideas  of  imagined  parts of  duration and ex- 
pansion, with the infinity of number, in which we can 
come to no end of addition ?  For such an inexhaustible 
stock, number  (of  all other our ideas),  most clearly 
furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one.  For let 
a man collect into one sum as great a number as  he 
pleases, this multitude,  how great soever, lessens not 
one jot the power of  adding to it, or brings him any 
nearer  the end  of  the inexhaustible  stock of  num- InJinity.  Book 2. 
ber, where still there remains as much to be added as 
if none were taken out.  And this endless addition or 
addibility  (if any one like the word better)  of  num- 
bers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think,  which 
gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity: 
of which more in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER XVII. 
Of Infinity. 
Infinity,  in  1. HE  that would know what kind of 
its original  idea it is  to which we  give the name of 
infinity, cannot do it better than by con-  attributed to 
space,  dur.+  sidering to what  infinity is by the mind 
tion, and  more  immediately  attributed,  and  then 
number.  how the mind comes to frame it. 
Finite and infinite  seem to me to be  looked  upon 
by the mind as the modes of  quantity, and to be at- 
tributed primarily in  their  first  designation  only  to 
those things which have parts, and are capable of in- 
crease  or  diminution, by the addition or subtraction 
of any the least part ;  and such are the ideas of space, 
duration,  and number, which we  have  considered in 
the foregoing chapters.  It is  true,  that we  cannot 
but be assured, that the great God, of whom and from 
whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite :  but 
yet when  we apply to that first and  supreme Being 
our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, 
we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubi- 
quity ; and, I think,  more  figuratively to his power, 
wisdom,  and goodness,  and  other attributes,  which 
are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. 
For, when  we  call  them  infinite,  we  have  no  other 
idea  of  this  infinity,  but what  carries with  it some 
sog 
reflection on, and imitation of, that number or extent 
of  the acts or  objects  of  God's  power,  wisdom,  and 
goodness, which can never be supposed so great or so 
many, which these attributes will not always surmount 
and exceed, let us multiply them in our thoughts as 
far as we can, with all the infinity of endless number. 
I do not pretend to say how these  attributes  are in 
God, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow 
capacities.  They do, without doubt, contain in them 
all possible perfection :  but this, I say, is our way of 
conceiving them, and these our ideas of their infinity. 
$ 2. Finite then, and infinite, being by  The idea of 
the mind  looked  on  as  modifications  of  finite easily 
expansion and duration, the next thing to  got. 
be considered  is, how the mind  comes by them.  As 
for the idea of finite, there is no great difficulty.  The 
obvious  portions  of  extension that affect  our senses, 
carry with them into the mind the idea of finite ;  and 
the ordinary periods of  succession, whereby we mea- 
sure time and duration, as hours, days, and years, are 
bounded lengths.  The difficulty is, how we come by 
those boundless ideas of eternity and immensity, since 
the objects we  converse with come so  much short of 
any approach or proportion to that largeness. 
$ 9. Every one that has any idea of any  H,,  ,, 
stated lengths of  space,  as a  foot, finds  come  by the 
that he can repeat that idea ;  and, joining  idea of infi- 
it to the former,  make  the idea  of  two  nity. 
feet; and by the addition of a third, three feet ; anci 
so on, without ever coming to an end of his addition, 
whether of the same idea of a foot, or if he pleases of 
doubling it, or any other idea he has of any length, as 
a mile, or diameter of  the earth, or  of the orbis mag- 
nus: for whichsoever  of these he takes, and how often 
soever he doubles, or  any otherwise multiplies it,  he 
finds that after he has continued his  doubling in his 
thoughts, and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases, 
he has no more  reason to stop, nor is  one jot nearer 
the end of such addition, than he was  at first settir~g 
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out.  The power  of  enlarging his  idea of  space by 
farther additions remaining  still the same, he hence 
takes the idea of infinite space. 
Our idea of  $ 4.  This, I think, is the way whereby 
Bpace  bound-  the mind gets the idea of  infinite  space. 
less.  It is  a  quite  different  consideration to 
examine whether the mind  has the  idea 
of such a boundless space actually existing, since our 
ideas are not always proofs of  the existence of things; 
but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I 
may say, that we are apt to think that space in itself 
is actually boundless;  to which imagination, the idea 
of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us.  For 
it being considered by us either as the extension  of 
body, or as existing by itself, without any solid matter 
taking it up (for of such a void space we have not only 
the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the mo- 
tion of body, its necessary existence),  it is impossible 
the mind should be ever  able to find or suppose any 
end of it, or be stopped any where in its progress in 
this space,  how  far soever  it extends  its  thoughts. 
Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, 
are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its far- 
ther progress  in  space  and extension,  that it rather 
facilitates and enlarges it; for  so far as that body 
reaches,  so  far no one can doubt of  extension:  and 
when we are come to the utmost extremity of  body, 
what is there that can there put a stop and satisfy the 
mind that it is at the end of space, when it perceives 
that it is not ;  nay, when it is satisfied that body itself 
can move into it  ?  For if it be necessary for the mo- 
tion of  body,  that there should  be  an empty space, 
though ever so little, here amongst bodies ;  and if it 
be possible for body to move in or through that empty 
space  (nay, it is impossible for any particle of matter 
to move but into an empty space),  the same possibi- 
lity of a body's  moving into a void  space, beyond the 
utmost bounds of body,  as well as into a void  space 
interspersed amongst bodies, will always remain clear 
and evident:  the idea of  empty pure space, whether 
within  or  beyond  the confines  of  all bodies,  being 
the same,  differing not in nature,  though in 
bulk;  and there being nothing to hinder  body from 
moving  into it.  So that wherever  the mind  places 
itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from 
all bodies, it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere 
find  any bounds,  any end; and so must  necessarily 
conclude it, by the very nature and idea of each part 
of it, to be actually infinite. 
i$ 5. As by the power we  find in our-  And so of 
selves  of  repeating,  as often as we will,  duration. 
any idea of  space, we get the idea of  immensity ;  so, 
by  being  able  to repeat the idea of  any length of 
duration we  have in our minds with all the endless 
addition of number, we come by the idea of eternity. 
For we find in ourselves, we can no more come to an 
end of such repeated ideas  than we can come to the 
end of number, which every one perceives he cannot. 
But here again it is  another question, quite different 
from our having an idea of eternity, to know whether 
there were any real being,  whose duration has been 
eternal.  And as to this, I say, he that considers some- 
thing now existing,  must necessarily come to some- 
thing eternal.  But having spoke of  this in another 
place, I shall say here no more of it,  but proceed on 
to some other considerations of our idea of infinity. 
§ 6.  If it  be so, that our idea of infinity  Why other 
be got from the power we observe in our-  ideas are 
selves of repeating without end our own  capable of 
ideas ;  it may be demanded, "why  we do  in fin it^ 
not attribute infinite to other ideas,  as well as those 
of  space  and duration;"  since they may be as easily 
and as often repeated in our minds as the other; and 
yet nobody  ever thinks  of  infinite sweetness,  or in- 
finite whiteness,  though he can repeat  the idea of 
sweet or white  as frequently as those of a yard, or a 
day ?  To which I answer,  all the ideas that are con- 
sidered  as  having parts,  and are capable of  increase 
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by the addition of  any equal or less parts,  afford us 
by their repetition the idea of  infinity ; because with 
this endless repetition there is continued  an enlarge- 
ment,  of  which  there can  be no  end.  But in other 
ideas it is not so ;  for to the largest idea of extension 
or duration that I at present have, the addition of any 
the least part makes an increase ;  but to the perfectest 
idea I have of the whitest whiteness, if I add another 
of  a less  or equal whiteness  (and of  a whiter than I 
have I cannot add the idea), it makes no increase, and 
enlarges not my idea at  all ;  and therefore the different 
ideas of whiteness, &c. are called degrees.  For those 
ideas that consist  of  parts are capable of  being  aug- 
mented by every addition of the least part ;  but if you 
take the idea of white, which one parcel of snow yielded 
yesterday to our sight, and another idea of white from 
another parcel of snow you see to-day,  and put them 
together in  your mind,  they embody,  as it were,  and 
run into one,  and the idea of  whiteness  is not  at all 
increased;  and if  we add a less  degree of  whiteness 
to a greater,  we are so far from increasing that we 
diminish it.  Those ideas that consist not of parts can- 
not be augmented to what proportion men please, or 
be stretched beyond what they have received by their 
senses; but space,  duration,  and number,  being ca- 
pable of increase by repetition,  leave in the mind an 
idea of  endless  room  for more :  nor can we conceive 
any where a stop to a farther addition or progression, 
and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the 
thought of infinity. 
Difference  $ 7. Though our idea of infinity arise 
htweeninfi-  from the contemplation of  quantity, and 
nit~ofs~ace,  the endless increase the mind is  able to 
and space 
infinite.  make iu quantity, by the repeated  addi- 
tions of what portions thereof it pleases ; 
yet I guess we cause great confusion in our thoughts, 
when we join infinity to any supposed idea in quantity 
the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or 
reason about an infinite quantity, viz. an infinite space, 
Ch. 17. 
or an infinite duration.  For our idea of infinity being, 
as 1  think, an endless growing idea ;  but the idea of any 
quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated 
in that idea  (for be it as great as it will, it can be no 
greater than it is), to join  infinity to it, is to adjust a 
standing measure to a growing bulk ;  and therefore I 
think it is  not an insignificant subtilty, if I say that 
we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the 
infinity of space, and the idea of a space infinite: the 
first is nothing but a supposed endless progression of 
the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases; 
but to have actually in the mind the idea of  a space 
infinite, is to suppose the mind already passed  over, 
and  actually to have  a  view  of  all  those  repeated 
ideas of  space, which an endless repetition can never 
totally  represent  to it; which  carries  in  it a  plain 
contradiction. 
5  8.  This,  perhaps,  will  be  a  little  We have ., 
plainer,  if  we  consider  it in  numbers.  idea of infi- 
The infinity of  numbers,  to the end of  nite 
whose  addition  every  one  perceives  there is  no  ap- 
proach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: 
but how clear soever this idea of the infinity of num- 
ber  be,  there is nothing yet more evident,  than the 
absurdity of  the actual idea  of  an infinite  number. 
Whatsoever  positive  ideas we  have in our minds of 
any space, duration, or number,  let them be ever so 
great, they are still finite ; but when we suppose an 
inexhaustible  remainder,  from which  we  remove  all 
bounds,  and wherein we allow the mind  an endless 
progression of  thought, without ever completing  the 
idea, there we have our idea of infinity ;  which though 
it seems to be pretty clear when we consider nothing 
else  in it but the negation of  an end,  yet when we 
would  frame in our minds  the idea  of  an  infinite 
space or duration, that idea is very obscure and con- 
fused, because it is made up of  two parts, very dif- 
ferent, if not inconsistent.  For let a man frame in his 
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will,  it is plain the mind rests and terminates in that 
idea, which is contrary to the idea of  infinity, which 
consists in a supposed endless progression.  And there- 
fore I think it is,  that we  are so easily confounded, 
when  we  come  to argue and  reason  about infinite 
space or duration, &c.:  because  the parts of  such an 
idea not  being  perceived  to be,  as they are, incon- 
sistent, the one side or other always perplexes, what- 
ever consequences we draw from the other ;  as an idea 
of motion not passing on would perplex any one, who 
should argue from such an idea, which is not better 
than an idea  of  motion  at rest:  and such  another 
seems  to me to be the idea of  a space,  or (which is 
the same thing) a  number infinite, i. e. of a space or 
number which the mind actually has, and so views and 
terminates in ;  and of  a space or number which, in a 
constant and endless enlarging and progression, it can 
in thought never attain to.  For how large soever an 
idea of space I have in my mind, it is no larger than 
it is that instant that I have it, though I be capable 
the next instant to double it,  and so on in inznitum : 
for that alone is infinite which  has no bounds;  and 
that the idea of  infinity, in which  our thoughts can 
find none. 
~~~b~~  af-  $ 9.  But of  a11  other ideas, it is num- 
fords us the  ber,  as I have  said,  which  I think fur- 
clearest idea  nishes  us with  the clearest and most di- 
stinct idea of  infinity we are capable of. 
For even in space and duration, when the  mind pursues 
the idea of  infinity,  it there makes  use of  the ideas 
and repetitions of numbers, as of millions and millions 
of  miles, or years, which  are so many distinct ideas, 
kept best by number from  running into a confused 
heap, wherein the mind loses itself;  and when it has 
added together as many millions,  &c. as it pleases, of 
known lengths of space or duration, the clearest idea 
it  can get  of infinity is the confused incomprehensible 
remainder of  endless addible numbers,  which affords 
no prospect of stop or boundary. 
9 10. It will,  perhaps,  give us a little  Ourdifferent 
farther light into the idea we have of in-  conceptionof 
finity, and discover to us that it is nothing  ~~~;:","~~~ 
but the infinity of number applied to de-  duration, 
terminate parts, of which we have in our  and expan- 
minds the distinct ideas,  if we consider,  sion. 
that number is not generally thought by us infinite, 
whereas  duration and  extension  are apt to be  so; 
which  arises from  hence,  that in number we  are at 
one end as it were :  for there being in number nothing 
less than an unit, we there stop, and are at an end ; 
but in addition or increase of number, we can set no 
bounds.  And so it is like a line, whereof one end ter- 
minating with us, the other is extended still forwards 
beyond  all that we  can conceive;  but in space and 
duration it is otherwise.  For in duration we consider 
it, as if this line of number were extended both ways to 
an unconceivable,  undeterminate, and infinite length ; 
which  is  evident to any one that will but reflect  on 
what consideration he hath of eternity ;  which, I sup- 
pose, he will find to be nothing else but the turning 
this infinity of number both ways, d parte ante and d 
parte post,  as they speak.  For when we would  con- 
sider eternity, d parte ante, what do we but, beginning 
from ourselves and the present time we are in, repeat 
In our minds the  ideas of years, or ages, or any other 
assignable portion of duration past, with a prospect of 
proceeding in such addition,  with all the infinity of 
number? and  when  we  would  consider  eternity,  d 
parte  post,  we just  after the same rate begin from 
ourselves,  and reckon  by  multi  lied periods yet to 
come,  still extending that line o  f  number,  as before. 
And these two being put together,  are that infinite 
duration we call eternity :  which, as we turn our view 
either way,  forwards or backwards,  appears infinite, 
because  we  still  turn that way  the infinite end  of 
number, i. e. the power still of adding more. 
$ 11. The same happens also in space, wherein con- 
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on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of num- 
ber;  and reckoning  any way from ourselves,  a yard, 
mile,  diameter of  the earth, or orbis rnagnus,  by the 
infinity of number, we add others to them as often as 
we  will;  and having  no more reason to set bounds 
to those repeated  ideas than we have to set bounds 
to number, we have that indeterminable  idea of  im- 
mensity. 
Infinite di-  $ la.  And since in any bulk of matter our 
visibility.  thoughts can never  arrive at the utmost 
divisibility, therefore there is an apparent infinity to us 
also in  that, which has the infinity also of  number; 
but with this difference, that, in the former considera- 
tions of  the infinity of  space  and duration, we  only 
use addition of numbers ; whereas this is like the di- 
vision of  an unit into its fractions, wherein the mind 
also can proceed in  inznitum, as well as in the former 
additions ;  it being indeed but the addition still of new 
numbers :  though in  the addition of  the one we can 
have  no more the positive  idea of  a space infinitely 
a  great, than, in the division of  the other, we can have 
the idea of a body infinitely little ;  our idea of infinity 
being,  as I may say, a  growing or fugitive idea, still 
in a boundless progression, that can stop nowhere. 
N~ positive  5 13. Though it be  hard,  I think,  to 
idea of in-  find any one so absurd as to say,  he has 
finity.  the  positive  idea  of  an  actual  infinite 
number;  the infinity  whereof  lies  only  in  a  power 
still of adding any combination of units to any former 
number,  and that as long and as much as one will; 
the like also being  in the infinity of  space and dura- 
tion, which power leaves always to the mind room for 
endless  additions;  yet there  be  those  who  imagine 
they  have  positive  ideas  of  infinite  duration  and 
space.  It would, I think, be  enough to destroy any 
such positive idea of  infinite, to ask him that has it, 
whether he could add to it or no ;  which would easily 
show the mistake of such a positive idea.  We can, I 
think, have no positive idea of  any space or duration 
which is not made up and commensurate to repeated 
numbers of  feet or yards,  or days and years,  which 
are the common measures, whereof we have the ideas 
in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness 
of this sort of quantities.  And therefore,  since an in- 
finite idea of space or duration must needs be made 
up of infinite parts, it can have no other infinity than 
that of number, capable still of farther addition ;  but 
not an actual positive idea of a number infinite.  For, 
I think, it is evident that the addition of finite things 
together  (as  are all  lengths,  whereof  we  have  the 
positive  ideas) can never otherwise produce the idea 
of infinite, than as number does ; which, consisting of 
additions of  finite units one to another,  suggests the 
idea of  infinite,  only by a power we  find we have of 
still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same 
kind, without coming one jot  nearer the end of  such 
progression. 
§ 14. They who would prove their idea of  infinite 
to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant argu- 
ment, taken from the negation of an end ;  which being 
negative, the negation of it is positive.  He that con- 
siders that the end is,  in body,  but the extremity or 
superficies of that body,  will not perhaps be forward 
to grant that the end is a bare negative : and he that 
perceives the end of his pen is black or white, will be 
apt to think that the end is something more than a 
pure negation.  Nor is it, when applied to duration, 
the bare negation of existence, but more properly the 
last moment of  it.  But if they will have the end to 
be nothing but the bare negation of  existence, I am 
sure they cannot deny but the beginning is the first 
instant of being, and is not by any body conceived to 
be a bare negation ;  and therefore, by their own argu- 
ment, the idea of  eternal, $ parte ante, or of  a dura- 
tion without a beginning, is but a negative idea. 
§ 15.  The idea of  infinite has,  I con-  What is PO- 
fess,  something of  positive  in all  those  sitive, what 
things we  apply to it.  When we would  in Book 8. 
our idea of  think of  infinite space or duration, we at 
infinite.  first step usually make some  very  large 
idea,  as perhaps of  millions of  ages,  or miles,  which 
possibly we  double and multiply several times.  All 
that we thus amass together in our thoughts is posi- 
tive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive 
ideas of  space or duration.  But what still  remains 
beyond  this,  we  have  no  more  a  positive  distinct 
notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the sea; 
where, having let down a large portion of  his sound- 
ing-line,  he reaches  no  bottom:  whereby  he knows 
the depth to be so many fathoms, and more ;  but how 
much the more is be hath no distinct notion at all: 
and could he always  supply  new line,  and find  the 
plummet always sink, without ever stopping, he would 
be something in the posture of the  mind reaching after 
a complete and positive idea of infinity.  In which case 
let this line be ten,  or one thousand fathoms long, it 
equally discovers what is beyond it; and gives only 
this confused  and comparative idea, that this is not 
all,  but one  may  yet  go farther.  So much  as the 
mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea 
of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being 
always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is still 
imperfect and incomplete.  So  much space as the mind 
takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness, is a 
clear picture, and positive in the understanding :  but 
infinite is still greater.  1. Then the idea of so much 
is positive  and clear.  2. The idea of greater is also 
clear, but it is but a comparative idea, viz.  the idea of 
so much greater as cannot be comprehended ;  and this 
is plainly negative,  not positive.  For he has  no po- 
sitive clear  idea of  the largeness  of  any  extension 
(which is that sought; for in the idea of  infinite), that 
has not a comprehensive idea of the dimensions of it ; 
and such nobody, I think,  pretends to in what is in- 
finite.  For to say a man has a positive clear idea of 
any quantity, without knowing how great it is,  is as 
reasonable as to say, he has  the positive clear idea of 
the number of the sands on the sea-shore, who knows 
not how many there be, but only that they  are more 
than twenty.  For just  such  a  perfect and  positive 
idea has he of an infinik space or duration, who says 
it is  larger than the extent or duration of  ten,  one 
hundred, one thousand, or any other number of miles, 
or years, whereof he has, or can have a positive idea ; 
which is all the idea, I think, we have of infinite.  So 
that what lies beyond  our positive  idea towards in- 
finity,  lies  in obscurity;  and has  the indeterminate 
confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither 
do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large 
for a finite and narrow capacity :  and that cannot but 
be very far from a positive complete idea, wherein the 
greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, 
under  the  undeterminate  intimation  of  being  still 
greater :  for to say, that having in any quantity mea- 
sured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the 
end, is only to say, that that quantity is greater.  So 
that the  negation  of  an end in any quantity is,  in 
other words, only to say, that it is bigger :  and a total 
negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still 
with you,  in all the progressions your thoughts shall 
make in quantity, and adding this idea of still greater 
to all the ideas you have, or can be supposed to have, 
of  quantity.  Now whether such an idea as that be 
positive, I leave any one to consider. 
$ 16. I ask those who say they have a  ham no 
positive  idea  of  eternity,  whether  their  positive idea 
idea of duration includes in it succession,  of an infinite 
or not ? If it does not, they ought to show 
the difference  of  their notion  of  duration,  when ap- 
plied to an eternal being and to a finite ; since, per- 
haps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own 
to them their weakness of understanding in this point; 
and acknowledge, that the notion they have of dura- 
tion forces them to conceive, that whatever has dura- 
tion,  is of  a  longer  continuanee  today than it was 
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istence,  they  return  to  the  pzcncturn  stans  of  the 
schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend 
the matter, or help us to a more clear and positive idea 
of  infinite  duration,  there  being  nothing  more  in- 
conceivable to me than duration without succession. 
Besides,  that punctum stans,  if it signify  any  thing, 
being  not  quantum, finite  or  infinite  cannot belong 
to it.  But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate 
succession  from  any  duration  whatsoever,  our  idea 
of  eternity can be nothing but of  infinite succession 
of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exist; 
and whether any one has, or call have a  positive idea 
of an actual infinite number, I leave him to consider, 
till his  infinite  number be so great that he himself 
can add no more to it ;  and as long as he can increase 
it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of 
it a little too scanty for positive infinity. 
§ 17. I think it unavoidable for every considering 
rational  creature, that will but examine his own or 
any other existence, to have the notion of  an eternal 
wise Being, who had no beginning ;  and such an idea 
of infinite duration I am sure I have.  But this nega- 
tion of a beginning being but the negation of  a posi- 
tive thing, scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity; 
which whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts 
to, I confess myself  at a loss,  and I find I cannot at- 
tain any clear comprehension of it. 
N~ positive  § 18. He that thinks he has a positive 
idea of in-  idea of  infinite space, will, when he con- 
finite  siders it, find that he can no more have a 
positive idea of  the greatest, than he has of  the least 
space.  For in this latter, which  seems the easier of 
the two, and more within our comprehension, we are 
capable only of a comparative idea of smallness, which 
will always be less than any one whereof we have the 
positive idea.  All our positive ideas of any quantity, 
whether great or little, have always bounds ;  though 
our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to 
the  one  and take from  the  other,  hath no bounds: 
for that which remains either great or little, not being 
comprehended in that positive  idea which we have, 
lies in obscurity; and we have no other idea of it, but 
of  the power of  enlarging  the one,  and diminishing 
the other, without ceasing.  A  pestle and mortar will 
as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility 
as  the acutest  thought of  a  mathematician;  and  a 
surveyor may as soon with his chain measure our in- 
finite space as a philosopher by the quickest flight of 
mind reach it,  or by thinking comprehend it ;  which 
is to have a positive idea of  it.  He that thinks on a 
cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and positive idea 
of it in his mind, and so can frame one of +,  +,  -$,  and 
so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something 
very little ; but yet reaches not the idea of  that in- 
comprehensible littleness which division ca'n produce. 
What remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts 
as when he first began ;  and therefore he never comes 
at a11  to have a clear and positive idea of that small- 
ness which is conseauent to infinite divisibility. 
§ 19. Every one that looks towards in-  Gat  is 
finity does, as I have said, at first glance  sitive, what 
make some very large idea of that which  negative, in 
he applies it to, let it be space or dura- 
tion; and possibly he wearies his thoughts, 
by multiplying in his mind that first large idea:  but 
yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a posi- 
tive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive 
infinite,  than the country-fellow  had  of  the water, 
which was yet to come  and pass the channel of the 
river where he stood : 
Rusticus expectat durn transeat amnis, at ille 
Labitur, et labetur in omne volubilis aevurn. 
$ 20.  There are some I have met with,  Some think 
that put so much difference between in-  the?havea 
positive idea  finit;  duration  and  infinite  space,  that 
of  they persuade themselves that they have  and not ofin- 
a positive idea of eternity ;  but that they  finite space. $22  In$nity.  Book 2. 
have  not,  nor  can have  any  idea of  infinite  space. 
The reason  of  which  mistake  I suppose to be this, 
that finding by  a due contemplation of  causes  and 
effects,  that it is  necessary  to admit  some  eternal 
being,  and so to consider  the real existence of that 
being, as taken up and commensurate to their idea of 
eternity; but,  on the other side,  not  finding it ne- 
cessary, but on the contrary apparently absurd, that 
body should be infinite ;  they forwardly conclude, that 
they have no idea of  infinite space, because  they can 
have no idea of infinite matter.  Which consequence, I 
conceive, is very ill collected ; because  the existence 
of  matter is  no ways  necessary  to the existence of 
space, no more  than  the existence of  motion,  or the 
sun, is necessary to duration, though duration uses to 
be measured  by it: and I doubt not but that a man 
may have the idea of ten thousand miles square, with- 
out any body so big, as well as the idea of  ten thou- 
sand years,  without  any  body  so  old.  It seems  as 
easy to me to have the idea of  space empty of  body, 
as to think of  the capacity of  a bushel without corn, 
or the hollow of a nut-shell without a kernel in it: it 
being no more necessary that there should be existing 
a, solid body infinitely extended, because we have  an 
idea of  the infinity of  space, than it is necessary that 
the world should be eternal, because we have an idea 
of infinite duration.  And why should we  think our 
idea of  infinite  space  requires  the real existence of 
matter to support it,  when  we find that we have as 
clear  an idea of  an infinite  duration to come,  as we 
have  of  infinite  duration  past? Though, I suppose, 
nobody thinks it conceivable,  that any thing does or 
has existed in that future duration.  Nor is it possible 
to join  our idea of  future duration with present or 
past existence,  any more than it is possible to make 
the ideas of  yesterday,  to-day,  and to-morrow,  to be 
the same; or  bring  ages past and future together, 
and make them contemporary.  But if these men are 
of  the mind,  that they have clearer ideas of infinite 
~h.  17.  Infinity.  223 
duration than of infinite space, because it  is past doubt 
that God has existed from all eternity, but there is no 
real matter co-extended with infinite space ;  yet those 
philosophers who are of  opinion that infinite space is 
possessed  by God's  infinite  omnipresence, as well  as 
infinite duration  by his  external existence,  must be 
allowed to have as clear an idea of infinite space as of 
infinite duration ;  though neither of them, I think, has 
any positive idea of infinity in either case.  For what- 
soever  positive  idea  a man has in  his  mind  of  any 
quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former as 
easy as he can add together the ideas of two days, or 
two paces, which are positive ideas of  lengths he has 
in his mind, and so on as long as he pleases ;  whereby 
if a man had a positive idea of infinite, either duration 
or space, he could  add two infinites  together;  nay, 
make one infinite infinitely bigger than another :  ab- 
surdities too gross to be confuted. 
5 21. But yet after all this, there being  Supposed 
men who ~ersuade  themselves that thev  positive 
have clearlnositive comarehensive ideas df  Ideas 
nity, cause  infinity, it {s  fit they eniooy  their privilege:  of 
and I should  be  very  glad  (with  some 
others  that I  know,'  tho acknowledge  they  have 
none such) to be better informed  by their communi- 
cation.  For I have been hitherto apt to think that the 
great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually 
involve all discourses concerning infinity, whether of 
space, duration, or divisibility, have been the certain 
marks of a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the dis- 
proportion the nature thereof has to the comprehen- 
sion of  our narrow capacities.  For whilst men talk 
and dispute of  infinite space  or  duration, as if  they 
had as complete  and positive ideas of them as they 
have  of  the names  they  use  for  them,  or  as they 
have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate 
quantity;  it is no wonder if the incomprehensible na- 
ture of  the thing they discourse of, or reason  about, 
leads them into perplexities and contradictions ;  and 8243  0  f  other Simple Modes.  ~ook  2. 
their minds  be  overlaid  by an object  too  large and 
mighty to be surveyed and managed by them. 
~11  these  tj 22. If I have  dwelt pretty  long  on 
ideas from  the consideration of  duration, space, and 
sensation 
and reflec-  number,  and what  arises  frdmAthe  con- 
tion.  templation of them, infinity ;  it  is possibly  .-.-- 
no more  than the matter requires,  there being  few 
simple ideas whose  modes gi;e  more exercise io the 
thoughts of men than these do.  I pretend not to treat 
of them in their full latitude ;  it suffices to my design 
to show how the mind receives them, such as they are, 
from sensation and reflection ;  and how even the idea 
we  have of  infinity, how remote soever  it may seem 
to be  from  any object  of  sense  or  operation of  our 
mind, has nevertheless, as dl our other ideas, its ori- 
ginal  there.  Some  mathematicians  perhaps  of  ad- 
vanced speculations, may have other ways to introduce 
into their  minds  ideas  of  infinity ; but this  hinders 
not,  but that they  themselves,  as  well  as  all other 
men,  got the first  ideas which  they had  of  infinity 
from sensation and reflectign, in the method we have 
here set down. 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
Of other Sintple  Modes. 
Modes of  $ 1. THOUGH  I have in the foregoing 
motion.  chapters shown how  from simple  ideas, 
taken in by sensation, the mind comes to extend itself 
even to infinity ;  which however it may, of  all others, 
seem most remote from  any sensible perception, yet 
at last hath nothing in it but what is made  out of 
simple ideas, received into the mind by the senses, and 
afterwards there put toget,her by the faculty the mind 
has to repeat its own ideas :  though, I say, these might 
be instances enough of  simple  modes  of  the simple 
ideas of sensation, and suffice to show how the mind 
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comes by them ;  yet I shall, for method's sake, though 
briefly, give an account of  some  few more,  and then 
proceed to more complex ideas. 
tj 2. To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, 
leap,  skip,  and  abundance of  others that might be 
named, are words which are no sooner heard but every 
one,  who  understands  English,  has presently in his 
mind  distinct ideas,  which  are all but the different 
modifications  of  motion.  Modes  of  motion  answer 
those of extension : swift  and slow are two different 
ideas of  motion,  the measures whereof  are made  of 
the distances  of  time  and space  put  together;  so 
they  are  complex  ideas  comprehending  time  and 
space with motion. 
$ 3. The like variety have we in sounds.  Modes of 
Every articulate word is a different modi-  sounds. 
fication  of  sound:  by which  we  see,  that from  the 
sense of hearing, by such modifications, the mind may 
be furnished with  distinct ideas to almost an infinite 
number.  Sounds also,  besides  the distinct cries  of 
birds and beasts, are modified by diversity of notes of 
different length put together, which  make that com- 
plex idea called a tune, which  a musician  may have 
in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all, 
by reflecting on the ideas of  those sounds so put to- 
gether silently in his own fancy. 
$ 4.  Those  of  colours  are  also  very  Modes of 
various : some  we  take notice of  as the  colours- 
different degrees, or, as they are termed, shades of the 
same colour.  But since we very seldom make assem- 
blages of colours either for use or delight, but figure 
is taken in also and has its part in it, as in painting, 
weaving, needle-works,  &c. those which are taken no- 
tice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes, as 
being made up of ideas of divers kinds, viz. figure and 
colour, such as beauty, rainbow, &e. 
$ 5.  All compounded tastes and smells  Modes of 
are also modes made up of the simple ideas  taste. 
of those senses.  But they being such as generally we 
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have no names for, are less taken notice of,  and can- 
not be set down in writing;  and therefore must be 
left without enumeration to the thoughts  and expe- 
rience of my reader. 
some  simple  5 6. In  general it  may be observed, that 
modes have  those simple modes which are considered 
no names.  but as different degrees of the same simple 
idea,  though they are in themselves  many of  them 
very  distinct ideas,  yet have  ordinarily no  distinct 
names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas, 
where the difference is but very small between them. 
Whether men have neglected these modes, and given 
no names to them, as wanting measures nicely to di- 
stinguish them-or  because, when they were so distin- 
guished,  that knowledge would not be of  general or 
necessary use-I  leave it to the thoughts of  others : 
it is sufficient  to my purpose to show  that all our 
simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and 
reflection ;  and that when the mind has them, it can 
variously repeat and compound  them,  and so  make 
new complex ideas.  But though white, red, or sweet, 
&c. have not been  modified  ar made  into complex 
ideas, by several combinations, so as to be named, and 
thereby ranked into species ;  yet some others of  the 
simple ideas, viz. those of unity, duration, motion, &c. 
above instanced in, as also power and.thinking, have 
been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas, 
with names belonging to them. 
Wh  some  d 
9 7. The reason whereof, I suppose, has 
m  es have,  been this ;  that, the great concernment of 
and others  men being with men one amongst another, 
have not,  the knowledge of  men and their actions, 
names.  and the signifying of them to one another, 
was most necessary;  and therefore  they made ideas 
of actions very nicely modified,  and gave those com- 
plex ideas names, that they might the more easily re- 
cord  and discourse  of  those  things  they were  daily 
conversant in, without long ambages and circumlocu- 
tions;  and that the things they were continually to 
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give  and  receive  information  about  might  be  the 
easier and quicker understood.  That this is so, and 
that men  in  framing  different  complex  ideas,  and 
giving them names, have been much governed by the 
end of speech in general  (which is a  very short and 
expedite way of conveying their  thoughts one to an- 
other),  is evident in the naines which in several arts 
have been found out and applied to several complex 
ideas of  modified  actions  belonging  to their several 
trades, for  despatch  sake,  in their  direction or dis- 
courses  about them;  which ideas are not  generally 
framed in the minds  of  men  not  conversant  about 
these operations.  And  thence  the words that stand 
for them, by the greatest part of men of the same lan- 
guage, are not understood :  v.g.  colshire, drilling, fil- 
tration,  cohobation,  are words  standing  for  certain 
complex  ideas,  which  being  seldom in the minds of 
any but those few whose particular employmellts do 
at every turn suggest them to their thoughts,  those 
names of them  are not generally understood  but by 
smiths and chymists ;  who having framed the complex 
ideas which these words  stand for, and having given 
names to them, or  received  them  from others, upon 
hearing of these names in communication, readily con- 
ceive those ideas in their minds ;  as by cohobation all 
the simple ideas of distilling, and the pouring the li- 
quor distilled from any thing back upon the remain- 
ing matter, and distilling it again.  Thus we see that 
there are great varieties of  simple ideas,  as of tastes 
and smells, which have no names, and of modes many 
more ;  which either not having been generally enough 
observed,  or  else  not being of  any great use  to be 
taken notice of in the affairs and converse of men, they 
have not had names  given  to them,  and so pass not 
for species.  This we shall have occasion hereafter to 
consider more  at large, when  we  come  to speak  of 
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CHAPTER  XIX. 
Of  the  Modes  of Thinlcing. 
Sensation,  fS  1. WHEN  the mind turns its view in- 
remem- 
brance,  con-  wards upon  itself,  and contemplates its 
tempbtion, own actions, thinking is the first that oc- 
&e.  curs.  In it the mind  observes  a  erreat 
variety of modifications,  and from thence receivcs  di- 
stinct ideas.  Thus the perception which actually ac- 
companies, and is annexed to any impression  on  the 
body, made by an external object, heing distinct from 
all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind 
with  a  distinct idea, which we call sensation ; which 
is,  as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the 
understanding by the senses.  The same idea, when 
it again recurs without  the operation of  the like ob- 
ject on the external sensory, is remembrance ;  if it be 
sought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour 
found  and brought again in view, it is recollection; 
if it be held there long under attentive consideration, 
it is  contemplation.  When ideas float in our  mind, 
without any reflection or regard of the understanding, 
it is that which the French call reverie, our language 
has scarce a name  for it.  When the ideas that offer 
tliemselves  (for, as I have observed in another place, 
whilst we are awake there will  always  be a  train of 
ideas succeeding one another in our minds) are taken 
notice of,  and, as it were,  registered  in  the memory, 
it is  attention.  When the mind with great earnest- 
ness,  and of  choice, fixes its view on any idea, consi- 
ders it on all sides, and will  not be called off by the 
ordinary solicitation of  other ideas, it is that we call 
intention or study.  Sleep, without dreaming, is rest 
from all these : and dreaming itself is the having of 
ideas  (whilst the outward senses are stopped, so that 
they  receive  not  outward  objects  with  their  usual 
quickness) in the mind, not suggested by any external 
objects  or  known  occasion, nor under any choice or 
of  the understanding  at all.  And whether 
that, which we call ecstasy, be not dreaming with the 
eyes open, I leave to be examined. 
S 2.  These are some few instances of those various 
modes  of  thinking which  the mind  may  observe  in 
itself,  and so have  as distinct ideas of  as it hath of 
white and red, a square or a eircle.  I do not pretend 
to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this set 
of ideas, which are got from reflection :  that would be 
to make a volume.  It suffices to my present purpose 
to have shown here,  by some  few examples, of what 
sort these ideas are, and how the  mind comes by them ; 
especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to  treat 
more  at large  of  reasoning,  judging,  volition,  and 
knowledge, which are some  of  the most considerable 
operations of the mind and modes of thinking. 
5 3.  But perhaps it may not be an un-  ~h,  ,aria,, 
pardonable  digression, nor wholly imper-  attention of 
tinent to our present design, if we reflect  the mind in 
liere upon  the different state ofthe mind 
thinking. 
in thinking, which those instances of attention, reverie, 
and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough 
suggest.  That there are ideas, some or other, always 
present in the mind of a waking man, every one's  ex- 
perience convinces him, though the mind employs it- 
self  about them with  several  degrees  of  attention. 
Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnest- 
ness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns 
their ideas on all sides,  remarks  their  relations  and 
circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with 
such  intention,  that it shuts out all other thoughts, 
and takes no notice of the ordinary impressions made 
then on  the senses, which  at another  season  would 
produce very sensible perceptions : at other times it 
barely observes the train of  ideas that succeed in the 
understanding,  without  directing and pursuing  any 
of  them ;  and at other times it lets them pass almost 
quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no im- 
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Hence it is  $ 4. This difference  of  intention  and 
prohble  remission of the mind in thinking, with a 
that think- 
ing is  the  great variety of  degrees between earnest 
action, not  study and very  near minding nothing at 
essence of  all, ;very  one; I think, has  G~erimeited 
the soul.  in himsdf.  Trace it  little farther, and 
you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the 
senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on 
the organs of sense, which at  other times produce very 
vivid and sensible ideas.  I need not for this, instance 
in those who sleep out whole stormy nights, without 
hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling 
the shaking of  the house, which are sensible enough 
to those who  are waking:  but in this  retirement  of 
the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more 
loose and incoherent  manner  of  thinking, which we 
call dreaming ;  and, last of all, sound sleep closes the 
scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances.  This, 
I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, 
and his own observation without difficulty leads him 
thus far.  That which I would farther conclude from 
hence is, that since the mind  can sensibly put on, at 
several  times,  several  degrees  of  thinking,  and  be 
sometimes even in a waking man so remiss, as to have 
thoughts dim and obscure to that degree, that they 
are very little removed from none at all ;  and at last, 
in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight 
perfectly of all ideas whatsoever : since, I say, this is 
evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience, 
I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the 
action,  and not the essence,  of  the soul? since  the 
operations of agents will easily admit of intention and 
remission, but the essences of things are not conceived 
capable of any such variation.  But this by the by. 
CHAPTER XX. 
Of  Modes  of Pleasure  and  Pain. 
$ 1. AMONGST  the simple ideas  which  Pleasure and 
we  receive  both  from  sensation and re-  pninsim~le 
fleetion, pain and pleasure  are two very 
considerable ones.  For as in the body there is sensa- 
tion barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or plea- 
sure; so the thought or  perception  of  the mind  is 
simply so,  or else accompanied  also with pleasure or 
pain, delight or trouble, call it  how you please.  These, 
like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their 
names defined ;  the way of knowing them is, as of the 
simple ideas of  the senses, only by experience.  For 
to define them by the presence of  pod  or evil, is no 
otherwise to make them known to us than by making 
us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several 
and  various  operations of  good  and evil  upon  our 
minds, as they are differently applied to  or considered 
by us. 
§ 2. Things then are good or evil only  Gd  and 
in reference to pleasure or pain.  That we  evil, what. 
call good, which is apt to cause or increase 
pleasure or diminish pain in us ;  or else to procure or 
preserve us the possession  of  any other good, or ab- 
sence of any evil.  And, on the contrary, we name that 
evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain or 
diminish any pleasure in us ;  or else to procure us any 
evil, or deprive us of any good.  By pleasure and pain, 
I must be understood  to mean  of  body or mind, as 
they are commonly distinguished ;  though,  in truth, 
they be only different constitutions of the mind, some- 
times occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes 
by thoughts of the mind. 
$ 3.  Pleasure and pain, and that which  our  pas- 
causes them, good and evil, are the hinges  sion~  moved 
on which our passions turn :  and if we re-  and 
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under various considerations, operate in us,-what  mo- 
difications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations 
(if I may so call them)  they produce  in  us,  we  may 
thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions. 
Love.  $4. Thus any one reflecting upon the 
thought he has of  the delight which any 
present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has 
the idea we call love.  For  when  a  man  declares in 
autumn, when  he is eating them, or in  spring, when 
there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but 
that the taste of grapes delights him :  let an alteration 
of health or constitution destroy the delight of  their 
taste, and he then can be said to  love grap& no longer. 
Hatred.  $ 5.  On the contrary, the thought of 
the pain which any thing present or  ab- 
sent is apt to yr,oduce in us, is what we call hatred. 
Were it my business here to inquire any farther than 
into the bare ideas of  our pas8ions,  as  they depend 
on  different  modifications  of  pleasure  and  pain,  I 
should remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate 
insensible beings  is  commonly founded on that plea- 
sure and pain which we  receive  from their  use and 
application any way to our senses, though with their 
destruction :  but hatred or love, to beings capable of 
happiness or misery, is often the uneasiness or delight 
which we find in ourselves, arising from a considera- 
tion  of  their  very  being  or  happiness.  Thus  the 
being and welfare of a man's  children or friends, pro- 
ducing constant delight in him, he is said constantly 
to love  them.  But it suffices to note, that our ideas 
of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, 
in respect of  pleasure  and pain in general, however 
caused in us. 
Desire.  $ 6.  The  uneasiness a man finds in him- 
self ur>on  the absence of anv thine. whose 
present enjoymen't carries the idea of belighGvith it, 
is that we call desire ;  which is greater or less as that 
uneasiness is more or less vehement.  Where, by the 
by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the 
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chief  if  not  only spur to human industry and action 
is  uneasiness.  For whatsoever  good  is  proposed, if 
its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a 
man be easy and content without it, there is no desire 
of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a 
bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest de- 
gree of desire, and that which is next to none at  all,- 
when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of any 
thing, that it carries a man no farther than some faint 
wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous 
use of the means to attain it.  Desire also is stopped 
or abated by the opinion  of  the impossibility or un- 
attainableness of  the good  proposed,  as far  as  the 
uneasiness is cured  or allayed by that consideration. 
This might csrry our thoughts farther, were it sea- 
sonable in this place. 
$7. Joy is a delight of the mind from 
Joy.  the consideration of the present or assured 
approaching  possession  of  a  good;  and we are then 
possessed  of  any good  when  we  have  it so  in  our 
power that we  can use it when  we please.  Thus a 
man almost starved  has joy  at the arrival of  relief, 
even before  he has the pleasure  of  using  it:  and a 
father,  in  whom  the very well-being  of  his children 
causes  delight, is always, as long as his children are 
in such a state, in the possession of that good ;  for he 
needs but to reflect on it to have that pleasure. 
$ 8.  Sorrow is uneasiness in the mind  Sormw.  upon the thought of  a  good  lost, which 
might have  bee11  enjoy&  longer;  or the sense  of  a 
present evil. 
$ 9. Hope is that pleasure in the mind,  Hope, 
which every one finds in himself upon the 
thought of  a profitable  future enjoyment of a thing, 
which is apt to delight him. 
9 10. Fear is an uneasiness of the mind, 
upon the thought of  future evil  likely to 
befal us. 
§ 11. Despair is the thought of the un-  Despsir. 
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differently in  men's  minds,  sometimes producing un- 
easiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency. 
Anger.  $ 18. Anger is uneasiness or discompo- 
sure of the mind upon the receipt of any 
injury, with a present purpose of revenge. 
Envy.  $13.  Envy is an uneasiness of the mind, 
caused by the consideration of a good we 
desire, obtained by one we think should not have had 
it before us. 
What pas-  $ 14. These two last, envy and anger, 
sions all men  not being  caused  by  pain  and pleasure, 
have.  simply in themselves, but having in them 
some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are 
not therefore  to be  found in all  men, because those 
other parts of  valuing  their merits, or intending re- 
venge,  is  wanting  in them:  but all the rest termi- 
nating purely in pain and pleasure,  are, I think, to be 
found  in all men.  For we  love, desire, rejoice, and 
hope, only in respect of pleasure ;  we hate, fear, and 
grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately :  in fine, all 
these passions are moved  by things, only as they ap- 
pear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have 
pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. 
Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at 
least, if s  sensible or voluntary agent) which has pro- 
duced pain in us,  because the fear it leaves is a con- 
stant pain:  but  we  do not so constantly love what 
has done us good ;  because  pleasure operates not so 
strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready 
to have hope it will do so again.  But this by the by. 
Pleasure and  $ 15. By  leasure and ~ain,  delight and 
+in,  what.  uneasiness, P must all along be understood 
(as I have above intimated)  to mean not 
only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight 
or uneasiness is felt by  us,  whether arieing from any 
grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection. 
5 16. It is farther to be considered, that in reference 
to the passions, the removal or lessening of a 
or diminishing of a pleasure as a pain. 
considered  and operates as a pleasure ;  and  t 
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$ 17.  The passions  too  have  most  of  Shan,e. 
them in  most persons operations on  the 
body, and cause various changes in it ;  which not be- 
ing always sensible, do  not make a necessary part of 
the idea of each passion.  For shame, which is an un- 
easiness of the mind upon the thought of having done 
something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued 
esteem which others have for us, has not always blush- 
ing accompanying it. 
5 18. I would not be mistaken here, as  These in- 
if I meant this as a discourse of  the pas-  stances to 
sions ; they are many more than those  I 
our ideas of  have here named :  and those I have taken  parsions  notice  of  would  each  of  them  require  a  are got from 
much larger and more accurate discourse.  sensation 
I have only mentioned  these  here  as so  i,tt.reflec- 
many instances of modes of pleasure and 
pain resulting in our minds from various considerations 
of good and evil.  I might perhaps have instanced in 
other modes of pleasure and pain more  simple  than 
these, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the plea- 
sure of eating and drinking to remove them ;  the pain 
of tender eyes, and the pleasure of music ;  pain from 
captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of 
rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed 
study in the search and discovery of  truth.  But the 
passions being  of  much  more  concernment  to us, I 
rather made choice to  instance in them, and show how 




$ 1.  THE  mind being every day inform-  This idea 
ed, by the senses, of the alteration of those  how got. 
simple ideas it observes in things without, and taking ?3G  Of  Power.  Book a. 
notice how  one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and 
another begins to exist which was not before ;-reflect- 
ing also on what passes within himself, and observing 
a constant change of  its ideas, sometimes by the im- 
pression of  outward objects on the senses, and some- 
times  by  the  determination  of its own  choice ; and 
concluding  from what it has so constantly observed 
to have been, that the like changes will for the future 
be made in the same  things  by  like  agents, and by 
the like ways ;-considers  in one thing the possibility 
of having any of  its simple ideas changed, and in an- 
other the possibility  of making that change ;  and so 
comes by that idea which we  call power.  Thus we 
say fire has a power to melt gold, i. e.  to destroy the 
consistency  of  its insensible parts, and consequently 
its hardness, and make it fluid, and gold has a power 
to be melted ;  that the sun has a power to blanch wax, 
and wax a power to be blanched by the sun, whereby 
the yellowness  is destroyed,  and whiteness made to 
exist  in its room.  In which, and the like cases, the 
power we consider  is  in  reference  to the change of 
perceivable ideas ;  for we  cannot observe any altera- 
tion to be made in, or operation upon,  any thing, but 
by the observable  change of  its sensible ideas; nor 
conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving 
3 change of some of its ideas. 
Power ac-  $ 2.  Power,  thus  considered,  is  two- 
tivc and pas-  fold, viz. as  able  to make, or able to re- 
sive.  ceive, any change :  the one may be called 
active, and the other passive power.  Whether matter 
be not wholly destitute of active power, as its author 
God is truly above all passive  power,  and whether 
the intermediate state of  created spirits be not that 
alone  which  is  capable  of  both  active  and  passive 
power, may be worth consideration.  I shall not now 
enter into that inquiry;  my  present  business being 
not to search into the original of power, but how we 
come by the idea of it.  But since active powers make 
so great a part of  our complex ideas of  natural sub- 
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stances  (as  we  shall  see  hereafter),  and  I mention 
them  as  such  according  to common  apprehension; 
yet they being not perhaps so truly active powers as 
our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge 
it not amiss, by this intimation, to direct our minds to 
the consideration of God and spirits, for the clearest 
idea of active powers. 
$3.  I confess power includes in it some  Power in- 
kind of relation  (a  relation  to action  or  cludes rela- 
change),  as indeed which of our ideas, of  tion. 
what kind soever, when  attentively  considered, does 
not ?  For our ideas of extension, duration, and num- 
ber,  do they not  all contain in  them  a  secret rela- 
tion of the parts ?  Figure and motion have something 
relative in them much more visibly :  and sensible qua- 
lities, as colours and smells, &c. what are they but the 
powers of different bodies, in  relation  to our percey- 
tion ? &c.  And if considered in the things themselves, 
do they not depend on  the bulk, figure, texture, and 
motion of  the parts ?  All which include some kind 
of relation in them.  Our idea therefore of  power, I 
think,  may  well have a place  amongst other simple 
ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of 
those that make a principal ingredient in our complex 
ideas of substances, as we shall hereafter have occasion 
to observe. 
§ 4. We  are abundantly furnished with  ~h~ clearest 
the idea of  passive power  by almost all  idea ofactire 
sorts of sensible things.  In most of them  Power had 
we cannot avoid  observing their sensible  from spirit. 
qualities, nay,  their very substances, to be in a  con- 
tinual  flux : and therefore  with  reason  we look  on 
them asliable still to the same change.  Nor have we 
of active power (which is the more proper signification 
of  the word power)  fewer instances ;  since whatever 
change  is  observed,  the mind  must  collect a power 
solnewhere  able to make that change,  as well  as  a 
possibility in the thing itself to receive  it.  But yet, 
if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, 
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power as we have from reflection on the operations 
of our minds.  For all power relating to action,-and 
there being but two sorts of  action whereof we have 
any  idea, viz.  thinking and motion,-let  us consider 
whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which 
produce these actions.  1. Of  thinking,  body affords 
us no idea at all; it is only from reflection  that we 
have that.  2. Neither have we from body  any idea 
of the beginning of  motion.  A body  at rest  affords 
us no idea of any active power to move ;  and when it 
is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion 
than an action in it.  For when the ball obeys the 
motion of  a  billiard-stick, it is not any action of  the 
ball, but bare passion :  also  when  by impulse it sets 
another ball  in motion  that lay in its way,  it only 
communicates  the motion  it had  received  from  an- 
other,  and loses in itself  so much  as the other re- 
ceived :  which gives us but a very obscure idea of an 
active power of moving in body,  whilst we observe it 
only to transfer, but not produce any motion.  For it 
is but a very obscure idea of power, which reaches not 
the production of  the action, but the continuation of 
the passion.  For so is motion in a body impelled by 
another ; the continuation of  the alteration made in 
it from rest to motion being little more an action than 
the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the 
same blow is an action.  The  idea of the beginning of 
motion we have only from reflection  on what passes 
in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely 
by willing  it,  barely by  a thought of  the mind,  we 
can move the parts of our bodies which were before 
at rest.  So that it seems to me, we have from the 
observation of  the operation of  bodies by our senses 
but a very  imperfect obscure  idea of  active power, 
since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the 
power to begin any action, either motion or thought. 
But if, from the impulse bodies are observed to make 
one upon another,  any one thinks he has a clear idea 
of power,  it serves as well to my purpose,  sensation 
being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its 
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ideas : only 1  thought it worth while to consider here, 
by  the way,  whether the mind  doth not receive  its 
idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own 
operations than it doth from any external sensation. 
5 5.  This at least I think evident, that  will an dun- 
we find in ourselves a power to begin or  derstanding, 
forbear, continue or end several actions of  Powers- 
our minds,  and  motions  of  our bodies,  barely by  zt 
thought or preference of the mind ordering,  or, as it 
were,  commanding  the doing  or  not  doing such or 
such a particular action.  This power which the mind 
has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the 
forbearing to consider it ;-or  to prefer the motion of 
any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any 
particular  instance ;-is  that which  we call the will. 
The actual exercise of  that power,  by directing any 
particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we 
call volition or willing.  The forbearance of that action, 
consequent to such order or command of the mind, is 
called voluntary.  And whatsoever action is performed 
without such a thought of  the mind,  is called invo- 
luntary.  The power of perception is that which we 
call the understanding.  Perception, which we make 
the act of the understanding, is of three sorts : 1. The 
perception of  ideas in our mind.  2.  The perception 
of the signification of signs.  3.  The perception of the 
connexion or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, 
that there is between any of our ideas.  All these are 
attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, 
though it be the two latter only that use allows us to 
say we understand. 
$ 6. These powers of  the mind, viz.  of 
perceiving, and of preferring, are usually 
called  by  another name:  and the ordinary  way  of 
speaking is,  that the understanding and will are two 
faculties of the mind ; a word proper enough, if it be 
used  as all words  should be,  so as not to breed  any 
confusion in men's thoughts, by being supposed (as 1 
suspect it has ken)  to stand for somc real beings in 
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ing and volition.  For  when we  say the will  is the 
commanding and superior faculty of the soul ;  that it 
is,  or is not free;  that it determines the inferior fa- 
culties ;  that it follows the dictates of the understand- 
ing,  &c. ;-though  these, and the like expressions, by 
those  that carefully attend to their own  ideas,  and 
conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things 
than the sound of words, may be understood in a clear 
and distinct sense ;-yet  I suspect, I say, that this way 
of  speaking  of  faculties has misled  many into a coil- 
fused notion  of  so many distinct agents in us, which 
had their  several provinces  and authorities,  and did 
command,  obey,  and perform  several  actions,  as so 
many distinct beings ;  which has been no small occa- 
sion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in ques- 
tions relating to them. 
Whence the  § 7. Every one,  I think,  finds in him- 
idea of li-  self a power to begin or forbear, continue 
berty and  or put an end to several actions in himself. 
From the consideration of  the extent of 
this power of  the mind  over the actions of  the man, 
which  every one  finds  in  himself,  arise the ideas of 
I  liberty and necessity. 
Liberty,  § 8. All the actions  that we have  any 
what.  idea of  reducing themselves, as has been 
said,  to these two,  viz.  thinking and motion;  so far 
as  a  man  has  power  to think,  or  not  to think,  to 
move, or not to move, according to the preference or 
direction  of  his  own  mind;  so  far  is  a  man  free. 
Wherever  any  performance  or  forbearance  are not 
equally  in  a  man's  power;  wherever  doing  or  not 
doing will not equally follow upon the preference of 
his  mind directing it; there he is  not  free,  though 
perhaps  the action may be voluntary.  So that the 
idea of liberty is the idea of  a power in any agent to 
do or  forbear  any  particular  action,  according  to 
the determination or  thought of  the mind,  whereby 
either  of  them  is  preferred  to  the  other;  where 
either of  them  is not  in  the power  of  the agent to 
be  produced  by him according to his volition,  there 
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he is  not at liberty;  that agent is under necessity. 
SO  that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, 
no volition, no will ; but there may be thought, there 
may be will, there may be volition, where there is no 
liberty.  A little consideration of an obvious instance 
or two may make this clear. 
$ 9.  A tennis-ball,  whether  in  motion  Supposesthe 
by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at  understand- 
rest, is not by any one taken to be a free  ing and 
agent.  If we inquire into the reason,  we shall find it 
is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and 
consequently not to have  any volition,  or preference 
of motion to rest, or vice versa; and therefore has not 
liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both  motion 
and rest come under our idea of necessary,  and &re so 
called.  Likewise  a  man  falling  into  the water  (a 
bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is 
not a free agent.  For though he has volition, though 
he prefers his not falling to falling,  yet the forbear- 
ance of that motion not being in his  power,  the stop 
or cessation of  that motion  follows not  upon  his vo- 
lition ;  and therefore therein he is not free.  So a man 
striking himself, or his friend, by  a convulsive motion 
of  his  arm, which  it is not  in his  power,  by volition 
or the direction of  his mind,  to stop, or  forbear,  no- 
body thinks he  has in this liberty; every one  pities 
him, as acting by necessity and constraint. 
$ 10. Again, suppose a man be carried,  BeIon,os not 
whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a  to 'olition. 
person  he longs to see and speak with,  and be there 
locked fast in, beyond his power to get out, he awakes, 
and is glad to find  himself in  so desirable company, 
which  he stays willingly in,  i.  e. prefers his  stay to 
going  away;  I ask,  Is  not  this  stay voluntary?  I 
think nobody will doubt it ;  and yet, being locked fast 
in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has 
not freedom to be gone.  So that liberty is not an idea 
belonging to volition, or preferring ;  but to the person 
having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, accord- 
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ing as the mind  shall choose or direct.  Our idea of 
liberty reaches as far as that power,  and no farther. 
For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or 
compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on 
either side to act, or to forbear acting,  there liberty, 
and our notion of it. ~resentlv  ceases. 
Voluntary  S 1 l.'~e  havg instances  enough, and 
opposed to  often  more  than  enough,  in  our  own 
involuntary,  bodies.  A  man's  heart  beats,  and  the 
not to "e-  blood  circulates,  which  it is  not in his 
cessary.  power by any thought or volition to stop; 
and therefore in respect of  these motions, where  rest 
depends not on his choice,  nor would  follow the de- 
termination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not 
a Gee agent.  Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so 
that, though he wills it ever  so much,  he cannot by 
any power of  his  mind  stop their motion  (as in that 
odd  disease called chorea  sancti viti), but he is per- 
petually dancing :  he is not at liberty in this action, 
but under  as much  necessity  of  moving  as  a  stone 
that falls, or a tennis-ball  struck with a racket.  On 
the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder  his legs 
from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would 
thereby  transfer his  body  to another place.  In all 
these  there is want  of  freedom;  though the sitting 
still even of a paralytic,  whilst he prefers it to a re- 
moval, is truly voluntary.  Voluntary then is not op- 
posed  to necessary,  but to involuntary.  For a man 
may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do; 
the state he is in to its absence or change, though ne- 
cessity has made it in itself unalterable. 
Liberty,  $12.  As it is in the motions of the body, 
what.  so it  is in the thoughts of our minds :  where 
any one is such that we have power to take it up,  or 
lay it by,  according to the preference  of  the mind, 
there we are at liberty.  A waking man being under 
the necessity of  having  some  ideas constantly in his 
mind,  is not at liberty to think or  not to think,  no 
more  than he  is  at liberty,  whether  his  body  shall 
touch any other or no;  but whether he will remove 
his  contemplation from one idea to another is many 
times in his choice ; and then he is in respect of  his 
ideas as much at liberty as he is in respect of  bodies 
he rests on: he can at pleasure remove himself from 
one to another.  But yet some ideas to the mind, like 
some motions to the body,  are such as in certain cir- 
cumstances it cannot avoid,  nor obtain their absence 
by the utmost effort it can use.  A man on the rack 
is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert 
himself with other contemplations : and sometimes a 
boister~us  passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane 
does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of think- 
ing on other things,  which we would rather  choose. 
But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or 
continue,  begin  or  forbear,  any of  these motions  of 
the body without, or thoughts within, according as it 
thinks fit  to prefer either to the other,  we then con- 
sider the man as a free agent again. 
$ 13. Wherever thought is wholly want-  Necessity, 
ing, or the power to act or forbear accord-  what. 
ing to the direction of thought ;  there necessity takes 
place.  This in an agent capable of volition,  when the 
beginning or  continuation  of  any action  is contrary 
to that preference of his mind,  is called compulsion ; 
when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary 
to his volition, it is called restraint.  Agents that have 
no thought, no volition at all,  are in every thing ne- 
cessary agents. 
$ 14. If this be so (as 1 imagine it is)  Liberty be- 
I  leave  it to be  considered,  whether  it  longs not to 
may not help to put an end to that long  thewill. 
agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelli- 
gible question, viz. Whether man's will be free or no? 
For, if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, 
that the question itself is altogether improper ;  and it 
is as insignificant to  ask, whether man's  will  be free, 
as  to ask  whether  his  sleep be  swift,  or his  virtue 
square ;  liberty being as little applicable to the will as 
11  2 244  Of  Power.  Book 2. 
swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. 
Every  one would  laugh at the absurdity of  such  a 
question as either of these ;  because it is obvious, that 
the modifications of  motion  belong  not to sleep,  nor 
the difference of  figure to Sirtue : and when any one 
well  considers it, I think he will  as plainly perceive 
that liberty, which  is but a  power,  belongs  only  to 
agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of 
the will, which is also but a power. 
Volition.  § 15. Such is the difficulty of  explain- 
ing and giving clear notions of  internal 
actions  by sounds,  that I must here warn my reader 
that  ordering,  directing,  choosing,  preferring,  &c. 
which I have made use of, will  not distinctly enough 
express  volition,  unless  he will  reflect  on  what  he 
himself does when he wills.  For example, preferring, 
which  seems perhaps best to express the act of  voli- 
tion, does it not precisely.  For though a man would 
prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills 
it  ?  Volition,  it is plain, is an act of  the mind know- 
ingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have 
over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with- 
holding it from, any particular  action.  And what is 
the will, but the faculty to do this? And is that faculty 
any thing more  in effect than a power, the power of 
the mind to determine its thought,  te the producihg, 
continuing, or stopping any action, as far as it depends 
on us ?  For can it be denied, that whatever agent has 
a power to think on its own actions, and to prefer their 
doing or  omission  either to other,  has  that faculty 
called will?  Will then is nothing but such a power. 
Liberty, on the other side, is the power  a man has to 
do or forbear doing any particular action,  according 
as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference 
in the mind ;  which  is the same thing as to say,  ac- 
cording as he himself wills it. 
Powers be-  $ 16. It is plain  then,  that the will is 
longing to  nothing  but  one  power  or  ability,  and 
agents.  freedom  another  power  or  ability : so 
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that to ask, whether the will  has  freedom,  is  to ask 
whether  one  power  has  another  power,  one  ability 
another ability ; a question at first sight too grossly 
absurd  to make a dispute or need  an  answer.  For 
who  is it that sees not  that powers  belong  only  to 
agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not 
of powers themselves ?  So that this way of putting the 
question, viz. Whether the will be free ?  is in effect to 
ask, Whether the will be a substance, an agent? or at 
least to suppose it, since freedom can properly be at- 
tributed  to nothing  else.  If freedom  can with any 
propriety of  speech be applied to power,  or may be 
attributed to the power that is in a man to produce 
or forbear producing motion in parts of  his body,  by  . 
choice or preference;  which is that which denominates 
him free, and is freedom itself.  But if any one should 
ask whether freedom were free, he would be suspected 
not to understand well what he said ;  and he would be 
thought to deserve Midas's  ears who,  knowing that 
rich was a denomination  for the possession of  riches, 
should demand whether riches themselves were rich. 
§ 17. However the name faculty, which  men have 
given to this power called the will,  and whereby they 
have been led into a way of talking of the will as act- 
ing,  may, by an appropriation that disguises its true 
sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity ; yet the 
will in truth signifies nothing but a power, or ability, 
to prefer  or  choose:  and  when  the will,  under  the 
name of a faculty, is considered as it is,  barely as an 
ability to do something,  the absurdity in saying it is 
free, or not free, will easily discover  itself.  For if it 
be reasonable to suppose and talk of  faculties as di- 
stinct beings that can act (as we do, when we say the 
will orders, and the will is free), it is fit that we should 
make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and 
a  dancing faculty,  by  which  those  actions  are pro- 
duced,  which  are but several modes  of  motion;  as 
well  as we make  the will  and understanding  to be 
faculties,  by which the actions of  choosing and per- 
ceiving are produced, which are but several modes of 246  Of  Power.  Book 2. 
thinking : :tnd  we niay as properly say,  that it is the 
si~iging  faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances; 
as  that the will  chooses,  or that the understanding 
conceives ;  or, as is usual, that the will directs the un- 
derstanding, or the understanding obeys or obeys not 
the will :  it being altogether as proper and intelligible 
to say, that the power of  speaking directs the power 
of singing, or the power of  singing o5eys or disobeys 
the power of speaking. 
§ 18. This way  of  talking,  nevertheless,  has  pre- 
vailed,  and,  as  I  guess,  produced  great  confusion. 
For these being all different powers in  the mind,  or 
in the man,  to do several actions, he exerts them as 
he thinks fit: but the power to do one  action is not 
operated  on by  the power  of  doing  another  action. 
For the power of thinking operates not on the power 
of choosing, nor the power of  choosing on the power 
of  thinking;  no  more  than  the power  of  dancing 
operates  on  the power  of  singing,  or  the power of 
singing on the power  of  dancing; as any  one, who 
reflects on it, will easily perceive:  and yet this is it 
which we say, when we thus speak, that the will ope- 
rates on the understanding, or the understanding on 
the will. 
$ 19. I grant, that this or that actual thought may 
be the occasion of  volition, or exercising the power a 
man has to choose ; or the actual choice of the mind, 
the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing: as 
the actual singing of  such a tune may be the cause 
of  dancing such a dance,  and the actual dancing of 
such  a  dance  the occasion  of  singing such  a  tune. 
But in all these it is not one power that operates on 
another ;  but it is the mind that operates, and exerts 
these powers ;  it is the man that does the action, it is 
the agent that has power, or is able to do.  For powers 
are relations,  not  agents:  and  that  which  has the 
power,  or  not  the power  to  operate, is  that alone 
which is or is not free, and not the power itself.  For 
freedom, or not freedom, can belong to nothing but 
what has or has not a power to act. 
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$ 40. 'The attributing to faculties that  Liberty be- 
which  belonged  not to them,  has  given  1011gs  not to 
occasion to this way of  talking :  but the  the will. 
introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with 
the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, 
I suppose, as little advanced  our knowledge  in that 
part of ourselves, as the great use and mention of the 
like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, 
has helped us in the knowledge of physic.  Not that I 
deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: 
they  both  of  them  have  their  powers  of  operating, 
else neither the one nor the other could operate.  For 
nothing can operate that is not able to operate ; and 
that is not able to operate that has no power to ope. 
rate.  Nor do I deny, that those words, and the like, 
are to have  their  place  in  the common  use  of  lan- 
guages, that have made them current.  It  looks like 
too  much  affectation  wholly  to lay  them  by:  and 
philosophy  itself,  though it likes not a gaudy dress, 
yet,  when  it appears in  public,  must have so much 
complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion 
and language of  the country,  so far as it can consist 
with truth and perspicuity.  But the fault has been, 
that faculties have been spoken of and represented as 
so many distinct agents.  For it being asked, what it 
was that digested the meat in our stomachs ? it was a 
ready and very satisfactory answer, to say, that it was 
the digestive  faculty.  What was  it that made any 
thing come out of  the body? the expulsive  faculty. 
What  moved ?  the  motive  faculty.  And  so in the 
mind,  the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, 
understood;  and  the  elective  faculty,  or  the  will, 
willed or commanded.  This is in short to say,  that 
the ability to  digest, digested; and the ability to move, 
moved;  and the ability  to understand,  understood. 
For faculty,  ability,  and power, I think,  are but dif- 
ferent names of the same things: which ways of speak- 
ing,  when  put into more  intelligible  words,  will,  I 
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formed by something that is able to digest, motion by 
sometlling able to move,  and understanding by some- 
thing able to understand.  And in truth it would be 
very strange if  it should be otherwise ; as strange as 
it would be for a man to be free without being able 
to be free. 
But to the  §  21. To return then to the  inquiry 
agent or  about liberty,  I think the question is not 
man.  proper,  whether  the  will  be  free,  but 
whether a man be free.  Thus, I think, 
1. That so far as any one can,  by the direction or 
choice  of  his  mind,  preferring  the existence  of  any 
action  to the non-existence  of  that action,  and  vice 
uersa,  make  it to exist  or  not  exist;  so  far he is 
free.  For if I can, by a thought directing the motion 
of  my finger, make it move when  it was  at rest, or 
aice  versa, it is evident, that in respect of that I am 
frec : and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, pre- 
ferring  one  to  the  other,  produce  either  words  or 
silence,  I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace; 
and  as  far  as  this  power  reaches,  of  acting, or nut 
acting, by the determination of  his own thought pre- 
ferring either, so far a man is free.  For how can we 
think  any  one  freer than to have  the  power  to do 
what he will ? And so far as any one can, by preferring 
any action to its not being, or rest to any action, pro- 
duce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will. 
For such a preferring of  action to its absence is the 
willing of it ; and we can scarce tell how to imaeine 
any being freer than to be  able to do what he wllls. 
So that in respect of actions within the reach of such 
a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible 
for freedom to make him. 
In respect of  S 22. But the inquisitive mind of man, 
willing, a  willing to shift off from himself, as far as 
man is not  he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be 
free.  by putting himself into a worse state than 
that of fatal necessity, is not content with this : free- 
dom, unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve 
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the turn :  and it passes for a good plea, that a man is 
not free at all,  if  he be not as free to will as he is to 
act what he wills.  Concerning a man's  liberty, there 
yet therefore is raised this farther question, Whether 
a man be free to will ? which I think is what is meant, 
when it is disputed whether the will be free.  And as 
to  that I imagine, 
23. That willing, or volition, being an action, and 
freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, 
a  man in respect  of  willing,  or  the act of  volition, 
when any action in his power is once proposed to his 
thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free.  The 
reason whereof is very manifest :  for it being unavoid- 
able that the action depending on his will should exist 
or not exist ;-and  its existence, or not existence, fol- 
lowing perfectly the determination and preference of 
his will ;-he  cannot avoid willing the existence or not 
existence of that action ;  it is absolutely necessary that 
he will the one or the other; i. e.  prefer the one to 
the other :  since one of them must necessarily follow ; 
and that which does follow, follows by the choice and 
determination  of  his mind,  that is,  by his willing it: 
for if he did not will it, it would  not be.  So that in 
respect of  the act of  willing,  a nian  in such a case is 
not free :  liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to 
act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a 
proposal, has not.  For it is unavoidably necessary to 
prefer the doing or forbearance of  an action in a man's 
power,  which is once so proposed to his thoughts;  a 
man must necessarily will the one or the other of them, 
upon  which preference  or volition  the action  or its 
forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. 
But the act of volition,  or preferring one of  the two, 
being that which he cannot avoid,  a man in respect 
of that act of willing is under a necessity, and so can- 
not be free ;  unless necessity and freedom can consist 
together, and a man can be free and bound at once. 
3 24. This then is evident,  that in all proposals of 
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will, because he cannot forbear willing : liberty con- 
sisting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in 
that only.  For a man that sits still is said yet to be at 
liberty, because he can walk  if he wills it.  But if a 
man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, 
he is not at liberty ; so likewise a man falling down 
a precipice,  though in motion,  is  not at liberty, be- 
cause he cannot stop that motion if he would.  This 
being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom 
it is proposed to give off  walking,  is  not at liberty 
whether he will  determine himself  to walk,  or give 
off walking, or no :  he must necessarily prefer one or 
the other of them, walking or not walking ;  and so it 
is in regard of  all other actions in our power so pro- 
posed, which  are the far greater number.  For con- 
sidering  the vast  number  of  voluntary  actions  that 
succeed one another every moment that we are awake 
in the course of our lives, there are but few of  them 
that are thought on  or proposed to the will till the 
time they are to be done ;  and in all such actions, as I 
have shown, the mind in respect of willing has not a 
power to act, or not to act,  wherein  consists liberty. 
The mind  in that case has not a  power  to forbear 
willing ;  it cannot avoid some determination concern- 
ing them, let  the consideration be as short, the thought 
as quick  as it will;  it either leaves the man in the 
state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues 
the action, or puts an end to it.  Whereby it is mani- 
fest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or 
with neglect of the other, and thereby either the con- 
tinuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary. 
The will de-  § 25. Since then it is plain, that in most 
terminedby  cases a man is not at liberty, whether he 
something  will, or no ;  the next thing demanded, is, 
it-  whether a man be at liberty to will which 
of the two he pleases,  motion or rest? This question 
carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself, that 
one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty 
concerns not the will.  For to ask, whether a man be 
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at liberty to will  either motion  or rest,  speaking or 
silence, which  he pleases ; is  to ask,  whether a man 
can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is 
pleased  with? A  question which,  I think,  needs  no 
answer ; and they who can make a question of it, must 
suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and 
another to determine that; and so on in inznitum. 
§ 26. To avoid  these and the like absurdities, no- 
thing can be of  greater use,  than to establish in our 
minds determined ideas of the things under considera- 
tion.  If the ideas of  liberty  and volition mere well 
fixed in the understandings, and carried along with us 
in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions 
that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of 
the difficulties  that perplex men's  thoughts,  and en- 
tangle their understandings, would be much easier re- 
solved;  and  we  should  perceive where the confused 
signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing 
caused the obscurity. 
§ 2'7'. First, then, it is carefully to be re- 
membered,  that freedom  consists in the 
dependence of  the existence,  or not existence of  any 
action,  upon  our volition  of  it; and not  in  the de- 
pendence  of  any action, or its contrary, on our pre- 
ference.  A  man standing on a  cliff is at liberty to 
leap twenty yards  downwards into the sea, not be- 
cause  he  has  a  power  to do the contrary  action, 
which  is to leap twenty yards upwards,  for that he 
cannot do ;  but he is therefore free because  he has a 
power to leap or not to leap.  But if a greater force 
than his either holds  him  fast or tumbles him down, 
he is no longer free in that case ;  because the doing 
or forbearance of  that particular action is no longer 
in his  power.  He  that is a close prisoner  in a room 
twenty  feet  square,  being  at the north  side  of  his 
chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, 
because he can walk or not walk it ;  but is not, at the 
same time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e.  to walk 
twenty feet northward. 252  Of  Power.  Book 9. 
In this then consists freedom, viz. in our being able 
to act or not to act, according as we  shall choose or 
will. 
Volition,  $28. Secondly, we must remember, that 
what.  volition or willing  is an act of  the mind 
directing its thought to the production of any action, 
and thereby exerting  its power  to produce  it.  To 
avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, 
under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance 
too of  any action proposed : sitting still, or  holding 
one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed, 
though mere forbearances, requiring as much the de- 
termination of the will, and being as often weighty in 
their  consequences  as  the contrary actions, may, on 
that consideration, well enough pass for actions too: 
but this I say, that I may not be mistaken, if for bre- 
vity sake I speak thus. 
What  deter-  $ 29. Thirdly, The will being  nothing 
mines the  but a  power  in  the  mind  to direct the 
will.  operative faculties of a man to motion or 
rest, as far as they depend on such direction ; to the 
question,  What is it determines the will?  the true 
and proper answer is,  The mind.  For that which de- 
termines  the  general power  of  directing to this or 
that particular direction, is nothing but the agent it- 
self exercising the power it has that particular way. 
If this answer  satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of 
the question, What determines the will ?  is this, What 
moves the mind,  in every particular instance, to de- 
termine  its general power of directing to this or that 
particular motion or rest? And  to this I answer, the 
motive for continuing in the same state or action, is 
only  the  present  satisfaction  in it; the motive  to 
change  is always some  uneasiness : nothing  setting 
us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, 
but some uneasiness.  This is the great motive that 
works on the mind to put it upon action,  which  for 
shortness sake we  will call determining of  the will; 
which I shall more at large explain. 
$ 30.  But, in  the way to it,  it will  be  will ,a  a,, 
necessary to premise, that though I have  sire must 
above endeavoured to express the act of  not be 
volition  by choosing? preferring, and the  founded. 
like terms, that signify desire  as well  as volition, for 
want of  other words  to mark  that act of the mind, 
whose proper name is willing or volition ;  yet it being 
a  very  simple act,  whosoever  desires  to understand 
what it is will better find it by reflecting on  his own 
mind, and observing what it does when  it wills, than 
by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever.  This 
caution of being careful not  to be misled by expres- 
sions that do not enough keep up the difference be- 
tween the will and several acts of  the mind that are 
quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary ;  be- 
cause I find the will often confounded with several of 
the affections, especially desire,  and one  put for  the 
other ; and that by  men who would not willingly be 
thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, 
and not to have writ very clearly about them.  This, 
I imagine, has been no small occasion of obscurity and 
mistake in this matter;  and therefore is, as much  as 
may be, to be  avoided.  For he that shall turn his 
thoughts inwards upon what passes in his mind when 
he wills, shall ~ee~that  the will or power of volition  is 
conversant about nothing  but that particular deter- 
mination of  the mind,  whereby barely by a thought 
the mind endeavours to give rise, continuation, or stop, 
to any action which it takes to be in its power.  This, 
well considered,plainly shows that the will is perfectly 
distinguished from  desire ; which  in  the very  same 
action may have a quite contrary tendency from that 
which our will sets us upon.  A man whom I cannot 
deny, may oblige me  to use  persuasions  to another, 
which, at the same time I am  speaking, I may wish 
may not prevail  on him.  In this case, it is plain the 
will  and  desire  run counter.  I will the action that 
tends one way, whilst  my  desire  tends  another,  and 
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lent fit of the gout in his limbs finds a doziness in his 
head,  or a want of  appetite in his stomach removed, 
desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands 
(for wherever there is pain, there is a desire to be rid of 
it) though yet, whilst he apprehends that the removal 
of  the pain  may translate  the noxious  humour to a 
more vital part,  his will  is  never  determined  to any 
one action that may serve to remove this pain.  Whence 
it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct 
acts of  the mind;  and consequently  that the will, 
which is but the power  of  volition, is much more di- 
stinct from desire. 
Uneasiness  § 31. To return then  to the inquiry, 
determines  What is it that determines the will in re- 
the will.  gard  to  our  actions?  And  that,  upon 
second  thoughts,  I  am apt to imagine is  not,  as is 
generally  supposed,  the  greater good in  view,  but 
some  (and for the most  part the most pressing)  un- 
easiness a man is at present under.  This is that which 
successively  determines  the will,  and  sets  us  upon 
those actions we  perform.  This uneasiness  we may 
call,  as it is,  desire;  which  is  an uneasiness  of  the 
mind for want of some absent good.  All pain of the 
body, of  what sort soever,  and disquiet of  the mind, 
is  uneasiness : and with this is always joined  desire, 
equal to the pain or uneasiness  felt, and is scarce di- 
stinguishable from it.  For desire being  nothing but 
an uneasiness  in the want  of  an  absent good,  in re- 
ference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good :  and 
till that ease be attained, we inay call it desire, nobody 
feeling pain that he wishes not to be  eased of with a 
desire  equal to that pain,  and  inseparable from  it. 
Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another 
of absent positive good ;  and here also the desire and 
uneasiness are equal.  As much as we desire any ab- 
sent good, so much are we  in pain for it.  But here 
all absent good does not, according  to the g.reatness 
it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause yam equal 
to that greatness ; as  all  pain  causes desire equal to 
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it itself:  because  the absence of good is not always 
a pain,  as the presence  of  pain  is.  And  therefore 
absent good may be looked on and considered with- 
out  desire.  But so much  as there is anywhere of 
desire, so much there is of uneasiness. 
§ 32.  That desire is a state of  uneasi-  Desire is  ness,  every  one  who  reflects  on  himself 
will quickly find.  Who is there that has 
not felt in  desire  what the wise  man  says  of  hope 
(which is not much different from it),  that it being 
deferred makes the heart sick ?"  and that still propor- 
tionable to the greatness of  the desire ; which some- 
times raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes 
people cry out,  Give me children, give me the thing 
desired, or I die ?  Life itself, and all its enjoyments, 
is a burden cannot be born under the lasting and un- 
removed pressure of such an uneasiness. 
$ 33.  Good  and evil, present  and ab-  Tile uneasi- 
sent, it is true, work upon the mind :  but  nessofdesire 
that which  immediately  determines  the  :;."::ifes 
will, from time  to time,  to every volun- 
tary action, is the uneasiness of desire, fixed on some 
absent good ;  either negative,  as indolence to one in 
pain ;  or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure.  That it 
is this uneasiness that determines the will to the suc- 
cessive voluntary actions, whereof the greatest part of 
our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted 
through  different  courses  to  different  ends,  I shall 
endeavour to  show, both from experience and the rea- 
son of the thing. 
$ 34. When a man is perfectly content  This is the 
with the state he is in, which is,  when he  spring of 
is perfectly without any uneasiness, what  action. 
industry, what  action, what will  is  there left, but to 
continue in it? of this  every man's  observation will 
satisfy him.  And thus we  see  our All-wise  Maker, 
suitably to our constitution  and frame, and knowing 
what it is that determines the will, has put into man 
the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural 
desires,  that return at their  seasons to move and de- Of  Power.  Book 2. 
termine their wills, for the preservation of themselves, 
and the continuation of their species.  For I think we 
may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these 
good ends, to which we  are carried by these several 
uneasinesses,  had  been  sufficient  to  determii~e  the 
will,  and set  us  on work, we  should have had  none 
of  these  natural  pains,  and perhaps  in  this  world 
little or no pain  at all.  '' It  is better to marry than 
to burn:'  says St. Paul; where  we  may  see what it 
is  that chiefly  drives men  into the enjoyments of  a 
conjugal  life.  A  little burning  felt pushes us more 
powerfully than  greater pleasures in prospect  draw 
or allure. 
Thegreatest  $ 35. It seems so established  and  set- 
positivegood  tled  a maxim  by the general consent  of 
determines  all mankind, that good, the greater good, 
not the  determines  the will, that I do not  at all 
but_ uneasi- 
ness.  wonder,  that when I first  published  my 
thoughts  on  this  subject  I  took  it  for 
granted ;  and I imagine that by a great many I shall 
be thought more excusable for havlng then done  so, 
than that now I have ventured to recede from so re- 
ceived an opinion.  But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I 
am forced  to conclude, that good, the greater good, 
though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does 
not determine the will,  until our desire,  raised pro- 
portionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. 
Convince a man ever so much that plenty has its ad- 
vantages over  poverty ;  make him see and own, that 
the handsome  converiiencies of  life  are  better  than 
nasty penury ; yet  as long as  he is content with  the 
latter, and finds  no  uneasiness in it,  he  moves  not; 
his will never  is  determined  to any action that shall 
bring him out of it.  Let a man be ever so well per- 
suaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as neces- 
sary to a man who  has any great aims in this world, 
or hopes in the next, as food to life ;  yet, till he hun- 
gers and thirsts after righteousness,  till he feels  an 
uneasiness in  the want  of  it, his will will  not  be  de- 
termined  to any  action  in pursuit of  this confessed 
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greater good; but any other uneasiness  he  feels in 
himself shall take place,  and  carry his will to other 
actions.  On the other side, let a  drunkard see that 
his  health  deceys,  his  estate wastes ; discredit and 
diseases, and  the want of  all things,  even of  his be- 
loved drink, attends him in the course he follows ;  yet 
the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions, the 
habitual thirst after his cups at  the usual time, drives 
him to the tavern, though he has in his view the loss 
of  health and plenty,  and perhaps  of the joys of an- 
other life :  the least of which is no inconsiderable good, 
but such as he confesses is far greater than the tick- 
ling of his palate with a glass of wine, or the idle chat 
of  a soaking  club.  It is  not  want  of  viewing  the 
greater good ; for he sees and acknowledges it, and, 
in the intervals of his  drinking hours, will take reso- 
lutions to pursue the greater good ;  but when the un- 
easiness  to miss  his  accustomed delight returns, the 
greater acknowledged  good  loses  its hold,  and  the 
present  uneasiness  determines the will  to the accus- 
tomed action ;  which thereby gets stronger footing to 
prevail  against the next occasion, though he at the 
same time makes  secret promises  to himself, that he 
will do so no more:  this is the last time he will  act 
against the attainment of those greater goods.  And 
thus he is from time to time in the state of that un- 
happy  complainer, video  meliora proboque,  deteriora 
sequor :  which  sentence, allowed for true, and made 
good by  constant experience, may  this,  and possibly 
no other way, be easily made intelligible. 
$ 36.  If we  inquire into the reason  of  the 
what experience makes so evident in fact,  removal of 
and examine  why  it is uneasiness alone  uneasiness is 
operates on the will, and determines it in  ~~~~~?~~~~ 
its choice;  we  shall find  that we being 
capable but of one determination of  the will to one 
action  at once,  the present  uneasiness that we  are 
under does naturally determine the will, in order to 
that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions ; 
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forasmuch as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we 
cannot apprehend  ourselves  happy, or in the way to 
it : pain  and  uneasiness  being,  by  every  one,  con- 
cluded  and  felt  to be  inconsistent  with  happiness, 
spoiling the relish  even  of  those  good  things which 
we have ;  a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure 
we rejoiced in.  And  therefore that which of  course 
determines the choice  of  our will  to the next action, 
will  always  be  the removing  of  pain,  as long as we 
have any left, as the first and necessary step towards 
happiness. 
Because  $ 37. Another  reason why  it is  unea- 
uneasiness  siness alone determines the will,  may be 
alone  is pre-  this ;  because that alone is present, and it 
sent.  is against the nature of  things that what 
is absent should operate where it is not.  It may be 
said,  that  absent  good  may  by  contemplation  be 
brought home to the mind,  and made present.  The 
idea of it indeed may be  in the mind, and viewed as 
present there ;  but nothing will  be in the mind as a 
present good, able to counterbalance the removal  of 
any uneasiness which  we  are under, till it raises our 
desire ;  and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency 
in determining the will.  Till then,  the idea in the 
mind of whatever good, is there only, like other ideas, 
the object of  bare unactive  speculation, but operates 
not  on  the  will,  nor  sets  us  on  work;  the  reason 
whereof I shall show by and by.  How many are to 
be found, that have had lively representations set be- 
fore their minds of  the unspeakable joys  of heaven, 
which they acknowledge  both possible  and probable 
too, who yet would be  content to take up with their 
happiness here !  And so the prevailing uneasinesses 
of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of this 
life, take their turns in  the determining their wills ; 
and all that while they take not one step, are not one 
jot  moved  towards  the good  things  of  another life, 
considered as ever so great. 
Because all  38. Were the will determined by the 
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views  of  good,  as it appears in  contem-  who allom 
plation greater or less to the understand-  the joys of 
ing, which is the state of all absent good,  :$i:ig;e 
and  that which  in  the received  opinion  them not. 
the will is supposed to move to, and to be 
moved by,  I do not see how it could  ever get loose 
from the infinite eternal  joys of heaven, once proposed 
and considered  as possible.  For all absent good, by 
which alone, barely proposed and coming in view, the 
will is thought to be determined, and so to set us on 
action, being only possible, but not infallibly certain ; 
it is unavoidable,  that the infinitely greater possible 
good should regularly and constantly determine the 
will in all the successive actions it directs : and then 
we should keep constantly and steadily in our course 
towards heaven, without ever standing still, or direct- 
ing our actions to any other end;  the eternal  con- 
dition of a future state infinitely outweighing the ex- 
pectation of  riches  or honour,  or any other worldly 
pleasure which we  can propose  to ourselves,  though 
we should  grant these  the more probable  to be ob- 
tained :  for nothing future is yet in  ossession, and so 
dP  the expectation even of  these may  eceive us.  If  it 
were so, that the greater good in view determines the 
will, so great a  good  once  proposed  could  not but 
seize the will,  and hold it fast to the pursuit of this 
infinite1  greatest  good,  without  ever  letting it go 
again :  kr  the will having a power over and directing 
the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were 
so, hold the contemplation of the mind Axed  to that 
good. 
This would  be the state of  &he mind  But any 
and regular  tendency  of  the will  in all  great qnea- 
its determinations, were it determined by  siness is ne- 
that which is considered  and in view the  2;- 
greater good ;  but that it i~  not so is visi- 
ble in experience : the infinitely greatest  confessed 
good being  often neglected  to satisfy the successive 
uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles.  But though 
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the greatest  allowed,  even  everlasting  unspeakable 
good,  which  has  sometimes  moved  and affected  the 
mind, does not stedfastly hold the will, yet we see any 
very great and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid 
hold on the will, lets it not go ;  by which we may be 
convinced what  it is that determines the will.  Thus 
any vehement  pain  of  the  body,  the ungovernable 
passion of  a man violently in love, or the impatient 
desire of  revenge, keeps  the will  steady and intent ; 
and the will, thus determined, never lets the under- 
standing lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the 
mind  and  powers  of  the body  are uninterruptedly 
employed that way, by the determination of the will, 
influenced  by that topping  uneasiness  as long as it 
lasts ;  whereby it seems to me evident, that the will 
or power of setting us upon one action in preference 
to all other, is determined in us  by uneasiness.  And 
whether this be not so, I desire every one to observe 
in himself. 
Desire  ac-  39.  I have hitherto chiefly instanced 
companies  in the uneasiness of  desire, as that which 
all  measi-  determines the will,  because  that is the 
ness.  chief and most sensible, and  the will sel- 
dom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary ac- 
tion performed, without some desire accompanying it ; 
which I think is the reason why the will  and  desire 
are so often confounded.  But yet we are not to look 
upon the uneasiriess which makes up, or at least ac- 
companies most  of  the other passions,  as wholly ex- 
cluded in the case.  Aversion, fear, anger, envy, shame, 
%c. have  each  their  uneasiness  too,  and thereby in-. 
fluence the will.  These passions  are scarce  any of 
them in life and practice simple and alone, and wholly 
unmixed  with  others;  though  usually  in discourse 
and contemplation,  that carries the name which ope- 
rates strongest, and appears most in the present state 
of the mind:  nay there is, I think, scarce any of  the 
passions to be found without desire joined with it.  I 
am sure, wherever there is uneasiness, there is desire : 
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for we constantly desire happiness ;  and whatever  we 
feel of  uneasiness,  so  much  it is  certain we want of 
happiness, even in our own opinion, let our state and 
condition otherwise be what it will.  Besides, the pre- 
sent moment  not  being  our  eternity, whatever  our 
enjoyment be,  we look beyond the present, and desire 
goes with our foresight, and that still carries the will 
with it.  So that even in joy  itself, that which keeps 
up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the 
desire to continue it,  and fear to lose it: and when- 
ever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the 
mind, the will presently is by that determined to some 
new action, and the present delight neglected. 
$ 40.  But we being in this world beset  The most 
with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with  pressing un- 
different  desires,  the next inquiry natu-  easiness na- 
rally will be, which of  them has the pre-  turally de-  termines the 
cedency  in  determining the will  to the  ,ill. 
next action? and  to that the answer is, 
that ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that 
are judged  capable of being then removed.  For  the 
will being the power of  directing our operative facul- 
ties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time 
be moved towards what  is judged  at that time  un- 
attainable : that would  be to suppose  an intelligent 
being  designedly to  act  for  an end  only to lose its 
labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not at- 
tainable;  and therefore very great uneasinesses move 
not the will, when  they are judged not capable of  a 
cure :  they, in that case, put us not upon endeavours. 
But these set apart,  the most important and urgent 
uneasiness we  at that time feel, is  that which  ordi- 
narily determines  the will  successively in that train 
of voluntary actions which makes up our lives.  The 
greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action that 
is constantly felt, and for  the most  part determines 
the will in its choice of the next action.  For this we 
must carry along with us, that the proper  and only 
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else :  for we producing nothing by our willing it but 
some action in  our power, it is there the will termi- 
nates, and reaches no farther. 
All desire  $ 41. If it be farther asked, what it is 
happiness  moves desire ?  I answer, Happiness, and 
that alone.  Happiness  and misery are the names of 
two extremes,  the utmost  bounds whereof  we know 
not ; it is what  <'  eye  hath not  seen,  ear not heard, 
nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." 
But of some degrees of  both we have very lively im- 
pressions, made  by  several  instances  of  delight and 
joy on the one side, and torment and sorrow on  the 
other; which, for shortness  sake, 1 shall comprehend 
under  the names of  pleasure  and pain, there being 
pleasure and pain of  the mind  as well  as the body: 
"  with  him is fulness  of joy  and pleasure  for  ever- 
more.'"  Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind ; 
though some have their rise in the mind from thought, 
others in the body from certain modifications of  mo- 
tion. 
Happiness,  $42.  Happiness, then, in its full extent, 
what.  is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, 
and misery the utmost pain :  and the lowest degree 
of what can be called happiness is so much ease from 
all pain,  and so much present pleasure,  as  without 
which any one cannot be content.  Now because plea- 
sure and pain are produced in us by the operation of 
certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and 
in different degrees,  therefore  what has  an aptness 
to produce pleasure in us is  that we  call good,  and 
what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no 
other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure 
and pain  in  us,  wherein  consists  our happiness  and 
misery.  Farther, though what is apt to produce any 
degree of pleasure be in itself good,  and what is apt 
to produce any degree of pain  be evil,  yet it often 
happens that we do not call  it so when  it comes in 
competition with a greater of its sort ;  because when 
they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure 
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and pain have justly a preference.  So that if we will 
rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we  shall 
find it lies much in comparison :  for the cause of every 
less degree of pain,  as well  as  every greater degree 
of pIeasure, has the nature of good, and c  we  '  versa. 
$ 43. Though  this  be  that  which  is  Whatgo& 
called good and evil, and all good be the  is desired, 
proper object of desire in general, yet all  what 
good, even seen, and confessed to be so,  does not ne- 
cessarily move every particular man's  desire, but only 
that part, or so much of it as is considered and taken 
to make a necessary part of his happiness.  All other 
good, however great in reality or appearance, excites 
not a man's  desires,  who  looks not  on it to make a 
part of  that happiness  wherewith  he, in his 
thoughts, can satisfy himself.  Happiness, un Irese'?  er this 
view,  every one constantly pursues, and desires what 
makes any part of it : other things, acknowledged to 
be  good,  he  can look  upon without desire, pass  by, 
and be content without.  There is nobody, I think, so 
senseless as to deny that there is pleasure in  know- 
ledge : and for the pleasures of  senst,,  they have too 
many followers to let it be  questioned whether men 
are taken with them or no.  Now let one man  place 
his satisfaction in sensual  pleasures,  another in the 
delight of knowledge : though  each  of  them cannot 
but confess there is great pleasure  in what the other 
pursues,  yet  neither of  them making the other's de- 
light a  part of  his  happiness,  their  desires  are not 
moved, but each is satisfied without what the other 
enjoys,  and so his will is not determined to the pur- 
suit of  it.  But yet  as  soon  as the studious man's 
hunger and thirst make him uneasy,  he, whose will 
was never determined to any pursuit of  good  cheer, 
poignant sauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste 
he has found in them, is, by the uneasiness of hunger 
and thirst, presently determined to eating and drink- 
ing,  though possibly  with great  indifferency,  what 
wholesome food comes in his way.  And on the other 9.64  Of  Powe,r.  Book a. 
side, the epicure buckles to study when shame, or the 
desire  to recommend  himself  to his  mistress,  shall 
make him uneasy in the want of  any sort of  know- 
ledge.  Thus, how much soever men  are in earnest, 
and constant in pursuit of  happiness,  yet they may 
have a clear view of good,  great and confessed good, 
without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they 
think they can make up their happiness without it. 
Though as to pain,  that they are always concerned 
for; they can feel no uneasiness without being moved. 
And therefore being uneasy in the want of whatever 
is judged necessary to their happiness,  as soon as any 
good appears to make a part of their portion of  hap- 
piness, they begin to desire it. 
Why the  $ 44.  This,  I think,  any one  may  ob- 
peatest  serve  in  himself  and  others,  that  the 
good is not  greater visible good does not always raise 
always de-  men's  desires in proportion to the great- 
sired.  ness it appears and is acknowledged to 
have ;  though every little trouble moves us,  and sets 
us on work  to get rid of it.  The reason whereof  is 
evident from the nature of  our happiness and misery 
itself.  All present pain, whatever it be, makes a part 
of our present misery:  but all absent good does not 
at any time  make  a  necessary  part of  our  present 
happiness,  nor the absence of  it make a part of  our 
misery.  If it did,  we should  be  constantly  and in- 
finitely miserable;  there  being  infinite  degrees  of 
happiness  which are not  in our possession.  All un- 
.easiness therefore being removed, a moderate portion 
of good serves at present to content men ; and some 
few degrees of  pleasure, in a  succession  of  ordinary 
enjoyments,  make up a  happiness wherein they  can 
be satisfied,  If this were not so,  there could be no 
room for those indifferent  and visibly trifling actions, 
to  which our wills are so often determined, and wherein 
we voluntarily waste so much of our lives ; which re- 
missness  could by no means consist with a constant 
determination  of  will  or  desire  to the greatest  ap- 
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parent good.  That this is so, I think few people need 
go far from home  to be  convinced.  And indeed in 
this life there are not many whose happiness reaches 
so far as to afford them a constant train of  moderate 
mean pleasures,  without any mixture of  uneasiness ; 
and yet they could be content to stay here for ever: 
though they cannot deny, but that it is possible there 
may be a state of  eternal durable joys after this life, 
far surpassing all the good  that is to be found here. 
Nay, they cannot but see that it is more possible than 
the attainment and continuation  of  that pittance of 
honour,  riches,  or  pleasure  which  they pursue,  and 
for which they neglect that eternal state: but yet in 
full view of this difference, satisfied of  the possibility 
of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in a future 
state,  and under a clear conviction that it is not to 
be had here, whilst they bound their happiness within 
some little enjoyment or aim of this life, and exclude 
the joys of heaven from making any necessary part of 
it,  their  desires  are not  moved  by  this greater ap- 
parent good, nor their wills determined to any action 
or endeavour for its attainment. 
§ 45.  The ordinary necessities of  our  why  not be- 
lives  fill  a great part of  them  with the  ing desired, 
uneasiness  of  hunger,  thirst,  heat,  cold,  it moveS not 
weariness with labour,  and sleepiness, in  the will. 
their constant returns, &c.  To which if,  besides ac- 
cidental harms, we add the fantastical uneasiness (as 
itch  after  honour,  power,  or  riches,  &c.)  which  ac- 
quired  habits  by  fashion,  example,  and  education, 
have  settled  in  us,  and a  thousand  other irregular 
desires,  which  custom  has  made natural to us; we 
shall find, that a very little part of our life is so vacant 
from these uneasinesses as to leave us free to the at- 
traction of  remoter absent  good.  We are seldom at 
ease,  and  free enough  from  the solicitation  of  our 
natural or adopted desires,  but a constant succession 
of uneasinesses out of that stock, which natural wants 
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their turns : and no sooner is one action despatched, 
which by such a determination of the will we  are set 
upon,  but another uneasiness  is  ready  to set us on 
work.  For the removing of  the pains we  feel,  and 
are at present pressed with, being the getting out of 
misery,  and consequently the first thing to be done 
in order to happiness,  absent good, though thought 
on, confessed, and appearing to be good, not making 
any part of this unhappiness in its absence, is justled 
out to make way for the removal of those uneasinesses 
we  feel;  till  due and  repeated  contemplation  has 
brought it nearer to our mind,  given  some relish of 
it, and raised in us some desire :  which then beginning 
to make a part of our present uueasiness,  stands upon 
fair terms with the rest to be satisfied;  and so, ac- 
cording to its greatness and pressure,  comes in its 
turn to determine the will. 
Due con-  $ 46. And thus, by a due consideration, 
sideration  and examining any good proposed, it  is in 
raises desire.  our power  to raise our desires in a due 
proportion  to the value of that good, whereby in its 
turn  and place  it may come to work  upon the will 
and be pursued.  For good,  though appearing, and 
allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in 
our minds,  and thereby made us  uneasy in its want, 
it reaches not our wills ;  we are not within the sphere 
of its activity ;  our wills being under the determina- 
tion only of  those  uneasinesses which  are present to 
us, which (whilst we have any) are always soliciting, 
and ready at  hand to give the will its next determina- 
tion : the balancing, when there is any in the mind, 
being only which desire shall be next satisfied, which 
uneasiness first removed.  Whereby it comes to pass, 
that as long as any uneasiness,  any desire remains in 
our mind,  there is no room for good, barely as such, 
to come at  the will, or at  all to determine it.  Because, 
as has been said, the first step in our endeavours after 
happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of 
misery,  and to feel  no part of  it,  the will  can be at 
Ch. 21.  Of Power.  967 
leisure for nothing else,  till every uneasiness we feel 
be  perfectly  removed;  which,  in  the  multitude  of 
wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect 
state, we are not  like to be  ever  freed from in this 
world. 
5 47.  There being  in us a great many  Thepolverto 
uneasinesses  always soliciting and readv  suspend the 
to determine the bill, it is gatural. as  p!OYec"tioll  -. 
of  any (lesire  have  said,  that the  greatest  and  most  makes nay 
pressing should determine the will to the  for con- 
next action ;  and so it does for the most  sideration- 
part, but not always.  For the mind having in  most 
cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend 
the execution and  satisfaction of  any  of  its desires, 
and so all, one after another; is at liberty to consider 
the objects of them, examine them on all sides,  and 
weigh them with others.  In this lies the liberty man 
has;  and from  the not  using  of  it right comes  all 
that variety of mistakes,  errors, and faults which we 
run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours 
after happiness ;  whilst we precipitate the deterniina- 
tion of our wills, and engage too soon before due exa- 
mination.  To prevent this,  we have a power to sus- 
pend the prosecution  of  this or that desire,  as every 
one daily may experiment in himself.  This seems to 
me the source of all liberty ;  in this seems to consist 
that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will. 
For during this suspension of  any desire,  before the 
will  be determined  to action,  and the action (which 
follows that determination) done, we have opportunity 
to examine, view,  and judge  of  the good  or evil  of 
what we are going to do ; and when, upon due exa- 
mination,  we  have judged,  we  have  done our  duty, 
all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of  our hap- 
piness ; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of  our 
nature to desire,  will,  and act according to the last 
result of a fair examination. 
5 48.  This is so far from being  a  re-  To be de- 
straint or diminution  of  freedom, that it  t~mined  b~ 968  OJ Power.  Book 3. 
ourown  is the very  improvement  and  benefit  of 
judgment,is  it; it is not an abridgment, it is the end 
no restraint 
liberty.  and use of our liberty ;  and the farther we 
are removed  from such a determination, 
the nearer we  are to misery  and slavery.  A perfect 
indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last 
judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend 
its choice, would  be so far from being an advantage 
and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it  would 
be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency 
to act or not to act till determined by the will, would 
be  an imperfection  on the other  side.  A man is at 
liberty to lift  up his hand to his head,  or let it rest 
quiet ;  he is perfectly indifferent in either ;  and it would 
be an imperfection in him if he wanted that power, if 
he were deprived of that indifferency.  But it would 
be as great an imperfection if he had the same indif- 
ferency  whether he  would  prefer  the lifting  up his 
hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would save his 
head  or eyes  from  a  blow  he sees coming:  it is as 
much a perfection  that desire,  or the power  of pre- 
ferring,  should  be determined by  good,  as that the 
power of  acting should be  determined by  the will; 
and the certainer such determination is,  the greater 
is the perfection.  Nay, were we  determined  by any 
thing but the last result of  our own  minds, judging 
of the good or evil of  any action, we were not  free; 
the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain 
the good we choose.  And therefore every man is put 
under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent 
being, to be determined in willing by his own thought 
and judgment  what  is best  for him  to do : else he 
would be under the determination of some other than 
himself, which is want of  liberty.  And to deny that 
a man's  will,  in every determination,  follows his own 
judgment,  is to say,  that a man wills and acts for an 
end that he would not have, at the time that he wills 
and acts  for it.  For if  he   refers  it in his  present 
thoughts before  any other, it is plain  he then thinks 
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better of it, and would  have it before any other ; un- 
less he can have and not have it, will and not will it, 
at the same time ;  a contradiction too manifest to be 
admitted ! 
$ 69. If we  look  upon  those  superior  ~h,  freest 
beings above us,  who  enjoy perfect hap-  agentsare so 
piness, we shall have reason to judge that  determined. 
they are more  steadily determined  in their choice of 
good than we; and yet we  have no  reason  to think 
they are less happy or less free than we are.  And if 
it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to 
pronounce what infinite wisdom  and goodness could 
do,  I think we might say, that  God  himself  cannot 
choose what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty 
hinders not his being determined by what is best. 
5 50.  But to give a right view of this  A constant 
mistaken  part  of  liberty,  let  me  ask,  determina- 
Would  any  one  be  a  changeling,  be-  2:igr- 
cause he is less determined by wise con-  piness no 
siderations than a wise man ?  Is it worth  abridgment 
the name of freedom  to be at liberty to  of liberty. 
play  the fool,  and  draw shame  and  misery  upon  a 
man's  self?" If to break  loose  from  the conduct  of 
reason, and to want that restraint of examination and 
judgment, which keeps us from choosing or doing the 
worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are 
the only freemen:  but yet,  I think,  nobody  would 
choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty,  but he 
that is mad already.  The constant desire of happiness, 
and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, nobody, 
I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least 
an abridgment of  liberty to be complained of.  God 
Almighty  himself  is  under  the  necessity  of  being 
happy;  and the  more  any  intelligent  being  is  so, 
the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and 
happiness.  That in this state of ignorance we short- 
sighted  creatures  might  not  mistake  true  felicity, 
we  are endowed with  a  power to suspend any par- 
ticular desire, and keep it from determining the will, 
and  engaging  us  in  action.  This is  standing  still, R70  Of  Power.  Book 2. 
where  we  are not  sufficiently  assured  of  the way: 
examination is consulting a guide.  The determination 
of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of 
that guide:  and he that has a power to act or not to 
act, according as such determination directs, is a free 
agent ;  such determination  abridges not that power 
wherein  liberty  consists.  He that  has  his  chains 
knocked 06  and the prison-doors  set open to him,  is 
perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, 
as he best likes ;  though his preference be determined 
to stay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of the 
weather,  or want of other lodging.  He ceases not to 
be free,  though the desire of  some convenience to be 
had  there absolutely determines his  preference,  and 
makes him stay in his prison. 
The ne-  $ 51. As therefore  the highest perfec- 
ce~ity  of  tion of intellectual nature lies in a caref~il 
pursuing  and constant pursuit of true and solid hap- 
true happi- 
ness the  piness,  so the care of  ourselves,  that we 
foundation  mistake not imaginary for real happiness, 
of limy.  is the necessary foundation of  our liberty. 
The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of 
happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and 
which,  as such,  our dedjires always follow, the more 
are we free from any necessary determination of our 
will  to any particular  action,  and  from a necessary 
compliance with our  desire,  set upon any particular 
and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly 
examined whether it has a  tendency to,  or be incon- 
sistent with, our real happiness : and therefore till we 
are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight 
of the matter  and the nature of  the case demands, 
we are,  by  the necessity of  preferring and pursuin 
true  happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspen 
the satisfaction of  our desires in particular cases.  I 
The reason  $$  52. This is the hinge on which turns 
of it.  the liberty of  intellectual beings, in their 
constant endeavours after and a steady prosecution of 
true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in 
particular cases till they had looked before them, and 
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informed  themselves  whether  that particular  thiag, 
which  is then proposed  or desired,  lie in  the way to 
their main  end,  and make a real part of  that which 
is their  greatest good : for the inclination and tend- 
ency  of  their  nature to  happiness  is  an obligation 
and motive to them to take  care  not to mistake or 
miss it ; and so necessarily puts them upon caution, 
deliberation,  and wariness,  in the direction of  their 
particular actions,  which  are the means to obtain it. 
Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of  real 
bliss, the same necessity with the same force establishes 
suspense, deliberation, and scrutiny of each successive 
desire, whether  the satisfaction  of  it does  not inter- 
fere with our true happiness, and mislead us from it. 
This,  as seems to me,  is the great privilege of  finite 
intellectual beings ;  and I desire it may be well  con- 
sidered, whether the great inlet and exercise of all the 
liberty men have,  are capable of,  or can be useful to 
them, and that whereon depends the turn of their ac- 
tions, does not lie in this, that they can suspend their 
desires,  and stop them from determining their  wills 
to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined 
the good  and evil of  it, as far forth as the weight of 
the thing  requires.  This we  are able to do;  and 
when we have done it, we have done our duty,  and 
all that is in  our power,  and indeed all that needs. 
For since the will  supposes knowledge to guide  its 
choice, and all that we can do is to hold our wills un- 
determined till we have examined the good  and evil 
of  what  we  desire,  what  follows  after that, follows 
in a chain of  consequences  linked one to another, all 
depending on the last determination of the judgment; 
which,  whether  it shall be  upon  a  hasty  and pre- 
cipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, 
is in our power : experience showing us,  that in most 
cases we are able to suspend the present satisfaction 
of any desire. 
53.  But if  any  extreme disturbance  ,,,,,,, 
(as  sometimes it happens)  possesses our  of our pas- 
whale  mind,  as  when  the  pain  of  the  sions 979  Of  Power.  Book a 
rig~~t  im-  rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, 
provement  anger, or any other violent passion,  run- 
of liberty.  ning  sway  with  us,  allows  us  not  the 
liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of 
our own  minds  to consider  thoroughly and examine 
fairly ;  God, who  knows our frailty, pities our weak- 
ness,  and requires of  us no more than we are able to 
do, and sees what was and what was not in our power, 
will judge  as a kind  and  merciful  father.  But the 
forbearance  of  a too hasty compliance with  our de- 
sires,  the moderation  and restraint of  our  passions, 
so that our understandings  may be  free to examine, 
and reason  unbiassed give its judgment,  being  that 
whereon a right direction of our conduct to true hap- 
piness  depends;  it is in this we  should  employ our 
chief  care  and endeavours.  In this we should  take 
pains to suit the relish of  our  minds  to the true in- 
trinsic good or ill that is in things, and not permit an 
allowed or supposed possible great and weighty good 
to  slip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, 
any desire of itself there,  till, by a due consideration 
of  its true worth,  we  have formed  appetites in  our 
minds suitable to it, and made ourselves uneasy in the 
want of it, or in the fear of losing it.  And how much 
this is in every one's power, by making resolutioils to 
himself such as he may keep, is easy for every one to 
try.  Nor let any one say he cannot govern his passions, 
nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him 
into action ; for what he can do before a prince,  or a 
great man,  he can  do  alone,  or  in the presence  of 
God, if he will. 
How  men  3 54. From what has  been  said,  it is 
come to  pur-  easy to give an account how  it comes to 
sue different  pass,  that though  all men desire happi- 
ness,  yet  their wills  carry them so  con- 
trarily,  and  consequently  some  of  them  to what  is 
evil.  And  to this I  say,  that the various  and con- 
trary  choices  that men  make in  the world  do  not 
argue that they do not all pursue good, but that the 
same thing  is not  good  to  every  man  alike.  This 
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variety  of  pursuits  shows,  that every  one  does  not 
place  his  happiness  in  the  same  thing,  or  choose 
the same way to it.  Were all the concerns of  man 
terminrtted  in this life, why  one followed  study and 
knowledge,  and another hawking and hunting ; why 
one chose luxury and debauchery, and another sobriety 
and riches ;  would not be, because every one of these 
did not  aim at his own  happiness, but because their 
happiness was placed in different things.  And there- 
fore it was a right answer of the physician to his pa- 
tient that had  sore eyes : If you  have more pleasure 
in the taste of  wine  than in  the use  of  your sight, 
wine is good for you ; but if the pleasure of seeing be 
greater to you than that of drinking, wine is naught. 
$ 55. The mind has a different relish, as well as the 
palate; and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight 
all men  with  riches  or glory  (which  yet some men 
place  their happiness in) as you would  to satisfy all 
men's  hunger with cheese or lobsters ;  which, though 
very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others 
extremely nauseous  and offensive : and many people 
would  with  reason prefer  the griping of  an hungry 
belly  to those dishes  which  are  a  feast to  others. 
Hence  it was,  I think,  that the philosophers  of  old 
did in vain inquire, whether sumnzum bonum consisted 
in riches, or  bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation : 
and they might have as reasonably disputed whether 
the best relish were to be  found  in apples, plums, or 
nuts,  and have divided  themselves into sects upon it. 
For as pleasant tastes depend not on the things them- 
selves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular 
palate, wherein there is great variety ;  so the greatest 
happiness  consists  in  the having those things which 
produce the greatest pleasure,  and in the absence of 
those  which cause any disturbance, any pain.  Now 
these, to different men,  are very different things.  If 
therefore men in this life only have hope, if in this life 
they can only enjoy, it is not strange nor unreasonable 
that they should seek their happiness by avoiding all 
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things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that 
delight them; wherein it will be no wonder  to find 
variety and difference.  For if  there be no prospect 
beyond  the grave,  the inference  is  certainly  right, 
6c let us eat and drink,"  let us enjoy what we delight 
in, "  for to-morrow  we shall die."  This, I think, nlay 
serve to show us  the reason  why,  though all men's 
desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by 
the same object.  Men may choose different things, 
and yet  all choose right;  supposing them only like 
a  company  of  poor insects,  whereof  some are bees, 
delighted  with  flowers  and  their  sweetness ; others 
beetles, delighted with other kinds of  viands,  which 
having enjoyed for a season, they would  cease to be, 
and exist no more for ever. 
How men  $ 56. These things, duly weighed, will 
come to  give us,  as I think,  a clear view into the 
state of  human  liberty.  Liberty,  it  is 
plain,  consists in a power to do, or not to do ; to do, 
or forbear doing, as we will.  This cannot be denied. 
But this seeming to comprehend only the actions of 
a  man consecutive  to volition,  it is farther inquired, 
"  whether he be  at liberty to will,  or no."  And to 
this it has been answered, that in most cases a man is 
not at liberty to forbear the act of volition:  he must 
exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed 
is made to exist,  or not to exist.  But yet there is a 
case wherein a man is at liberty in respect of willing, 
and that is the choosing of  a remote good  as an end 
to be pursued.  Here a man may suspect the act of 
his  choice from being determined for or against the 
thing proposed,  till  he has  examined whether it be 
really of a nature in itself and consequences to make 
him happy,  or no.  For when he has once chosen it, 
and thereby it is become  a part of his  happiness, it 
raises  desire,  and that proportionably gives him un- 
easiness,  which determines his  will,  and sets him at 
work  in pursuit  of  his  choice  on all occasions that 
offer.  And  here we may see how  it comes to pass, 
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that a man may justly incur punishment, though it be 
certain that in all the particular actions that he wills 
he does, and necessarily  does will that which he then 
judges to be good.  For, though his  will  be  always 
determined by tliat which is judged  good by his un- 
derstanding, yet it excuses him not :  because, by a too 
hasty choice  of  his  own making, he has imposed on 
himself  wrong  measures  of  good  and  evil;  which, 
however false and fallacious, have the same influence 
on all his  future conduct  as if  they were  true  and 
right.  He has vitiated  his  own  palate,  and must be 
answerable to himself for the sickness and death that 
follows from it.  The eternal law and nature of things 
must not  be altered  to comply  with  his  ill-ordered 
choice.  If the neglect or abuse of the liberty he had 
to examine what would really and truly make for his 
happiness misleads  him, the miscarriages that follow 
on it musl be imputed to his  own election.  He had 
a power to suspend  his  determination : it was  given 
him that he might examine and take care of his own 
happiness, and look tliat he were not deceived.  And 
he could never judge, that it was better to be deceived 
than not, in a matter of  so great and near  concern- 
ment. 
What has  been  said may  also discover  to us the 
reason why men in this world prefer different things, 
and pursue happiness by  contrary courses.  But yet, 
since men are always constant, and in earnest, in mat- 
ters of happiness and misery, the question still remains, 
How  men  come  often  to prefer  the  worse  to the 
better; and to choose that which, by their own con- 
fession, has made them miserable ? 
$ 57. To  account for the various and contrary ways 
men take, though all aim at being  happy, we must 
consider whence the various uneasinesses, that deter- 
mine the will in the preference of each voluntary ac- 
tion, have their rise. 
1. Some of them come from causes not  From bodily 
in our power ;  such as are often the pains  pains. 
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of the body from want,  disease, or outward injuries, 
as  the rack,  &c. which,  when  present  and  violent, 
operate for  the most  part forcibly on  the will,  and 
turn the courses of men's lives from virtue, piety, and 
religion, and what before they judged to lead to hap- 
piness ;  every one not endeavouring, or through dis- 
use not  being  able, by the contemplation  of  remote 
and future good, to raise  in himself  desires of them 
strong enough to counterbalance  the uneasiness  he 
feels in those  bodily torments,  and to keep his will 
steady in the choice  of  those actions  which  lead to 
future happiness.  A neighbour  country has been  of 
late a tragical theatre, from which we might fetch in- 
stances, if there needed  any,  and the world  did not 
in all countries and ages furnish  examples enough to 
confirm  that received  observation,  "  necessitas  cogit 
ad turpia ;"  and therefore there is great reason for us 
to pray, "  lead us not into temptation." 
From wrong  2. Other  uneasinesses  arise  from  our 
desires aris-  desires of absent good;  which desires al- 
ing from  ways bear proportion  to, and depend on 
wrong judg-  the judgment  we make, and the relish we 
ment.  have of  any absent good : in both which 
we are apt to be  variously  misled,  and that by our 
own fault. 
Our judg-  $ 58. In the first place, I shall consider 
,,.t  of pre-  the wrong judgments men make of future 
sent good or  good and evil,  whereby their  desires are 
evil always  misled.  For, as to present happiness and 
right.  misery, when that alone comes into consi- 
deration, and the consequences are quite removed, a 
man never chooses amiss ;  he knows what best pleases 
him,  and  that he actually ~refers. Things in their 
present enjoyment are what they seem ;  the apparent 
and real good are, in this case, always the same :  for 
the pain or pleasure being just so great, and no greater 
than it is  felt, the present good or evil  is really so 
much as it appears.  And therefore, were every action 
of ours concluded  within  itself,  and  drew no  conse- 
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quences after it, we  should undoubtedly never  err in 
our choice of good ; we should always infallibly pre- 
fer the best.  Were the pains of honest industry, and 
of starving with hunger and cold, set together before 
us, nobody would be in doubt which to choose : were 
the satisfaction of  a lust, and the joys of  heaven, of- 
fered at once to any one's present possession, he would 
not balance or err in the determination of his choice. 
$ 59.  But since our voluntary actions carry not all 
the happiness and misery that depend on them along 
with them in their present performance, but are the 
precedent causes of  good and evil, which  they draw 
after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves 
are passed and cease to be ; our desires  look beyond 
our present enjoyments,  and carry the mind  out to 
absent  good,  according  to the necessity  which  we 
think there is of  it to the making or increase of our 
happiness.  It  is our opinion of such a necessity that 
gives it its attraction :  without that, we are not moved 
by absent good.  For in this narrow scantling of capa- 
city, which we are accustomed to and sensible of here, 
wherein  we  enjoy but one pleasure  at once,  which, 
when  all  uneasiness is  away,  is,  whilst it lasts, suf- 
ficient  to make  us think ourselves  happy,  it is  not 
all remote, and even  apparent good,  that affects us. 
Because the indolency  and enjoyment  we have, suf- 
ficing for our present happiness, we desire not to ven- 
ture the change ; since we judge that we  are happy 
already, being content, and that is enough.  For who 
is content is ha~~v.  But as soon as anv new uneasi- 
ness comes in, icii happiness is disturbe'd,  and we are 
set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness. 
5 60.  Their  aptness therefore to con-  From a 
clude that they can be happy without it,  wrong judg- 
is one great occasion that men often are  mentofwhat 
makes a ne-  not raised to the desire  of  the greatest  ,ss,y  part 
absent good.  For whiist  such  thoughts  of their hap- 
possess  them, the joys  of  a future state  piness. 
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about them ;  and the will, free from the determination 
of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satis- 
factions,  and  to the removal  of  those  uneasinesses 
which it then feels, in its want of  and longings after 
them.  Change but a man's  view of these things ;  let 
him see that virtue and religion  are necessary to his 
happiness ;  let him look  into the future state of bliss 
or misery,  and  see  there  God, the righteous judge, 
ready to "render to every man according to his deeds ; 
to them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek 
for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life ; 
but unto every soul that doth  evil,  indignation and 
wrath, tribulation and anguish :" to him,  I say, who 
hath a prospect of  the different state of perfect hap- 
piness  or misery that attends all men after this life, 
depending on their  behaviour  here,  the measures of 
good and evil,  that govern  his  choice, are mightily 
changed.  For since nothing of pleasure and pain in 
this life can bear any proportion  to the endless hap- 
piness, or exquisite misery, of an immortal soul here- 
after; actions in his power will have their preference, 
not according to the transient pleasure or pain that 
accompanies or follows them here, but as they serve 
to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter. 
A more par-  § 61.  But to account more particularly 
titular ac-  for the misery  that men often  bring on 
count of  themselves, notwithstanding that they do 
wrongjudg-  all in earnest pursue happiness, we must 
ments.  consider  how  things come  to be  repre- 
sented to our desires  under  deceitful  appearances: 
and that is by  the judgment  pronouncing  wrongly 
concerning them.  To see how far this reaches, and 
what are the causes of wrong judgment, we must re- 
member  that things  are judged  good  or  bad  in a 
double sense. 
First,  That which  is  properly good or bad,  is no- 
thing but barely pleasure or pain. 
Secondly,  But because  not only present pleasure 
and pain,  but that also which is apt by its eBcacy or 
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consequences to bring it upon  us  at a distance, is a 
proper object of our desires, and apt to move a crea- 
ture that has  foresight;  therefore  things  also  that 
draw after them pleasure and pain are considered as 
good and evil. 
$ 62.  The wrong judgment that misleads us,  and 
makes the will often fasten on the worse side, lies in 
misreporting upon the various  comparisons of  these. 
The wrong judgment I am here speaking of,  is  not 
what one man may think of  the determination of an- 
other, but what every man himself must confess to be 
wrong.  For since I lay it for a certain ground that 
every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which 
consists  in  the enjoyment  of  pleasure,  without  any 
considerable mixture  of  uneasiness ;  it is  impossible 
any one  should willingly put into his  own  draught 
any bitter ingredient,  or leave  out any thing in his 
power  that would  tend to his  satisfaction,  and the 
completing  of  his  happiness,  but  only  by  wrong 
judgme~t. I shall not  here speak of  that mistake 
which is the consequence  of  invincible  error, which 
scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment;  but of 
that wrong judgment  which every man himself must 
confess to be so. 
$ 63.  If, therefore,  as to present plea-  1,  c,,p,. 
sure and pain, the mind, as has been said,  inrt Dresent 
never mikakes that which is really good  aaluture- 
or evil;  that which  is  the greater pleasure,  or  the 
greater pain, is really just as it appears.  But though 
present pleasure and pain show  their difference and 
degrees so plainly as not to leave  room  for  mistake, 
yet when we compare present pleasure or pain with 
future (which is usually the case in the most important 
determinations  nf  the will),  we  often  make  wrong 
judgments of  them, taking our measures of  them in 
different positions of distance.  Objects near our view 
are apt to be thought greater than those  of  a larger 
size that are more remote : and so it is with pleasures 
and pains ;  the present is  apt to carry it, and those at 
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Thus most men, like spendthrift heirs, are apt to judge 
a little in hand better than a great deal to come ;  and 
so, for small matters in possession, part with greater 
ones in reversion.  But that this is a wrong judgment 
every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in what- 
ever it will:  since that which  is future will certainly 
come to be present;  and then, having the same ad- 
vantage of nearness, will show itself in its full dimen- 
sions, and discover his wilful mistake,  who judged of 
it by unequal measures.  Were the pleasure of drink- 
ing accompanied,  the very moment  a  man  takes off 
his glass,  with  that sick  stomach  and aching  head, 
which, in some men, are sure to follow not many hours 
after ; I think nobody, whatever  pleasure  he had  in 
his  cups,  would,  on  these  conditions,  ever  let wine 
touch his lips ;  which  yet he daily swallows, and the 
evil side comes to be  chosen  only by the fallacy of  a 
little difference in time.  But if  pleasure or pain can 
be so lessened only by a few hours' removal, how much 
more will it be so by a farther distance, to a man that 
will not by a right judgment  do what time will, i. e. 
bring it home upon himself, and consider it as present, 
and there take its true dimensions!  This is the way 
we  usually  impose  on ourselves,  in  respect  of  bare 
pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness or 
misery :  the future loses its just proportion, and what 
is present obtains the preference  as the greater.  I 
mention not here the wrong judgment,  whereby the 
absent are not only lessened,  but reduced to perfect 
nothing ;  when men enjoy what they can in present, 
and make sure of  that, concluding amiss that no evil 
will  thence  follow.  For that lies not in comparing 
the greatness of  future good  and evil,  which is that 
we are here speaking of, but in another sort of wrong 
judgment,  which is concerning good  or evil, as it is 
considered to be the cause and procurement of plea- 
sure or pain, that will follow from it. 
Causes of  $64. The cause of our judging amiss, 
this.  when we compare our present pleasure or 
pain  with  future,  seems  to me  to be the weak  and 
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narrow  constitution  of  our minds.  We cannot well 
enjoy two pleasures at once, much less any pleasure 
almost, whilst pain  possesses us.  The present plea- 
sure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, 
fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind 
that it scarce leaves any  thought of  things  absent: 
or if, among our pleasures,  there are some which are 
not  strong  enough  to exclude  the consideration  of 
things at a distance ;  yet we have so great an abhor- 
rence of pain,  that a  little of  it extinguishes all our 
pleasures ;  a little bitter mingled in our cup leaves no 
relish of  the sweet.  Hence it comes, that at any rate 
we desire to be rid  of the present evil, which we are 
apt to think nothing absent can equal ;  because, under 
the present pin,  we find not ourselves capable of any 
the least degree of happiness.  Men's daily complaints 
are a loud  roof of this :  the pain that any one actually 
feels is still of all other the worst;  and it is with an- 
guish they cry out, "Any  rather than this ;  nothing 
can  be  so intolerable  as what I now  suffer.''  And 
therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are in- 
tent to get rid of  the present evil, before all things, 
as the first necessary condition  to our happiness,  let 
what will follow.  Nothing, as we passionately think, 
can exceed, or almost equal, the uneasiness that sits 
so heavy upon us.  And because the abstinence from 
a present pleasure that offers itself is a pain, nay often- 
times  a  very  great  one,  the desire  being  inflamed 
by a near  and tempting object,  it is no wonder that 
that operates after the same  manner pain does, and 
lessens in our thoughts what is future ;  and so forces, 
as it were, blindfold into its embraces. 
$ 65.  Add to this,  that absent good,  or,  which is 
the same thing, future pleasure, especially if of a sort 
we are unacquainted with, seldom is able to counter- 
balance any uneasiness, either of pain or desire, which 
is  present.  For  its greatness  being  no more  than 
what shall be really tasted when enjoyed, men are apt 
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present desire;  and conclude with  themselves,  that 
when it comes to trial, it may possibly not answer the 
report  or  opinion  that generally passes  of  it; they 
having often found, that not only what others have 
magnified, but even  what  they themselves have  en- 
joyed with great pleasure and delight at one time, has 
proved insipid or nauseous at another; and therefore 
they see nothing in it for which they should forego a 
present  enjoyment.  But that this is a false way of 
judging,  when  applied  to the happiness  of  another 
life,  they must  confess ;  unless  they will  say, "  God 
cannot make those happy he designs to be so."  For 
that being intended for a state of happiness, it must 
certainly be agreeable to every one's  wish and desire : 
could we suppose their  relishes  as different there as 
they are here, yet the manna in heaven will suit every 
one's  palate.  Thus much of the wrong judgment we 
make of present  and future pleasure and pain, when 
they are compared together, and so the absent consi- 
dered as future. 
In consider-  § 66.  11.  As to things good or  bad in 
ingconse-  their consequences,  and by the aptness is 
quences of  in them to procure us good or evil in the 
actions.  future, we judge amiss several ways. 
1. When we judge that so much evil does not really 
depend on them, as in truth there does. 
2. When we judge,  that though the consequence 
be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty but 
that it may otherwise fall out, or else by some means 
be avoided, as by industry,address, change, repentance, 
&c.  That these  are wrong  ways  of judging,  were 
easy to show in every particular,  if I would  examine 
them at large singly: but I shall only mention this 
in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational 
way of  proceeding,  to venture a  greater good for a 
less, upon  uncertain guesses,  and before  a due exa- 
mination be made proportionable to the weightiness of 
the matter,  and the concernment  it is  to us not to 
mistake.  This, I think, every one must confess, espe- 
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cially if he considers the usual  causes of  this wrong 
judgment, whereof these following are some : 
9 67.  I.  Ignorance : he  that judges  Causes of  without  informing himself  to the utmost  this. 
that he is  capable, cannot acquit himself 
of judging amiss. 
11.  Inadvertency :  when a man overlooks even that 
which  he does know.  This is an affected  and pre- 
sent ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much 
as the other.  Judging is,  as it were,  balancing  an 
account, and determining on which side the odds lie. 
If therefore either side be  huddled  up in haste,  and 
several of  the sums,  that should have gone into the 
reckoning,  be  overlooked  and left out,  this precipi- 
tancy causes as wrong a judgment as if it were a per- 
fect ignorance.  That which  most  commonly causes 
this is the prevalency  of  some present  pleasure  or 
pain, heightened by our feeble passionate nature, most 
strongly wrought on by what is present.  To check 
this precipitancy,  our understanding and reason was 
given us,  if we will make a right use of it,  to search 
and see, and then judge thereupon.  Without liberty, 
the understanding would be to no purpose :  and with- 
out understanding, liberty (if it could be)  would sig- 
nify nothing.  If a man sees what would do him good 
or harm,  what would make him happy or miserable, 
without being able to move himself  one step towards 
or from it, what is he the better for seeing ?  And he 
that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what 
is his  liberty better  than if he were  driven  up and 
down  as a  bubble by the force  of  the wind?  The 
being acted by a blind impulse from without, or from 
within, is little adds.  The first therefore, and great 
use  of  liberty, is  to hinder  blind  precipitancy;  the 
principal exercise of freedom is to stand still, open the 
eyes, look about, and take a view of the consequence 
of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of 
the matter requires.  How much sloth and negligence, 
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quired indispositions, do severally contribute on occa- 
sion to these wrong judgments, I shall not here farther 
inquire.  I shall only add one other  false judgment, 
which I think necessary to mention, because perhaps 
it is little taken notice of, though of great influence. 
Wrong  $ 68.  Ail men desire happiness,  that is 
judgment  of  past doubt; but, as has been alreadv ob- 
what is ne- 
cessary to  served,  when  they are rid  of  pain, 'they 
,,, happi-  are apt to take up with any pleasure  at 
ness.  hand,  or  that  custom  has  endeared  to 
them, to rest satisfied in that;  and so  being  happy, 
till some new desire, by making them uneasy, disturbs 
that happiness,  and shows them that they are not so, 
they look no farther ;  nor is the will determined to any 
action,  in pursuit of  any  other  known  or  apparent 
good.  For since we  find, that we  cannot enjoy  all 
sorts of  good, but one excludes  another,  we  do not 
fix our desires on every apparent greater good, unless 
it be judged to be necessary to our happiness ;  if we 
think we  can be happy without  it,  it moves us not. 
This is  another occasion  to men  of  judging  wrong, 
when they take not that to be necessary to their hap- 
piness  which  really is so.  This mistake misleads us 
both in the choice of  the good  we aim at,  and very 
often in the means  to it,  when it is  a remote good : 
but which way ever it be, either by placing it where 
really it is  not,  or  by  neglecting the means  as not 
necessary to it; when  a  man  misses  his  great end, 
happiness, he will acknowledge he judged  not right. 
That which contributes to this mistake, is the real or 
supposed unpleasantness of  the actions which are the 
way to this end ;  it seeming so preposterous a thing 
to men, to make themselves unhappy in order to hap- 
piness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.  - 
We can  69.  The lasi inqu:ry  therefore con- 
&ange  the  cerning this matter is, "  whether it be in 
agre&ble-  a man's power to change the pleasantness 
ness Or  dis-  and unpleasantness that accompanies any 
agreeable-  sort  of  action?"  And  as to that,  it is 
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plain  in many cases  he can.  Men may  ness in 
and should correct their palates, and give  t'lin@ 
relish to what  either  has, or they suppose has none. 
The relish  of  the mind  is  as  various  as that of  the 
body,  and like that too may be  altered;  and it is  a 
mistake to think,  that men  cannot change  the dis- 
pleasingness  or  indifference  that  is  in  actions  into 
pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their 
power.  A due consideration will do it in some cases ; 
and practice, application, and custom in most.  Bread 
or tobacco may be  neglected, where  they are shown 
to be  useful  to health, because of  an indifferency or 
disrelish to them ;  reason and consideration at first re- 
commend, and begin their trial, and use finds or custom 
makes  them  pleasant.  That this is so in virtue too, 
is very certain.  Actions are pleasing or displeasing, 
either in themselves, or  considered  as a means to a 
greater  and more  desirable  end.  The eating  of  a 
well-seasoned  dish, suited to a man's  palate, may mcve 
the mind  by the delight itself  that accompanies the 
eating, without reference to any other end: to which 
the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and 
strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add 
a new gusto, able to make us swallow  an ill relished 
potion.  In the latter of these, any action is rendered 
more or less  pleasing  only by  the contemplation  of 
the end, and the being more or less persuaded of its 
tendency to it, or  necessary  connexion  with  it :  but 
the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired or in- 
creased by use and practice.  Trials often reconcile us 
to that which at a distance we looked  on with aver- 
sion, and by repetitions  wear us into a liking of what 
possibly, in the first essay, displeased us.  Habits have 
powerful  charms,  and put so  strong  attractions  of 
easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves 
to, that we  cannot  forbear  to do, or at least be easy 
in the omission of actions, which habitual practice has 
suited, and thereby recommends to us.  Though this 
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he can do so ;  yet it is a part in the conduct of inen 
towards  their  happiness,  neglected to a degree, that 
it will be  possibly entertained as a  paradox, if  it be 
said, that men can make things or actions more or less 
pleasing to tllemselves;  and thereby remedy that, to 
which  one may justly  impute a  great deal of  their 
wandering.  Fashion and the common opinion having 
settled wrong  notions,  and education and custon~  ill 
habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the 
palates of men corrupted.  Pains should be taken to 
rectify  these;  and contrary habits change our plea- 
sures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or 
conducive to our happiness.  This every one must con- 
fess he can do ;  and when happiness is lost, and misery 
overtakes him, he will confess he did amiss in neglect- 
ing it,  and condemn himself  for it : and I ask  every 
one, whether he has not often done so ? 
Preference  $ 70.  I shall not now enlarge any far- 
ofvice to +  ther on the wrong judgments and neglect 
tue a mani-  of  what is in  their power, whereby men 
fest wrong  mislead themselves.  This would make a 
judgment.  volume,  and  is  not  my  business.  But 
whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is 
in their power, may put men out of their way to hap- 
piness,  and distract them, as we see, into so different 
courses of life, this yet is certain, that morality, esta- 
blished  upon its true foundations, cannot but deter- 
mine  the choice  in  any one  that will  but consider: 
and he that will not be so far a rational creature as 
to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, 
must needs condemn himself  as not making that use 
of  his  understanding he  should.  The rewards  and 
punishments of  another life, which the Almighty has 
established  as the enforcements  of  his  law,  are  of 
weight enough to determine the choice, against what- 
ever  pleasure  or pain  this  life  can show, when the 
eternal state is considered  but in its bare possibility, 
which nobody can make any doubt of.  He that will 
allow exquisite  and endless happiness to be but the 
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possible consequence of a good life here, and the con- 
trary state the possible  reward  of  a bad  one,  must 
own himself to judge very much amiss if he does not 
conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expect- 
ation  of  everlasting bliss, which may come, is  to be 
preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dread- 
ful state of misery, which it is very possible may over- 
take the guilty ;  or at best the terrible uncertain hope 
of annihilation.  This is evidently so,  though the vir- 
tuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious 
continual pleasure : which  yet is, for  the most part, 
quite otherwise, and wicked  men have not much the 
odds to brag of, even in their present possession ;  nay, 
all things rightly considered, have, I think, even the 
worst part here.  But when  infinite happiness is put 
into one scale against infinite misery in the other,  if 
the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, 
be the best that the wicked  can attain to, if he be in 
the right, who can without madness run the venture ? 
Who m his wits would  choose  to come within  a pos- 
sibility of infinite misery, which if he miss, there is yet 
nothing to be got by that hazard?  Whereas, on the 
other side, the sober man ventures nothing against in- 
finite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to 
pass.  If the good man be in the right, he is eternally 
happy ; if  he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels 
nothing.  On the other side, if  the wicked be in the 
right, he is not happy ;  if he mistakes, he is infinitely 
miserable.  Must it not be  a  most  manifest wrong 
judgment  that does not presently see to which side, 
in this case,  the preference  is to be given?  I have 
forborn to mention any thing of the certainty or pro- 
bability of a future state, designing here to show the 
wrong judgment  that any one must allow he makes 
upon  his  own principles,  laid how  he pleases,  who 
prefers the short pleasures of  a vicious life upon any 
consideration,  whilst  he  knows,  and cannot but be 
certain, that a future life is at least possible. 
$  71. To conclude  this  inquiry  into  Reapitula- 
human liberty, which, as it stood before, I  tion. 288  Of  Power.  Book 2. 
myself  from  the beginning  fearing,  and  a  very ju- 
dicious  friend  of  mine,  since  the  publication,  sus- 
pecting to have some  mistake in it, though he could 
not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter 
review of this chapter ;  wherein lighting upon a very 
easy and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting 
one seemingly indifferent  word for another, that dis- 
covery opened to me  this present view, which  here, 
in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, 
and which in short is  this :  'C  Liberty is  a power  to 
act or not to act, according as the mind  directs."  A 
power to direct  the operative faculties to motion or 
pest in particular instances, is that which  we call the 
will.  That which in the train of our voluntary actions 
determines  the will  to any change of  operation,  is 
some present uneasiness; which is, or at  least is always 
accompanied  with,  that of  desire.  Desire is always 
moved by evil, to fly it ;  becmse a total freedom from 
pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness : 
but every good, nay every greater good, does not con- 
stantly move desire, because it may not make, or may 
not be taken to make, any necessary part of Our happi- 
ness:  for  all that we  desire  is  only  to be  happy. 
But though this general desire of happiness operates 
constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any 
particular ileqire can be suspended from determining 
the will to any subservient  action till we  have  ma- 
turely  examined,  whether  the  particular  apparent 
good, which we then desire, makes a part of our real 
happiness,  or  be  consistent  or  inconsistent  with it. 
The result of our judgment upon that examination is 
what ultimately determines the man,  who  couId  not 
be free if his will were determined by any thing but 
his own desire guided by his own judgment.  I know 
that liberty by some is placed in an indifferency of the 
man, antecedent to the determination  of his  will.  I 
wish they, who lay so much stress on such  an ante- 
cedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, 
whether this supposed indifferency be antecedent to 
the thought and judgment  of  the understanding, as 
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well as to the decree of the will.  For it is pretty hard 
to state it between them ; i. e. immediately after the 
judgment of the understanding, and before the deter- 
mination of the will, because the determination of the 
will immediately follows the judgment  of the under- 
standing:  and  to place  liberty in  an  indifferency, 
antecedent to the thought  and judgment  of the un- 
derstanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state 
of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any 
thing of it ; at least it places it in a subject incapable 
of  it, no agent being allowed  capable of  liberty but 
in consequence of thought and judgment.  I am not 
nice about phrases, and therefore consent to say, with 
those that love to speak so,  that liberty is placed  in 
indifferency ;  but it is an indifferency which remains 
after the judgment  of the understanding,  yea,  even 
after the determination  of  the will :  and that is an 
indifferency  not  of  the man (for  after he has once 
judged  which is best, viz.  to do or forbear, he is no 
longer indifferent), but an indifferency of the operative 
powers of the man, which, remaining equally able to 
operate or to forbear operating  after as before  the 
decree of the will, are in a state which, if one pleases, 
may be called indifferency ;  and as far as this indif- 
ferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther :  V. g. 
I have the ability to  move my hand, or to let it rest, 
that operative power is indifferent to move, or not to 
move my hand : I am then in that respect perfectly 
free.  My  will  determines that operative power  to 
rest, I am yet  free,  because the indifferency  of  that 
my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains ; 
the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired 
by  the determination  of  my  will,  which  at present 
orders rest ;  the indifferency of that power to act, or 
not to act, is just  as it was  before, as will appear, if 
the will puts it to the trial, by ordering the contrary. 
But if during the rest of  my hand  it be seized by  a 
sudden palsy, the indiffeiency of that operative power 
is  gone,  and  with it my  liberty; I have no longer 
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freedom in that respect, but am under a necessity of 
letting my hand rest.  On the other side, if my hand 
be put into motion  by a convulsion, the indifferency 
of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion, 
and my liberty in that case is lost :  for I am under a 
necessity  of  having my  hand move.  I have  added 
this to show in what sort of indifferency liberty seems 
to me to consist,  and not in any  other, real or ima- 
ginary. 
$ 72. True notions concerning the nature and ex- 
tent of liberty are of so great importance, that I hope 
I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt 
to explain"it  has led me into.  The idea of will, voli- 
tion, liberty, and necessity,  in this chapter  of power, 
came naturally in my way.  In a  former  edition  of 
this treatise I gave an account of my  thoughts con- 
cerning them, according to the light I then had :  and 
now, as a lover of truth, and not a worshipper of  my 
own  doctrines,  I own  some  change  of  my  opinion, 
which I think I have discovered ground for.  In  what 
I first writ, I with an unbiased indifferency followed 
truth,  whither I thought she ,led me.  But neither 
being so vain  as to fancy  infallibility,  nor so disin- 
genuous  as  to dissemble  my  mistakes  for  fear  of 
blemishing  my  reputation,  I  have,  with  the  same 
sincere  design  for  truth only, not been ashamed  to 
publish what a  severer inquiry has suggested.  It is 
not impossible but that some may think my  former 
notions right,  and some  (as  I have  already found) 
these  latter,  and some  neither.  I  shall  not  at all 
wonder  at this variety  in men's  opinions ;  impartial 
deductions of reason in controverted  points being so 
rare, and exact ones in abstract notions  not so very 
easy,  especially  if  of  any  length.  And  therefore I 
should think myself not a little beholden  to any one, 
who would upon these, or any  other grounds,  fairly 
clear this subject of  liberty from any difficulties that 
may yet remain. 
Before I close this chapter, it may perhaps be to 
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our purpose, and help to give us clearer  conceptions 
about power, if we make our thoughts  take a  little 
more exact survey of action.  I have said above, that 
we have ideas but of two sorts of  action, viz.  motion 
and  thinking.  These,  in  truth,  though called  and 
counted actions, yet, if nearly considered,  will not be 
found to be always perfectly so.  For,  if I mistake 
not,  there  are instances of  both  kinds, which, upon 
due consideration, will be found  rather passions than 
actions, and consequently so far  the effects barely of 
passive powers in those subjects, which yet on their 
accounts are thought agents.  For in these instances, 
the substance that hath motion  or thought receives 
the impression, where it is put into that action purely 
from without,  and so acts merely by the capacity it 
has to receive such an impression from some external 
agent;  and such a  power is not properly an active 
power,  but a  mere  passive  capacity in  the subject. 
Sometimes the  substance  or  agent puts  itself  into 
action by its own  power,  and this is properly  active 
power.  Whatsoever  modification  a  substance  has, 
whereby it produces any effect, that is called action ; 
v. g.  a solid substance by motion operates on or alters 
the sensible ideas of another substance, and therefore 
this modification of motion we call action.  But yet 
this motion in that solid  substance is,  when rightly 
considered, but a passion,  if it received it only from 
some  external  agent.  So that the active power  of 
motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion 
in itself, or in another  substance,  when  at rest.  So 
likewise  in  thinking,  a  power  to receive  ideas  or 
thoughts,  from  the operation  of  any external  sub- 
stance, is called a power of  thinking :  but this is but 
a passive power, or capacity.  But  to be able to bring 
into view ideas out of sight at one's  own choice, and 
to compare which of  them one thinks fit,  this is  an 
active power.  This reflection may be of some use to 
preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions, 
which grammar and the common frame of languages 
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may be apt to lead us into ;  since what is signified by 
verbs that grammarians call  active, does  not  always 
signify action:  v. g. this proposition, I see the moon, 
or  a  star, or I feel the heat of  the sun,  though ex- 
pressed by a verb active, does not  signify any action 
in me,  whereby I operate  on  those  substances ; but 
the reception of the ideas of light, roundness, and heat, 
wherein I am not active, but barely passive, and can- 
not in that position of my eyes or body avoid receiving 
them.  But when I turn my eyes another way, or re- 
move  my body out of  the sunbeams, I am properly 
active ; because of my own choice, by a power within 
myself,  J  put myself  into that motion.  Such an ac- 
tion is the product of active power. 
5 73. And thus I have, in a short draught, given a 
view of  our original ideas, from whence  all the rest 
are derived,  and of  which  they are made up; which 
if I would consider as a philosopher, and examine on 
what causes they depend, and of what they are made, 
I believe they all might be reduced to these very few 
primary and original ones, viz. extension, solidity, mo- 
bility,  or the power  of  being moved,  which  by our 
senses  we  receive  from  body;  perceptivity,  or  the 
power  of  perception  or  thinking;  motivity,  or  the 
power of moving ;  which by reflection we receive from 
our minds.  I crave leave  to make  use  of  these two 
new words, to avoid the danger of  being mistaken in 
the use  of  those  which  are equivocal.  To which if 
we add existence,  duration, number,-which  belong 
both to the one and the other,-we  have, perhaps, all 
the original ideas, on which the rest depend.  For by 
these, I imagine, might be  explained  the nature of 
colours, sounds, tastes, smells, and all other ideas we 
have, if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive 
the severally modified extensions and motions of these 
minute bodies, which produce those several sensations 
in us.  But my present purpose being only to inquire 
into the knowledge the mind has of  things, by those 
ideas and appearances which God has fitted it to re- 
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ceive from them,  and  how the mind comes by  that 
knowledge, rather  than  into their  causes or manner 
of production ; I shall not, contrary to the design of 
this essay,  set myself  to inquire philosophically into 
the peculiar constitution of bodies, and the configura- 
tion of parts, whereby  they have the power  to pro- 
duce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities : I shall 
not enter any farther into that disquisition, it sufficing 
to my purpose to observe, that gold or saffron has a 
power to produce in us the idea of  yellow, and snow 
or milk the idea of white, which we can only have by 
our sight, without examining the texture of the parts 
of those bodies, or the particular figures or motion of 
the particles which rebound from them, to cause in us 
that particular sensation :  though when we go  beyond 
the bare ideas in our minds, and would  inquire into 
their causes, we cannot conceive any thing else to be 
in any sensible object, whereby it produces  different 
ideas in us, but the different bulk, figure, number, tex- 
ture, and motion of its insensible parts. 
CHAPTER XXII, 
Of mixed Modes. 
$ 1. HAVING  treated  of  simple modes  Mixed 
in the foregoing chapters, and given seve-  modes,what- 
ral instances of some of the most considerable of them, 
to show what they are, and how  we  come by them, 
we are now in the next place  to consider  those we 
call mixed  modes:  such are the complex ideas we 
mark by the names obligation, drunkenness, a lie, &c. 
which  consisting  of  several  combinations of  simple 
ideas of different kinds, I have called mixed modes, to 
distinguish them from the more simple modes, which 
consist only of simple ideas of the same kind.  These 
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ideas as are not looked  upon  to be  characteristical 
marks of any real beings that have a steady existence, 
but scattered and independent ideas put together by 
the mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex 
ideas of substances. 
Made by  5 2.  That the mind,  in respect  of  its 
the mind.  simple  ideas,  is  wholly  passive,  and re- 
ceives them all from the existence  and operations of 
things,  such  as  sensation  or  reflection  offers  them, 
without being able to make any one idea, experience 
shows us :  but if we attentively consider these ideas I 
call mixed modes,  we are now speaking of,  we shall 
find  their  original  quite different.  The mind often 
exercises  an active  power  in  making  these  several 
combinations :  for it being once furnished with simple 
ideas, it  can put them together in several composi- 
tions, and so make variety of  complex ideas, without 
examining whether they exist  so together in nature. 
And  hence I think it is  that these  ideas  are called 
notions, as if they had their original and constant ex- 
istence more in the thoughts of men than in the reality 
of things ;  and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the 
mind puts the parts of  them together, and that they 
were consistent in the understanding, without consi- 
dering whether they had any real being :  though I do 
not deny, but several of  them might  be  taken from 
observation, and the existence of several simple ideas 
so combined, as they are put together in the under- 
standing.  For the man who  first framed the idea of 
hypocrisy might have either taken it at first from the 
observation of one, who made  show of good qualities 
which he had not, or else have framed that idea in his 
mind, without  having  any such pattern to fashion it 
by :  for it  is evident, that in the beginning of languages 
and societies of  men, several  of  those complex ideas, 
which were consequent to the constitutions established 
amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of 
men,  before  they  existed  any where  else : and that 
many names  that stood for such complex ideas were 
Ch. 22.  Of  mixed Modes.  295 
in use, and so those ideas framed, before the combina- 
tions they stood for ever existed. 
5 3.  Indeed,  now  that  languages are  Sometimes 
made, and abound  with  words  standing  got by the 
for  such  combinations, an usual  way  of  exp!ic?tion 
of  their  getting these complexideas is by the  ex- 
~lication  of  those terms that stand  for 
ihem: for  consisting  of  a  company of  simple  ideas 
combined,  they  may  by  words,  standing  for  those 
simple  ideas, be  represented to the mind of one who 
understands those words, though that complex  com- 
bination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind 
by the real  existence  of  things.  Thus a  man may 
come to have the idea of sacrilege or murder, by enu- 
merating to him the simple ideas which these words 
stand  for,  without  ever  seeing  either  of  them com- 
mitted. 
5 4.  Every  mixed  mode  consisting  of  The name 
many distinct simple ideas, it seems  rea-  ties the parts 
sonable  to inquire,  "  whence  it has  its  modes  of mixed  into 
unity, and how such  a precise multitude  one idea. 
comes to make  but one idea, since that 
combination does  not  always  exist  together  in na- 
ture ?"  To which I answer, it is plain it has its unity 
from an act of the mind combining those several simple 
ideas together, and considering them as one complex 
one, consisting of those parts ; and fhe mark of  this 
union, or  that which  is looked  on generally to com- 
plete it, is one name given to that combination.  For 
it is by their names that men commonly regulate their 
account of their distinct species of mixed modes, sel- 
dom allowing  or  considering  any number  of  simple 
ideas to make  one  complex one, but such collections 
as there be names for.  Thus, though  the killing of 
an old man be as fit in nature to be united into one 
complex idea as the killing a man's  father ;  yet there 
being no name standing precisely for the  one, as there 
is the name of  parricide  to mark the other, it is not 
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species of  actions from that of killing a young man, 
ir  any other man. 
The cal~se  $ 5.  If we  should inquire a little far- 
of  making  ther, to see what it is that occasions men 
mixed  to make  several  combinations  of  simple 
modes.  ideas into distinct, and, as it were, settled 
modes,  and  neglect others which,  in  the  nature of 
things  themselves,  have  as  much  an  aptness  to be 
combined and make  distinct ideas, we  shall find the 
reason of  it to be the end of  language ; which being 
to mark or  conlmunicate men's  thoughts to one  an- 
other with all the despatch that may be,they usually 
make  such  collections  of ideas into complex modes, 
and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of 
in their way of living and conversation, leaving others, 
which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, 
loose and without names to tie them together ; they 
rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) 
such ideas as make them up, by the particular names 
that stand for  them,  than to trouble their memories 
by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, 
which  they  seldom  or  never  have  any  occasion  to 
make use of. 
Why words  $ 6.  This shows  us  how  it comes  to 
in our Ian-  pass,  that there  are in every  language 
guage have  many particular  words which  cannot  be 
none an-  rendered  by any one  single word  of  an- 
swering in 
another.  other.  For the several fashions, customs, 
and manners of  one nation, making seve- 
ral combinations  of  ideas  familiar  and necessary  in 
one,  which  another people have  had never any occa- 
sion to make, or perhaps so much as taken notice of; 
names  come  of  course  to be  annexed  to them,  to 
avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation, 
and so  they become  so  many distinct complex ideas 
in their minds.  Thus drpaxrrpor  amongst the Greeks, 
andproscriptio amongst the  Romans, were words which 
other languages had no names that exactly answered, 
because they stood for complex ideas, which were not 
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in the minds  of  the men  of  other nations.  Where 
there  was  no  such custom,  there was  no  notion  of 
any such actions ;  no use of such combinations of ideas 
as were united, and as it were tied together by those 
terms :  and therefore in other countries there were no 
names for them. 
$ 7.  Hence also we may see the reason  ~,d  Ian- 
why languages  constantly  change,  take  page$ 
up new  and lay  by  old terms;  because  change. 
change of customs and opinions bringing with it new 
combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently 
to think on, and talk about, new names, to avoid long 
descriptions,  are annexed  to them,  and so they be- 
come new species of complex modes.  What a number 
of  different  ideas are by this means wrapt up in one 
short sound, and how much  of  our time and breath 
is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take 
the pains to enumerate  all the ideas that either re- 
prieve or appeal stand for;  and, instead of  either of 
those names, use a  periphrasis, to make any one un- 
derstand their meaning. 
$ 8.  Though I shal'l have  occasion  to  Mixed 
consider this more at large, when I come  modes, 
to treat of  words  and  their  use,  yet  I  where they 
could not avoid to take thus much notice  exlst. 
here of the names of mixed modes ;  which being fleet- 
ing and transient combinations of simple ideas, which 
have but a short existence any where but in the minds 
of men, and there too have no longer any existence 
than whilst they are thought on, have  not so much 
anywhere the appearance  of  a  constant  and lasting 
existence as in their names : which  are therefore, in 
this sort of ideas, very apt to be  taken for the ideas 
themselves.  For if we should inquire where the idea 
of  a  triumph or  apotheosis  exists, it is evident they 
could neither of  them exist altogether anywhere in 
the things themselves, being actions that required time 
to their performance, and so could never all exist to- 
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of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have 
there tho  a very uncertain  existence;  and therefore 
we are apt to annex  them to the names that excite 
them in us. 
H~~ we gel  $ 9.  There  are  therefore three ways 
the ideas of  whereby  we  get the  complex  ideas  of 
mixed  mixed modes.  1. By experience and ob- 
modes.  servation of things themselves.  Thus by 
seeing two men wrestle or  fence, we get the idea of 
wrestling or fencing.  9.  By invention, or voluntary 
putting together of several simple  ideas in  our own 
minds :  so he that first invented printing or etching, 
had an idea of  it in his  mind before  it ever existed. 
3.  Which is  the most  usual way,  by explaining the 
names of actions we never saw, or notions we cannot 
see;  and by  enumerating,  and thereby,  as it were, 
setting before our imaginations  all those ideas which 
go to the making them up, and are the  constituent 
parts of them.  For having by sensation and reflection 
stored our minds with  simple  ideas, and by use  got 
the names that stand for them, we can by those means 
represent to another any complex idea we would have 
him conceive ;  so that it has in it no simple ideas but 
what he knows, and has with us the same name for. 
For  all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable 
into simple ideas, of which they are compounded and 
originally made up, though perhaps their immediate 
ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex ideas. 
Thus the mixed mode, which the word lie stands for, 
is made of  these simple  ideas : 1. Articulate sounds. 
2.  Certain ideas in the mind of the speaker.  3. Those 
words the signs of  those ideas.  4.  Those signs put 
together  by affirmation or negation,  otherwise than 
the ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. 
I think I need not go any farther in the analysis of 
that complex  idea we  call a lie :  what I have said is 
enough to show, that it is made  up of  simple idem : 
and it could not be but an offensive tediousness to my 
reader, to  trouble him with a more minute enumera- 
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tion of every particular simple idea that goes to this 
complex one ;  which, from what has been said, he can- 
not but be  able  to make  out to himself.  The same 
may be done  in  all  our  complex  ideas whatsoever; 
which, however compounded and decompounded, may 
at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the 
materials of  knowledge or  thought we have, or can 
have.  Nor shall we have reason to  fear that the mind 
is hereby stinted to too scanty a number  of  ideas, if 
we  consider what  an inexhaustible  stock  of  simple 
modes, number and figure alone afford us.  How far 
then mixed modes which  admit of  the various com- 
binations of different simple  ideas, and their infinite 
modes, are from being few and scanty, we may easily 
imagine.  So that before  we have done, we shall see 
that nobody need  be  afraid he shall not have scope 
and compass  enough for  his  thoughts  to range in, 
though they be, as I pretend, confined only to simple 
ideas recei'ved from sensation or reflection,  and their 
several combinations, 
$ 10.  It is worth our observing, which  Motion, 
of  all our  simple  ideas  have  been  most  thinki% 
modified, and had most mixed ideas made  and power, 
out of them, with names given to them ;  have been 
most modi-  and those have been these three;  think-  fied. 
ing and motion  (which  are the two ideas 
which  comprehend  in  them all action)  and  power, 
from whence these actions are conceived to  flow.  The 
simple  ideas, I say, of thinking,  motion,  and power, 
have been those which have  been most modified, and 
out of whose modifications have been made most com- 
plex modes, with names  to them.  For action being 
the great business of  mankind, and the whole matter 
about which all laws are conversant, it is no wonder 
that the several modes of thinking and motion should 
be taken notice of, the ideas of  them observed.  and 
laid up in the memory, and have naines assigned to 
them ;  without which, laws could be but ill made,  or 
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nication be well had amongst men, without such com- 
plex ideas, with names  to them : and therefore men 
have settled names, and supposed settled ideas in their 
minds, of modes of action distinguished by their causes, 
means,  objects,  ends,  instruments,  time,  place,  and 
other circumstances, and  also of  their powers  fitted 
for those actions : v.g.  boldness is the power to speak 
or do what we intend, before  others, without fear or 
disorder ;  and the Greeks call the confidence of speak- 
ing by a peculiar name, zirap{~ura  :  which power or abi- 
lity in man, of doing any thing, when it has been ac- 
quired by frequent doing the same thing, is that idea 
we name habit t  when  it is forward, and ready upon 
every occasion to break  into action, we call it dispo- 
sition.  Thus testiness is a disposition  or aptness to 
be angry. 
To conclude : Let us examine any modes of action, 
v.g. consideration and assent, which are actions of the 
mind;  running and speaking,  which  are actions  of 
the body ;  revenge and murder,  which are actions of 
both together ; and we  shall find  them but so many 
collections of simple ideas, which  together make up 
the complex ones signified by those names. 
Several  9 11. Power  being  the  source  from 
words seem-  whence all action proceeds, the substances 
ing to sig-  wherein these powers are, when they exert 
nif~  this power into act, are called causes ;  and 
signify but 
the efleect,  the substances which  thereupon  are pro- 
duced, or the simple  ideas which  are in- 
troduced into  any  subject  by  the  exerting  of  that 
power, are called  effects.  The efficacy whereby the 
new substance or idea is  produced, is called,  in the 
subject exerting that power, action ; but in the sub- 
ject wherein any simple idea is changed or produced, 
it is called  passion : which efficacy, however various, 
and the effects almost infinite,  yet we  can, I think, 
conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else' 
but  modes  of  thinking  and  willing;  in  corporeal 
agents, nothing else  but modifications of  motion.  I 
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sayt I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but 
these two :  for whatever sort of action, besides these, 
produces any effects, I confess myself to have no no- 
tion  or  idea of; and so it is quite remote from my 
thoughts, apprehensions, and knowledge ;  and as much 
in the dark to me as five other senses, or as the ideas 
of colours to a blind man :  and therefore many words, 
which seem to express some action, signify nothing of 
the  action  or modus operandi  at all,  but barely the 
effect, with some circumstances of the subject wrought 
on,  or  cause  operating;  v. g. creation,  annihilation, 
contain  in  them  no  idea  of  the action  or manner 
whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, 
and the thing done.  And when  a  countryman says 
the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems 
to import some action, iet truly it signifies nothing 
but the effect, viz.  that water that was before fluid is 
become  hard  and consistent, without containing any 
idea of the action whereby it is done. 
$ 12.  I think  1 shall not  need  to re-  Mixed 
mark here, that though power and action  modes made 
make the greatest part of  mixed modes,  also of  other 
marked  by  names,  and  familiar  in  the  ideas. 
minds and mouths of men, yet other simple ideas, and 
their several  combinations,  are not excluded : much 
less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate 
all the mixed  modes,  which have  been  settled, with 
names to them.  That  would be to make a dictionary 
of the greatest part of the words made use of in divi- 
nity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. 
All that is requisite to my present design  is,  to show 
what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, 
how the mind comes by them,  and that they are com- 
positions made up of simple ideas got from sensation 
and reflection;  which I suppose I have done. 
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